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Abstract 
Thesis title: Interference Patterns: Literary Study, Scientific Knowledge, and 
Disciplinary Autonomy After The Two Cultures. 
Author: Jonathan Neil Adams 
This project interrogates the claims made for the possibility of collapsing all the 
various disciplines into one discipline, probably physics, and surely a science, in the 
name of making clearer the relations between our various fields of knowledge. This is 
the aim of the radical reductionist, and I take E. O. Wilson's Consilience as exemplary 
of such attempts. Central to Wilson's method of achieving unity is the new science of 
evolutionary psychology - itself a re-working of the sociobiology with which Wilson 
first achieved notoriety. In the on-going project of explaining culture under a Darwinian 
description, the evolutionary psychologists have begun to suggest explanations for the 
popularity and content of narrative fiction. Because they are consonant with the rest of 
science, these bioiogistic accounts of fiction might be preferable to the accounts 
traditionally offered by Literary Studies. 
Consequently, there is a risk that the traditional practices of Literary Studies will 
be made redundant within the academy and gradually atrophy. The demand is that 
Literary Studies either makes itself rigorous like the sciences (as with such projects as 
Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism), or else forfeit its claims to produce knowledge. 
Aware of this threat, some literary critics embrace forms of relativism in an attempt to 
deny the unity or effectiveness of scientific knowledge and so neuter the threatened 
takeover. Among these forms of relativism, Richard Rorty's account seeks to collapse 
the hierarchy of disciplines and seemingly offers Literary Studies a means of retaining 
its distinctive approach without denying the effectiveness of scientific knowledge. I aim 
to show that Literary Studies need not become a science, and that such sciences as 
evolutionary psychology are neither as threatening as some had feared, nor as useful to 
literary study as some have hoped. 
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Introduction 
Interference Patterns 
There is an anxiety among literary critics that is grounded not in doubts about 
the worth of the novels, poems, and plays that they study, but in the manner in which 
those studies are conducted. This anxiety arises because of the sciences. It is thought to 
be no coincidence that whilst the sciences have enjoyed an unprecedented level of 
demonstrable success in achieving their aims, they have simultaneously conducted their 
studies according to quite different methods to those employed within the humanities. It 
is not the purpose of this work to dispute that success, nor to question the applicability 
of those methods employed by the various scientific disciplines in the pursuit of their 
aims, but rather to address the anxiety of literary critics regarding the epistemological 
status of their work. There is a perception that the type of knowledge scientists possess 
about natural phenomena is superior to the type of knowledge possessed by literary 
critics. This is an insecurity felt across the humanities, and exacerbated by those 
scientists who, emboldened by the achievements of their colleagues, would seek to 
convert all knowledge into scientific knowledge; alleging that the intellectual demands 
of the humanities, and the consequent epistemological value of their productions, are 
grossly inferior to those of the sciences. There is no shortage of voices from within the 
humanities willing to corroborate those claims. This, for example, is the philosopher of 
science Bas Van Fraassen: 
There is a reason why metaphysics sounds so passe, so vieux jeu today; for 
intellectually challenging perplexities and paradoxes it has been far 
surpassed by theoretical science. Do the concepts of the Trinity, the soul. 
haecceity, universals, prime matter, and potentiality baffle you? They pale 
beside the unimaginable otherness of closed space-times, event-horizons, 
EPR correlations, and bootstrap models. (258) 
Those problems which have traditionally exercised the humanities have come to seem 
not only elementary but, what is perhaps worse, artificial and unnecessary. Literary 
study looks weak and easy and, above all, parochial, beside the technologies and 
universal truths of science. 
Consequently, literary critics will either admit defeat and accept a subservient 
role beside science (a sense of inferiority before scientists that Auden compared to 
feeling like "a shabby curate in a drawing-room full of dukes" [The Dyer's Hand 81]), 
or else challenge the claims of scientists to epistemological superiority. This often 
manifests in a defensiveness that seeks not to answer directly the complaints of the 
scientists, but to deny the validity of those complaints. The philosophical positions most 
suitable for supporting such a denial are those which seek to establish a relativism of 
human knowledge with respect to culture. Recognising that their own work is bounded 
by cultural norms, and true only within the culture from which it arises, thinkers within 
the humanities often choose to demand that scientists impose similar constraints upon 
their knowledge claims (constraints which strategically abduct most all of science's 
validity and affect literary study not at all). Largely because such positions are adopted 
solely for defensive purposes, rather than out of any genuine conviction that knowledge 
is indeed limited in this sense, this all too often results in literary critics embracing 
crude forms of cultural relativism that fare poorly under scrutiny - leading to absurd 
positions that attempt to deny the effectiveness of scientific knowledge and its 
technologies, positions all too easily overturned by such simple responses as Richard 
Dawkins's "knock-down" aeroplane argument: "Show me a cultural relativist at thirty 
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thousand feet and I ' l l show you a hypocrite" (River Out of Eden 31-32). Unwilling or 
unable to confront the technical difficulties involved with arguing against scientists on 
their own ground, literary critics often adopt relativistic positions only instrumentally, 
expediently diverting criticisms in order to better continue the real task at hand: the 
analysis of novels, poems, and plays. It is the contention of this study that such a retreat 
is unnecessary, that literary study need not deny the validity of scientific knowledge in 
order to preserve its place in the academy. 
How, then, to defend literary study in anything like its present form without 
ceding to some form of scientisation? Not all literary critics agree that such scientisation 
is entirely undesirable, and following the path of such disciplines as linguistics or 
psychology, there have been attempts to introduce into literary study some of the 
empirical methods and conceptual organisation that characterises scientific thinking. In 
the second half of the twentieth century, both linguistics and psychology have achieved 
(partial) recognition as scientific disciplines, and in the crossover study of 
psycholinguistics, they find a degree of mutual reinforcement for this status.' Both 
adhere to a scientific materialism that seeks to root the phenomena they study in 
evolved biological structures, and although they still possess their unscientific elements 
(for example, the remnants of psychoanalysis in psychology, and pragmatics in 
linguistics), these are not necessarily inconsistent with the sciences, simply less 
theoretically dependent upon them (this is especially true of pragmatics). Crucially, 
what both linguistics and psychology have achieved is a methodological alignment with 
the sciences, and it is this sort of methodological alignment that literary study 
' The inception of psycholinguistics, as a sub-discipline straddling psychology and linguistics, is evidence 
of how the sciences enjoy mutual compatibility - and, consequently, is something which attaches 
scientific validity to both parent disciplines. This mutual reinforcement occurs because compatibility is a 
distinguishing feature of the sciences. The smooth inter-theoretic transitions and reductions allowed 
between chemistry and molecular physics or between biochemistry and biology attest to a shared set of 
criteria of proof that is usually absent from non-scientific subjects. 
conspicuously lacks. The twentieth century saw attempts to forge links with both 
linguistics and psychology, but these coalitions were for the most part unsuccessful: the 
hopes triggered by thinkers like Roman Jakobson for a linguistic base for literary study 
proved short on content and unable to discriminate value, and the influence of Freudian 
theories of interpretation and Jungian theories of origin, whilst popular, ultimately 
proved to be a damaging alliance when these same theories were shed from academic 
psychology precisely because they lacked scientific credibility. 
In the last decade of the twentieth century, however, a new possibility for 
scientific integration arose through evolutionary psychology, a discipline branching 
from psychology and ethology that seeks to understand human behaviour through an 
understanding of the adaptive benefits of a particular behaviour or cognitive trait to 
Stone Age man. Evolutionary psychology takes as its starting point the claim from 
William James that humans have more instincts than the other animals, not less, and the 
claim from Noam Chomsky that the human mind is modular; not a general purpose 
processor, but equipped with task-specific (and genetically inherited) mechanisms. As 
part of their ongoing project to comprehensively understand and explain human 
behaviour through Darwinian theory, evolutionary psychologists began to turn their 
attention to art and literature, which, as species-typical behaviours, must be accounted 
for. (The conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology and its interest in literature 
are explored in the second chapter.)^ 
^ It is worth noting at this stage that James and Chomsky are the intellectual fathers of many of the ideas 
discussed in this work: both the evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides and their 
opposite part, the philosopher Richard Rorty, acknowledge a filial debt to James; and Chomsky is the 
figure who brings linguistics into the domain of the sciences. In his argument for the modularity of mind, 
it is not an overstatement to say that Chomsky makes possible evolutionary psychology, and he creates 
the conceptual link that allows the linguist Steven Pinker to legitimately write books about evolutionary 
psychology and, as he puts it. How the Mind Works. 
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Although it is not the explicit intention of evolutionary psychology to subsume 
literary study, the threat of elimination is very real. What evolutionary psychology 
apparently offers is a means of drawing literary study into the sciences, legitimising it in 
the same way that linguistics and psychology have become legitimate. What this 
threatens is to render obsolete the current practices. Couple this with the imperialistic 
claims of those reductionists who would see all explanations given in scientifically 
digestible terms, and it becomes clear that modest calls for "conceptual integration" 
translate to calls for the excision of literary study from the academy. So there is some 
hesitation among literary critics to accept the evolutionary account of literature. 
Whilst there are relativistic positions of considerable sophistication, resisting the 
explanatory power of evolutionary thinking need not involve the denial of evolutionary 
theory. The core argument against the adoption of an exclusively evolutionary view is 
put succinctly by Hilary Putnam: "What is wrong with evolutionary epistemology is not 
that the scientific facts are wrong, but that they don't answer the philosophical 
questions" ("Why Reason Can't be Naturalized" 226). Putnam's arguments (explored in 
the first chapter, and reintroduced in the third, through Richard Rorty) trade on defining 
"explanation" in terms of answering the questions asked. It is a contention of this study 
that a discipline is defined not by its subject matter but by the questions it answers 
regarding that subject matter (and this is discussed in the sixth chapter, with reference to 
Stanley Fish's arguments about disciplinary identity). That said, evolutionary 
psychology has its adherents even among the literary critics: Joseph Carroll was quick 
to adopt wholeheartedly the idea that literary study could profit from a closer 
relationship with the sciences. Under scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that 
Carroll's argument for the relevance of evolutionary theory to literary study has as 
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much to do with what an evolutionary psychological perspective would exclude as what 
it would facilitate (and this is discussed in the second and sixth chapters). 
So the relationship between literary study and the sciences is more muddled than 
the idea of mutual-incomprehension-tending-toward-hostility that Charles Percy Snow 
first detected in 1959. In 1964, the same year that Snow published the second edition of 
his "Two Cultures" lectures, physicist Richaid Feynman was still able to claim that, in 
the West, "we respect the arts more than the sciences" (The Character of Physical Law 
13). In spite of the persistent feeling among scientists that this situation still obtains,^ 
the position is increasingly implausible. Seen from outside of the universities, literary 
study has come to seem one of the weaker academic disciplines. Unlike science, it is 
without technologies and sharply limited in its scope. By contrast, the public appetite 
for science, sustained by popularisations and regularly (and sensationally) reported in 
news stories, is huge.'* Because it has such wide application, science assumes and 
maintains a relevance and a cultural importance that literary study cannot hope to 
challenge. Our immersion in and dependence upon its technologies is able 
demonstration of the success of the sciences over the past two or three hundred years. 
Even without the prodding of imperialists like E. O. Wilson, that success alone is apt to 
make the unscientific disciplines feel somewhat inadequate. 
With no technologies or practical applications beyond unwanted and 
increasingly perverse interpretations of texts, literary study remains bound up with the 
universities, unable to be more than an academic exercise. Meanwhile, "scientific" has 
become a synonym for precision in much the same way as "academic" has become a 
^ See, for example, Steven Pinker in How the Mind Works (522-23). 
* There is no "Popular Lit-crit." There is, of course, popular fiction, but it is criticism and not fiction that 
is usually taught in the universities. That is to say, popular science is a less scholarly version of science as 
it is taught in the universities, but there is no popularised equivalent of literary studies as it taught in the 
universities. 
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synonym for unnecessary, joining "sophistry" as a pejorative tag for learned debate. 
Technological application is what stops the work of scientists being merely academic. 
When it matters, we turn to science to maintain our health, as in medicine, or settle 
disputes, as in the law courts. (That the relations between science and technology are 
more complex than this sketch suggests is something discussed in the fifth chapter.) 
So literary study sits uncomfortably in the modem academy. Its failure to adopt 
a research programme and methodology consonant with the sciences is seen by some 
scientists as a stubborn and wilful rejection of what has been an indisputably successful 
approach to their own subject of study. I aim to show that methods applicable to one 
discipline are often not applicable to another, and that it is not stubbornness, but 
necessity, that has left literary study floating outside the sciences. Integration cuts off 
too much of what we want to say - it is not that you cannot talk about books 
scientifically, just that the type of answers that science can offer us about fiction are 
inapplicable to the questions we had been asking. Of course, this is not to say literary 
study is not also stubborn and backward looking, and there are many ways in which the 
sciences and the arts can be interesting to one another, but these should not demand the 
collapse of existing practices in the weaker discipline. In terms of disciplinary 
autonomy, that is what is meant by imperialism, and what looks like interdisciplinarity 
is very often this sort of negative interference; a cancelling out of methods. 
Interference Patterns, the title of this study, refers to just such disturbance. The 
two cultures do not exist entirely harmoniously, but nor has one simply brushed the 
other aside. The relations and interactions between literary study and the sciences are 
complex. Interference Patterns is a reference to Thomas Young's famous two-slit 
experiment (first conducted in the early nineteenth century) which physicists use to 
demonstrate that light travels in waves. The experiment involves two boards, the first 
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with one slit, the second with two, and a third surface at a sufficient distance behind 
that. A light source is shone at the first board. It passes through the single slit, and a 
narrower beam of light is cast onto the two slits of the second board. Whilst it might 
have been expected that the light subsequently cast from these two slits would simply 
project two discrete beams onto the wall beyond. Young discovered that the actual 
result was a complex pattern of dark and light bands, like a barcode. These patterns are 
caused by what is called constructive and destructive inference. So my use of the title is 
intended to suggest that a similar interference occurs between the sciences and the 
humanities. The interference is both complex and unexpected. 
Given that the main subject of this study is science and literature, a conspicuous 
omission here is fiction, which, although discussed indirectly throughout, is treated of 
directly only in the latter part of the final chapter, with reference to Kurt Vonnegut's 
Slaughterhouse-Five and two novels by Martin Amis: Time's Arrow and The 
Information. Even then, it is not the fiction of Vonnegut and Amis that is being 
discussed so much as the philosophical and theoretical content of their work, and their 
perspective upon the issue under discussion (namely, how science offers new ways of 
thinking about time and mankind's place in the universe). That the ideas appeared in 
works of fiction becomes incidental (and in Amis's case, those ideas had already been 
touched upon in his literary criticism before they were discussed by characters in his 
novel). Much has already been written upon the interactions between science and 
literature - how authors have been scientifically alert, how they have been influenced by 
the science of their day, even the extent to which science borrows ideas from literature. 
The majority of literature and science criticism takes as its foundation the shared ground 
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of language, and very often concentrates on the use of metaphor.^ The metaphor-based 
approach is avoided here for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the particular 
interests of this study. Second, I am unsure of the effectiveness of the metaphor 
approach. 
Talking about the exchange of metaphors between science and literature is 
complicated. One of the reasons it is complicated is that what literary critics call a 
metaphor is often nothing of the sort for a scienfist. New language spills out from the 
sciences (novelist Don DeLillo calls science "a source of new names" [interview with 
LeClair 84]) and as it seems that you need an (at least putative) object or phenomenon 
before you can have a noun, it is obvious why: science catalogues the world. It gives us 
names for physical entities and processes that can subsequently be used 
metaphorically.^ Poets are not a source of new names; their particular skill has always 
been importing words metaphorically. It is the scientists who offer the neologisms. 
When a certain scientist says, "the mind is a machine," that is not a metaphor. He is 
trying to explain to us that he really thinks that the mind should be understood as 
machines like typewriters and steam engines and computers are understood (in terms of 
the causal relations that hold between components, and so on). He will argue that it is a 
very complex machine, but that this does not mean it is not a machine. 
Whilst much interesting work has been written about the cross-pollination of 
metaphor between science and literature, there is a tendency among literary critics 
taking this approach to overstate the metaphorical content of scientific writing, to 
' For example, N. Katherine Hayle's The Cosmic Web. Daniel Cordle's Postmodern Postures, and Gillian 
Beer's Open Fields, discussed below. 
^ We need only think of how emotions are described; of how adjectives for emotion are usually drawn 
from some physical process or event. An angry man is simmering (or even seething - a word almost 
entirely used for emotional states now, but originally used to describe a state of boiling, which is another 
emotion word). It is difficult to think of emotions being used to name something physical - excepting, of 
course, the poetic device of pathetic fallacy, which is anyhow usually a projection of emotion onto the 
environment, and therefore designed to draw attention to the poet or character's emotion, not serve as a 
description of his or her environment. 
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assume that everything that might be metaphorical probably is. By looking for 
metaphorical language within a scientific text, the critic has found a means of treating 
scientific writing as i f it were literary writing. In other words, the critic is able to draw 
scientific writing into the rhetorical domain, effectively removing it from the 
jurisdiction of the science. Literary critics are trained to detect and account for 
metaphorical language, but they are also conditioned to expect metaphorical language. 
This, in turn, leads to an over-sensitivity to the presence of language which might have 
been legitimately read as figurative had it occurred in a literary text. It is not, of course, 
either impossible or invalid to read a scientific text as if it were a literary text, but to do 
so is to deliberately ignore all but the aesthetic features, and it is surely invalid to infer 
from this possibiUty that the scientific text is therefore of the same epistemological 
status as a literary text. A technical illustration (such as a map or a zoological plate) 
may possess aesthetic merit, but it is an error to assume that an appreciation of its 
aesthetic qualities is sufficient to exhaust its purpose (that is, a map is not only an 
abstract composition; with the addition of a key, it is also a map). By apparently failing 
to recognise this distinction, such approaches often miss something important about the 
limitations of the literary approach to scientific writing. The following extract from 
Gillian Beer underlines my concerns here: 
The excitement generated among non-scientists by chaos theory is an 
instance: chaos theory calls attention to observed but excluded irregularity, 
asymmetry and flux. That it has developed alongside deconstruction, with 
its refusal of parameters of interpretation, its obdurate relativism, is as 
intriguing as is the rediscovery of plate-tectonics at the height of the 
fashion for Derridean epistemology, with its emphasis on un-grounding. 
Are such analogies just a play of words? I do not believe so. (194) 
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Her answer to that last question is where we should begin to stop listening. What Beer is 
doing is bringing the type of interpretative skills quite valid within her own discipline of 
literary study and treating scientific work as if it could be evaluated or even sensibly 
discussed in such terms. "Un-grounding" means quite different things in each case. 
Tectonic plate movement is not a metaphor. Geophysicists call the sections of crust 
"plates" because they are flat sheets (dinner plates being, of course, only an instance of 
this broader definition of a plate). The movement is because the plates move. This is not 
a metaphor. There is no language play here. There are plates, albeit big ones, and they 
are moving around, albeit only very slowly and very slightly. These are matters of 
empirical fact. Why, then, do we have Gillian Beer pondering the metaphorical content 
of plate tectonics? In a sense, she is looking at the map without the key. Even if the 
revival of plate-tectonics had been brought about by a geophysicist reading Derrida, the 
influence of Derrida's thinking upon plate-tectonics insofar as that is a science would 
have been nil.^ There is no causality between these two events; the only link is 
linguistic. I f you only perform a literary-critical or linguistic reading then it starts to 
look as if there might be something in it because these readings recognise an intriguing 
verbal echo, but that is not substantive - it is true insofar as the echo exists, but it says 
nothing about the validity of either theory in light of the coincidence of terms (and 
would in any case probably not be true in other languages). 
Another anxiety with analysing fiction through literature-science criticism 
involves the risk of layering scientific ideas over artworks that can be adequately 
explained without reference to those ideas. This type of overdetermination leaves its 
culprits looking too eager to have scientific ideas meaningfully active within literary 
^ What Beer is tacitly doing is assuming that proponents of the sociology of scientific knowledge have 
been successful in their strategic erosion of the barrier between discovery and justification. These are to 
some extent internal standards of proof, but that is no reason to see them as invalid. 
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texts or paintings in order to allow their favoured authors or artists to share in the 
prestige of science, and creates an intellectual climate where consonance with scientific 
ideas scores an aesthetic point for the artist - as John Limon has it: "One finds oneself 
at slide shows aching with good intentions to see special relativity in the Demoiselles 
d'Avignon" (11). This is both needless and, insofar as it implicitly acknowledges a 
superior status for scientific ideas, pernicious. 
Limon's comment reminds us that the metaphor approach has been particularly 
popular with scholars interested in exploring the similarities between modernist art and 
what was often called "the new science" - quantum mechanics and relativity. The 
appeal here is understandable: in the early decades of the twentieth century, both art and 
science made radical breaks from their histories. Rumours emerged from within the 
sciences that suggested the world was far stranger than Newton had expected; there was 
talk of the observer affecting the observed, of human consciousness being inseparably 
enmeshed with the process of measurement, and most tantalising of all, the German 
physicist Werner Heisenberg had spoken of "uncertainty." The word suggested that the 
Laplacean complacency of the physical sciences was unfounded, that the universe was 
unpredictable at every level. The so-called Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum 
physics (endorsed by Niels Bohr and resisted by Einstein) seemingly placed categorical 
limits on the knowable, introducing randomness as a feature of reality. Self-
destructively, the scientists themselves seemed to have proved that the omniscience and 
precision of physics was only a fa9ade, behind which their work was as subjective as 
the arts. At more or less the same time as Einstein was publishing his Special Theory, 
Picasso had parted ways with the realist tradition; all appearances were unstable, 
representational depiction was just another convention, no closer to how things were 
than his own dislocated images, where surfaces were relative to the viewer and not one 
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another. In fact, in light of the new science, Picasso's paintings themselves came to 
seem more accurate accounts of reality than the outmoded photorealism of Vermeer - as 
e. e. cummings (who had consciously tried to do to poetry what the cubists had done to 
painting) had it, "you hew form truly" ("Picasso" 195). But the disruption of realism in 
the arts was a very different thing to the disruption of reality implied by the new 
physics. The hoped-for affinities between "uncertainty" in science and uncertainty in 
painting, music, and literature are as shallow and as incidental as the link between 
Derridean epistemological ungrounding and the revival of plate tectonics. 
Whilst there is a good case for the influence of imaginative popularisations of 
science having an effect upon the way writers, musicians, and painters create their art, 
the case for a central cultural ferment or Zeitgeist from which both emerge is less 
strong. Some of the confusion can be traced back to the use of "uncertainty" - a word 
often preferably translated as "indeterminacy" or even "undecidability." (Michael Frayn 
- having employed uncertainty as the controlling metaphor for his play about 
Heisenberg and Bohr, Copenhagen - includes an interesting discussion of this confusion 
in an essay published as the postscript to the revised edition [95-132].) The Uncertainty 
Principle - much like the also ever-popular Incompleteness Theorem of Kurt Godel -
attracts thinkers from the humanities who fail to realise that these are specialist terms 
with strictly limited application (in crude terms, Heisenberg's principle is about the 
measurement of position and velocity of particles, and Godel's theorem is a 
mathematical version of the Epimenidean liar-paradox for formal systems in set theory). 
As with "Chaos," or "The Selfish Gene," the tag is attractive for all the wrong reasons 
(although as these are the same reasons deliberately exploited by the popularisers to 
attract attention there is an extent to which non-scientists are forgivably misled). 
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Whilst my title is taken from physics, in discussing the relations between literary 
study and science, I concentrate almost exclusively upon the biological sciences. This is 
in part for the reasons given above regarding the vacuity of much that is said within art 
criticism regarding the parallels between uncertainty in quantum physics and 
uncertainty in the interpretation of texts, but also because writing in any meaningful 
way about quantum physics would require a level of learning that I suspect would have 
been prohibitively time-consuming, not to mention beyond my capacities as a 
mathematician. The biological sciences are less committed to and dependent upon 
mathematics. Nor does an upheaval within atomic physics necessarily impact upon the 
truth of biological statements: Linnaean taxa and Darwinian evolution are, as it were, 
functional accounts, and their truth or falsity remains unaffected by the shift from a 
Newtonian to an Einsteinian universe (to the extent they are functional descriptions, 
they can be said to supervene upon the physical structures in which they are 
instantiated). Furthermore, the biological sciences - through evolutionary theory and to 
some extent neurobiology - seek to explain human behaviour directly, as behaviour; 
whereas the sense in which physics might be said to explain human behaviour is an 
incidental consequence of humans being made of atoms. Chief among those biologies of 
behaviour are evolutionary psychology and cognitive science - but although both have 
been influential upon literature-science criticism,^ my attention is asymmetric: 
evolutionary psychology is referenced throughout this study, and looked at in some 
detail in the third chapter, whilst cognitive science is almost wholly excluded. This is 
* Cognitive science has inspired, for example, Joseph Tabbi's Cognitive Fictions (Electronic Meditations. 
8. MinneapoUs: U of Minesota P, 2002), and Mark Turner's Reading Minds: The Study of English in the 
Age of Cognitive Science (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991). It's interesting to note that cognitive science, 
emerging in the late twentieth century, attracts more critics interested in contemporary fiction; whereas 
those critics interested in evolutionary theory, which emerged in the nineteenth century, tend to 
concentrate on nineteenth-century fiction. This correlation occurs because such critics are often involved 
with trying to demonstrate an awareness of contemporary science in authors, and to suggest an active 
dialogue between science and literature. 
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largely for reasons of space, but also to try to introduce some focus to an increasingly 
generalist project. Most of the conclusions about evolutionary psychology can also be 
applied to cognitive science. 
On a related note, and as something of a disclaimer, interdisciplinarity also 
opens problems for communication that revolve around a discipline's characteristic 
(and, some will argue, constitutive) vocabulary: its particular approach to its subject 
matter, the questions it seeks to answer, and the (often technical, discipline-specific) 
language in which it offers those answers. Since so much of this study is devoted to the 
problems of interdisciplinary exchanges created by the specificity of disciplinary 
vocabularies, it is an issue of some considerable importance here. 
A crucial problem for the dissemination of scientific knowledge to non-
specialists is effecting a suitable compromise between the preservation of the distinctive 
vocabulary of the science under discussion and the requirement that this material be 
accessible to an untrained readership - that is, the extent to which the translation of that 
vocabulary involves a dilution of the concepts being discussed. This is, of course, the 
central problem confronted by popularisers of science (discussed at length in chapter 
five). But whilst the sincere populariser will aim to minimise (as much as is possible) 
the deleterious effects of what Aldous Huxley called the necessary evil of abbreviation 
(foreword to Brave New World Revisited, n.p.), there is also a risk that this potential for 
confusion can be more cynically exploited by those seeking to avoid the direct questions 
of specialist interrogation. Mary Midgely calls this tactic "Chinese Metaphysics": the 
idea being that we talk metaphysics to the Chinese, and Chinese to the metaphysicians, 
so leaving both of the parties addressed unsure as to whether they have the relevant 
authority to question the point being made. "Real interdisciplinary work," Midgely 
contends, "includes some of the hardest thinking in the trade, though the substitute 
activity that sometimes passes under its name includes some of the easiest" (20). 
Although this study is (at least nominally) addressed to Uterary critics, in order 
to make my arguments, I have drawn upon the work of philosophers and scientists 
whose specialist vocabularies and deployment of terms (such as "begging the question" 
and "fitness") are often at odds with their usage outside of those disciplines. In so doing, 
I have sought as much as possible to avoid falling into Chinese metaphysics. 
Consequently, there are sections here that explain at some length such topics as 
evolutionary theory and neo-pragmatist philosophy, which, whilst crucial to my 
arguments, may be unfamiliar to those trained exclusively in literary study. The issue of 
audience is a central problem for any interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary work, and 
the absence of a common language still the major obstacle standing between the two 
cultures (indeed, there have been plausible claims made to the effect that such a 
common language is impossible - something discussed in the fif th chapter). The tension 
here is between the demands of specialism and the necessity of generalism. The anxiety 
here is falling into a trap highlighted by the American novelist David Foster Wallace. 
Reviewing two fictionalised accounts of mathematical discoveries, Wallace found what 
he considered to be a "paradoxical-looking problem": "the type of audience most likely 
to appreciate the novels' lofty ... view of pure math is also the audience most apt to be 
disappointed by the ... vague ... or inconsistent ways the novels handle the actual 
mathematics they're concerned with" (2266). In other words, by trying to include fairly 
complex material in what is marketed as a popular novel, the author creates a work 
which is at once too technical and not technical enough - a situation, as Wallace puts it, 
where "necessary conditions for liking the novel are also sufficient conditions for 
disliking it" (2266). The lengthy explanations in this study, when they occur, are 
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intended only to make clear the foundations of the positions of their proponents or to 
offer some context to the points discussed, and are obviously not intended as substite for 
scientific training. 
Related to this, there is a further problem intrinsic to this work, and that is that I 
am a non-scientist proposing to discuss in non-trivial terms certain scientific ideas, 
whilst running a parallel argument to the effect that only scientists can pronounce upon 
scientific ideas in a meaningful fashion. (This is discussed in the f if th chapter.) 
Consequently, I apparently leave myself vulnerable to the charge that any sections 
seeking to discredit particular claims of scientists involve an error of logic: either my 
argument about the insularity of specialist vocabularies is false, or else my critiques of 
scientific ideas are meaningless. Hence I appear to be a victim of my own arguments. 
Obviously, I do not think that this is the case. Pre-empting what will be discussed at 
more length in the fifth chapter, my arguments about the accessibility of scientific ideas 
to the non-specialist are intended to challenge directly the inconsistency at the heart of 
the twin claims made by hostile advocates of science that scientific ignorance is 
unforgivable (there are, after all, plenty of popular accounts) and that scientific 
knowledge is difficult to acquire (and that popular science cannot teach real scientific 
knowledge). With the majority of scientific information rendered inaccessible to the 
non-specialist, knowledge of scientific ideas comes largely from popular accounts. It is 
a condition of my case here that i f my knowledge of the science is inadequate and any 
critiques of scientific ideas are invalid on account of my distance from the specialism, 
then my arguments about the invalidity of the criticisms regarding the scientific 
ignorance of literary scholars made by advocates of science still hold. To be criticised 
by scientists for ignorance is for them to implicitly concede the educational redundancy 
of popular science, and to reveal the accusation of "you haven't tried to learn about 
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scientific ideas" to be the far sharper accusation of "you are not a scientist." That is, it 
turns an argument about epistemological superiority into a territorial issue, which is 
irresolvable beyond the ablation of literary study from the academy. 
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Scientism and the Unity of Knowledge 
C. P. Snow's "Two Cultures" lecture drew the borders clearly: "Literary 
intellectuals at one pole - at the other scientists, and as the most representative, the 
physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension - sometimes 
(particulariy among the young), hostility and dislike" (4). The thrust of the argument 
was a call to unity, to knit together a separation that Snow saw as "sheer loss to us all" 
(11). To those optimistic about the possibilities of cultural synthesis, Snow's was a 
welcome contribution to a history of such attempts that stretched back through the 
ideals of the Enlightenment to Francis Bacon and before, and finds voice today in the 
likes of E. O. Wilson, whose 1998 book. Consilience, marked another step in an on-
going project to understand human behaviour through an understanding of human 
evolutionary biology. Wilson began his scientific career as an entomologist, and secured 
his professional reputation through his work with ants; organisms with a tightly 
regimented society and very little intelligence. It was, however, 1975's Sociobiology 
that made his name outside of the scientific community. Because it makes little sense to 
talk of the cultural transmission of social structure in ants, the explanation for the 
manifest complexity of their societies must come from innate biological mechanisms. 
Entomologists therefore assume that any ant-behaviours they observe are pre-
programmed, mechanical performances. The central premise of Sociobiology - the book 
and the science that it spawned - consisted in the transferral of that perspective to the 
animal kingdom as a whole. A simplistic way to describe Wilson's work is that he sees 
all animal behaviour in the way he saw ant behaviour. Each section of Sociobiology 
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examined behaviour (in terms of evolutionary biology) in the societies of progressively 
more complex animals. The last chapter focused on human society, and this caused a 
good deal of controversy because, with barely a pause, Wilson had begun talking about 
humans with the same vocabulary he had been using to talk about animals just a few 
pages before. The evolutionary perspective of sociobiology put humans back among the 
animals; it implied that anthropology was just another ethology. So, having united the 
animal kingdom with Sociobiology, Consilience is Wilson's attempt to unite the 
disciplines, by urging, once again, that we can use the same tools. 
That the goal (and subtitle) of Consilience, "the unity of knowledge," is a 
worthwhile end is held to be axiomatic: all true beliefs will cohere, and the "sheer loss" 
of polarisation can be turned to intellectual profit. So Snow bemoaned "our fanatical 
belief in educational specialisation" (17) as a block to "the clashing point of two 
subjects," which "ought to produce creative chances" (16). Similarly, Wilson complains 
that: 
It is the custom of scholars when addressing behaviour and culture to 
speak variously of anthropological explanations, psychological 
explanations, biological explanations, and other explanations appropriate 
to the perspectives of individual disciplines. (Consilience 297) 
But there is a loss in unity, too, for unity also implies homogenisation; less a true 
synthesis and more an incorporation of one worldview into the parameters of what will 
become the dominant other. Wilson is quite clear on what the dominant other will be: " I 
have argued that there is intrinsically only one class of explanation. It traverses the 
scales of space, time, and complexity to unite the disparate facts of the disciplines by 
consilience, the perception of a seamless web of cause and effect" (297), and more 
explicitly: 
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The central idea of the consilience world view is that all tangible 
phenomena, from the birth of stars to workings of social institutions, are 
based on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long 
and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics. (297) 
Wilson's decision to ground his reductionism in physics is a deliberate return to the 
principles of logical positivism and the Vienna Circle. Like the logical positivists, 
Wilson's thinking is that every complex system is explicable in terms of the simpler 
rules governing the component parts of that system. For the positivists, this was a 
method by which to demonstrate the unity of the sciences; the thinking being that in this 
manner, all the various disciplines can be collapsed back into or analysed in terms of 
causally more basic physical laws and thereby shown to be unified in this respect (and, 
accordingly, dependent upon the physical sciences). The issue of reductionism has also 
featured in debates within the philosophy of mind, where mental properties - what 
Descartes called res cogitans - are explained in terms of the physical properties of the 
brain. No longer need we posit two kinds of things, mind and matter, because all that 
needs to be explained can be explained by matter alone. As materialism (or physicalism) 
has become orthodoxy, resistance to a reduction of this kind leads to accusations of 
what Kathleen Lennon has called "closet Cartesianism" ("Reduction, Causality, and 
Normativity" Lennon and Charles 225). To some extent, Wilson trades on the same 
threat: either everything is made of matter and thus explicable in terms of that matter, or 
else you are trying to insert into the explanation something other than matter -
something like the soul, or the spirit, or the res cogitans of Descartes. "Belief in the 
intrinsic unity of knowledge," Wilson writes, "rides ultimately on the hypothesis that 
every mental process has a physical grounding and is consistent with the natural 
sciences" (Consilience 105). The way Wilson presents it is as a choice between 
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accepting both materialism and consilience, or else rejecting consilience and accepting 
some form of dualism. It is as if Wilson is using dualism to bully us into agreeing with 
him. 
The motivation for such reductionism is usually parsimony or conservation of 
information. Demonstrating that different phenomena can be explained by reference to 
the same causes stems the ontological spread. This is how Paul Oppenheim and Hilary 
Putnam explain the appeal, in their 1958 paper, "Unity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis": "the meta-scientific study of major aspects of science, is the natural means 
for counterbalancing specialization by promoting the integration of scientific 
knowledge" (3). The threat from specialisation is incommunicability, where without 
some sort of organising principle, the various specialisms would collectively amount to 
what biologist Erwin Chargaff called the "Tower of Babble." Chargaff s fear is that the 
sheer volume of data necessary to participate in any one scientific specialism would 
preclude meaningful exchanges between those specialisms, and individual scientists 
would increasingly find they were unable to "know more than an ever smaller portion of 
what they must know in order to function properly" ("Building the Tower of Babble" 
777). The fear is echoed by Joshua Lederberg, when he complains that "[bjiology is 
already so fact laden that it is in danger of being bogged down awaiting advances in 
logic and linguistics to ease the integration of the particulars" (Foreword vii). It seems 
that, in every sense, the end of science is data. Snow was also wary of the multiplicity 
of sub-disciplines and feared this fragmentation, believing that the educational system 
in the United Kingdom encouraged specialisation too early, and saw this as a wedge 
keeping the two cultures apart. So the positive dimension of Wilson's Consilience is the 
drawing-up of a method by which specialists might find a common language, so as to 
ease the difficulty of communication and in so doing to bridge the divisions between the 
various disciplines. 
Wilson's approach for achieving this is modelled on Oppenheim and Putnam's. 
They proposed a six-tier hierarchy of "natural" reductive levels, where each thing of 
each level (except of course the lowest) is composed solely of things from the level 
immediately below it, and so "[i]n this sense each level will be as it were a 'common 
denominator' for the level immediately above it" (9). The six levels they list are (from 
the top): Social Groups, (multicellular) Living Things, Cells, Molecules, Atoms, and 
finally the Elementary Particles^. So, cell biology can be explained in terms of 
molecular biology, and molecular biology in terms of organic chemistry, chemistry to 
molecular and then atomic physics and atomic physics by reference to the elementary 
particles. These incremental, "cumulative micro-reductions" as Oppenheim and Putnam 
call them, are seductively simple, and no less so when they scale up rather than down: 
from cell biology to zoology to evolutionary biology to behavioural science or perhaps 
to neuroscience, to psychology and to sociology - each step shading into the next. As 
should be apparent, the so-called bottom-up approach is divergent, aiming for a specific 
discipline (here, sociology via behavioural science or psychology). This differs from the 
top-down approach, which always converges on physics. Scaling up, and subsuming 
disciplines as you go, dependency on the physical laws becomes less obvious. Without a 
fairly painstaking series of reductions, it's hard to see how sociology can be explained 
' The bottom end of this list possibly blurs into energy, granting the physicists' their concerns about all 
matter being interaction, and going by the consequences of E=mc^ (which is to say, you can talk of matter 
in terms of energy, and that mass is a form of energy). This is apparently discounted by Oppenheim and 
Putnam, unless they intend to use "elementary particles" to refer to whatever is the elemental base, be that 
quarks and muons or something even more ephemeral. On a similar theme, it might be argued that talk of 
"elementary particles" and "fundamental laws" is somewhat question begging (in the philosophers' sense 
of the term) - although, again, this is not applicable if "elementary particles" is being used to refer to 
whatever turns out to ground matter. At the top end of the scale, we might want to insert "perception" 
above "social groups," although this is perhaps a meta-category, if that is not too coy, a category-creating 
category. 
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in mathematico-physical terms. This is one reason why the extension of the (relatively 
uncontroversial) unity of science to include a reductive account of sociology, 
psychology, or the humanities is often resisted. Wilson's belief is that this is just a 
temporary obstacle, a symptom of working with an incomplete scientific ontology. 
Sixty years before, in their International Encyclopaedia of Unified Sciences, the 
positivists of the Vienna Circle had expressed similar hopes: Rudolf Camap assuring 
followers that although "it is obvious that, at the present time [1937], laws of 
psychology and social science cannot be derived from those of biology and physics ... 
no scientific reason is known for the assumption that such a derivation should be in 
principle and forever impossible" (qtd. in Hanfling 128). And Oppenheim and Putnam 
agree: 
It is not absurd to suppose that psychological laws may eventually be 
explained in terms of the behaviour of individual neurons in the brain; that 
the behaviour of individual cells - including neurons - may eventually be 
explained in terms of their biological constitution; and that the behaviour 
of molecules - including the macro-molecules that make up living cells -
may eventually be explained in terms of atomic physics. If this is achieved, 
then psychological laws will have, in principle, been reduced to the laws of 
atomic physics. (7) 
However, they are quick to stress the limits of such an approach, adding that "it would 
nevertheless be hopelessly impractical to try and derive the behaviour of a single human 
being directly from his constitution in terms of elementary particles" (7). Like Camap, 
Wilson admits that the type of unification he is aiming for is not yet possible: 
The belief in the possibility of consilience beyond science and across the 
great branches of learning [the sciences and the arts] is not yet science. It is 
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a metaphysical world view... . It cannot be proved with logic from first 
principles or grounded in any definitive set of empirical tests, at least not 
by any yet conceived. (Consilience 7) 
But unlike Oppenheim and Putnam, he doesn't seem to think the effort "hopelessly 
impractical." Wilson believes that scientific unity is as good as achieved and is 
confident that the linkage of the humanities and the sciences (what he calls "the greatest 
enterprise of the mind" [Consilience 6]) will be possible in time. But his phrasing here 
is telling, clearly giving preference to the scientific over the metaphysical and implying 
that consilience, while not yet a science, eventually will be. That is to say, whilst only a 
belief or a hope, consilience is philosophy, but completed, a science, and all the better 
for it. Moves such as this make real the uneasy feelings many hold about the power and 
influence of science. Whilst reconciliation will always entail some form of compromise, 
what is being proposed here is closer to a rewriting than an edit, a subsumption of the 
humanities into the sciences. The fuzzy-thinking and lack of methodological rigour seen 
in the humanities can be brought into line with the empirical clarity enjoyed by science 
- which, of course, loses nothing in the bargain. The advantages for Wilson are clear: 
what Snow called the "sheer loss" of polarisation is no longer a loss to us all. 
This is liable to engender a certain unease with the project of consilience, and 
Wilson does little to allay the concerns of those who might question the desirability of 
such a unity when he reveals his view of philosophy as a filler for everything science 
hasn't managed to achieve yet. We are encouraged to view philosophy as a temporary 
measure, a sort of heuristic scaffolding to be done away with as soon as possible. 
"Philosophy," he writes, "the contemplation of the unknown, is a shrinking dominion. 
We have the common goal of turning as much philosophy as possible into science" 
(Consilience 10). It is unclear whether the inclusive pronoun refers to all humanity or 
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just the scientists. It is difficult to believe that many philosophers (except maybe the 
later Wittgenstein) would be interested in achieving a unity of knowledge if that unity 
rendered philosophy obsolete. The implication seems to be that i f a field of study can be 
reduced to underlying scientific principles then that study becomes a science itself. This 
raises important questions about the ontological status of those theories and subject-
matter which have been successfully reduced in this manner, but they are questions 
which Wilson seems reluctant to engage with. As might be expected given his opinion 
of the relative merits of philosophy and physics, Wilson seems to see philosophical 
enquiry as something of an impediment to progress, an academic concern which the 
commonsense realist can simply step over. He writes: 
The unification agenda does not sit well with a few professional 
philosophers. The subject I address they consider their own, to be 
expressed in their language, their framework of formal thought. They will 
draw this indictment: conflation, simplism, ontological reductionism, 
scientism, and other sins made official by the hissing suffix. To which I 
plead guihy, guilty, guilty. Now let us move on.... (9) 
This is unfortunate. What Wilson fails to address when he talks about consilience and 
the reduction to physics is the question of what he intends to happen to the objects, 
properties, and disciplines when they have been collapsed into or explained in terms of 
physics. The threat here is from overdetermination and its corollary, elimination: i f the 
contents of one theory can be wholly explained by the contents of a causally more basic 
theory, then the first theory can be trimmed away as superfluous. As Kathleen Lennon 
and David Charles explain: "where we thought we had two sets of concepts, entities, 
laws, explanations, or properties, we in fact have only one, which is most perspicuously 
characterised in terms of the reducing vocabulary" (2). 
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Eliminativism has caused much controversy in the philosophy of mind, where it 
is the name for a radical form of physicalism that effectively denies the existence of the 
mental as described in terms of propositional attitudes (such as beliefs, desires, and 
intentions) as real properties of the mind (and thus the world). Eliminativists are 
materialists who hold with a form of the identity theory of mind,'" but who are 
pessimistic about the chances of finding identities between our existing propositional 
attitudes and particular structures at the neuronal level. Beliefs and desires, say the 
eliminativist, are the wrong things to be looking for; they won't be found because they 
don't exist. Paul Churchland, an advocate of eliminativism, believes that "we cannot 
expect a truly adequate neuroscientific account of our inner lives to provide theoretic 
categories that match up nicely with the categories of our common-sense framework" 
(Matter and Consciousness 43). The thinking here is that beliefs and desires are pre-
scientific notions, part of what is called "folk psychology" (or less derisively, 
"commonsense psychology"), and that this account has consistently failed to describe 
accurately the causes of behaviour, and enjoyed no significant revision in thousands of 
years (with the possible exception of the Freudian sub-conscious as a motivator). In the 
wake of cognitive neuroscience, we should be prepared to re-evaluate folk psychology 
as we have since re-evaluated folk astronomy (the stars are in one plane stretched over a 
dome surrounding the earth, the sky and sun turn around the earth, and so on) in the 
wake of scientific astronomy. 
The eliminativists concede that it is bound to be difficult at first to reject the 
folk-psychological, commonsense view, but argue that this is not a good enough reason 
to maintain it. They argue that there have been too many occasions in the history of 
'° Identity theory says that for every mental act there exists an identical physical state in the brain, and 
that identical thoughts will be physically identical, as much as it makes sense to the unexperienced ear to 
talk of thoughts as having a physical location. 
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science when an apparently necessary causal property has turned out to be no more than 
a convenient fiction. One example they often give is of phlogiston, which at the turn of 
the eighteenth century was commonly assumed by learned men to cause combustion in 
wood or rusting in iron. The idea was that the combustible material possessed a quantity 
of phlogiston that was released during burning, and that once all the phlogiston had 
been released, the material would no longer be combustible. Phlogiston certainly seems 
to explain combustion; it fits all the facts available to the naked eye. But modem 
chemistry tells us that combustion can be explained more accurately and 
comprehensively by oxidation and reduction - an exchange of electrons between the 
material and the surrounding environment. As oxidisation also explains a broad range of 
other phenomena," we can do away with phlogiston as an unnecessary postulate. 
Eliminativists claim that beliefs and desires, the propositional attitudes commonly used 
to explain the causes of behaviour, are just such convenient fictions, and that as we gave 
up belief in phlogiston (and in witches, demonic possession, vital forces for explaining 
animate matter, and so on) so too must we be prepared to give up our folk-
psychological account of the mind as neuroscience gradually corrects our 
assumptions.'^ 
" For example, in the production of oxides - as seen in rusting iron, green copper, and respiration in 
living bodies. See Hazel Rossotti, Fire (261-65) for the origins and history of the phlogiston hypothesis. 
The apparent paradox of believing there are no beliefs is remedied by realising that the eliminativist 
doesn't claim to have the replacement framework provided by neuroscience just yet, but that when it 
arrives, there will be something similar to our notion of "to believe that..." (what David Braddon-
Mitchell and Frank Jackson term "belief*" rPhilosophv of Mind and Cognition 242]) with which he will 
express his lack of sympathy with folk-psychology. Eliminativism is a speculative position in this regard, 
and some might argue it was premature, a case of killing chickens before they were hatched. A stronger 
version of eliminativism would want to do away with talk of folk psychology even if accurate, as a case 
of overdetermination. This would argue that if every mental event was also a physical event then talk of 
physical events alone would be sufficient and anything surplus to this (namely, talk of propositional 
attitudes) would be otiose and misleading (insofar as it sustains and encourages a dualism of mind and 
body). For why this might not be sensible, see section on smooth reductions and appropriate levels, 
below. 
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Eliminativism problematises the ontological status of those subject matters 
picked out by the reduced theory, but it does not imply that all reducible theories (and 
their subject-matter) can and should be eliminated. Recall that the eliminative 
materialist seeks to do away with folk psychology only because he is sceptical about the 
possibility of a complete reduction into neuroscience. As Churchland sees it, 
the one-to-one match-ups [demanded by the identity theory] will not be 
found, and our common-sense psychological framework will not enjoy an 
intertheoretic reduction, because our common-sense psychological 
framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of 
human behaviour and the nature of cognitive activity.... Accordingly, we 
must expect that the older framework will simply be eliminated, rather 
than be reduced, by a matured neuroscience. (Matter and Consciousness 
43) 
So the eliminativist only scraps the old theory because that theory is (or is expected to 
be) incommensurable with the new theory. Reduction does not imply elimination, and if 
a smooth and complete (or near complete) reduction of the framework of the old theory 
into the framework of the new theory can be achieved, then the old theory can be 
preserved, should that be wanted - which is to say, i f it is still useful as an heuristic tool. 
A popular example of a reduction of this type can be found in the reconciliation of "folk 
inheritance" with molecular biology. Gregor Mendel's work on inherited characteristics 
tessellates fairly comfortably with our common-sense beliefs that a child often 
resembles its parents or that two strong horses will produce a similarly strong foal. And 
it augments these assumptions with statistical patterns - the genetic theory of inherited 
characteristics. But as Peter Smith points out, " i f this theory isn't to invoke 
embarrassingly magical powers then genes need in some way to be realized in the 
biological materials involved in reproduction" (20). Fortunately for the genetic theory, 
just such a physical location was discovered as DNA in the chromosomes present in the 
gametes, the ova and the sperm. The functional explanation - genes - was grounded in a 
structural explanation - DNA. Genes, then, can still be used to explain the inheritance 
of particular characteristics and (for those currently named and mapped) also pointed to 
as a real, physical feature of the world with a real (and more or less precise) location.'^ 
The genetic theory is said to reduce smoothly because (almost) all the 
predictions of the genetic theory are accounted for by the molecular biological theory. 
The ontological status of genes is assured by the success of the reduction. Baldly, 
physical instantiation is proof of existence; and much faith is invested in this, as 
Jennifer Homsby points out: " I f a subject-matter is shown to be reducible to physics, its 
metaphysical status is revealed, and, presumably (supposing that the reduction carries 
conviction), rendered unproblematic" (155). So the reality of the postulated entity or 
property is assured only i f it will reduce to "whatever-physicists-will-countenance" (as 
Richard Rorty puts it [Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 217]). Everything that does 
reduce is real, everything that doesn't, isn't. (By the examples given above, our folk-
psychology wil l , like phlogiston, be eliminated i f the prepositional attitudes it proposes 
cannot be shown to reduce to neuronal arrangements, whereas genes, because they can 
be explained with reference to chromosomes and DNA,''* can be authenticated as real.) 
The one-to-one match-up between genes and chromosomal sites is less precise than is commonly 
assumed. Whilst this does problematise the reduction, it is not a block to its success, because even if the 
physical locations of a given gene are not adjacent or as coherent as might be hoped, they are still present, 
just a little more complex than was once thought. 
And because they explain inheritance in more comprehensible terms than the talk of amino acids and 
protein synthesis that DNA is discussed in terms of (see section below on interest-relative explanations). 
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Being told that everything real is made of matter seems to be so obvious as to be 
trivially true; it is perhaps our folk ontology.'^ And this is presumably what Wilson has 
in mind when he talks about "turning as much philosophy as possible into science" 
(Consilience 10). From "what isn't science isn't real," it isn't a big leap to "outside 
science there is no knowledge,""' and this seems to be Wilson's stance. His argument 
seems to be of the form that (1) only science can properly explain physical matter, and 
(2) as everything real is made of physical matter, then (3) therefore science can explain 
everything real. This can be extended (somewhat tenuously) to argue that (4) if the 
subject-matter isn't covered by science it therefore isn't real, and (5) if not real it cannot 
be known, and therefore isn't knowledge. Consequently, science is the only way to 
know. By privileging the ground of matter and reducing all knowledge to scientific 
knowledge, the relatively modest call for a unity of science becomes the unity of 
knowledge by default. 
This is not to say that the materialist ontology is unproblematic, nor does it claim that merely 
announcing that all real objects are made of atoms amounts to anything approaching a complete 
description of the world. The physicist's ontology also includes such non-physical things as spatial 
relations, the electromagnetic spectrum (cf. C. L . Hardin Color for Philosophers 60), and other factors 
which affect particle interactions and yet do not obtain at the atomic or subatomic level. As Richard 
Dawkins has complained, there is more to giving an explanation in terms of physics (or any of the other 
lower levels of the hierarchy) than simply stating that the world is made of atoms: '"In terms of covers a 
multitude of highly sophisticated causal interactions, and mathematical relations of which summation is 
only the simplest. Reductionism, in the 'sum of the parts' sense is obviously daft, and is nowhere to be 
found in the writings of real biologists" ("Sociobiology: The Debate Continues" 59-60). The physicist, 
then, will admit into his ontology something like "pattern" or "organisation" where this refers to a 
mathematically defmable/analysable subject-matter whose shape and interrelations are causally 
efficacious in a specified manner (for example; digital code, such as binary switches in a computer, the 
three-dimensional structure of a protein or chemical receptor, the outer shell of electrons in a covalent 
bond, and so on). Problems arise when the physicist tries to reconcile the simple picture of the world 
being only a heap of atoms in a certain order with a picture that includes causal relations as real 
properties. Putnam argues that such an account cannot help but be interest-relative because the account 
we give of a given event and cause will rarely involve the total cause of that event, only one or two 
factors, and what these factors are will be determined by the types of questions we ask (for example, what 
causes the car to speed up is the wheels turning faster, more gas in the engine, depression of the 
accelerator pedal, the driver realising he is ten minutes late, and so on, each true and each only a part of 
the total cause). (See section below, and Putnam "Why There Isn't A Ready-Made World" Realism and 
Reason 205-28. 221-22) 
"* In Against Method, Paul Feyerabend uses the Latin phrase "extra scientiam nullas salus" - there is no 
knowledge outside science - as exemplary of the attitude here (306). 
If this answers some of the concerns about the ontological status of the higher 
levels in a hierarchic reductive scale, it still leaves open the question of how best to talk 
about them. Would a reductionist like Wilson want to argue that the best way to talk 
about biology is in terms of chemistry (in virtue of the causal primacy of chemistry to 
biology)?'^ Ultimately, all discourse would properly take the form of talk of the 
interaction of fundamental particles, exchanges and transformations of energy at the 
subatomic level. This is plainly absurd, and the applicable escape route seems to be 
Oppenheim and Putnam's notion of "proper levels." To stem the reduction, they add the 
clause that although "each level includes all higher levels ... the highest level to which a 
thing belongs will be considered the 'proper' level of that thing" (10). The idea is that 
not every account qualifies as an explanation, but rather that explanations are always 
interest-relative. Unlike Wilson, who argues that "there is intrinsically only one class of 
explanation" (Consilience 297), Oppenheim and Putnam want to retain the separate 
levels for their explanatory power, and because different levels address different aspects 
of the subject-matter under study. 
For reasons similar to why they considered it "hopelessly impractical" to try and 
describe one man's behaviour from an analysis of his constituent atoms, they point out 
that "a physicist, when he talks of 'all physical objects,' is also speaking about living 
things - but not qua living things" (10). So there is a trivial sense in which the strong 
materialist claims are true: i f the explanation refers to a phenomenon that is instantiated 
within some or other physical system (and, if we include minds, then it is hard to think 
of phenomena that do not), then it is "explained" by physics, i f only because at the level 
Barkow, Tooby and Cosmides argue that the relation is not one of reduction but of consistency, what 
they call "conceptual integration": "A conceptually integrated theory is one framed so that it is 
compatible with data and theory from other relevant fields. Chemists do not propose theories that violate 
the elementary physics principle of the conservation of energy: Instead, they use the principle to make 
sound inferences about chemical processes" (The Adapted Mind 4). 
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of the atoms, electrons, photons, and so on, of which the phenomenon is composed, 
physical laws will apply. But what is questionable here is the extent to which reference 
to only those physical laws counts as an explanation. Displaying the same sort of 
threatening imperialism that Wilson often falls back on, particle physicist Steven 
Weinberg writes: 
Almost any physicist would say that chemistry is explained by quantum 
mechanics and the simple properties of electrons and atomic nuclei. But 
chemical phenomena will never be entirely explained in this way, and so 
chemistry persists as a separate discipline. Chemists do not call themselves 
physicists; they have different skills and different journals from physicists. 
It's difficult to deal with complicated molecules by the methods of 
quantum mechanics, but still we know that physics explains why 
chemicals are the way they are. The explanation is not in our books, it's 
not in our scientific articles, it's in nature; it is that the laws of physics 
require chemicals to behave the way they do. ("Can Science Explain 
Everything? Anything?" 48) 
The imperialism is carried in the condescension; it is worth noting that it is the 
physicist, and not the chemist, who is happy to agree that physics explains chemistry, 
and that it is chemistry (and not physics) that stubbornly "persists." What Weinberg 
does touch on here, however, is the idea that although physics could account for all the 
phenomena chemistry covers, to use physics to talk about chemistry is undesirable 
because the replacement of vocabularies would be inefficient (and possibly 
prohibitively so). That there seems to be a difference between "accounting for" and (in a 
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satisfactory sense) "explaining," was an idea Putnam was to expand upon, and is closely 
wedded to his functionalist theory of mind.'* 
Putnam makes a distinction between a deduction and an explanation. 
Anticipating Wilson's mode of materialism, Putnam says that "[v]ery often we are told 
that i f something is made of matter (and we make a lot of assumptions), then there 
should be a deduction of its behaviour from its material structure" (Mind, Language and 
Reality 296). But he does not consider that deduction to be the same thing as an 
explanation. Using the simple example of a square peg not fitting through a round hole, 
Putnam argues that the explanation of why this is will not be found in talk of a 
latticework or cloud of atoms, but in terms of geometry: the hole is too small. For the 
purposes of explaining why the peg doesn't fit , "the ultimate constituents don't matter, 
... only the higher level structure matters," and that this is "a correct explanation 
whether the peg consists of molecules, or continuous rigid substance, or whatever" 
(296). Putnam stresses the relevance of an explanation to what we are interested in, and 
(following John Stuart Mil l ) separates the everyday use of "cause" from "total cause," 
pointing out that "we regard certain parts of the total cause as 'background', and refer 
only to the part of interest as 'the' cause" (Realism and Reason 213). He goes on to add 
that "one man's ... 'background condition' can easily be another man's 'cause'. What is 
and is not a 'cause' or an 'explanation' depends on background knowledge and our 
reasons for asking the question" (214). Explanations, then, are interest-relative insofar 
as to qualify as (successful) explanations'^ they have to explain something to someone, 
It feeds into functionalism because these arguments are used to ground his belief that what is important 
to philosophy of mind should not be the matter of the mind (and the physical location of certain mental 
processes), but rather, the functions those minds perform: because the functions of the mind can 
theoretically be realised in multiple substrates (e.g., silicon-based) it is misleading (and unnecessary) to 
focus on the realisation that they do have (i.e., carbon-based). 
" Putnam concedes that you can call such a deduction an explanation, but "it is just a terrible explanation, 
and why look for terrible explanations when good ones are available?" (Mind, Language and Reality 296) 
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and they must address the salient features of the situation in terms of the questions 
asked. Hence, the deduction of why the square peg will not fi t through the round hole 
by reference to the respective atomic structures of the peg and the board fails, in part, 
because these features are not relevant, and can even be misleading: "The explanation at 
the higher level brings out the relevant geometrical relationships. The lower level 
explanation conceals those laws" (Mind, Language, and Reality 297). 
It might be argued that Putnam is separating aspects of the same thing and 
treating those aspects as i f they were two different things, that is, talking of two aspects 
of the same thing as if they were caused by two separate objects. When Putnam talks 
about separating the structure or the organisation of the material from the material in 
itself he is adhering to a sort of property dualism, insofar as he thinks there ought to be 
separate vocabularies to discuss organisation on the one hand and substrate on the other. 
Putnam's position on this (outlined in "Why There Isn't A Ready-made World," 
Realism and Reason 205-28) leans on Saul Kripke's argument that a statue is not the 
same thing as the clay it is made from. Descriptively speaking, there are two objects 
present, one defined (or named) by its shape and one defined by its substance. The clay 
will still be the same piece of clay even if it is rolled into a ball, but it will no longer be 
the statue. Likewise, the statue will still be recognisable i f a mould is made of it and it is 
then cast in bronze or latex. But nowhere is the claim made that there are two physical 
objects, "clay" and "statue" respectively, there is only one. As Putnam explains, "the 
difference between the objects lies in the different statements that are true of them, not 
in their physical distinctness" (Realism and Reason 219). As should be obvious, there is 
a proper level here for talking about the clay as a statue, and there is a proper level for 
talking about the clay as a substance. Talk of the clay as a substance needn't involve 
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any mention of macrostructure, just as talk of the statue needn't make any reference to 
the medium and its microstructure. 
Returning to the notion of total cause, causes are said to be proximal or distal 
depending upon their position in a causal chain. So, as Elliott Sober explains, in a causal 
chain A to B to C, the content of B accounts for C, but A accounts for both B and C, 
and so is more comprehensive. B is said to be the proximal cause of C, and A the distal 
cause (8).^° The question Putnam inserts here is deciding which is the more useful as an 
explanation. To lif t this out of the algebraic, we might talk about how an organism's 
behaviour was proximally caused by an environmental stimulus, but seek a more distal 
cause in an understanding of the organism's biology. Evolutionary theory posits distal 
causes for biological behaviour (Sober 8). This is what Wilson sees as the strength of 
the Darwinian explanation: using this conceptual apparatus we can explain a vast range 
of biological phenomena. As seen with Putnam before, the objection is usually not that 
the evolutionary explanation is wrong, just that it is hopelessly general. This threatens to 
collapse to a reductio, where the ultimate distal cause is the Big Bang. This is what 
Mary Midgely objects to in the Wilsonian account of culture. Whilst not disputing that 
the "account we give of culture must indeed be compatible with its evolutionary 
history" (25), she nonetheless feels that "the remoteness of causes by no means 
increases their explanatory force": 
If it did, the original big bang would be the only true explanation of 
everything, and we all ought to be doing astro-physics, not evolutionary 
biology. The concepts of cause and explanation, which are essential tools 
It might also be the case that our understanding of A was flawed, but this need not affect the relations 
between B and C; so there is an extent to which the proximal accounts are autonomous with respect to 
more distal causes. 
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of Wilson's argument, are far subtler and trickier to use than he supposes. 
He thinks he is quite at home in handling them - but he is wrong. (25) 
In his enthusiasm for a unified academy, it does indeed seem as if Wilson has 
underestimated the complexity of causal relations. 
The introduction of interest-relative explanations and the condition that there are 
proper levels for entities shores-up the ontological hierarchy: so long as we are 
interested in different features of objects we will need different vocabularies to talk 
about them. This also seems to refute Wilson's assertion that "there is intrinsically only 
one class of explanation" (Consilience 297) - assuming that by this he intends that "one 
class" to be explanation in terms of the laws of physics (and his dismissal of the idea of 
"appropriate levels" of explanation as "misguided" would seem to suggest that he does). 
But does Wilson really want to talk about everything in terms of physical structure? 
Apparently, he doesn't. For although he argues for there being only the one class of 
explanation, his own explanations come in several different classes - none of them only 
physical. In Consilience, we are given a pheromonal account of ant behaviour (73-77), a 
neurochemical account of sleep (82-84), and an account of art in terms of evolutionary 
biology (247-264). Surely, Wilson's use of various levels, types, and strategies of 
explanation suggests that he implicitly acknowledges that appropriate levels exist. He 
might retort that the levels he uses are there only to better guide the reader towards 
understanding how everything is reducible to physics. But even so, to do this he finds it 
necessary to employ different perspectives; which is to say, perspectives appropriate to 
the subjects (zoology, sociology, religion, ethics and so on) he is addressing - surely the 
very thinking he wanted to undercut. One thing common to all Wilson's explanations, 
however, is that they consistently entail the conversion of non-scientific explanations 
into scientific or at least scientifically digestible terms. The thesis turns out to be a 
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negative one, less concerned with the one true class of explanation than with the 
rejection of all non-scientific explanations. What matters here is not whether the 
explanation is particularly appropriate to neuroscience, biology, chemistry, or physics, 
but that it is not appropriate to sociology, anthropology, philosophy, or literary 
criticism. 
This is the point that the neopragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty picks up on in 
his response to Consilience, "Against Unity."^' Rorty's position on the relationship 
between the arts and the sciences emerges from a complex account of disciplinary 
boundaries and the status of scientific knowledge. How "Against Unity" fits into that 
will become more clear when situated within the context of his philosophical work, 
which is given a fuller treatment later, but his comments here, coming as they do in a 
direct reply to Wilson, deserve a brief mention. 
Rorty sees nothing attractive about what he sees as a scientistic homogenisation 
of knowledge, and he questions the basic desirability of dissolving the current boundary 
lines between subjects that consilience demands: 
The various things that people build and repair with tools are, to be sure, 
parts of a seamless causal web. But that seems no reason to impugn the 
plumber-carpenter or the carpenter-electrician distinction . . . . What strikes 
me as a reasonable and necessary division of cultural labour strikes Wilson 
as fragmentation. ... But contemporary knowledge does not seem to me to 
be fragmented, any more than does the home repair industry. (30) 
What Rorty rejects and what Wilson embraces is the claim that scientific knowledge is 
the best and possibly the only type of knowledge available, and that everything else is 
'^ Rorty's essay appears in The Wilson Quarterly, which, it should be noted, is named after the street on 
which its offices are located, and this in turn after President Woodrow Wilson, and not Edward O. 
Wilson. 
conjecture and assumption. This drift towards an all out scientism leaves the humanities 
seeming methodologically inadequate. Behind this drift is the assumed hierarchy of 
hard and soft science, and the "physics envy" that drives much of the reductionist 
programme, which Lynn Margulis describes as "a syndrome in which scientists in other 
disciphnes yearn for the mathematically explicit models of physics" (qtd. in Brockman 
132). But with the scientisation of all knowledge a credible proposition, physics envy 
has become an issue for non-scientists, too. The absence of a mathematical base to a 
discipline creates an anxiety in its practitioners that their work lacks rigour - that it is 
"soft" thinking. The scale is fairly simple, as Niles Eldredge and Ian Tattersall explain: 
"We get farther away from 'hard' science the farther we go from physics" (The Myths 
of Human Evolution 13), but its impact on how we think of what it means to be rigorous 
(or any of its synonyms) have been quite dramatic. As Rorty has it: 
For more than two centuries, up through the heyday of logical positivism, 
practitioners of many disciplines had wondered i f they were being 
"sufficiently scientific" - a term they used almost interchangeably with 
"sufficiently rational" and "sufficiently objective". The "hard" sciences -
physics in particular - were viewed as models which other disciplines 
should imitate. ("Kuhn" 204) 
But Rorty does not agree that everything is best addressed scientifically. Taking an 
analogy from Hilary Putnam's arguments for functionalism and Daniel Dennett's talk of 
adopting the appropriate stance,^ ^ he argues that whilst it might be possible to explain 
Dennett speaks of how the different "stances" we take towards objects we encounter affect the type of 
explanation we give. An intentional explanation is one which tries to "explain a bit of behaviour, an 
action, or a stretch of inaction, by making it reasonable in light of certain beliefs, intentions, desires 
ascribed to the agent" (Brainstorms 236). Whilst this sort of explanation will chiefly be used for 
explaining the behaviour of other people, there are times when the behaviour of a complex system other 
than a human can be most effectively predicted by adopting the intentional stance, that is, by acting as if 
the system has intentions, beliefs and desires. Taking the intentional stance does not entail that you really 
and predict the behaviour of a computer in terms of its circuitry, "we do not use this 
vocabulary if we can help it: it is much easier to predict and explain what the computer 
is going to do by reference to the program it is running" ("Against Unity" 28). In a 
move similar to Leavis's rebuttal of Snow, and Matthew Arnold's response to Thomas 
Huxley, Rorty argues that Wilson's Consilience, and reductive accounts Hke it, fail to 
give an account of meaning and value because they insist on using a hardware language, 
which is the wrong type of language for describing how the software w o r k s . A s such, 
a scientific account of the world will always be an incomplete account. Rorty is not 
arguing that these are grounds for ignoring science, but he does call for a recognition 
that science addresses some issues better than others, and that what Wilson sees as the 
fragmentation of knowledge across different disciplines using different explanatory 
frameworks is better seen as a constructive pluralism which more effectively addresses 
the types of questions we ask and things we do: "Reality is one but descriptions of it are 
many. They ought to be many, for human beings have, and ought to have, many 
different purposes" ("Against Unity" 31). Rorty's insistence on maintaining separate 
levels of explanation reflects his belief that science is not the only way to know, that it 
"provides us with a spectacularly useful and astonishingly beautiful set of tools, but 
think the system (for example, a chess-playing computer) has intentions, just that its behaviour can be 
most successfully predicted by acting as if it did. (In the case of the chess-playing computer, it should be 
fairly obvious that taking the intentional stance is far easier than trying to figure out the computer's next 
move by thinking about the electrical activity in the circuit boards, or even the programming code in 
which the game is written.) 
As discussed above, saying that there are different ways to talk about the same thing which do not 
cover each other's ground - the irreducibility of vocabularies - can seem to be leaning towards property 
dualism. It makes no sense to talk about the "truth value" of a particular neuronal arrangement, but this 
does not mean that we need deny that the proposition whose truth value is in question is constituted by 
anything more than that particular neuronal arrangement. Like Kripke's statue/ball of clay, what is 
different about the two things are the statements that are true of them. And it is not just that non-scientific 
accounts are shorthand accounts of the fuller scientific explanation, the issues discussed at higher levels 
simply have no common ancestor in physical accounts. The reason why a quantum physical explanation 
of the-square-peg-will-not-pass-through-the-round-hole fails is not just that it is a cumbersome and 
confusing account, but because that exact atomic arrangement will never recur - whereas it will always be 
true in rigid bodies that a square one inch will not pass through a circular aperture of diameter one inch, 
whether the rigid material is wood or plastic, metal or whatever. 
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only one such set among many others" ("Against Unity" 38). What he doesn't want to 
see is the elimination of "soft" thinking, or the wholesale shift into exclusive use of 
hardware language. Rorty holds that knowledge about the workings of the brain will not 
help us decide what to do with our lives, that science can offer explanation but not 
justification.'^'^ So, 
when we know what we want but don't know how to get it, we look to the 
natural sciences for help. We look to the humanities and arts when we are 
not sure what we should want. This traditional division of labor has 
worked pretty well. So it is not clear why we need the further consilience 
which is Wilson's goal. ("Against Unity" 34) 
For Rorty, consilience is both undesirable (because of the types of thinking it excludes) 
and inadequate (because it fails to offer satisfactory replacement accounts for the values 
and meanings provided by the arts and humanities). He feels that the hardware language 
of science, occupied as it is with mechanism and not meaning, is simply inapplicable to 
discussions involving value, and he fails to see how "our answers to such moral or 
practical questions will be improved by better knowledge of how things work" 
("Against Unity" 34). 
This division, that sees the humanities addressing meaning and the sciences 
addressing mechanism, is crucial in keeping the two cultures separate. It also creates a 
situation where discussions of meaning and value are inherently unscientific 
discussions. With all the pejorative connotations this carries, those seeking scientific 
credibility will consequently limit their talk to mechanism. But in an age where 
scientific credibility is enthusiastically sought by many other disciplines - psychology. 
*^ This has been a long-standing interest of Rorty's; compare the following, from 1979: 'The gap between 
explaining ourselves and justifying ourselves is just as great whether a programming language or a 
hardware language is used in the explanation" (Philosophy and the Mirrror of Nature 249). 
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economics, linguistics - literary study seems to remain stubbornly outside of the 
sciences; both in terms of its subject matter, and, more importantly, in the approach it 
takes toward that subject matter. This failure to integrate is partly because novels and 
poems don't seem the type of things that could be understood by the quantitative 
analyses that often characterise the scientific disciplines (and are the first things that 
disciplines bidding for scientific status will construct for their own subject), but it is also 
because it seems difficult to imagine a science that could talk about meaning and value. 
When Wilson talks about making literary interpretation more scientific, he is 
well aware that his is not the first such attempt. Calls for the scientisation of Uterary 
study have long been made, and often from within the discipline (for example, from I . 
A. Richards and Northrop Frye), so it is clear that elimination, however likely a 
consequence it seems under a system like Wilson's, is not the goal of effecting such a 
shift. What Wilson wants to impose in the service of his consilience program is a 
system of thought and analysis across the disciplinary spectrum that translates all 
knowledge into scientific knowledge. This is grounded in his central belief that i f minds 
are only brains then all thoughts have material bases, and so are best characterised in 
terms of those bases, and best analysed with the empirical methods of the sciences. 
What this threatens to exclude is a space where meaning and value can be discussed. 
That is, an end to such disciplines as philosophy and literary criticism (or at least an end 
to their individual approaches and traditional, existent methods of addressing these 
issues). It demands that we look always to the hardware to explain ourselves. 
This is not, however, as crude a method as it may first appear, and among the 
various approaches open to the materialist, recent developments in evolutionary 
psychology promise to offer comprehensive accounts of many aspects of human 
behaviour, cultural practices, and values, within an ostensibly scientific, materialist 
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framework. The response to these accounts is divided, and not always along the strict 
and familiar boundaries of science and the humanities. That some scientists (such as 
Stephen Jay Gould) offer a degree of resistance to aspects of evolutionary psychology, 
whilst some philosophers (such as Daniel Dennett) offer enthusiastic support, suggests 
that here is a domain of scientifically acceptable thinking where value - or at least a 
functional analogue of value - can be reintroduced, and stably situated within the 
materialist ontology. 
Wilson is only one of several thinkers, either actually working within the 
sciences or just desirous of their prestige, who have explicitly called for the 
implementation of a literary criticism founded upon the principles of evolutionary 
psychology. Before analysing in some depth evolutionary psychology's claim to be a 
suitable replacement for the current vocabulary and methodology, it is worth exploring 
the general motivation for and rationale behind the scientisation of literary study. The 
following section analyses some previous attempts, both in terms of their approaches, 
and also how they can be seen as preparatory for the evolutionary psychology route 
currently in favour. 
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Making A Science of Criticism 
In the wake of the systematic study of linguistics enabled by cognitive science 
and the Chomskyan revolution, Steven Pinker happily salutes a new age: "Language is 
beginning to submit to that uniquely satisfying kind of understanding that we call 
science" (The Language Instinct ix). That shift - as far as Pinker is concerned - from 
social study into natural science began in the 1950s with Noam Chomsky's suggestion 
that human languages are underpinned by a human grammar - that is, that all human 
languages share sufficient characteristics to be collectively considered as self-similar. 
As with Wilson's consilience program, Chomsky's work takes off from absorbing the 
materialist collapse of mind into matter.^ ^ With this distinction out of the way, it 
becomes possible to ask, as Chomsky does: "Why, then, should we not study the 
acquisition of a cognitive structure such as language more or less as we study some 
complex bodily organ?" (10). He recognises that this seems, at first blush, an absurd 
suggestion - language is simply too various, and the attempted analogy with bodily 
organs surely cannot hold (10). But linguists studying world languages had already 
found evidence for the existence of "linguistic universals" - regularities of grammar that 
made it reasonable for Chomsky to make the counter-intuitive claim that whilst the 
words change between locations, humans everywhere speak approximately the same 
language. In other words, what was common to human languages was greater than what 
was different between them. That root commonality, Chomsky suggested, was a 
" This is not to say that Chomsky would necessarily be sympathetic to Wilson's program - he has, to the 
dissatisfaction of advocates such as Pinker, expressed reservations about the explanatory power of 
exclusively Darwinian evolutionary mechanisms (see Pinker, The Language Instinct 11). 
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"universal grammar," such that "[e]ach human language will conform to U[niversal] 
G[rammar]; languages will differ in other, accidental properties" (29). The "accidental" 
properties here are the specific words of any given natural language, organised by the 
"highly restrictive principles that guide the construction" (11) of this universal 
grammar. And since "human beings are obviously not designed to learn one human 
language rather than another; the system of principles must be a species property" (11). 
Linguistics thus transcends the merely cultural (and accidental) to root itself in the more 
inclusive categories of the biological (and essential). 
In perhaps much the same way as we struggle, even with the assurances of 
disinterested chemists, to see both diamond and coal as allotropes of carbon, our initial 
resistance to these claims for grarrmiatical similarity is grounded in our first-hand 
experience of the manifest differences between the spoken languages, most of which are 
indecipherable to us. Sympathetic to this, Chomsky recognises that "[i] t is natural in our 
daily life we should concern ourselves only with differences among people, ignoring 
uniformities of structure"; but he adds to this an important and telling qualifier: "But 
different intellectual demands arise when we seek to understand what kind of organism 
a human really is" (11). By making this scalar shift from the semantic surface to the 
underlying structure, linguistics announced its intention to move away from what was 
simply "natural in our daily life." There is little ambiguity about how the "intellectual 
demands" of this new approach will differ: linguistics intends to find out how humans 
really are. 
Seen now as patterned and structured by a universal grammar, hardwired into 
known regions of the human brain, the study of linguistics matriculated to a science, 
and as a science, shed itself of the methodological sloppiness and hazy speculation that 
had marked it out as one of the "soft" disciplines before. This association of "scientific" 
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with something hke "methodologically sound" recalls Rorty's frustration with the 
influence of the positivist program, and Eldredge and Tattersall's account of how the 
centre of all things rigorous was physics: the "harder," the more rigorous, the better. 
Would this "uniquely satisfying" understanding be as welcome in literary criticism, and 
is it even conceivable? Critics of the current state of literary studies often cite as its 
weakness a lack of rigour, and a tendency to settle for what Raymond Tallis has called 
"evidence-free generalisations" (see Tallis, "Evidence-Based and Evidence-Free 
Generalizations: A Tale of Two Cultures." Fuller and Waugh 71-93) - the type of loose 
theorising that the sciences claim to have driven out. Linguistics became scientific by 
the slow accumulation of data, and by specifying and searching for certain recurring 
patterns within its domain of study (and, as importantly, by finding them). In this 
respect, what criticism lacks is a taxonomical system capable of sub-dividing and 
categorising hterature. This, in turn, assumes that literature is the type of thing that 
might be so categorised. There are several candidates for what such a system might look 
like, although they tend to be, as John Ellis has argued, "more admired for [their] 
ambition than [their] accomplishment" (193). The issue, then, is whether literary 
criticism could be formalised along these lines, and whether such a system is ultimately 
desirable. 
In his Anatomy of Criticism (1957), Northrop Frye asks: "What i f criticism is a 
science as well as an art?" (7). What would a science of criticism look like, and is it 
either a possible or desirable goal? The question is a methodological one: are the 
approaches science takes to its study of natural phenomena applicable or transferable to 
the study of literature? Frye points out that to some extent, we already accept that there 
is a scientific element to literary criticism, at least insofar as we acknowledge that 
"previous authorities are used scientifically; fields are investigated scientifically; texts 
are edited scientifically. ... [So,] Either literary criticism is scientific, or all these highly 
trained and intelligent scholars are wasting their time on some kind of pseudo-science 
like phrenology" (8). Philology, prosody: these look more like a specific branch of 
Unguistics than they do literary criticism, but Frye - unlike Roman Jakobson, and those 
Structuralists who would also attempt to scientise literary studies - is not interested in 
pursuing the linguistics of literature. Instead, Frye locates literary criticism somewhere 
between philosophy and history ("The Archetypes of Literature" 88), although in the 
notes to Anatomy, he also wonders i f it would be possible to set up a more complex 
relationship: 
The arts might be more clearly understood i f they were thought of as 
forming a circle, stretching from music through literature, painting and 
sculpture to architecture, with mathematics, the missing art, occupying the 
vacant place between architecture and music. The feeling that mathematics 
belongs to science rather than art is largely due to the fact that mathematics 
is an art that we know how to use. (364)^^ 
This move to draw mathematics sideways into the arts (and claim that inclusion in the 
sciences turns on an only contingent instrumental usefulness) is a clear attempt to 
borrow prestige from mathematics; a discipline which - over the distinction between 
pure and applied - is, like literary studies, prey to charges of being merely an 
intellectual sport. But the internal consistency of mathematics grants it a unique 
independence from the sciences which rely upon it,^^ and it is precisely this type of 
insular self-sufficiency that Frye is looking to establish within literature when he talks 
It is perhaps significant that this quotation forms the very last words of the book. 
The troubling problem is not establishing that mathematics is internally coherent, but trying to 
understand how it is that numbers seem to also work in descriptions of the physical world. See, for 
example, Thomas Tymoczko, New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics, esp. Reuben Hersh's 
essay, "Some Proposals For Revising the Philosophy of Mathematics" (9-28). 
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about the "the possibility of a self-contained literary universe" (Anatomy 118). That 
such an internally consistent, world-independent model eludes him is why the attempted 
analogy with mathematics is only a footnote in a book which owes more to Carl Jung 
than David Hilbert. In the end, despite Frye's eagerness to make a science of criticism, 
the result fell short, and M . H. Abrams is typical in underlining the limitations of Frye's 
approach: "a thoroughgoing archetypal theory of literature does not resemble physics, 
chemistry, or biology nearly so much as it resembles alchemy" (Doing Things With 
Texts 230-31). Abrams's comment here underlines the common feeling that where the 
Anatomy fails is not in a lack of data, but in the absence of a means of organising those 
data. The graduation from alchemy to science awaits an advance in theoretical 
sophistication. 
Among the quotations attributed to him, Einstein is supposed to have remarked: 
on 
"The most incomprehensible fact about the universe is that it is comprehensible" - or 
in other words, there's no reason natural phenomena should make sense to us, and 
pattern is something we have no right to expect. When James Watson and Francis Crick 
suggested the first successful model for the structure of the DNA molecule, they were 
among many teams all working towards the same goal, but whilst there were competing 
theories as to what shape the molecule would take, everyone involved agreed that there 
would be some shape or other, that the search for structure was not misdirected. In 
searching for mechanism and pattern, the natural sciences proceed from the belief that 
those mechanisms and patterns exist to be discovered, and that (relatively) simple rules 
underlie the manifest complexity of natural phenomena. 
The popular version is a condensation of Einstein's words. The original text reads 'The eternal mystery 
of the world is its comprehensibility ... The fact that it is comprehensible is a miracle." From a paper 
called "Phvsik und Realitat [Physics and Reality]" Journal of the Franklin Institute 221 (1936): 313-47. 
See The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. Ed. Elizabeth Knowles. Oxford: OUP, 1998. (97.1) 
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Unfortunately, literary fiction has no such security. There are two senses here in 
which we can talk of literature being patterned. At the small scale, there is the question 
of whether individual works can be thought of as internally patterned. Obviously, this is 
something the author is in a good position to control - although a reader faced with an 
overtly complex text, like Pound's Cantos, or Joyce's Finnegans Wake, has no 
guarantee that there is sense to be made of it. Surface complexity may shield a profound 
and subtle architecture, or the work may be as unstructured, fragmentary, and chaotic as 
it appears to be. Wayne C. Booth draws attention to the problems for interpretation of 
complexity without structure: 
One can't be sure that Finnegans Wake is not a great novel; perhaps 
someday readers will discover that the complex structure they now dream 
of and quarrel about is a realizable structure, an experienced structure. I 
doubt it, but it may happen. Until then, each new intricacy discovered... 
reveals precisely nothing more than that: a new intricacy. (Now Don't 
Try... 106) 
What's missing is the "skeleton key," the conceptual centre around which overall 
coherence might be achieved from what had seemed to be unconnected parts. If this sort 
of centre cannot be found in the individual work, it may yet obtain between works. 
There is the example Borges uses of how Kafka's work retrospectively conveys a 
familial similarity upon previously unconnected works. The quality of being "Kafka-
esque" is the only thing common to the pieces, but was not apparent (or rather - the 
paradox that excites Borges - did not exist) prior to Kafka's writing (see Borges, 
"Kafka and his Precursors" [trans. James E. Irby], Labyrinths 234-236). This is the 
second sense in which literature might be thought of as patterned; that is, not within 
works, but across them. On the larger scale, is it possible that literature as a whole could 
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be understood as patterned? Frye believed that the assumed existence of a pattern 
mapped between works was a prerequisite to a science of criticism: 
It is clear that criticism cannot be a systematic study unless there is a 
quality in literature which enables it to be so. We have to adopt the 
hypothesis, then, that just as there is an order of nature behind the natural 
sciences, so literature is not a piled aggregate of "works," but an order of 
words. (17)^^ 
Frye's "order of words" is an order in the sense that the Linnaean system of 
classification in biology reveals (or imposes) an order; it is a system that assumes the 
existence of "natural kinds." Natural kinds mark the boundaries between nouns; the 
lines along which the world can be sensibly cut-up into discrete classes of objects and 
types, which can then be grouped accordingly, like with like. (That this essentialism is 
something that many philosophers have found problematic is discussed later.) 
The Linnaean system in biology sphts living things into six kingdoms, and those 
kingdoms into phyla, phyla into families, families into genera, and genera into species. 
Frye's system sifts literature into similarly concentric sets. The model he develops 
rejects the linear, historical view that sorts writers only by such external factors as the 
name of the monarch under whose reign they lived and wrote, and attempts instead to 
record the internal patterns suggested by a survey of the works themselves. It is like the 
distinction cartographers make between a political and a topographical map: which is to 
say, Frye is looking for something like a natural order beneath the arbitrary boundaries. 
Again, we might think of Chomsky's division between the essential and the accidental 
Making explicit the connections, he continues by recognising that '[a] belief in the order of nature, 
however, is an inference from the intelligibility of the natural sciences" (17). 
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features of a language correlating with (respectively) the biological and the cultural. To 
be scientific, Frye's taxa must be found and not made. 
The Anatomy is subdivided into four essays: the Theory of Modes (by which 
works are allocated to modes calibrated against the power of the protagonist), of 
Symbols (which seeks to organise around a coherent structure the various universally 
recognised archetypes), of Myths (which seeks to locate the meanings of those 
archetypes), and of Genres (by which the four seasons are used as an index for the four 
main genres). These form a confusing matrix of categories and sub-categories, into 
which works can be slotted and against which they can be cross-referenced. Despite this 
complexity, it is possible to call the basic pattern Linnaean, insofar as there exist groups 
within groups, and, like the Linnaean system, the Anatomy is prey to debates about the 
appropriate level of specificity. Classification can look arbitrary, and the exact 
specifications in Frye's schema are often quite unclear - his system is not always 
hierarchical, and some of his categories appear all the more arbitrary for their apparent 
instability. For example, in 1951 Frye links the genre of romance with Spring, and 
comedy with Summer (see "The Archetypes of Literature" in Vickery 87-97). By the 
publication of the Anatomy six years later, these had been inverted. That said, Frye 
admits that the exact interrelations of his system are tentative: "not only elementary but 
grossly over-simplified" ("The Archetypes of Literature" 97). The point is not that the 
scheme fits this or that particular account, the point is that there is believed to be a 
scheme at all.^^ What matters is approach, the aim here is to lay foundations. 
Frye's structuring is spurred by the belief that "primitive formulas" can be 
found, a series of familiar storylines and narrative events that recur across world 
Which is to say: we expect to find order. On some level we must believe in the unity or at least the 
similarity of the minds that individually produce and consume the literature. Without this assumption, it 
doesn't make sense to expect a pattern to emerge. This is discussed in the closing section, tying Frye to 
evolutionary psychology. 
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literature. This suggests that literature may be organised not just across time, but also 
"in conceptual space from some kind of center that criticism could locate" (Anatomy 
17). He thinks that this centre will be "a group of universal symbols" (118), but stresses: 
"1 do not mean by this that there is any universal archetypal code book which has been 
memorized by all human societies without exception. I mean that some symbols are 
images of things common to all men" (118). Anatomy of Criticism was Frye's attempt 
to locate that centre, and to organise satellite myths around it. In search of the type of 
internal coherence that biology had achieved with the addition of Darwinian theory to 
the existing taxonomy of speciation, Frye believed that "what is at present missing from 
literary criticism is a co-ordinating principle, a central hypothesis which, like the theory 
of evolution in biology, will see the phenomena it deals with as parts of a whole" ("The 
Archetypes of Literature" 89). 
Cezanne claimed that his painting was guided by the belief that all shapes were 
combinations of the cube and the sphere. Frye believes that in literature, a similar 
atomism applies, with the "primitive formulas," the myths and the archetypes, taking 
the place of the sphere and the cube: "the structural principles of literature are as closely 
related to mythology and comparative religion as those of painting are to geometry" 
(Anatomy 134-35). In another analogy with painting, he argues that close readings and 
rhetorical analyses are akin to an examination of brushwork, but that by moving away 
from the painting we can see first the figures in the picture, and subsequently, the 
organising structure of the painting (140). Frye believes that i f we "stand back far 
enough" from literature, that is, i f we think about it in sufficiently abstract, general 
terms, then similar regularities and patterns emerge, both within and between works. 
What those patterns reveal are the common cultural origins of Western literature, Frye 
suggesting that "the symbolism of the Bible, and to a lesser extent Classical mythology" 
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will offer "a grammar of literary archetypes" (135). Here and elsewhere, the language of 
the Anatomy shows some telling similarities with the manner in which linguists talk of 
the language instinct. Although Frye doesn't draw on it explicitly - the theory was new 
and not yet popularised'^' - there are many ways in which his work is similar to the 
Chomskyan account of a universal grammar. Just as linguists stress that the language 
instinct worked only on grammar; on the rules for organisation and not the contingent, 
accidental details, so Frye talks about aiming to discover "the grammatical rudiments of 
literary expression" (Anatomy 133). 
As it threatens to do with language, codification in this manner seems like a type 
of natural constraint, a cap on possibility, and just as advocates of the language instinct 
(and proponents of any theory that posits the existence of innate mechanism) are wary 
of sounding repressive with respect to freedom of agency, so Frye is cautious when 
suggesting "that the resources of verbal expression are limited, i f that is the word, by the 
literary equivalents of rhythm and key," and is quick to qualify this: "though that does 
not mean, any more than it means in music, that its resources are artistically 
exhaustible" (Anatomy 133). This inexhaustibility is one of the key differences Frye 
finds between art and science. He believes that a mature and completed science would 
have nothing more to say about the world; that the total description of the system would 
be the end of science. He does not, however, think that this holds for literary criticism, 
arguing that literature "is, so far as we know, an inexhaustible source of new critical 
discoveries, and would be even if new works of literature ceased to be written" (17). It 
is not clear if Frye's confidence on this point is well founded: "so far as we know," 
science is also inexhaustible. There seems little evidence for projecting from the current 
wealth of new criticism a continuation of that productivity. Indeed, the force of opinion 
'^ Chomsky's Syntactic Structures was published in 1957 - the same year as Frye's Anatomy. 
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against the obscurity of much of that new criticism (see, for example, John Ellis's 
Literature Lost) might suggest that limits are already being reached. 
Like Pinker with linguistics, Frye seems to want to reinforce the scientific 
elements of hterary criticism so as to inaugurate the study into science's "uniquely 
satisfying kind of understanding." And he clearly reserves much respect for science: 
"The presence of science in any subject changes its character from the casual to the 
causal, from the random and intuitive to the systematic, as well as safeguarding it 
against external invasions" (7).^^ Part of Frye's motivation for drawing up the 
scientised, taxonomical system that is laid out in Anatomy was his frustration at seeing 
literary criticism submit to the confines of another perspective - such as Marxism, 
Feminism, phenomenological criticism, and so on - which he saw as deeply flawed 
because such approaches take for their conceptual framework something outside of 
literature. This is the external invasion Frye feared. Literary criticism would be formless 
without internal structure, and so would have to take its structuring principles from 
outside of literature: from Marxist thinking. Feminist thinking, phenomenological 
thinking, and so on. But give literature its own structure, one drawn out from and built 
around the "order of words," and the discipline can be self-contained, it can be a science 
of criticism. As Frye has it: 
To subordinate criticism to an eternally derived critical attitude is to 
exaggerate the values in literature that can be related to the external source, 
whatever it is. It is all too easy to impose on literature an extra-literary 
schematism, a sort of religio-political color-filter which makes some poets 
Frye seems to think that the scientific characteristics he perceives to already exist within literary 
criticism are the causal ones, and that everything else - all the talk of "feeling," and all the hazy 
generalisations and wordplay - is just casual. But he reveals himself: the contrast [causal/casual] is 
wordplay itself. It bends as much to the love of words as to any genuine distinction. 
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leap into prominence and others show up as dark and faulty. (Anatomy 6-
7) 
This, then, is the negative aspect of the work: Frye's hope is that the systematisation he 
proposes will remove the myopia of critical attitude, to allow literature to be judged by 
the standards of literature, whatever that may turn out to mean, and not by the standards 
of any external ideology. But the system he sets out is as much at risk from critical 
myopia as any other. The framework may well be designed specifically for literature, 
but its application requires just as much selective inclusion as a system borrowed from 
politics. One of the criticisms levelled at Frye's Anatomy is that the subordination to 
taxa is just as forced as the subordination to political ideologies. The problem is one of 
inclusion, and it is a recurrent problem for all taxonomical systems. It is difficult, too, to 
see how Frye's work is meant to be applied in practical terms - or what follows from 
the fact that literature might be so organised. In other words, the Anatomy of Criticism 
is just that: a meta-theoretical analysis of the conditions necessary for a science of 
literature and not in itself a prescriptive guide for how to study texts scientifically. 
Wayne C. Booth finds Frye's classification "of limited use ... since they give us groups 
of works still unmanageably large and heterogeneous, groups distinguished from each 
other less by an induction from their common effects than by a deductive classification 
of the materials represented" (The Rhetoric of Fiction 37 n.27). Booth's criticism is in 
part a criticism that Frye's categories are simply too big to be of any use. They are phyla 
and genera, but they are not species. 
At times, it does seem as i f Frye is willing to break down his system into smaller 
parts. Inviting comparisons with what Claude Levi-Strauss would later develop into his 
structural theories of mythology, he explicitly appeals to the parallels between his 
formulations and the work of anthropology, considering: 
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the possibility of seeing literature as a complication of a relatively 
restricted and simple group of formulas that can be studied in primitive 
culture. I f so, then the search for literary archetypes is a kind of literary 
anthropology, concerned with the way that literature is informed by pre-
literary categories such as ritual, myth and folktale. ("The Archetypes of 
Literature" 91) 
From here, "We may next proceed inductively from structural analysis, associating the 
data we collect and trying to see larger patterns in them" (90). This approach is more 
atomistic; less concerned with the coherence he sought in locating the conceptual centre 
of literature, and closer to the simple cataloguing of the primitive formulas of which 
literature is a complication. This feeds out of and appeals to the long-held popular 
suspicion that there exist only a finite number of plots, from which all stories are 
formed. The level of detail varies. It is sometimes said there are just seven stories 
(usually, but not absolutely: Orpheus, Achilles, Cinderella, Tristan and Isolde, Circe, 
Romeo and Juliet, Faust) of which all other stories are versions. Although this seems 
too reductive, and the categories too broad, the notion that atomic plots exist is a 
seductive one that has attracted much attention. One of the more thorough attempts to 
identify and catalogue these, and to arrange them into a taxonomy, was carried out by 
Georges Polti. Polti's scheme is not especially well known (or useful), but is exemplary 
of the urge to reduce and categorise. I f Frye's Anatomy had tried to map a Linnaean 
order over literature, then Polti's attempt was closer to the construction of a periodic 
table. But where Frye's taxa laboured under their lack of specificity, Polti's 
enumerations tend toward absurdity in their arbitrary precision. 
Taking as his inspiration a comment by Goethe that there were said (by Gozzi) 
to be only thirty-six dramatic situations, Polti began charting the parallels between 
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narratives, isolating recurrent storylines and sorting them into groups according to 
shared features. Polti claimed to have condensed the whole range of available storylines 
down to only a few dozen, and these he collected and published in 1921 as The Thirty-
Six Dramatic Situations. Unlike Frye, whose systematisation was designed as an aid to 
criticism, Polti's work was addressed chiefly to playwrights and scriptwriters, intended 
to act as an a compositional aid, allowing writers to concentrate on theme and dialogue 
by removing the burden of fashioning a plot (something which, i f Polti's scheme is 
correct, is never original anyway). 
Polti sees himself as resurrecting a lost line of enquiry - much as Frye did when 
he bemoaned the paucity of literary criticism's technical vocabulary, complaining that it 
had not moved on since Aristotle's Poetics (Anatomy 71). Apparently ignoring James 
Frazer, who had published the first volumes of The Golden Bough three decades earlier, 
Polti finds few precedents to his project, complaining that only one other writer "had 
grasped and presented briefly the ensemble of all dramatic production" (8). But Polti 
finds the basis of this scheme - "the outworn classification of the seven capital sins" -
"far from satisfactory" (8). He maintains that "no one has treated, in [a] genuinely 
technical manner, of the secrets of invention" (8). The failure to treat creativity in a 
technical (which is to say, scientific) manner is diagnosed as typical of the intellectual 
attitude of the day; such aims being " i l l comprehended by an age that dreads 
didacticism, - that is to say, dreads any serious reflection upon art" (8). A precursor to 
Frye's belief that a more analytical, empirical approach would change the character of 
literary studies "from the casual to the causal" (Anatomy 7), Polti felt that this type of 
taxonomy was long overdue. Unfortunately, Polti is far from rigorous in his own 
methodology. Although he criticised the basis of previous attempts, he gives scant 
description of his own basis, nor any indication of the criteria by which situations are to 
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be considered either similar or separate. His account of how the thirty-six situations 
were derived is almost comically abrupt: "Finally, in brief, I rediscovered the thirty-six 
situations, as Gozzi doubtless possessed them ... for there were indeed, as he had 
indicated, thirty-six categories" (9). Once again, the scheme is essentialist, with the 
emphasis on these categories being found rather than made, consistent with the act of 
scientific discovery. 
Owing to the number of possible narrative events being grossly underdetermined 
by the thirty-six subheadings in the scheme, there is an inevitable flexibility to deciding 
which of Polti's situations a given story is to be included under, and as to what, under 
his cryptic formulations, is to qualify as meeting those criteria ("Murder, for instance, 
may be reduced to a wound, a blow, ... a too-hasty word, an intention not carried out, 
... a thought, a wish, an injustice" and so on [119]). Polti also permits free-combination, 
considering this a strength of his system: "There is ... no Situation which may not be 
combined with any one of its neighbors, nay, with two, three, four, five, six of them and 
more!" (120). Later on the same page, Polti seems to imply that there are constraints on 
these possibilities, that is, combinatory rules, but is unwilling to explore these as yet, 
leaving their explication to a never-to-be-written future work called The Laws of 
Literary Invention ("I cannot here elaborate the system by which this study of the 
Thirty-Six Situations may be continued, and by means of which they may be endlessly 
multiplied; that is a separate work upon the 'Laws of Literary Invention.'" [120]). One 
of the constraints he does include is purely arithmetical. With his characteristic manner 
of making the absurd sound obvious, Polti realises that the combination of situations 
"will not go very far, however, since we cannot... receive from the drama, or from life, 
more than one thousand three hundred and thirty-two surprises. ... Perform the 
multiplication; result, one thousand, three hundred and thirty-two" (121). 
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Polti's bluntly empirical tone reflects his belief that what he has done is not 
devise a new formulation, but simply discover an underlying and pre-existing structure. 
He is fully assured that these situations are not arbitrary, but concrete and given,and 
this confidence spills over into the remarkable claim that "to this declared fact that there 
are only thirty-six dramatic situations, is attached a single corollary, the discovery that 
in life there are but thirty-six emotions" (9). And so: 
it is with these thirty-six emotions - no more - that we color, nay, we 
comprehend cosmic mechanism, and since it is from them that our 
theogonies and our metaphysics are, and ever will be constructed; all our 
dear and fanciful "beyonds;" - thirty-six situations, thirty-six emotions, 
and no more. (9) 
Polti's writing here slips into the mystic - the inference from a catalogue of popular 
narratives to an exhaustive catalogue of human emotion is surely not a valid one, and 
there is no explanation of how the purported match-up between the number of situations 
and the number of emotions was discovered. But in this respect, Polti's bold 
pronouncements chime with much of what evolutionary psychology and human 
ethology has since begun to say about the numerous similarities between, and the limits 
or constraints upon, human behaviour in different cultures (the concepts of similarity 
and constraint here running together), and the stronger claim, recently made first by 
sociobiologists Uke Wilson, and now reiterated by evolutionary psychologists, that 
human nature is everywhere the same. Polti's moral atomism is less well supported but 
certainly not inimical in principle to the type of limitations that ethologists like Irenaus 
That said, he does add that the number thirty-six is not to be considered an immutable figure: 'There is, 
I hasten to say, nothing mystic or cabahstic about this particular number; it might perhaps be possible to 
choose one a trifle higher or lower, but this one I consider the most accurate" (9) - a confession 
somewhat at odds with the general sense of necessity surrounding his other proclamations, particularly as 
regards the one-to-one correlation he detects between the dramatic situations and the human emotions. 
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Eibl-Eibesfeldt, following psychologist Paul Ekman, have catalogued since.'''' Crucially, 
in evolutionary psychology and ethology, the inference runs the other way: i f there is 
any correlation between the type and number of emotions and the type and number of 
(consistently entertaining) plots, then the theorist would expect the latter to derive from 
the former, that is, new plots from much older emotions and not, as Polti seems to 
suggest, the other way around. 
The value of Polti's work is not in the exact specifications of his taxonomy, but 
in the way he approaches creativity (which is to say, he believes that there is logic and 
pattern behind the inspiration), and in his belief that we would benefit from a more 
structured theory of literary creation and appreciation. Amid the make-it-new-
Modemism of the early 1920s, Polti had perhaps good reason to feel that the artists 
shared his desire for systematisation. "It is," he writes, "toward an art purely logical, 
purely technical, and of infinitely varied creations, that all our literary tendencies seem 
to me to be converging. In that direction proceed ... all writers deliberately unmindful 
of their libraries" (129). Like Frye, Polti's schema is designed not to subsume art under 
a scientised framework, but by the construction of such a framework, to secure for art a 
place safe from what Frye would call the "external invasions" of politics and religion. 
To this end, Polti sees: 
a whole new generation springing up, futurists, "loups," cubists, [who] 
seem to me to be seeking the same goal, the final abolition of absolute 
authority, even that of Nature and of our sciences her interpreters; and the 
erection upon its debris of simple logic, of an art solely technical, and thus 
In terms of universal facial expressions (see Ekman and Davidson, The Nature of Emotion), universal 
decorative patterns (see Dissanyake, Homo Aestheticus: Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Human Ethology), even 
universal responses to certain landscapes (see "Environmental Aesthetics" section of The Adapted Mind 
552+). 
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capable of revealing an unknown system of harmony; in brief, an artists' 
art. (130) 
If the assumption that plot is finitely bounded in anything like the manner Polti suggests 
is correct, then any praise for originality of plot would seem to be misdirected. At best, 
we could applaud a writer for their originality in combining certain situations 
(according to the un-written Laws of Literary Invention) - although presumably even 
such combinations would be subject to a further set of injunctions, another level of 
organisation. With every writer held to rehearsing the same plots, the interest and 
emphasis for criticism will be placed not on narrative event but on what variables 
remain: if not narrative sequence and event, then narrative style, dialogue, poetic or 
rhetorical accomplishment. These constraints, this necessity to work within given limits 
(maintains Polti), would gradually increase the quality of the writing being produced, as 
it did for the dramatic works of the ancient Greeks: "We are not unaware of the 
importance, in the perfecting of Greek art, of the fact that it was circumscribed and 
restricted to a small number of legends ... , which each poet had in his turn to treat, thus 
being unable to escape comparison, step by step, with each of his predecessors" (126). 
(To a certain extent, directors of plays or translators are already judged by this system.) 
Polti hopes that once we stop praising plot, we might start to tease great art out of 
writers currently preoccupied with trying to surprise us with novel storylines. And so 
the "artists' art," an autonomous art, uninterested in making profit or political 
statements, emerges. 
Despite Polti's certainty, it is hard to understand how a system as tightly knit as 
this could be reached. His bizarre claims for fmitude in all directions seem baseless, and 
despite his denials, cabbalistic (and this is at odds with the "genuinely technical 
manner" [8] he aims at). The Thirty-Six Dramatic Situations lacks a larger coherence 
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and reasoning. Most of the situations are so vague as to admit almost any plotline (and 
certainly too many plotlines as to successfully serve as boundaries), and given that Polti 
allows them to be used in combination, almost like an alphabet, it is not clear how these 
can be considered usefully elementary: knowing the limits of the alphabet is not the 
same thing as knowing which are the best words to make with it. Stopping at thirty-six 
situations seems arbitrary - a number chosen for convenience (and to agree with 
Goethe) that seemingly fits upon a continuum of available detail passing from just four 
or seven situations, to a taxonomy so accurate as to count each and every production as 
an original type. This far end of the detail scale, the chaos of irreducibility, is the stance 
taken by those resistant to classification, those who abhor what Polti called 
"didacticism." At this end of the scale we cannot classify at all. The argument here is 
that there are not "types" in literature, or that if types do exist then canonical classics are 
not simply tokens of those types. Joseph Carroll calls this the "traditional humanistic 
behef in the irreducible singularity of all artistic productions" ("Wilson's Consilience 
and Literary Study" 397). This irreducibility is pointedly limited to artistic productions, 
tacitly excepting mere entertainment. It is no coincidence that genre fiction struggles to 
merit literary status. A book obedient to the conventions of a particular genre is no 
longer irreducibly singular and no longer literary; genre labelling can be a method of 
suppression, a convenient means of dismissing by type. A system Hke Polti's threatens 
to turn all literary output into genre fiction of one kind or another. Those seeking to 
preserve a distance between the literary and the sub-literary wil l argue that, as opposed 
to a formulaic romance or horror novel, a work of literature is a token not of a type of 
dramatic situation, but only a token of the type "literature," which is a separate and 
somehow-special class of writing. There is not enough internal similarity beyond this 
broad category to successfully impose either an atomistic or a Linnaean taxonomy. The 
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imposition of genres, types, and "species" of literature cuts into the cherished belief in 
(or fallacy of) absolute creativity. I f ICing Lear or Crime and Punishment are only 
tokens of types, instances of particular and ready-made dramatic situations, they lose 
something in the classification. 
Frye recognised this as a latent difficulty within any taxonomical account of 
literature. He admired the systematic manner in which the sciences go about their 
business, and it is this rigour that he wanted to introduce into literary study through the 
taxa of the Anatomy. But science is also essentially disinterested toward its subject of 
study, and so Frye's problem is squaring the need to organise the knowledge with the 
value-judgements implicit in maintaining a distinction between literary and popular 
fiction. Accordingly, he insisted on the difference between value-judgement ranking and 
organisation around non-evaluative principles: 
There is a place for classification in criticism, as in any other discipline 
which is more than an elegant mandarin caste. The strong emotional 
repugnance felt by many critics towards any form of schematization in 
poetics is again the result of a failure to distinguish criticism as a body of 
knowledge from the direct experience of literature, where every act is 
unique, and classification has no place. (Anatomy 29) 
Note how the "unique" aspect of the work of literature is shifted from the work itself to 
the reader's experience of that work. Frye is at pains to stress that his scheme cannot 
offer a means of discriminating between good and bad literature, and that value-ranking 
is something quite separate from the "order of words" he is looking to map out. This 
enables him to maintain that the structure exists, whilst effectively disposing of the need 
to account for value. What we are left with are more problems: Where do the patterns 
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come from? And why - i f value is something external to the works - is there any 
consensus at all about what constitutes good and bad literature? 
Beyond locating their roots in the Bible and Classical mythology, neither Frye 
nor Polti went into an account of why the taxa they proposed existed, or offered any 
detail as to where and how the patterns and commonalities they detect originated. But 
whilst their work was largely concerned with the interpretation of Western literature, 
anthropologists studying the wider field of world narratives have found similar 
patterning in geographically isolated cultures, suggesting that some mechanism exists 
below the level of straightforward cultural transmission. Joseph Campbell traced a 
recognition of cultural universals - what he calls "the archetypes of mythology" ("Bios 
and Mythos" 15) - back to at least the sixteenth century, when Spanish conquistadors 
mistook Mexican images and myths for corruptions of Catholicism. James Frazer was to 
find similar evidence in the transubstantiation of body-into-bread rites practiced 
independently by Aztecs and Catholics, noting that "the ancient Mexicans, even before 
the arrival of Christian missionaries, were fully acquainted with the theological doctrine 
of transubstantiation . . . . They believed that by consecrating bread their priests could 
turn it into the very body of their god" (Frazer 507).^ ^ In the mid-nineteenth century, 
German scholar Adolf Bastian noticed recurrent beliefs and narratives across 
civilisations in China, Japan, India, Africa, and South America. These he called 
Frazer also reports that transubstantiation was "familiar to the Aryans of ancient India long before the 
spread and even the rise of Christianity" (507). In Unweaving the Rainbow. Richard Dawkins attempts to 
explain the recurrence of transubstantiation rites with reference to "an obsession with things representing 
other things that they slightly resemble" (181), and attributes this to the tendency to draw connections by 
metaphor. "Skill in wielding metaphors" - as the bestselling author of The Selfish Gene and The Blind 
Watchmaker is only too happy to point out - "is one of the hallmarks of scientific genius" (185). But, 
cautions Dawkins, such associations are normally "superficial and meaningless," their authors are too 
often "drunk on metaphor which misleads [them] into seeing connections which do not illuminate the 
truth in any way" (186). The innate tendency to connect ideas by metaphor has been explored by Mark 
Turner in Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 1991). 
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"Elementary" or "Folk" ideas,^ ^ and tentatively suggested that research into 
geographical and climatic conditions might point toward common causes for the 
observed similarities (Campbell, "Bios and Mythos" 15-16). Almost twenty years later, 
Frazer, shifting his attention from psychology to anthropology - from "the nature of 
human thought" to its history - noticed that "the human mind, across a variety of 
cultures and times, and especially when trained upon the religious and the magical, 
showed certain constancies" (Robert Fraser, intro to Frazer xx). Frazer set out "to 
examine the refinements of such universal thought-processes, and their different ways 
of expressing themselves in a variety of places and periods" (Fraser xx) and catalogued 
them in The Golden Bough, which sprawled from two volumes in 1890 to an 
encyclopaedic thirteen volumes (including an index and a supplement) by the final 
edition in 1936 (Fraser xl). Where The Golden Bough focused more on religion and 
magic than mythology, in the 1920s, the so-called Cambridge Ritualists, Gilbert 
Murray, F. M . Comford, and Jane Harrison,^^ set out specifically to catalogue and 
locate the origins of myths. Like Bastian and Frazer before them, they found that even 
in diverse and geographically distant cultures, the same types of stories were told again 
and again. Here there were continuities between cultures that had been isolated from 
each other since long before even the earliest serious estimates would have in place a 
common cultural document, such as the Bible or Classical mythology, that might 
explain any regularities in Western literature. So Bastian's loosely formulated 
"Elementary Ideas," and the continuities in ritual, religion, and myth documented by 
Bastian calls them Elementargedanke and Volkergedanke; the translation is Campbell's. Bastian's work 
was published as Das Bestandige in den Menschenrassen und die Spielweite ihrer Veranderlichkeit 
(Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1868). 
Sometimes they are called "the Cambridge Anthropologists" or just "the Cambridge Group" - despite 
Murray's being an Oxford scholar. 
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Frazer and the Cambridge Ritualists, have quite profound implications, as Wendell 
Harris points out: 
If these commonalities cannot be explained by transmission from one 
culture to another, the alternative appears to be that the human mind (or 
human experience as processed by the mind) is so constructed that certain 
modes of thought and correlative narratives are produced by all peoples. 
(247) 
That similarities across world narratives exist is relatively uncontroversial. What is 
needed is some means of grounding these patterns, and (as Harris points out) i f there are 
similarities in the works that cannot be explained with reference to cultural transmission 
alone, then the similarities must be in the people who collectively produce and consume 
those narratives. 
One early attempt, in many ways influential on the direction of Frye's work, was 
Carl Jung's appeal to the existence of a pan-human "collective unconscious." Maud 
Bodkin, in her 1934 work. Archetypal Patterns in Poetry, takes an explicitly Jungian 
approach to the study and interpretation of literature. Her claims for the special quality 
of great literature turn on that quality being indefinable, and recognisable only 
intuitively through the Jungian collective unconscious. Resisting the sort of 
reductionism seen in a scheme like Polti's, and the abduction of creativity it effects, 
Bodkin attempts to retain a theory of archetypes, but within a framework that preserves 
literature as a type of writing that is immune to simple formulation. 
Bodkin is attempting to expand upon Jung's already flawed premise that the 
"special emotional significance possessed by certain poems" is the result of the poem 
"stirring in the reader's mind ... 'primordial images', or archetypes," which Jung 
describes as "psychic residua of numberless experiences of the same type" (qtd. in 
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Bodkin 1). Bodkin explains that these experiences "have happened not to the individual 
but to his ancestors, and of which the results are inherited in the structure of the brain" 
(1). Such themes and images are recognised by our "racial memory," and already 
known, as it were, intuitively, in the collective unconscious. Bodkin tries to encourage 
us to rely upon these intuitions when reading poetry - to experience poems on an 
emotional level, as opposed to a wholly analytical or intellectual level, and so to dredge 
the collective unconscious for a fuller appreciation of the poem. She aligns her approach 
with a comment by Keats that a poem should rest on the mind to be savoured: "let him 
on any day read a certain Page of full Poesy or distilled Prose let him wander with it, 
and muse upon it, and reflect upon it, ... and dream upon it" (Keats, letter to Reynolds 
[19 Feb. 1818], 541; and Bodkin 29). Bodkin admits that "[t]he inquiry here is plainly 
of a subtlety and complexity apt to discourage at the outset those who prefer to avoid all 
questions that cannot be investigated in strict accordance with a strict technique" (2). 
The background belief here is that analysis is an impediment to emotion, and that it is 
the emotional response which deserves priority. 
A detailed examination of Bodkin's work is unnecessary here, but it is important 
to outline the problems with trying to employ "race memories" or a collective 
unconscious as the basis of observed similarities in narrative or motif (not least because 
these problems are sufficient reason for the rejection of such accounts). Theories like 
this, which talk of a psychic unity of mankind, possess considerable intuitive appeal -
and Bodkin urges us to content ourselves with intuition as reason enough to follow her. 
Rather than attempt to address the question of how racial memories are supposed to 
work, she sidesteps the issue, claiming: "It is not necessary for our purpose to determine 
exactly the method of this 'biological inheritance' from our ancestors" (24). But 
attractive as the idea of archetypes emerging from a collective unconscious might be. 
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the theory is difficult to accept. The main problem - a problem Bodkin inherits from 
Jung - is the nature of the racial memory proposed, and the method of transmission. 
Any account of race memory, i f we are to assume it is anything hke memory in the 
usual sense of the word, will rely on the transmission of acquired characteristics - what 
is often called Lamarckian inheritance.^^ There is almost nothing in contemporary 
biology to recommend such a theory, nor was the state of the Darwinian version of 
inheritance so misunderstood when either Jung or Bodkin were writing that their theory 
here can be excused on historical grounds. The problems are manifold. The experiences 
that supposedly feed into the collective unconscious are not the experiences of the 
individual, but of the individual's ancestors - ancestors who were themselves 
individuals, and so presumably equally unable to "store" memories in the fashion that 
the collective unconscious demands. That the experiences are "numberiess" is also 
irrelevant, as there is no reason to suppose that the frequency of the experiences of our 
descendants would increase the likelihood of those experiences being indelibly 
imprinted on the structure of the mind (as the theory seems to suggest), anymore than 
one experience of one individual would be stored for genetic transmission to the next 
generation. (This is, in part, because memory is what is called by some philosophers a 
success term, which means that you can't truly remember something unless it actually 
happened whilst you were there.) A memory is an acquired characteristic. The notion of 
inheriting memory assumes that an experience of a descendant was somehow stored in a 
form transferable to successive generations. I f we are not to abandon the genetic theory 
entirely, this basically assumes that an experience was transferred within an individual's 
In his Philosophic Zoologique of 1809, Lamarck claimed that "numerous repetitions of... organized 
activities strengthen, stretch, develop and even create the organs necessary to them. .. .every change that 
is wrought in an organ through a habit of frequently using it, is subsequently preserved by reproduction... 
. Such a change is thus handed on to all succeeding individuals in the same environment" (in Dampier and 
Dampier, eds. Readings in the Literature of Science 205). 
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lifetime from their memory to their gametes - gametes which, in the case of females, 
are in place and fixed in the ovaries from before birth. So even i f we do allow for sperm 
(which, unlike ova, are synthesized throughout adult life) to carry memories somehow, 
there is still only a race memory for half the race (something which, as a woman. 
Bodkin might be expected to resist^^). 
So, the notion of a collective unconscious is no more viable than the standard 
examples of the inheritance of acquired characteristics (giraffes' necks growing longer 
as each generation stretches a little more, mice whose tails are amputated at birth 
eventually splitting off into a sub-species of tailless mice, and so on), but it is perhaps 
easier to believe. With the mechanics of acquisition now concealed in mental processes, 
talk of inherited memories appeals to lingering Cartesian intuitions about the normal 
rules of biology not applying to res cogitans. The only method of transmission that 
could conceivably work is cultural; transmission through language or dance or art. But 
this is a much weaker version of "race memory," and hardly the type of mechanism that 
would satisfy the Jungian account Bodkin wants to use. In the interests of consistency, 
to accept Jung and Bodkin we have to reject Darwin, and the appeal of the collective 
unconscious seems insufficient to justify this. 
Although this biological refutation of Bodkin's project may seem a little too 
literal-minded, it is intended to underline quite how distant much of literary studies is 
from criteria used in the sciences for the evaluation of theories. That Jung's theories 
could go as far as they have in literary studies highlights a more serious incompatibility: 
the easy acceptance and stubborn retention of implausible ideas like the collective 
The only possible escape route here would seem to be mitochondrial DNA, which are passed 
exclusively from mother to child, but micochondrial DNA have no effect on phenotypic development. 
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unconscious widens the rift between literary studies and the sciences. The implications 
are quite broad, as Joseph Carroll underlines: 
This kind of scholasticism isolates literary study from the forces of 
progressive understanding within the larger intellectual community, and it 
eliminates the methodological constraints with which other disciplines 
establish their intellectual validity. (Evolution and Literarv Theory 27) 
There are few other subjects where it would it be acceptable to shrug off the demand for 
a feasible mechanism as Bodkin does (when she says "[i] t is not necessary for our 
purpose to determine exactly the method of this 'biological inheritance' from our 
ancestors" [24]). Carroll wants to argue that accounts like this, which lack empirical 
footing and so fail to conceptually integrate with the sciences, have encouraged literary 
criticism's affiliation with relativistic, often anti-scientific philosophies; principally 
those lumped under poststructuralism. But not all critics of the poststructuralist 
movement are so sure of the relationship. For John M . Ellis, who shares many of 
Carroll's concerns, it is not a lack of objectivity in literary criticism that has led to the 
shift towards relativism, but rather, that the proliferation of pseudo-objective accounts 
inevitably provoked a relativist-driven backlash. According to Ellis, who is strongly 
opposed to the presence of theory in the literary academy (and in particular the often 
subjectivist, anti-establishment criticism found in what he brands "race-gender-class" 
criticism), the real invasion has not been the external threat of Marxist and Feminist 
perspectives that Frye spoke of, but come instead from within literary studies and 
spread outwards, even as a response to the formalisation. As Ellis has it in Literature 
Lost: 
the overambitious systematizing tendencies of Frye and of French 
structuralism provoked a reaction, and by the 1960s the newest version of 
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anti-objectivism had appeared. It is this latest swing of the pendulum that 
race-gender-class scholars are part of. Another manifestation of this 
reactive development is reader-response theory.... Still another is the strain 
of deconstructionism that stresses the infinite deferral of meaning in 
language. (193) 
The systematising of Frye and the structuralists is apparently not the type of 
"objectivism" that Ellis sees as appropriate for literary studies, and his argument here is 
a little weak. When he talks of "the mood swings of the field - from attraction to 
controlled scientific methods to distaste for them and back again" (193-94), he seems to 
be implying that the pendulum would swing anyway, as a matter of rhythmic historical 
necessity, and Frye is blamed simply because he was at the end of the last swing. 
Taxonomic systems of the type Frye and Polti suggest will always meet with resistance, 
with the principal objection grounded in accusations of reductionism. As detailed above, 
what systems like Polti's threaten is a reduction of literature to expressions of formulae 
- formulae which precede the individual creative act, which underpin literary texts in 
ways which seem to erode the creativity of the author; removing the conscious authorial 
element, and replacing it with an unconscious, automatic one. This is not the death of 
the author which Barthes spoke of, but something closer to the death of creativity, or at 
least the death of the Romantic notion of creativity. 
The central question here is whether a materialist, scientific theory of literary 
creation demands the rejection of anything like the traditional notion of creativity. 
Certainly, a materialist account will be sure to reject any conception of artistic creativity 
that defined it with reference to an immaterial source. That the Romantic (and 
vernacular) conception of creativity does just this goes some way to explaining the 
familiar hostility directed toward the project (or threat) of codifying and categorising 
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imagination. Polti complained: " I hear myself accused, with much violence, of an intent 
to 'ki l l imagination'" (124). It is as i f creativity is something of a Golden Goose - it will 
work so long as we don't try to find out the mechanism. It is quite possible to read the 
story of the Golden Goose as concealing a moral deeply opposed to scientific 
investigation - this is the lot of those greedy for knowledge; impatient, ungrateful to 
providence. This is the scientist who, as Wordsworth had it, murders to dissect, and who 
cummings saw as paying too much attention to the "syntax of things"; their "naughty 
thumb[s]" rudely probing nature's beauty.""^  Here again, analysis impedes (and even 
precludes) both the experience of the artwork and the act of creation itself. Scientific 
understanding threatens to demystify and mechanise creativity. In the introduction to his 
Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett writes of how such demystification might be 
regrettable: "It might be like the loss of childhood innocence, which is definitely a loss, 
even if it is well recompensed" (22-23). 
The critic keen to share in the prestige of scientific recognition and willing to 
offer literature up to empirical scrutiny must be willing to accept that the analysis may 
yield an undesirable result: it is not guaranteed that creativity will survive the operation, 
and even less certain that an empirical account of literary creativity could support an 
evaluative distinction between high and low art. The following section looks in some 
detail at two attempts to analyse literary creativity in highly reductive (and at least 
proto-scientific) terms: first, through linguistics; and secondly, through computer 
Here, first nature and science are opposed, and secondly, analysis and experience, or thought and 
feeling. So e. e. cummings writes: "since feeling is first / who pays any attention / to the syntax of things / 
will never wholly kiss you;" ("since feeling is first," Complete Poems 290), and again: "O sweet 
spontaneous / earth how often have / the / doting // fingers of / prurient philosophers pinched / and / 
poked // thee / ,has the naughty thumb / of science prodded / thy / beauty" ("O sweet spontaneous earth," 
Complete Poems 46). The thumb here is likely a reference to Whitman's "Spontaneous Me," where he 
describes the penis as the "thumb of love" (line 13) (Complete Poems 138). This equation of knowledge 
with violation, nature's innocence being corrupted by humanity's hunger for rational explanation, 
stretches back to Genesis, and remains a familiar theme, particularly for poets, which Richard Dawkins 
moves against in Unweaving the Rainbow. 
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simulations of creativity. Just as linguistics served as the springboard and model for 
structuralism, which sought to understand the mind through systems more or less 
analogous with language; so computer simulations attempt to understand and integrate 
creativity into a computational model of the mind/brain. Both accounts assume 
creativity to be explicable in atomistic terms. 
Applying the methods of linguistics to literary analysis apparently offers a 
means of grounding criticism's evaluative claims in something more substantial than a 
traditional consensus, and so provides a response to accusations of unfounded eUtism. 
Sometimes called styhstics, the approach is, as Stanley Fish has it, at least "an attempt 
to put criticism on a scientific basis" ("What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying 
Such Terrible Things About It?" 109). The hope is that linguistics will disclose some 
difference between the literary and the non-literary text. However, it is not at all clear 
that any such linguistic distinction exists to be found. A. L. Binns sounds a cautionary 
note: 
it is entirely possible that the many objective differences which would be 
revealed by a complete linguistic description of Shakespeare's Sonnets and 
of a theatre programme would not of themselves permit us to distinguish 
between the similarly complete descriptions of two other texts and say 
with confidence that one was literature and one was not. (118) 
A linguistic analysis might exhaust the text and still not find anything like "literary 
quality" as it is spoken of within conventional evaluative criticism. Of course, this 
doesn't necessarily mean it isn't there; it might be that a linguistic vocabulary is the 
wrong sort with which to talk about literary quality. As Binns goes on to point out, "[the 
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linguistic] method becomes dangerous only when it assumes that it has, by completing a 
dissection and finding no soul, disproved the existence of any soul" (119)."*' 
One of the first and most influential attempts to analyse literature linguistically 
was conducted by the Czech linguist Roman Jakobson, a founder of the Prague 
Linguistic Circle. Jakobson's aim was to disclose what he called the "literariness" of 
Hterary texts. His approach relied heavily on analysing a text's internal structure, and so 
discovering, by the performance of a meticulous linguistic analysis, patterns of 
opposition and repetition that would normally be invisible to even the most sensitive 
reader. Jakobson's work, building upon that of Ferdinand de Saussure,'*^ was seminal to 
structural linguistics, which promised scientific analyses of texts, revealing a depth in 
literary productions absent in other writing. Just as microscopy had reinvigorated the 
biological sciences, the specialised tools of linguistics were to disclose hidden structures 
and regularities which might explain in a technical manner the more familiar properties 
and quahties apparent at the surface. Tzvetan Todorov, writing in 1969 (by which time 
the project was as good as bankrupt), sums up the hopes invested in the method: "the 
structural analysis of literature is a kind of propaedeutic for a future science of 
literature" ("Structural Analysis of Narrative" 71). 
Jakobson took structuralism beyond linguistics and into the study of literature. 
In a series of essays, including "Linguistics and Poetics" (Language in Literature 62-94) 
Of course, to a materialist - an especially an eliminativist - finding no soul in dissection would actually 
be quite compelling evidence that no soul existed to be found. In this respect, his point is perhaps a little 
misleading. However, substituting "soul" for something less ontologically problematic like "personality" 
or "capacity to suffer" retains his general point and is less open to argument on these grounds. 
Unfortunately, this only opens up another problem; namely, is literary quality more like a soul or a 
capacity to suffer? That is, might it be like pain, both felt and explicable in physical terms (in this case, 
perhaps nerve fibres, or particular neural structures), or, might it be like a soul, and open to elimination as 
an illusory epiphenomenon of causally prior and physically describable structures. 
''^  In lectures given between 1907 and 1911, Saussure had proposed a shift in linguistic thought from the 
then-prevalent historical study of language origin and change, to an analytic study, where the focus would 
be upon how language fiinctioned as a system. 
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and "Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry" (121-144),'*^ Jakobson set forth a 
program for the hnguistic analysis of literary texts. He believed that poetics, understood 
as asking "What makes a verbal message a work of art?", was "entitled to the leading 
place in literary studies" (63). The rationale for this comes by way of an appealingly 
tight (and curiously familiar) syllogism. Jakobson arguing that: "Poetics deals with 
problems of verbal structure, just as the analysis of painting is concerned with pictorial 
structure. Since linguistics is the global science of verbal structure, poetics may be 
regarded as an integral part of linguistics" (63). He draws poetics into the f ield of 
linguistics in the same way that materialists like Wilson draw the other disciplines into 
physics. The logic is that of the reductionist who claims that since everything is made of 
matter, and physics is the study of matter, everything can be studied by physics. Since 
literature was made of language, i t followed that an analysis of the language would be 
an analysis of the whole work, with no remainder. 
In this fashion, Jakobson conducted detailed and exhaustive hnguistic analyses 
of poems, including Sonnet 129 ("Shakespeare's Verbal Ar t in 'Th ' Expense of Spirit , '" 
Language and Literature [198-215] and, in collaboration with Levi-Strauss, an analysis 
of Baudelaire's "Les Chats" [180-197]). One of the virtues of the structuralist approach 
to literature, as Jakobson saw it, was its ability to scrutinise the text under examination 
at unprecedented levels of detail. In their analysis of Baudelaire's "Les Chats," Levi-
Strauss and Jakobson spent some 16 pages, nearly 7000 words, on an exclusively 
linguistic analysis of a fourteen-line poem. The discussion avoids all digressions into 
biography, Hterary allusion, or thematic concerns. Consequently, to readers 
''^  There is something telling about Jakobson's use of this phrase - the word order prioritises 'The Poetry 
of Grammar," suggesting he was always more in awe of the beauty of grammar than of poetry. The title 
almost makes an equivalence between the aesthetic pleasure to be had from studying grammar and the 
aesthetic pleasures of poetry. Given that Jakobson is primarily a linguist, this is perhaps unsurprising, and 
it is probably a deliberate move. 
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unacquainted with linguistic terminology, it is only occasionally cogent, and displays 
interests in different features than conventional criticism; for example: " . . . the cats 
manage to identify themselves with the grands sphinx. A chain of paranomasias, linked 
to these key words and combining nasal vowels with continuant dentals and labials, 
reinforces the metamorphosis" (190)."^ Whilst Jakobson's interest in the relationship 
between linguistic texture and semantic content is familiar in literary criticism (as when 
rhythm is said to modify tone, for example), the detail of his technical vocabulary when 
discussing linguistic features ("continuant dentals," and so on) far outstrips that usually 
found in literary criticism (particularly in an academy where even rudimentary prosody 
is usually avoided in scholarly analyses of poems). In short, Jakobson's are readings for 
a specialist audience, unashamedly employing the vocabulary of that specialism. 
Although his subject matter - poems - may be unfamiliar to fellow linguists more 
accustomed to the analysis of transcribed conversation, the approach toward that subject 
matter is not. Conversely, although the literary critic may feel at home with the subject 
matter, he or she is liable to be alienated by the approach. 
Through this sort of analysis, Jakobson seemingly finds ingenuity in every 
syllable of the poem. Baudelaire is not the only poet able to be profitably unpacked in 
this way; he goes on to produce another detailed reading, this time of Shakespeare's 
Sonnet 129, "Th ' Expense of Spirit." Once again, the analysis is both extraordinarily 
thorough and almost entirely avoids digression into semantic content and the broader 
thematic issues typical of conventional literary criticism. Reinforcing the similarities 
with a science paper, Jakobson breaks his essay into such sub-sections as "Rhymes," 
And again: 'The remarkable rhyme which hnks the two tercets r"un reve sans f in" (line 11) and "un 
sable fin" (line 13)] is the only homonymous rhyme in the whole sonnet and the only one among its 
masculine rhymes which juxtaposes different parts of speech. There is also a certain syntactic symmetry 
between the two rhyme words, since both end subordinate clauses, one of which is complete, the other 
elliptical" (192). 
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"Strophes," "Lines," "Spelling" and "Punctuation." By the end of the 6000 words of the 
essay, Jakobson seems to have exhausted the 110 words of the sonnet, but adds a tenth 
section, somewhat cautiously entitled "Anagrams?" (213), where, picking up on a clue 
f rom Sonnet 76 - "every word doth almost tell my name," Jakobson scours Sonnet 129 
for support. Predictably, the evidence is found, but now even Jakobson seems a little 
sceptical: 
Since in wordplays Shakespeare was prone to equate the vocables w i l l and 
well , the entire concluding couplet could - perhaps! - conceal a second, 
facetious autobiographical reading: " A l l this [is] the world W i l l knows, yet 
none knows W i l l to shun the heaven that leads men to this hell." (214 -
substitution Jakobson's) 
It is as i f even Jakobson is beginning to doubt the validity of his findings. Part of his 
motivation for conducting this particular analysis was a reaction against what he called 
"forced, oversimplified, and diluting interpretations" (215), but also to offer a corrective 
to those critics (he names Laura Riding and Robert Graves, and their essay "Wil l i am 
Shakespeare and E. E. Cummings") who would substitute a simplistic reading for an 
over-interpretation: "there is a far-reaching distance f rom [Shakepeare's] puns and 
double meanings to the surmise of the free and infinite multiplicity of semantic load 
attributed to Sonnet 129 by [Riding and Graves]" (215). What Jakobson sees himself as 
doing is replacing this free-interpretation (notably a semantic rather than syntactic or 
phonetic interpretation) with "an objective scrutiny of Shakespeare's language and 
verbal art" to reveal "the cogent and mandatory unity of its thematic and compositional 
framework" (215). 
Impressive though these readings are, they invite us to commit a version of 
Wimsatt and Beardsley's intentional fallacy, and wonder i f Baudelaire or Shakespeare 
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had any idea of the Hnguistic complexity - the manifold oppositions, the contrasting 
strophes and rhymes - that Jakobson finds. Frye recognised this as a common objection: 
"Critics of Shakespeare are often supposed to be ridiculed by the assertion that i f 
Shakespeare were to come back f rom the dead he would not be able to appreciate or 
even understand their criticism" (Anatomy 5). And it seems Jakobson, too, was alert to 
this potential for scepticism: 
Whenever and wherever I discuss the phonological and grammatical 
texture of poetry, and whatever the language and epoch of the poems 
examined, one question constantly arises among the readers or listeners: 
are the designs disclosed by linguistic analysis deliberately and rationally 
planned in the creative work of the poet, and is he really aware of them? 
(Language in Literature 250) 
The answer comes in the affirmative: 
A calculus of probability as well as an accurate comparison of poetic texts 
with other kinds of verbal messages demonstrates that the striking 
particularities in the poetic selection, accumulation, juxtaposition, 
distribution, and exclusion of diverse phonological and grammatical 
classes cannot be viewed as negligible accidentals governed by the rule of 
chance. Any significant poetic composition, whether it is an improvisation 
or the frui t of long and painstaking labour, implies a goal-orientated choice 
of verbal material. (250) 
The first claim in this answer, that an "accurate comparison" of poetic and non-poetic 
texts reveals distinctive features, is worth clarifying in light of the type of features 
Jakobson is interested in . Given the criteria suggested for examination 
("...juxtaposition, distribution, and exclusion of diverse phonological and grammatical 
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classes..."), it seems safe to assume that by "accurate comparison," he is thinking of a 
specifically linguistic analysis and comparison. The second claim, that the choice of 
verbal material is "goal orientated," is relatively uncontroversial. But it also slips past 
the question: no one doubts that poets usually have goals in mind when they write."*^ We 
assume and accept that the poet is trying to evoke pity or wonder or whatever by a 
choice of certain words, but this is largely a semantic operation, and Jakobson is 
describing not a level of semantic sophistication, but a syntactic one. The scepticism as 
regards Jakobson's analyses arises f rom a sense of incredulity at the extent of the 
"choices" he thinks a writer makes. It is one thing to carefully choose words so as bring 
to mind a certain image (and to some extent, to f ind echoes such as, say, assonance, or 
rhyme), but quite another to simultaneously control, with the level of detail Jakobson 
retrieves, "the phonemic, morphological, and syntactic framework" (250) into which 
those words w i l l f i t ; particularly when it is unlikely that anyone but a trained linguist 
would even recognise the available complexity. Yet it gradually becomes apparent that 
Jakobson doesn't think that the authors are consciously controlling these things, and that 
they are consequently not fu l ly aware of the rich texture of their own writings -
problematising an issue of authorial decision making that he had made seem quite 
straightforward. 
This becomes clear when the poet under analysis is, unlike Shakespeare or 
Baudelaire, available to respond. Jakobson records how the Russian Velimir 
Xlebnikov,'^'' looking back at his poem "The Grasshopper," realised that "throughout its 
first, crucial sentence . . . each of the sounds k, r, 1, and u occurs f ive times" and this, 
adds Xlebnikov, " 'without any wish of the one who wrote this nonsense'" (qtd. in 
There are exceptions here, hke the "automatic writing" of the surreahsts and beats. 
Sometimes "Khlebnikov" - 1 have retained the spelling used by Pomorska and Rudy in Language and 
Literature. 
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Jakobson, Language and Literature 251 and 263). He is thus added to "all those poets 
who acknowledged that a complex verbal design may be inherent in their work 
irrespective of their apprehension and volit ion" (251). This is far f rom the "goal-
orientated choice of verbal material" at the root of poetry that was supposed to ensure 
the reality of Jakobson's discoveries. Whatever is informing Xlebnikov's poetry on this 
level, it isn't choice (unless Jakobson has in mind some sort of "unconscious choice," 
which doesn't seem to be a particularly coherent notion). Presumably recognising this, 
Jakobson does include a modification, a clause that allows for "the relevance of the 
phonemic ... framework" to "remain outside of [the author's] awareness, bu t . . . the 
poet and his receptive reader nevertheless spontaneously apprehend the artistic 
advantage of a context embedded with those components over a similar one devoid of 
them" (250-51). Quite how these recognitions are made (and the somewhat question-
begging introduction of "sensitive readers" - sensitive to what? - surely the very 
property under analysis) is not elaborated upon. It seems clear, however, that what 
Jakobson is outlining here is a theory of authorship that credits the poet with more than 
just the achievements he was aware of (and, something like crediting a person with 
being unusually tall, this is a reward for an achievement you had no choice in making or 
didn't know you had made). 
The ingenuity, however, apparently does not stop here: "Xlebnikov failed to 
recognize the much wider range of those regular phonological recurrences" (251). 
Jakobson rather audaciously goes on to detail the f u l l linguistic depth that Xlebnikov 
himself had not noticed, and (it follows) that he had certainly not consciously intended. 
The reason given for this is a discrepancy between the poet's ability as a poet and his 
ability as a critic, and a corollary that these two abilities are not linked: "The poet's 
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metalanguage may lag far behind his poetic language, and Xlebnikov proves i t " (253).'*^ 
Frye had said something similar more than a decade before, "Criticism can talk, and all 
the arts are dumb" (Anatomy 4). He makes few concessions to the artist: 
The poet may of course have some critical ability of his own, and so be 
able to talk about his work. But the Dante who writes a commentary on the 
first canto of the Paradiso is merely one more of Dante's critics. What he 
says has a peculiar interest, but not a peculiar authority. It is generally 
accepted that a critic is a better judge of the value of a poem than its 
creator, but there is a still a lingering notion that it is somehow ridiculous 
to regard the critic as the final judge of its meaning, even though in 
practice it is clear that he must be. (5) 
The motivation for such a stance, one which seems to leave the poet as something of an 
awkward but necessary stage on the way to criticism, is strategic. It is a way of getting 
criticism clear f rom accusations of parasitism: "The notion that the poet necessarily is or 
could be the definitive interpreter of himself or the theory of literature belongs to the 
conception of the critic as parasite or jackal" (6). Note that Frye conflates two different 
points here, (1) the writer would be a poor interpreter of the theory of literature, and (2) 
the writer would be a poor interpreter of himself. Whilst the first of these does seem 
plausible (there is, after all , no reason why the poet need be well-read or even interested 
in other people's books; he or she may have no concept of literature in its totality), the 
second is a little more puzzling. Whilst Jakobson's work with Xlebnikov seems to give 
support to Frye's argument, it is diff icul t to see how the author might not have access to 
the meaning of his own work. 
''^  Jakobson seems almost dismayed by Xlebnikov's inattentiveness, complaining about "the substantial 
gaps in his observations concerning the quintuple pattern of the discussed tristich," and "even more when 
in the next sentence of the same essay he deplores the lack of such arrangement in his militant quatrain ... 
and thus surprisingly loses sight of its six quintets" (253). 
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What Frye's formulation does is to invert the "folk-theory" of literary criticism, 
what he calls "the absurd quantum formula," whereby "a critic should confine himself 
to 'getting out' of a poem exactly what the poet may vaguely assumed to have been 
aware of 'putting i n ' " (Anatomy 17). This doesn't seem so absurd whilst we still have 
an interest in the poet's abilities as distinct f rom those of the critic. Frye's opinion that 
the poet has no special claims to understand his own work is consonant with his analogy 
between physics and poetry: 
Physics is an organized body of knowledge about nature, and a student of 
it says that he is learning physics, not nature. Art, like nature, has to be 
distinguished f rom the systematic study of it , which is criticism. It is 
therefore impossible to "learn literature": one learns about i t in a certain 
way, but what one learns, transitively, is the criticism of literature. 
(Anatomy 11) 
For Frye, to achieve a systematic criticism demands we recognise that literature is an 
object of study, rather than a subject (11), and that as a completed object, the 
circumstances of creation are not an issue: "Criticism, rather, is to art what history is to 
action and philosophy to wisdom: a verbal imitation of a human productive power 
which in itself does not speak" (12). The way Frye describes it , the poet doesn't just 
seem dumb in the (presumably intended) sense of "mute," but also a little dumb in the 
sense of "stupid," or at the least, unaware, incongruously inarticulate. When Frye and 
Jakobson write about poets, i t is as i f the poets had no real grasp of what they were 
doing, as i f they were just f lai l ing and helpless, waiting to made great by the superior 
critical skills of others. For Frye, this seems especially true: "Whatever popularity 
Shakespeare and Keats have now is . . . the result of the publicity of criticism" (4). 
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In trying to enable writers to escape f rom what he calls this theory of authorial 
ignorance, E. D . Hirsch makes a distinction here between an understanding of the 
meaning and an understanding of the subject matter (Validity in Interpretation 20). It 
may be, he claims, that the interpreter knows more about, or has a clearer conception of, 
the subject matter than the author, and so finds himself able to draw f rom the author's 
text details that the author was unaware of having included. But whilst this fits the 
example Hirsch uses of Kant's reading of Plato (20), it doesn't seem to be'the case 
when Frye is claiming that although the author supplies the words, i t is the reader that 
brings the meaning. Hirsch allows that there may be features of a text which seem to 
contribute to the meaning, but of which the author is unaware. In a case very similar to 
Jakobson's exchange with Xlebnikov, he uses the example of a linguist subjecting 
casual conversation to stylistic analysis: " ' D i d you know that those last two sentences of 
yours had parallel constructions which emphasized their similarity of meaning?'" To 
which the speaker replies: " 'No! How clever of me! I suppose I really did want to 
emphasize the similarity, though I wasn't aware of that, and I had no idea I was using 
rhetorical devices to do i t ' " (Hirsch 21). Here, the author appears to have 
unintentionally inserted meaning - but as Hirsch points out: "How can an author mean 
something that he did not mean?": 
The answer to that question is simple. It is not possible to mean what one 
does not mean, though it is very possible to mean what one is not 
conscious of meaning. That is the entire issue in the argument based on 
authorial ignorance. That a man may not be conscious of all that he means 
is no more remarkable than that he may not be conscious of all that he 
does. There is a difference between meaning and consciousness of 
meaning... (22) 
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He goes on to make a distinction between "attended" and "unattended" meanings, by 
analogy with consciousness and self-consciousness. This allows the author in a self-
congratulatory mood to claim any "meanings" thus revealed as evidence of his 
cleverness, but throws up a problem with intention that impacts upon how we allocate 
praise. 
The poet in Frye and Jakobson is intellectually inert, almost animalistic or 
autistic in his or her ability to write well and seemingly fai l to fu l l y realise what they 
have done. This opens a telling analogy between how Frye and Jakobson treat poets and 
how physicists treat athletes. Neuroscientist Wi l l i am Calvin investigated how hunters 
and sportsmen threw spears and balls with such accuracy, calculating the "launch 
window" for when a swinging arm must release a missile: too late and the missile hits 
the floor, too early and it sails of f into the sky (Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow 301). 
For what he calls "a reasonable beginner's throw" ("A Stone's Throw. . ." 125); hitting a 
rabbit-sized target approximately four metres away (a task that most able-bodied 
persons could perform), he found the launch window was about 11 milliseconds wide. 
The launch window shrinks rapidly, as Calvin underlines: "Hitting the same target f rom 
twice the distance with equal reliability [8 out of 10] means releasing within a launch 
window about eight times narrower, IA msec." (How Brains Think 97).^ *^ Further: "An 
eight-fold decrease in total launch window occurs when the distance doubles, a 27-fold 
decrease when distance triples" ("A Stone's Throw and Its Launch Window" 125). This 
assumes a stationary target and a stationary thrower. Needless to say, the physics behind 
a sprinting cricketer catching and almost immediately throwing a ball whilst running all 
the while (and still successfully striking the stumps f rom twenty metres) is significantly 
See Calvin, "A Stone's Throw and its Launch Window," esp. 124-125. For a summary, Calvin, How 
Brains Think 97. 
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more complex.'*^ A parallel can be found in most ball sports. Clearly, the athlete 
involved is not consciously making the calculations necessary - not, at least, on the 
level the physicists recognise, of working out trajectory, velocity, direction, and taking 
into account wind speed, release time, and the force necessary relative to the mass of the 
projectile. On paper, the task seems impossibly diff icult , and certainly beyond what we 
would credit the mind with being capable of within the time available, and yet it 
palpably is possible, forcing us to recognise that there is a level of sophistication here 
far beyond the conscious intention of the person doing the action, or rather, because the 
intention is quite clear - make the missile connect with the target - i t is more correct to 
say that these actions are beyond the conscious calculation of the actor. The calculations 
and the physics behind realising this intention are where the actor's purpose and the 
mechanics of execution part ways. In light of the physicists' analysis, we gain a 
renewed respect for the achievement of the sportsman as a biological organism or 
machine, but not for the sportsman as a conscious agent. 
The way physicists treat sportsmen is comparable with the way literary critics 
treat creative writers. Is this what Jakobson and Frye have in mind when they call the 
writer dumb, unable to articulate or even recognise his own brilliance? Inasmuch as 
Frye thinks we need critics to fu l ly appreciate art, i t is apparent that just such an analogy 
is being made, albeit implicitly. I f this is the case, then our respect for the literacy of 
writers must be analogous to our respect for the mathematics of sportsmen; which is to 
say, it w i l l be tempered by a realisation that their achievements are on the whole 
unconscious, and that the cleverness is quite beyond their reckoning or volition. This 
seems to be an unavoidable consequence of adopting what Hirsch calls the doctrine of 
"semantic autonomy" (Validity in Interpretation 1). What is being admired is no longer 
49 See Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow 301, for anecdotal support for this. 
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someone's achievement, but the intricacy of nature, and this has important ramifications 
for how literary critics want to talk of great writers. I f Dante and Wordsworth don't 
know what they are doing (at least to the same extent that the critic knows what they are 
doing^**), then it becomes diff icul t to maintain an intentional vocabulary with regard to 
literary merit. With the text as object, we should no longer talk of "who" is being 
admired, but "what." 
This abduction of conscious intention is certainly in keeping with the analyses 
Jakobson conducts. Having discussed the linguistic depth present (and largely expected) 
in canonical literature, he begins to take examples f rom outside literature. Recall that 
Jakobson allows for sophistication not only in the fruits of "painstaking labor" but also 
in "improvisation" (Language and Literature 250). To illustrate the potential complexity 
even in improvisation, Jakobson finds in an off-the-cuff comment by Turgenev (a 
seven-word list, rattled o f f at a dinner) all the phonetic richness and poetic texture that 
he had found in Baudelaire and Shakespeare ("Supraconscious Turgenev,"^' Language 
in Literature 262-66). And not only here, but in poHtical slogans; Dwight Eisenhower's 
apparently simple " I like Ike" campaign concealing an unrecognised complexity in the 
pairing of "-ike" and "Ike."^^ Jakobson seems to f ind this structure and poetic texture in 
all places equally, like some background hum that emanates f rom all writing -
undermining his belief that "an accurate comparison of poetic texts with other kinds of 
°^ As Hirsch was aware, it also becomes a problem for the critic to maintain that he is fully in control of 
the meanings of his own language. 
^' The comment apparently translates as "Radish! Pumpkin! Mare! Turnip! Peasant Woman! Kasha! 
Kasha!" Jakobson deals with the Russian. It is interesting to note that both in this title, "Supraconscious 
Turgenev," and others - for example, "Subliminal Verbal Patterning in Poetry" (Language in Literature 
250-261) - Jakobson deliberately emphasises the non-conscious dimension to the aspects of writing that 
he is looking at. 
Jakobson writes: "Both cola of the trisyllabic formula T like / Ike' rhyme with each other, and the 
second of the two rhyming words is fully included in the first one (echo rhyme), /layk/ - /ayk/, a 
paranomastic image of a feeling which totally envelops its object. Both cola alliterate with each other, and 
the first of the two alliterating words is included in the second: /ay/ - /ayk/, a paranomastic image of the 
loving subject enveloped by the beloved object. The secondary, poetic function of this campaign slogan 
reinforces its impressiveness and efficacy" (Language and Literature 70). 
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verbal messages demonstrates . . . striking particularities in the poetic selection" (250). 
That the magic is everywhere he looks suggests that the magic is all Jakobson's, and 
exists not in the text but in the analyst (or at least, i f it does exist in the text, i t exists 
below the level of conscious decision, and so throws into question the extent to which 
we might want to credit the writer for i t) . This only brings us right back to where we 
started as regards lacking a linguistic basis upon which to found an ontological 
distinction between literature outwith fiction. 
It was always part of Jakobson's project to define rationally and rigorously the 
unique features of specifically literary texts, prompting his famous comment that "the 
subject of literary scholarship is not literature but literariness, that is, that which makes 
of a given work a work of literature" ("Modem Russian Poetry" 62). But Jakobson's 
conviction here that "literariness" exists as a property that could be teased-out of a text, 
isolated, and described by linguistics has proved to be more problematic than at first 
hoped. A t its most mechanical, this is what Binns called the Fermat theorem of 
literature: "a formula in linguistic terms which w i l l generate literature and only 
literature" (120), an approach which for Binns "reflects a computer age at its worst" 
(121). The problem, once again, is related to the difference held to exist between 
Hterature, which is ideally irreducible, and generic fiction, which is likely to be 
formulaic. The Fermat theorem of literature, he explains: 
seems to assume that the study of language in the art of literature is the 
establishment of a formula of lowest common multiples, similar to that 
evidently used in the production of much successful entertainment, a 
repetition of previously successful elements to achieve an even greater 
success. (121) 
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It further assumes that " i t is possible to prescribe in linguistic terms alone the sufficient 
and necessary conditions for the production of all the sentences of the literature of the 
past, as well as those . . . of the future" (120). It is obvious that Jakobson holds nothing 
so crude in mind when he is talking about "literariness," and likely that in fact no one 
seriously holds such a mechanistic view of hterature, and that the Fermat theorist is just 
a straw man. But as a thought experiment, the results are illustrative of the background 
beliefs about the differences between literature and generic fiction: even i f an algorithm 
for creating fiction could be found then it would stretch only to the creation of 
"successful entertainment" (that is, popular or sub-literary fiction) and as it would not 
also produce literature (could not, in fact, produce literature), it maintains the qualitative 
difference between genre fiction (which can be formulaic) and literary fiction (which 
resists such formulation). Literature begins to seem by definition to be just that kind of 
writing that is impossible to formulate.^^ 
Added to which, these hnguistic analyses, though rigorous, seem to fal l short of 
what we might hope literary criticism to achieve. As mentioned, there is no talk of the 
text's subject matter or semantic content. Wi th this comes the complaint that stylistics is 
contentless - that its readings, for all their technical sophistication, fai l to explain 
anything to us. Fish sees this as deep problem for the approach: 
The machinery of categorization and classification merely provides 
momentary pigeonholes for the constituents of a text, constituents which 
are then retrieved and reassembled into exactly the form they previously 
This, in effect, is another version of Frye's claim that literature "is, so far as we know, an inexhaustible 
source of new critical discoveries, and would be even i f new works of literature ceased to be written" 
(Anatomy 17). For this to be the case, the intention of the author (which was limited at the time of 
writing) must take a backseat to the interpretative faculties of the critic (which have no limits and can be 
endlessly renewed). This is an enormously profitable strategy for the continuation of literary criticism, 
and apparently still fashionable - here is Paul H. Fry (writing in 1999), who concludes that literature is 
just "that form of discourse which is not exhausted by interpretation" ("Beneath Interpretation: Intention 
and the Experience of Literature." Fuller and Waugh 164-179. 179). 
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had. There is in short no gain in understanding; the procedure has been 
executed but it hasn't gotten you anywhere. ("What Is Stylistics..." 112) 
Of course, there is no demand to conduct exclusively linguistic readings, and a stylistic 
analysis could simply be supplemented with sections that discussed thematic matters. 
We could still have a rigorous analysis in the linguistic mould, but now one that was 
supplemented by the type of emotional response or thematic reading typical of much 
conventional interpretive criticism. But the conventional sections, being the only bits we 
were actually interested in, would remain as unsupported as before. The linguistic 
method offers no foundations whatsoever for evaluative criticism. Whatever 
implications the method has for literary texts are an incidental feature of its having 
implications for all texts. 
Aware of these limitations, but reluctant to concede that a rigorous methodology 
was wholly inapplicable to the analysis of literary texts, Tzvetan Todorov argued that to 
bring to bear directly the methods of linguistic analysis is to be taken in by the "too-
obvious relationship" between language and literature that says that as literature is made 
of language, an analysis of the language would be an analysis of the whole work. This is 
to be overly concerned with "language as material," when the more interesting relation 
is "rather with language as model" (The Poetics of Prose 19). And whilst Todorov 
would probably hold with Jakobson in saying that "poetics may be regarded as an 
integral part of linguistics" (Language and Literature 63), as Jonathan Culler explains, 
for Todorov, poetics "is based on linguistics but is not simply an application of 
linguistic categories to the language of literature" (intro. to Todorov, The Poetics of 
Frye reached the same conclusion: "Shakespeare, we say, was one of a group of English dramatists 
working around 1600, and also one of the great poets of the world. The first part of this is a statement of 
fact, the second a value-judgement so generally accepted as to pass for a statement of fact. But it is not a 
statement of fact. It remains a value-judgement, and not a shred of systematic evidence can ever be 
attached to it" (Anatomy 20). 
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Prose 9-10). Although Todorov makes a distinction between his type of poetics and 
straightforward linguistic readings, his early criticism is remarkably similar to linguistic 
readings insofar as it seeks to remove itself f rom interpretation altogether - Todorov 
limiting his discussion to the same type of systematically describable features of the text 
that Jakobson was looking at. This, explains James Bennett, is because Todorov, like 
Frye (and in a recurrent motive for those trying to scientise the discipline), wants to 
eliminate f rom literary study "the 'external' - history, culture, biography, 
psychoanalysis, Marxism" (Bennett 134), because, in Todorov's words, it "reduces 
literature to the status of mere material which illustrates a subject other than i t s e l f 
("Structuralism and Literature" 154-155; qtd. in Bennett 134). What emerges f rom this 
is a method at once rigorous but limited, and in similar ways to Jakobson's. For 
Bennett, this is unduly restrictive: 
We discern here Todorov's persistent effort to delimit "literature" as an 
autonomous object for scientific study, and to that extent we can fol low 
him. But his rejection of the "world" and the whole concrete text as 
elements of the proper study of literature raises issues so fundamental to 
the whole enterprise of literature that we can wish Todorov had examined 
his postulates more thoroughly. (135) 
Todorov's refusal to assimilate content with context, that is, the removal of historical 
and cultural relevance for the text, is the price paid for his rigour, but for Bennett, it is 
too much, and rather than ground literary value in unassailable empirical facts, his 
restricted approach instead only "contributes to the continued diminution of the 
importance of literature to l i f e " (139). 
This is much the same problem that seemingly faces any technical treatment of 
literature, and seems to be a direct consequence of adopting such an approach. Faced 
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with charges of elitism and arbitrary value codes, the promise of a rigorous and 
empirically defensible method of analysis seems to offer a means of supporting the 
established system by demonstrating its compatibility with scientific rationalism. But 
the irony is that such systems are indifferent to value and, i f successfully implemented, 
may not support the canon but dissolve it. Rather than ground claims for literary value, 
an approach like Jakobson's instead makes it not matter what type of texts you examine. 
I f Shakespeare can yield as good a result as an advertising slogan, that is, i f all types of 
writing are inexhaustible in the sense Frye spoke of, then the linguistic approach cannot 
support an account of literature which seeks to preserve an ontological distinction 
between the literary and the sub-literary. 
So it becomes apparent that the merit of literary productions lies below the radar 
of linguistics. The linguistic approach offers neither an explanation for creativity nor 
any support for evaluative claims. The difficulty is that with the promise of rigour 
comes a loss of value. Scientists are ideally disinterested in their object of study. 
Scientific enquiry is at least partially characterised by this disinterest: the cleverness is 
all in the method of analysis. Linguistics, insofar as it is scientific, shares this 
indifference towards its subject matter, and this is something Jakobson stresses, 
believing that "scientific poetics will become possible only when it refuses to offer 
value judgments. Wouldn't it be absurd for a linguist to ascribe values to dialects 
according to their relative merits?" ("Modem Russian Poetry" 59-60). Biologists are not 
considered to be any the poorer as scientists for studying bacteria rather than mammals. 
In the sciences, what counts is how the analysis is conducted, and there is (ideally, at 
least) little question of the status of the subject matter. If the tools of literary analysis are 
anything like the tools of scientific analysis in this crucial respect, then what matters 
should not be the status of the subject matter but the skill of the analyst in how well 
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these tools are employed. Distinctions of value between literature and sub-literary 
fiction would be irrelevant. 
That just such a value system is paramount to the survival of literary studies as 
an autonomous discipline within the academy has been the central claim of many 
scholars who see the relativising of value as signalling the end of literary study in its 
present form. Books such as Harold Bloom's The Western Canon, Sven Birkett's The 
Gutenberg Elegies, and Alvin Keman's The Death of Literature, their authors 
pessimistic in an age where the book is an anachronism, see literary study as being an 
historical contingency, now gradually marginalised, or subsumed under the variety of 
electronic distractions available. Thinkers such as I . A. Richards, Frye, or Jakobson, had 
all in their own ways tried to secure a place for literary study in an academic 
environment increasingly receptive only to the empirical methods of the sciences. Their 
consistent failure to shore up value within these accounts leaves the canon as exposed 
and unstable as ever, insofar as whatever the empirical methods could support didn't 
include the value gradient necessary for the maintenance of a canonical order. In 
reaction to that failure, and in common with the traditional basis for a division between 
the arts and sciences, there has been a widespread rejection of the validity of the 
empirical method at all; that is, a tendency in humanities scholars to side against those 
sciences which reject them. 
In The Death of Literature (1990), Alvin Keman is worried about this. He sees a 
deep hostility to scientific modes of investigation of the arts expressed in a tendency for 
the arts to set themselves methodologically in opposition to the sciences: 
Scientific rationalism has been the official mode of knowledge in modem 
society, but the artist has inevitably been distinguished by the possession 
of its mirror opposite, an intuitive power to create art and literature out of 
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the creative imagination . . . . [W]hatever the poetry-making power has 
been called, romanticism has constantly made it the essential energy of 
creative literature, making lovelier and truer things than the rational mind 
can discover in its laboratories and with its computers. (19) 
Once again, here is the idea that rational analysis impedes or excludes emotion. This 
thinking supports an antagonistic relationship between the arts and sciences, one that, in 
Keman's view, literature cannot afford to maintain. By claiming for its own the intuitive 
faculties and creative wellspring of poetry (knowledge that science rationally cannot 
and ideologically will not touch), literature does not so much capitaUse on a gap in the 
market as drive itself further from scientific rationalism. When appeals to intuitive 
capacities are embraced, what is being tacitly resisted is the idea that creativity is 
analysable in the same way that natural phenomena are analysable. 
In the sciences, simulation is a type of understanding.^^ If a simulation obedient 
to a theory reproduces the expected natural conditions, then this counts as good 
evidence that the theory is correct. Biologists can demonstrate using relatively simple 
computer simulations that populations of predators and prey obey the expectations of 
their theories when the results of those simulations tally with conditions found in natural 
populations. Richard Dawkins's "Blind Watchmaker" program used simulation to 
demonstrate that the Darwinian theory of descent with modification could account for 
phenotypic variation across species. An extreme case occurs in cosmology, where many 
of the phenomena studied occur in time scales and at such great distances so as to 
prohibit direct observation. What the cosmologist has is often only a series of snapshots 
This is an appeal to what Stephen Jay Kline calls Kelvin's dictum: "If I can make a mechanical model, 
then I can understand it; if I cannot make one, I do not understand it" (Kline 313). 
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of a celestial event. A good example is the galactic collision. Because there is no 
feasible way to observe the whole event unfolding in real time, a complex simulation is 
constructed using powerful computers, and, as a mark of how much trust the 
cosmologists put in the accuracy of their simulations, the simulation is studied rather 
than the phenomenon itself.^^ Talk of there being a "Fermat Theorem of Literature" was 
intended to capture the idea that somewhere there exists an elusive algorithm capable of 
producing literary fictions. Recall that Binns derided the idea of such an algorithm as 
the reflection of a computer age at its worst. The imagination, it is felt, simply isn't like 
animal populations or star clusters. But research with artificial intelligence (AI) systems 
is producing increasingly sophisticated simulations of creativity, simulations which 
suggest that there are algorithms for the process. 
If a computer simulation of creativity yielded similar enough productions to 
what might be expected of a human, then the scientists would be in a position to better 
claim to understand creativity, without reference to intuition or a creative wellspring, 
and entirely within the materialist framework. Margaret Boden, in her survey of the 
field. The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (1992), collects many incidents of 
what appears to be creativity emerging from A I programs: computers drawing original 
pictures, or composing original stories. These are simplistic, crudely formulaic works 
for the main part, a reassembly of pre-programmed elements according to certain rules -
but they are perhaps different only in degree and not in kind from the creative acts they 
are designed to mimic. 
Boden cites examples of children's stories produced by a program called TALE-
SPIN. Not all of the stories are successful. Some fall into loops of infinite repetition. 
An example of such work can be found in Edmund Bertschinger, "Simulations of Structure in the 
Formation of the Universe." Annual Review of Astrophysics 36 (1998): 599-654.1 am grateful to the 
cosmologist Claudio Dalla Vecchia for this article. 
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which often sound like they might have occupied Zeno or Borges (as when one 
character offers to find another a worm - but only if he will tell him where a worm is 
[170]), although, obviously, this occurs without the self-awareness of Zeno or Borges. 
At other times, characters act with a brutality inappropriate to children's fiction, 
something the computer fails to appreciate ("Joe threatened to hit Irving i f he didn't tell 
him where some honey was..." [170]). Others suffer merciless fates, and the ruthless 
logic of the computer has no place for compassion. The following is typical of TALE-
SPIN's oeuvre: 
Henry Ant was thirsty. He walked over to the river bank where his good 
friend Bill Bird was sitting. Henry slipped and fell in the river. He was 
unable to call for help. He drowned. THE END. (170) 
Here, the programmers had included the rule "being underwater prevents speech," but 
failed to incorporate a rule that made Bill Bird aware of his environment. What these 
examples (and their failures) demonstrate is the immensity of world-knowledge 
necessary to compose or comprehend even the simplest stories. Of course, no one is 
claiming that the computers (in any usual sense of the word) "comprehend" or 
understand what is happening in the stories, just as the resident in John Searle's Chinese 
Room didn't understand Chinese.But, unlike the Chinese Room, it is not important to 
these experiments that the computer understands the concepts it is using; what it means 
to feel jealous or angry. As Boden points out, "our prime interest is in what [the 
program] can teach us about human minds, which can make sense of these words. A 
program may embody psychological hypotheses about how concepts are used by 
people, without understanding those concepts i tself (163). The difficulty for the 
" See John Searle "Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?" Scientific American 262 (1990): 20-25; 
and "Minds, Brains, and Programs" in David Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind 509-19. 
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programmers is that all the simple connections and causal laws that go to make up our 
commonsense (solid objects to fall to earth, water is fluid, creatures can suffer, and so 
on - almost endlessly) must be explicitly prescribed. This is an enormous and difficult 
task, but whilst our commonsense background knowledge is "certainly much more 
powerful, and much more subtle, than any current program," Boden believes that the 
outputs of human and computer are at least "broadly comparable" (179), and this is the 
crucial point. She is hoping we will look past the simplicity of the TALE-SPIN 
narratives to recognise these similarities. 
One of Boden's central claims is that what it means to be creative is closely tied 
up with our ignorance of the creative process. This is consistent with the belief that 
rational analysis impairs aesthetic appreciation. "Creativity" is defined - at least in part 
- in opposition to known rhythms: mechanical, formulaic, plodding. The creative 
process is one that cannot be replicated by labour and effort; it comes spontaneously or 
not at all. What research like that described by Boden does is to erode the idea that the 
creative process is unknowable, and so outside of what can be simulated. If creativity 
can be simulated (and Boden's examples strongly suggest that it can), then it can be 
understood. The mystique evaporates as creativity, like combustion, genetic 
transmission, and language acquisition, cedes to what Pinker called the "uniquely 
satisfying type of understanding we call science" (The Language Instinct ix). Those 
who insist that creativity is a somehow-special and uniquely human characteristic must 
explain how the A I simulacrum differs from the manmade original. (Perhaps one way 
would be to dispute that the nature of the intelligence behind the creations was the 
same. We might, for example, argue that the human mind just doesn't work like the 
computers, however superficially similar the results - which is to say, it doesn't use 
multiple goal-directed programs, but instead its productions are the result of a more 
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general problem-solving capacity that resists easy formalisation. Of course, as a 
counter-argument this collapses if it turns out that creativity really is constrained in the 
way that Boden's talk of "creativity algorithms" suggests: the process needn't be simple 
to be algorithmic.) 
One interesting consequence of the work Boden looks at is that it presents 
problems about authorship and intentionality similar to those seen with critics who 
insist upon the autonomy of the text. Maintaining a doctrine of authorial irrelevance 
with regard to Dante or Wordsworth was a strategic move, enabling the critic to escape 
charges of parasitism. In the case of a narrative produced by a computer, the problem 
would not now be ignoring, but rather locating the author. When chess grandmaster 
Gary Kasparov was defeated by a computer called Deep Blue in 1999, no one seriously 
assumed that what the name "Deep Blue" pointed to was the sort of being to whom we 
should accordingly direct our admiration (and this despite the reports that claimed 
"Deep Blue beats Kasparov"). Instead, "Deep Blue" stood for the collective 
achievement of the team of technicians and software engineers who had built and 
programmed the computer. In the parallel case, i f a computer wrote a story, who would 
be the author, and how would that story be received if it was known to be the product of 
an algorithmic code? Of course, if Boden is correct, then we are already in a situation 
where all stories are the products of algorithms; it is simply that those algorithms appear 
impossibly complex to us, for the time being. With the translation of mind into machine, 
our interest seems drawn toward the mechanism as the better of the available 
explanations. This is because we think the mechanical explanation trumps the 
intentional one, or as Dennett puts it, "the mechanistic displaces the purposive" 
This is the difference Dennett underlined between the ways beavers build dams and the way humans do 
(Darwin's Dangerous Idea 372-73). 
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(Brainstorms 234). If there are algorithms for the generation of narratives, then on the 
reductionist account, they will take causal primacy over the claims of the author.^ ^ Once 
more, like Calvin's athlete, we find the more comprehensive explanation of the act is 
given in terms of the unconscious processes, and that the more we learn about the 
mechanics of production the less we care about the intention of the writer. Within the 
materialist worldview, every subject matter is (at least professionally) treated as an 
object. 
Because creativity, as mentioned above, seems to be (at least partly) defined in 
opposition to the formulaic, this reduction into algorithmic code, i f successful, looks 
likely to eliminate creativity in the sense it is currently spoken of. Yet it seems 
impossible to reserve a special and distinct place for creativity within the limits of a 
coherent materialist framework. (This was the fulcrum of Wilson's argument for the 
plausibility of consilience across the arts and sciences.) At best we might want to argue 
that creativity operates on a higher level of complexity than could be eventually (which 
is to say, in principle) simulated by the (as yet too crude) tools of the computer scientist. 
But this reduces the problem of modelling creativity to a problem of insufficient 
computational power and reduces its solution to a matter of time. It does not mean that 
creativity is qualitatively distinct from the relatively easy to simulate (and "lower" or 
simpler) brain functions such as motor control and stimulus response. 
Although they differ on when it will happen, most people have little trouble 
believing that science might one day produce an intelligent robot or computer, one quite 
capable of passing the Turing test. The proliferation of such robots in science fiction 
Of course, there is probably room to argue here that all the computer would be simulating is the 
construction of a plot, and appeal to the idea - discussed above with reference to Polti - that plot was 
always formulaic. This line of argument would work only so long as the computers didn't use innovative 
poetic language. 
104 
attests to this,^'' but science-fiction robots conspicuously lack creative powers; typically, 
they are emotionless automata. Creativity and empathy are not seen simply as properties 
emergent from sufficiently intelligent minds, but as specifically (and uniquely) human 
traits. Creativity is assumed to be different from other brain-functions. The lesson from 
cognitive science and Boden's research is that this is not the case, or is true only in 
terms of quantitative and not qualitative difference. One of the points Boden tries to 
stress is that creative ability is on a continuum, with TALE-SPIN at one end and 
Shakespeare at the other, their respective methods being (at least) "broadly comparable" 
(179). But as with holding on to the collective unconscious because it seemed 
intuitively easy to believe, there is an inversely similar resistance to accepting the strong 
materialism that says creativity, like the rest of mental life, is algorithmic and 
mechanical. Joseph Carroll calls this resistance "a quasi-religious desire to preserve an 
area of human subjectivity that is somehow, mystically, distinct from the objective 
world that can be known by science" (Evolution and Literary Theory 31). The notion 
that the source of poetry could be coded algorithmically, that inspiration is only a series 
of analogical connections, jars with the standard Romantic account of poetic 
composition. Whether or not the parallels between how computer programs produce 
narratives and how the human mind does it are strongly analogous, in the way Boden 
suspects they may be, matters less than the more general point that here is a plausible 
suggestion for one way in which creativity might be understood in terms acceptable to 
the materialist. 
^ That said, the popularity of Disney cartoons suggests we also have no trouble imagining talking 
animals. In his recent book, The Illusion of Conscious Will, neuropsychologist Daniel Wegner cites a 
classic study by the psychologists Heider and Simmel (conducted in 1944) that suggests we are more than 
willing to ascribe intentionality to (appropriately) moving images. Using images far more basic than the 
heavily anthropised mice and ducks of Disney, Heider and Simmel showed volunteers a film of geometric 
shapes (two triangles, T and t, and circle, c) revolving around a box with an opening, "in such a way that 
people almost always described T as chasing t and c around a house" (16). 
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Those projects described in The Creative Mind are ongoing, and expected to 
bring more impressive results as the technology develops and computational power 
increases. Unfortunately, despite the hopes invested in the method during the 1960s, the 
linguistic approach to literature looks less promising. There is, however, an important 
sense in which the structuralist movement that Jakobson spawned has had an impact 
upon the method and direction of subsequent work, making possible such projects as 
Wilson's ConsiHence. 
Structuralist thinking was soon applied more broadly than just to linguistics, 
expanding rapidly to become a philosophical position that held that we must look to the 
underlying structure to properly understand a system, be that system a text, a 
government, a society, or whatever. This expansion was something anticipated by 
Saussure and actively encouraged by Jakobson. "Semiology" (as Saussure called it), or, 
more commonly "semiotics," is the application of structuralist ideas to systems other 
than language: it proposes a science of signs. Semiotics is where the evolutionary 
psychology advocated by Wilson and linguistic structuralism find common ground. The 
pervasiveness of semiotics, the fact that its proponents apply these methods in fields as 
diverse as social organisation and the patterns of world myths (most famously, by Levi-
Strauss), is a testament to the power of the structuralist insight; so much so that 
linguistic structuralism has come to seem an offshoot of the wider study of semiotics. 
Jakobson himself felt that the structuralist method was able to account for more 
than just literary art, as Krystyna Pomorska explains: 
Even if language, in some cases, is not directly involved in the act of 
creation, it still remains a model for such an act. Consequently, the 
methods of modem linguistics, elaborated by Jakobson and his fellow 
scholars in the Moscow and Prague Linguistic Circles, serve as a basis for 
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the scientific analysis of any language or artistic code. (Pomorska, intro. to 
Jakobson, Language in Literature 1) 
Even this broad claim is understating the case, for Jakobson felt that the relations that 
held between terms in a language were analogous to a greater or lesser degree with the 
relations within any system. In light of this, David Robey argues that by 1970, 
structuralism had acquired two quite distinct meanings and had come to mean 
something far removed from its origins as a way of looking at the interrelations of terms 
in a language. In its broader sense (the sense largely taken up by semiotics), 
structuralism is simply a "method of inquiry based upon the concepts of totality, self-
regulation, and transformation, common not only to anthropology and linguistics, but to 
mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, and philosophy as well" (Robey 2). Which 
is to say, the analogy with structure in linguistics is weak and incidental. But in the 
sense that Jakobson seems to endorse, and the sense which Levi-Strauss and literary 
criticism embraced, structuralism remains closely tied to its origins in linguistics, and 
projects from linguistic principles outwards, to make broad statements about the 
parallels between linguistic structure and societal and psychological organisation. As 
Robey has it: 
this new science (as it claims to be) has grown out of the supposition that 
the theories and methods of structural linguistics are directly or indirectly 
applicable to the analysis of all aspects of human culture, in so far as all of 
these, like language, may be interpreted as systems of signs. (2) 
Here, the analogy with linguistics is strong, and the parallels between the structures of 
language and the structures of human cultural practices are not incidental but linked, 
and possibly even causally related. The first interpretation is relatively uncontroversial, 
making only general claims for the existence of structure in disparate fields; whereas the 
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second apparently suggests that it is legitimate and fruitful to project outward from 
linguistic structuralism and analyse non-verbal systems in the same terms as verbal 
systems. 
It is as i f linguistics might offer the basis for another sort of consilience - the 
various disciplines now organised, not by a shared material base in the laws of physics, 
but in a shared epistemological base in language. The assumption here is that all 
knowledge is locked into language, and therefore the study of language would be the 
study of knowledge. As Christopher Norris explains, by this route, the structural linguist 
can make claims comparable to the imperialism of Wilson's physics: 
For i f language was indeed the key to all understanding then structural 
linguistics was the pilot science that alone provided an adequate grasp of 
the various discourses (narratives, paradigms, modes of representation, 
etc.) which comprised the entirety of knowledge at any given time. 
(Deconstruction and the "Unfinished Project of Modernity" 162) 
Structuralism seemed to offer a means of uniting knowledge, and there is a clear case to 
made for the claim that the role once played by structuralism is now occupied by 
evolutionary psychology. Both claim to be global sciences, and inasmuch as 
structuralism seems to offer a scientific way of thinking about subjects not usually 
covered by science, it can be seen as a propaedeutic not just, as Todorov predicted, for a 
science of literature (directly), but rather for evolutionary psychology (indirectly). The 
appeal of each is similar, both assuming that diverse behaviours and phenomena might 
be explicable in a common vocabulary, and both projecting outward, ultimately seeking 
to systematically relate the way the mind works with how texts, societies, and so on, are 
organised. Although structuralism is now widely rejected within the disciplines from 
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which it emerged (linguistics, literary criticism, anthropology),^' much of the work 
carried out in the name of structuralism by thinkers like Levi-Strauss has been 
employed by adherents of evolutionary psychology, such as Wilson, who recognises the 
intuitive appeal of stmcturalism as salvageable i f redirected: 
The stmcturalist approach is potentially consistent with the picture 
emerging from natural sciences and biological anthropology . . . . Their 
problem is not the basic conception, ... but its lack of a realistic connection 
to biology and cognitive psychology. That may yet be achieved, with 
potentially fruitful results. (Consilience 169) 
See, for example Leonard Jackson, The Poverty of Structuralism (1991). 
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Evolutionary Psychology 
In their introduction to The Adapted Mind, Jerome Barkow, John Tooby, and 
Leda Cosmides call for a "conceptual integration" of the behavioural and social sciences 
with the natural sciences. Like Wilson, they believe that "[t]he natural sciences are 
already mutually consistent" but mean by this that 
the laws of chemistry are compatible with the laws of physics, even though 
they are not reducible to them. ... A conceptually integrated theory is one 
framed so that it is compatible with data and theory from other relevant 
fields. Chemists do not propose theories that violate the elementary 
physics principle of conservation of energy. (4) 
Their claim that conceptual integration is not the same as reductionism rings a little 
hollow: it is unclear how chemists could lay down rules that physicists were prohibited 
from violating. Conceptual integration is still reductionism in as much as every concept 
must "integrate" with physics i f it is to integrate successfully. Reciprocal integration 
between, say, sociology and anthropology^^ would not be considered sufficient. But the 
wider concern of Barkow, Tooby, and Cosmides is a methodological alignment: "The 
behavioural and social sciences borrowed the idea of hypothesis testing and quantitative 
methodology from the natural sciences, but unfortunately not the idea of conceptual 
integration" (4). 
This particular integration (which the authors call the Standard Social Science Model) is the target of 
their critique. The mutual, reciprocal consistency of sociology and anthropology, according to Barkow, 
Tooby, and Cosmides, counts for nothing unless there is also consistency with the natural sciences (the 
internal consistency of which, in turn, counts for nothing unless there is a consistency with physics). 
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What the authors want to impose is a unity similar to Wilson's consilience, but 
one which preserves current disciplinary boundaries whilst dissolving autonomous 
disciplinary methodologies. (This is problematic in itself, as it assumes that methods are 
transferable. This issue is discussed at more length below.) As they see it, that the 
claims of anthropology and sociology are not checked against the more primary claims 
of biology and the natural sciences constitutes a violation of the hierarchy whereby -
under the rubric of conceptual integration - everything must square with the level 
immediately below, and consonance with the claims of the natural sciences becomes a 
necessary condition for all knowledge claims. Because evolutionary psychology can 
claim a filial bond to the natural sciences in a way that anthropology, for example, 
cannot, it is accordingly better placed in the hierarchy. So evolutionary biology trumps 
anthropology, and because of this priority, Tooby and Cosmides hold that for anyone 
"to propose a psychological concept that is incompatible with evolutionary biology is as 
problematic as proposing a chemical reaction that violates the laws of physics" (4). 
As evolutionary psychologists, their starting point for cultural analysis is - like 
Wilson's - a claim for the universality of human nature, regardless of surface cultural 
differences. That this sounds like a return to an essentialist account marks a sharp break 
with what Tooby and Cosmides call the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM), 
typified by Clifford Geertz when he writes "humanity is as various in its essence as in 
its expression" (The Interpretation of Cultures 37). The evolutionary psychologist 
argues that psychological mechanisms are in place that shape behaviours but do not 
define their particulars. These are the "epigenetic rules," described by Wilson as "the 
neural pathways and regularities in cognitive development by which the individual mind 
assembles itself (Consilience 139). They are the rules prescribing what Martin 
Seligman called "prepared learning," the idea that an organism is bom with an evolved 
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set of innate preferences and aversions towards certain stimuli and behaviours, tending 
to steer development along what become species-typical directions.^^ According to 
Wilson, epigenetic rules not only govern prepared learning but also "comprise the full 
range of inherited regularities of development in anatomy, physiology, cognition and 
behaviour. They are the algorithms of growth and differentiation that create a fully 
functioning organism" (Consilience 165). It is important to note here that the epigenetic 
rules are not only rules for psychological development, but for all development, the 
view from here being that physiological and psychological development are equally 
subject to genetic constraint. That little or no distinction is made between the somatic 
and the psychological reflects the materialists' collapse of mind into matter, which is an 
ideological foundation of evolutionary psychology. 
As inherited mechanisms, the epigenetic rules for behaviour are thus also 
evolved mechanisms - which is to say, adaptations developed in order to solve a 
problem. The evolutionary account of how such adaptations arise is numbingly familiar, 
but worth reiterating for clarity: Without any protective environment, a savannah grazer, 
like the gnu, being bom knowing how to walk and run is more likely to survive than an 
infant gnu which spends weeks struggling to stand upright. Likewise, a gnu drawn to 
seek out lions will not normally live long enough to pass on the genes that code for 
predator affinity. Accordingly, those (otherwise normal) gnus predisposed to avoid 
predators will be more likely to survive, reproduce, and so increase the chances of their 
offspring and descendants also possessing predator avoidance mechanisms. The account 
is a negative one insofar as "selections-for" are just de-selections elsewhere: predator 
avoidance isn't really chosen (and certainly not consciously so), rather any behaviour 
which does not include predator avoidance will be eventually bred out of the 
See Martin Seligman and Joanne L . Hagar, eds. Biological Boundaries of Learning. 
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population; alternatives are eliminated. Blindly, the species as a whole eventually 
becomes wary of lions. But whilst predator avoidance or infant motor co-ordination 
have clear adaptive advantages to gnus, what of the epigenetic rules that supposedly 
guide human behaviour? How comprehensive an account does evolutionary psychology 
want to offer? 
It is hard to see how the sheer massive diversity of human behaviour could be 
explained in terms of adaptive advantage, but according to the evolutionary 
psychologists, this is only a problem because too many behavioural and social scientists 
are working with faulty conceptions both of the limits of human diversity and the 
genesis and function of adaptations. The diversity of human behaviour is indeed 
amazing, but (argue the evolutionary psychologists) so is the frequency with which 
behavioural patterns recur: no two human societies are so different that they cannot be 
recognized from a catalogue of behaviours as human societies (rather than, say, ant 
colonies or whale pods). In their essay "The Psychological Foundations of Culture" 
(The Adapted Mind 19-136 - where the authors lay out something of a manifesto for 
evolutionary psychology), Tooby and Cosmides draw on this self-similarity between 
geographically diverse cultures to better facilitate the analogy between adaptively 
evolved physiology and adaptively evolved cognitive architecture: 
Empirically, of course, the fact that any given page out of Gray's Anatomy 
describes in precise anatomical detail individual humans from around the 
world demonstrates the pronounced monomorphism present in complex 
physiological adaptations. Although we cannot directly "see" 
psychological adaptations (except as described neuroanatomically), no less 
could be true of them. Human nature is everywhere the same. (38) 
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Here is Steven Pinker in The Language Instinct, using the same example with less of the 
speciahst vocabulary: "you can open up any page of Gray's Anatomy and expect to find 
a depiction of organs and their parts and arrangements that will be true of any normal 
person" (356). In even less technical language, Matt Ridley makes more of the same 
point in the opening pages of The Red Queen: 
When a surgeon cuts into a body, he knows what he will find inside. ... All 
people have stomachs, all human stomachs are roughly the same shape and 
all are found in the same place. There are differences.... [b]ut the 
differences are tiny compared to the similarities. ... There is, it is safe to 
say, such a thing as the typical human stomach and it is very different from 
a non-human stomach. It is the assumption of this book that there is also, 
in the same way, a typical human nature. (3) 
What Ridley is doing is walking us through his case gradually - progressing quietly 
from uncontroversial claims about physiological similarity to far more controversial 
claims about psychological similarity. This is a strategy common to many advocates of 
evolutionary psychology: it is easy to persuade someone to agree that physiology is 
relatively similar in all humans, and relatively easy to persuade someone to agree that 
the mind is a product of the brain. The brain is part of the physiology - which we have 
already agreed is similar in all humans - therefore; the mind is similar (and "in the same 
way") in all humans. So now we all agree that the psychological divergence between 
individuals is no more dramatic than the divergence between individuals in the 
physiology of the stomach. 
There are lots of problems with this, the most obvious being the willingness to 
hand psychology over to physiology. What is trivially different about anatomically 
similar human stomachs is their content. What the analogy encourages us to overlook is 
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that, in brains, this difference is not so trivial. However, a universal human nature is 
essential i f evolutionary psychology or human sociobiology (the two being for these 
purposes indistinguishable^'^) are to proceed; without it, they cannot make the species-
wide generalisations necessary for their causes. If generalisations can only be made 
within geographically or ethnically bounded groups, then those generalisations will 
indeed look more like the products of culture than the products of an evolved 
psychology. I f a psychological foundation for culture exists, it must be the foundation 
for all cultures, be pan-human or species-wide (and usually species-specific), or else it 
would suggest that each culture was independently evolved, that is to say, that each 
culture was as another species. If there are innate behavioural patterns they are species-
wide and of probable adaptive advantage. 
Much of the work of evolutionary psychology is involved with "reverse 
engineering" manifest behavioural patterns to their often unclear adaptive origins. They 
are unclear, claim Barkow, Tooby, and Cosmides, because "the evolved structure of the 
human mind is adapted to the way of life of Pleistocene hunter-gatherers, and not 
necessarily to our modem circumstances" (5). Civilisation - and certainly modem 
civilisation as we know it - has simply not been around long enough for adaptations to 
civilisation to have had time to arise. (This is [at least partly] why we do not seem to 
have useful modifications to civilisation and do seem to have plenty of redundant 
^ The official difference between the two approaches is that evolutionary psychology posits a Pleistocene 
environment as the source of any and all adaptations, and so demands that to understand human behaviour 
in the present, we must first recognise the peculiar concerns of Pleistocene hominids. Evolutionary 
psychology is specific to humanity. Sociobiology, on the other hand, is a more general thesis about the 
social behaviour of fauna, and human sociobiology is therefore only a fragment of this larger project. 
That said, most one-time sociobiologists are now writing as evolutionary psychologists, and so for 
practical purposes evolutionary psychology represents little more than a rebranding of sociobiology so as 
to shed the taint of Social Darwinism. For a comprehensive history of this shift, see Ullica Segerstrale's. 
Defenders of the Truth. 
- " " " " 1 1 5 
features, such as the vestigal appendix.^^) Because the bulk of human evolutionary 
history was spent as hunter-gatherers, any adaptations will be adaptations to hunter-
gatherer life, rather than to city or town life. As Denis Button explains: 
While there is no denying the importance of culture in creating the 
character of modem homo sapiens, civilisation, and with it modem culture, 
only goes back 10,000 years, to the invention of agriculture and the 
establishment of cities. That's less than one percent of our hunter-gatherer 
history as humans and near proto-human ancestors. ("Art and Sexual 
Selection" 514) 
As Barkow, Tooby, and Cosmides have it, "this means that in relating the design of the 
mechanisms of the mind to the task demands posed by the world, 'the world' means the 
Pleistocene world of hunter-gatherers" (5). Consequently, the types of stories that the 
evolutionary biologists^^ tell about how and why we evolved our spots are linked to 
circumstances that do not necessarily obtain in modem life. What were beneficial 
adaptations for our ancestors may prove to be vestigial or even positively cumbersome 
to twenty-first-century humans. These stories vary in credibility; some seem efficient 
and satisfying explanations, others are simply spurious. Hence, morning sickness in 
pregnant women is explained as a mechanism to reduce the ingestion of toxins that may 
harm the foetus by increasing the body's sensitivity to unusual foods (see Margie Profet 
The other main reason is that such adaptations run into developmental constraints: the existing 
architecture of the body would get in the way, an adaptation doesn't start form scratch but always has to 
build on the existing bodyform, and this is linked to the insistence that an adaptation (like a wing) be 
useful at every stage of its development (the common objection being: "what use is half a wing?"). 
Notwithstanding the distinction made between sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, 
"evolutionary psychology" and "evolutionary biology" are being used here interchangeably because the 
point extends beyond psychology and into physiology. Evolutionary psychologists talk of anatomical 
monomorphism as a parallel to psychological unity with such regularity that it seems they want to see the 
brain as another organ to be studied by biology. They do this because they want to see the brain as 
another organ to be studied by biology, and not by the separate discipline of psychology - which, if 
"conceptually integrated" properly, would surely be indistinguishable from biology anyway. This 
underlines how little there is between conceptual integration and elimination. 
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in The Adapted Mind 327-366); human hairlessness save for the patch on the top of the 
head is explained as a sunshield for the bipedal posture; our love of certain landscapes 
featuring water, vegetation and shelter (rural idylls, choice locations for property, 
Constable's "Haywain") is explained by these being the ideal habitats for survival (see 
"Environmental Aesthetics" section of The Adapted Mind 552+); down to an 
explanation that acne in teenagers (and our repulsion to it) is "nature's way" of 
preventing youths below the optimum breeding age reproducing by making them 
unattractive to the opposite sex.^ ^ 
Few people who accept the Darwinian theory of evolution doubt the power of 
adaptationist thinking, and some adaptations (for example, an eye to see things with, a 
stomach to digest food) have such an obvious function that they do not seem to need an 
explanation at all.^^ What is criticised is the sheer untestability of many of the 
hypotheses, the accusation being that these are just Kiplingesque "Just-So Stories," and 
as Daniel Dennett cautions, "since some story or other must be true, we must not 
conclude we have found the story just because we have come up with a story that seems 
to fit all the facts" (Darwin's Dangerous Idea 245). Steven Pinker admits that "there is 
no shortage of bad evolutionary 'explanations'" (How the Mind Works 37), but it is 
unclear how to distinguish the "glib and lame" (37) from the successful. Clifford 
Geertz's warning to credulous anthropologists seems especially pertinent: "there is 
nothing so coherent as a paranoid's delusion or a swindler's story. The force of our 
Underlining the untestability of these postulates, an alternative theory of human evolution has our 
ancestors beginning to adapt to an aquatic or semi-aquatic lifestyle. Presented by Alistair Hardy and 
popularised by Elaine Morgan, the so-called aquatic ape theory offers highly plausible accounts of 
bipedalism, vocal ability, subcutaneous fat, the salinity of sweat and tears and the direction and amount of 
body hair. The theory has met with much derision from the scientific establishment, although it is unclear 
if the objections are on ideological or scientific grounds. (See Roede, et al., eds, The Aquatic Ape: Fact or 
Fiction?) 
John Searle is one of the dissenters from this view. He argues that function is a property of intention, 
that there is no function without there being a designer. That is to say, you can only call something 
functional if it was designed to do that particular thing. (See John Searle, The Rediscovery of Mind.) 
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interpretations cannot rest, as they are now so often made to do, on the tightness with 
which they hold together" (The Interpretation of Cultures 18). 
The other criticism is that, in some cases, perhaps no story is true. This was the 
position Steven Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin famously took in their critique of the 
adaptationist programme, "The Spandrels of San Marco and The Panglossian 
Paradigm." Gould and Lewontin do not oppose adaptationism so much as 
panadaptationism, the idea that every feature of an organism must have (or have had) a 
good reason for developing. They argue that some characteristics may be non-adaptive 
side-effects, so-called "spandrels" (after the name given to the curved triangular spaces 
left over when a dome is mounted on a junction of arches^^). The spandrels are often 
decorated (as they are in Venice's San Marco church, hence the title) and sometimes so 
ingeniously they even appear to be designed for just this purpose. But what they really 
are is wasted space, a necessary compromise opportunistically co-opted into the design 
of the dome. So Gould and Lewontin claim that, as with architecture, so it is with 
organisms: some features are just leftover spaces, with any "current utility as an 
epiphenomenon of non-adaptive structures" (Gould and Lewontin 581). 
Gould and Lewontin's point about spandrels is that not everything that is used 
by an organism for some or other purpose necessarily evolved for that purpose; some 
features are opportunistically co-opted by the organism, giving the appearance of having 
evolved for that purpose.Gould calls such features "exaptations." Their concern about 
Daniel Dennett cheerfully corrects Gould and Lewontin on this, pointing out that what they refer to are 
actually not spandrels at all, but pendentives (Darwin's Dangerous Idea 272). But since "spandrel" is as 
good as a neologism to non-architects, what it has come to mean in biology is probably much clearer than 
what it points out in construction. 
™ It is tempting to talk here in terms of effects and side-effects. The problem with such talk is that invites 
us to posit the existence of a designer who intended certain effects, rather than others. This is because, as 
Katherine Hayles has pointed out (in "Consolidating the Canon" Science Wars, ed, Ross, 226-237), there 
are no side-effects, only effects, and what decides which of those effects are relegated to the status of 
side-effects is the intended purpose of the operation at hand. The evolutionary biologists would not want 
to introduce a designer with intentions to the process of evolution, so they can sidestep this by arguing 
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seeking purpose where there was none is mounted on top of the wider question of how 
specific adaptations are, and how much flexibility is allowed within the adaptive 
framework: must everything have a use? Gould and Lewontin's criticism is that the 
adaptationists seemingly want to explain every feature of an organism (that is, both 
physiological and psychological) in adaptive terms.^' 
More worrying for some is that this treatment contributes to the dissolution of 
the boundary between biology and psychology. As Dennett has it: " i f human minds are 
nonmiraculous products of evolution, then they are, in the requisite sense, artifacts, and 
all their powers must have an ultimately 'mechanical' explanation" (Darwin's 
Dangerous Idea 371). This is the same line of reason Wilson followed through 
Consilience. If our minds are just our brains then what explains our brains explains our 
minds, and, because our brains are physical organs, the best answer to that seems likely 
to come from evolutionary biology. The materialist evolutionary view can be quite 
sobering, as Dennett realises: 
If this is right, then all the achievements of human culture - language, art, 
religion, ethics, science itself - are themselves artifacts (of artifacts of 
artifacts...) of the same fundamental process that developed the bacteria, 
the mammals, and Homo sapiens. There is no special creation of language, 
and neither art nor religion has a literally divine inspiration. If there are no 
that in reproduction there are selections and selections for, the difference being that one feature was a 
non-fatal mutation simply present on the genome at the time of conception, and the other was a positive 
boon to the organism's ability to reproduce successfully. 
'^ This is the "panglossian" element to their critique; where Dr. Pangloss, Voltaire's Leibniz parody from 
Candide comes in. The idea is that, like Dr. Pangloss (and, sometimes, Leibniz), the adaptationists tend to 
think that things are as they are because they were meant to be that way, ruling out accident and failure as 
happenings contrary to God's grand and mysterious design. Serving as an exemplar of optimisation - the 
idea that everything is as good as it could be - Dr Pangloss remarks that "Things cannot be other than 
they are ... Everything is made for the best purpose. Our noses were made to carry spectacles, so we have 
spectacles" (qtd. in Gould and Lewontin 149). 
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skyhooks needed to make a skylark, there are also no skyhooks needed to 
make an ode to a nightingale. (Darwin's Dangerous Idea 144) 
The implication of this is that the products of the mind are also (on some level) artefacts 
of evolution. Consequently, the adaptationist programme can be stretched to explain in 
functional terms not just the disappearance of body hair or the appearance of eyelids, 
but also - through such frameworks as Seligman's notion of prepared leaming - the 
stmcture of the mind and the types of things (and thoughts) it is likely to produce or 
contain. 
What is the character of the evolved mechanisms that control prepared leaming 
- are they so specific as to prescribe the foundations of religion, of mathematics, of art 
and of storytelling? How much are we prepared to leam? There is much debate as to the 
level of specificity, how much is prescribed and how much is (socially or culturally) 
acquired. At the sceptical end are those proponents of the SSSM who believe that man 
is bom everywhere the same and everywhere as a blank slate, the idea (here polemically 
simplified by Tooby and Cosmides) that "human nature is an empty vessel, waiting to 
be filled by social processes" (The Adapted Mind 19)?^ Opposing this view are the 
advocates of prepared leaming, who vary in the degree of "hardwiring" they believe 
exists in the mind. As very few people really believe the mind is a blank slate at birth 
(this is, even according to Geertz, a position "which no one of any seriousness holds" 
[qtd. in The Adapted Mind 29]), the question, as Tooby and Cosmides put it, is: 
Does the mind consist of a few, general-purpose mechanisms, like operant 
conditioning, social leaming, and trial and error induction, or does it also 
include a large number of specialized mechanisms, such as a language 
Social constructivists on these strong terms may well be mythical - as Tooby and Cosmides seem 
themselves to admit, when they claim "all coherent behavioural scientists accept the reality of evolved 
mechanisms" (The Adapted Mind 39). 
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acquisition device mate preference mechanisms sexual jealousy 
mechanisms mother-infant emotion communication signals social 
contract algorithms and so on? (The Adapted Mind 39) 
Once again, there is more resistance to the notion that humans have mechanisms of 
prepared learning in place than to conceding that other animals have such mechanisms. 
Ethologist Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt talks of blue whales swimming "with fully 
coordinated movements immediately after birth. A newborn gnu trots or gallops after its 
mother when danger threatens," and he points out that in (at least non-human) animals, 
"these obviously innate propensities have long been known to behavioural scientists" 
(Human Ethology 19). Importantly, these behaviours are species specific: it is easier to 
believe that a beaver could learn to build a dam than it is to believe you could teach a 
dog (or even a chimp) the same trick (Dennett Darwin's Dangerous Idea 372-73). 
Opponents tend to view the human mind as something different; a general-purpose 
processor, and resist thinkers who posit specific modules, like Chomsky. The idea is 
that the mechanisms of the language instinct are different in degree but not in kind from 
the mechanisms that make dam-building so easy for beavers (and difficult for dogs). 
Despite initial resistance, Chomsky's view that the brain is not empty at birth is now 
widely accepted by linguists and cognitive scientists, and has led to enthusiastic 
speculation in other fields: i f language (or, at least, the learning mechanism for 
language) is innate in this sense, what else might be? As Chomsky had it, "Why, then, 
should we not study the acquisition of a cognitive structure such as language more or 
less as we study some complex bodily organ?"^^ (10). 
Evolutionary psychologists posit innate mechanisms for increasingly specific 
functions, which, following Chomsky's lead, suggest that much of what we had 
Here, again, the analogy is with bodily organs, eliding the difference between psychology and biology. 
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assumed to be leamed may have been (in this sense) prescribed. This is sometimes 
called the "Swiss Army Knife" theory of mind; seeing the mind as designed to cope 
with a large number of relatively specific problems. Each blade or tool on the knife is a 
"module" or "faculty," or, in Tinker's usage, an instinct. Just as there are typical 
behaviours for gnus and whales, there are such things as typical human behaviours, 
something which - as Eibl-Eibesfeldt notes - anthropologists and ethologists have seen 
in different cultures all over the world. People everywhere smile when happy, frown 
when sad.^ '* This is part of the evidence supporting Tooby and Cosmides' claim that 
human nature is everywhere the same. But in a very important way, the human mind is 
not like the mind of the beaver or the gnu: whatever specific mechanisms are in place, 
the human mind is also (as Chomsky's opponents argued) a general problem solver. 
Unlike dogs, we can copy the beaver and build dams of our own. As Dennett notes, this 
suggests "that there are two profoundly different ways of building dams: the ways 
beavers do and the way we do. The differences are not necessarily in the products, but 
in the control structures within the brains that create them" (Darwin's Dangerous Idea 
373). If the language instinct gives us the ability to speak, it also in some way constrains 
what we can say, just as the beaver can only ever build the same types of dams. As 
naturalists have seen the continuities in beaver dams and nests within bird species, so 
the linguist seeks the continuities in human languages. 
As discussed above, it has become a commonplace in linguistics that across the 
variety of every spoken language there are found universals. These regularities are 
symptoms of the language instinct; they do not necessarily reflect the best way or the 
only way to constmct a language, but they are the way humans do it. Language (or, at 
Following Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872. Chicago: Chicago 
UP, 1965), Paul Ekman's work on the six basic facial expressions was decisive here (see Ekman, P. and 
R. J. Davidson, eds. The Nature of Emotion. New York: GUP, 1994). 
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least, its acquisition) is outside the domain of the general problem solving capacities 
because its stmcture comes to us as already given, subject to what Chomsky called 
"highly restrictive principles" (11). This implies that in a very real sense we are not free 
to dictate the grammar of our languages, and that whilst we may invent new words, we 
are powerless to significantly change the stmctures into which they will fit.^^ It is 
important to realise here that the psycholinguists are not talking about schoolroom (or 
"prescriptive") grammar: rules such as "never use double negatives," or "never end a 
sentence with a preposition," or "never split infinitives" are not features of innate 
grammar, but are usually, like irregular verb endings, arbitrary constraints, comparable 
to Johnsonian faux-Latin spellings (debt, receipt) in both their origins and 
idiosyncrasies. 
In the sciences, where there is regularity there is assumed to be mechanism and 
stmcture. The species-wide regularities of language strongly indicate the existence of 
mechanism, although, as Pinker cautions, "[n]ot everything that is universal is innate" 
(The Language Instinct 20)^^. One of the concems of those who object to seeing the 
general-problem-solver-mind constrained in this way is that it appears as a block on 
human freedom. Unfortunately, the emphasis of the researchers involved is indeed often 
weighted toward the limiting powers of innate mechanisms, rather than their enabling 
powers.Critics consequently see themselves as defenders of human freedom, claiming 
that whatever constraints apply to beavers do not apply to us, that the "'biological,' or 
It is, of course, possible to invent novel grammatical structures, but they are significantly more difficult 
to leam, and will not be adopted easily. In contrast, it is easy to replace words; but as with the 
development between generations from pidgin to Creole, infants using a new vocabulary will invariably 
insert them into familiar structures. 
Pinker points out that eating with hands rather than feet is also universal, but "we need not invoke a 
special hand-to-mouth instinct to explain why" (The Language Instinct 20). 
Recall that Chomsky formulated the grammatical principles as "highly restrictive," and Tooby and 
Cosmides regretfully list M. Konner's The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson, 1982), Seligman's own Biological Boundaries of Learning, and 
R. Gelman's "Structuralist Constraints on Cognitive Development" (Cognitive Science 14 [1990]: 3-9) 
(The Adapted Mind 36). 
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'innate' aspects of human behaviour or psychological organization are negligible," 
because the "evolution of the capacity for culture has led to a flexibility in human 
behaviour that belies any significant 'instinctual' or innate component" (Tooby and 
Cosmides, The Adapted Mind 32). But the evidence suggests that there are simply too 
many regularities for there not to be some form of innate structure to the human mind. 
Unsurprisingly, this area of evolutionary psychology has been an enormous boon to 
those looking to explain the regularities of human behaviour and culture in terms 
digestible to science, the thinking being: I f we share a language structure, what else do 
we share? 
In a defence of Wilson's consilience program, biologist Paul R. Gross asks the 
same question: "Since there are social arrangements most of the way down the 
phylogenetic tree, what regularities have they?" (49). Anthropologists looking for these 
cultural regularities find them (with a few exceptions) in such practices as monogamy, 
hierarchical society, wearing clothes, and in creativity; in decoration and in storyteUing. 
Typically, the arts are singled out from these practices as being entirely products of 
culture with little or no utility. But it is this very disutiUty - the often heard "uselessness 
of art"^^ - that marks its recurrence out for study. Unlike the invention (and subsequent 
reinventions) of the wheel or the spear, there is no clear (survival) function to which the 
emergence of and similarities in art would converge to provide a common solution. Art 
is entertainment; a luxury. As Dennett points out, this means that i f there are common 
features in different and isolated cultures, we can usually discount those which solve a 
problem as inevitable. It is the useless similarities that provide better evidence for 
common cultural descent: "Anthropologists looking for evidence of shared culture are. 
78 See, for example, Raymond Tallis's Newton's Sleep for an expansion of this. 
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quite properly, more impressed by common idiosyncrasies of decorative style than by 
common functional shapes" (Darwin's Dangerous Idea 357). 
Of course, this account of descent says nothing about art being innate. It still 
allows for a chain of cultural transmission that in no way implies that the creative urge 
or any specifics of art are hardwired into the human mind. But the regularity with which 
decoration, storytelling, music, and myth recurs across cultures is, argues Ellen 
Dissanayake, strongly suggestive of there being some biological basis to creativity. 
Dissanayake underlines that art is one of the few truly universal cultural norms: 
Although no one art is found in every society, or to the same degree in 
every society, there is found universally in every human group that exists 
today, or is known to have existed, the tendency to display and to respond 
to one or usually more of what are usually called the arts. (What is Art 
For? 6) 
According to Dissanayake, this ubiquity suggests that even i f the details of the art are 
cultural, the foundations for the urge to create art at all are biological. She argues that 
the urge to create art is perhaps the prime characteristic that sets humanity apart form 
the other great apes, that creativity is innate, and that Homo sapiens might be better 
labelled Homo aestheticus.^ ^ Just as a language instinct revealed itself through 
regularities of granmiar, so regularities in decoration and in narrative seem to suggest 
that there is a case to be made for a "creative instinct," one perhaps as enabling and as 
restrictive as the language instinct. Paleoanthropologist Alexander Marshack makes this 
link explicit, arguing for what Graham Richards describes as a "proto-human capacity 
That is, not "wise man" but "artistic man." See Dissanayake, Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes 
From and Why. 
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for symbolic representation intimately related to the emergence of language" (Human 
Evolution 309). Marshack writes: 
The Rock art [of pre-literate Eurasian / African / American and Australian 
cultures] evidences the same modes of image use, reuse, association and 
accumulation as are found in the earlier Eastem and Western European 
traditions. In this sense, the cognitive mode, involving the periodic use of 
image and symbol, approaches a universal H. sapiens sapiens capacity 
comparable to, but not equivalent to, the capacity for language use. (293-
94)80 
Marshack's proposition seems to be that art and narrative could be explained along 
similar lines to the explanation of the origins of language, that is, in terms of a function, 
an evolved adaptation. I f this is the case, then it suggests that art and narrative (or at 
least their origins and our continued interest) might be explicable in terms of 
evolutionary biology, and accordingly genetics, and ultimately the laws of physics. 
Averse to the pejorative connotations such words as "myth" and "archetype" 
have acquired, and trying to maintain the distance between Darwin and Jung, some 
evolutionary epistemologists have been tempted to propose a more science-friendly 
thought-unit. Richard Dawkins suggested these be called "memes" (The Selfish Gene 
192). He explains that the meme works like the gene: "Genes are replicated, copied 
from parent to offspring down the generations. A meme is, by analogy, anything that 
replicates itself from brain to brain, via any available means of copying" (Unweaving 
the Rainbow 302). It is important to notice that Dawkins has a special way of talking 
about genes and memes. The way he writes about them gives the reader the idea that the 
Quoted and discussed in Richards, Human Evolution: An Introduction for the Behavioural Sciences 
309. See also Marshack, "Explaining the Mind of Ice Age Man." National Geographic 147.1 (1975): 62-
89. 
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gene or meme is isolatable, autonomous: it "replicates itself," as i f it had torn free from 
the body or mind (the dualism here is unavoidable) in which it inhered. But for this way 
of thinking about evolution, the gene-centric or gene's-eye view, it is essential that the 
gene be separable. It must appear that it is primarily the genes that replicate, and the 
body that is merely a vehicle for those genes. That the body replicates or exists at all is 
just a side effect or consequence of or means for the genes to better their chances of 
replicating. Dawkins asks us to think of this like a Gestalt drawing; a Necker cube 
where the perspective flips between the "two ways of looking at natural selection; the 
gene's angle and that of the individual. If properly understood they are equivalent; two 
views of the same truth. You can flip from one to the other and it will still be neo-
Darwinism" (The Selfish Gene viii-ix). The conceptual shift effected here is repeated 
for the memetic theory. As the body was a vehicle for the genes on the gene-centric 
view, so the mind is just a vehicle for the memes. These are the terms in which Daniel 
Dennett, a keen advocate of both Darwin and Dawkins, lays out the analogy: 
Genes are invisible; they are carried by gene vehicles (organisms) in which 
they tend to produce characteristic effects (phenotypic effects) by which 
their fates are, in the long run, determined. Memes are also invisible, and 
are carried by meme vehicles - pictures, books, sayings (in particular 
languages, oral or written, on paper or magnetically encoded, etc.) 
(Darwin's Dangerous Idea 347) 
He offers a clear illustration of the consequences of this type of thinking: "A scholar is 
just a library's way of making another library" (Darwin's Dangerous Idea 346). It is not 
clear how seriously the evolutionary epistemologists want us to take the meme theory. 
When Dawkins first proposed the idea in The Selfish Gene in 1976, he presented the 
meme as a little more than a thought experiment: a two-way analogy that reinforces the 
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genetic theory and simultaneously employs the reinforced genetic theory to reinforce 
the memetic theory. Just as genes compete for places in a gene pool, so memes compete 
for places in a meme pool (The Selfish Gene 189-201). 
The meme is introduced to demonstrate how powerful Darwinian thinking is, 
and Dawkins uses the meme idea to try to demonstrate that the principle of evolution is 
universal, and not specific to our planet or even life: "We biologists have assimilated 
the idea of genetic evolution so deeply that we tend to forget that it is only one of many 
possible kinds of evolution" (194). So, to help us to understand in non-technical terms 
how evolution works, Dawkins asks us to try imagining that thoughts and ideas are also 
competing for space. Here, the terrain is our minds. The most successful ideas are those 
which are passed from person to person, because they stand a better chance of being 
remembered. The method of transmission is not messy strips of DNA and transfer-
RNA, but speech and writing, language, music, painting, dance. The most successful 
ideas are not necessarily the best ideas, or those closest to the tmth. Not, that is, insofar 
as there is another criterion for "best" other than "most successful," and it is unclear i f 
there is. But i f "best" is calibrated in terms of (biological) fitness, as it is for genes, then 
memes are not only not useful, but often actually detrimental. As they are not 
transmitted genetically, they do not need to help the genes to reproduce, as the "celibacy 
meme" or the "suicide meme" ably demonstrate. The memes are also presumably 
unconcemed with "tmth" in the abstract; their content is less important than their 
proliferation. This is something of an issue for Dawkins, who is often found railing 
against the "God meme," which he would later call "a vims of the mind" ("Vimses of 
the Mind" in Bo Dahlbom's Dennett and His Critics 13-27). The transmission and 
longevity of the God meme is assured by the twin pincers of blind faith and the threat of 
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damnation for the unbelievers.^' Other strengths of the God meme, at least the Christian 
God meme, include the command to evangelise, and spread the meme further still. A 
text like the Bible ensures "copying-fidelity" (The Selfish Gene 194). "God exists," he 
writes, ' i f only in the form of a meme with high survival value" (193). Reflecting on the 
success of religious belief, Dawkins writes that "[i] t might almost have been planned by 
a machiavellian priesthood," adding (somewhat snidely), "[hjowever, I doubt i f the 
priests were that clever" (197-98). (Of course, if this last bit is true, it should moot his 
distaste. For if, rather than being manipulative and scheming, the priests really were 
victims of a "mind virus," then we might have expected a little less venom in Dawkins's 
criticism of them: in the spirit of blaming the meme not the messenger, he might do 
better to credit them with the intelligence.) 
There is some debate as to what constitutes "one meme," just as there is debate 
about what constitutes one gene. Dawkins provides a list of things that we might want 
to consider memes: "tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots 
or building arches" (The Selfish Gene 192). Dennett calls them "distinct memorable 
units," and offers a list that contains, among other things; the arch, the wheel, the 
calendar, chess, The Odyssey, "Greensleeves," and deconstructionism (Darwin's 
Dangerous Idea 344). Had he had the vocabulary, George Polti would probably want to 
say that the thirty-six dramatic situations he offers are also each memes. Some of these 
things are "meme complexes," and Dawkins invites comparisons with gene complexes 
(such as the carnivore's "[m]utually suitable teeth, claws, guts, and sense organs" which 
are "so tightly [linked together on the same chromosome] that they can be treated as one 
gene" [The Selfish Gene 197]). Memes are an adaptable idea. Amongst other things, 
"Unbelievers": that is, those unwilling to carry the God meme in its active form. Dawkins himself 
obviously carries a version of the God meme, but it is inert. Dawkins's knowledge of religion is not for 
evangelical purposes, but fulfils a negative role; his is a knowledge of religion intended to cut against 
religion. That is, not love your enemy but know your enemy. 
" " -129 
Dawkins uses the meme to explain the ZeitReist, and the pop-bubblegum song: "Some 
memes, Hke some genes, achieve brilliant short-term success in spreading rapidly, but 
do not last long in the meme pool" (194). 
As should already be apparent, there is a tendency for meme enthusiasts to 
become tricksy when talking about how the memes work. There is something self-
congratulatory about meme-talk, something vapid about the inversions and a pleasure in 
the construction of examples disproportionate to the importance of the ideas being 
conveyed. Dennett takes some glee in pointing out that, a "wagon with spoked wheels 
carries not only grain or freight from place to place; it carries the brilliant idea of a 
wagon with spoked wheels from mind to mind" (Darwin's Dangerous Idea 348). One of 
the most gnomic of these formulations comes from Sol Speigelman: "The nucleic acids 
invented human beings in order to be able to reproduce themselves even on the Moon" 
(qtd. in Eigen 124). As Dennett says, the meme is a successful meme; not only has it 
found a place in the lexicon of the evolutionary epistemologists, but in so doing, it has 
beaten down its competitors. Wilson Hsts some of the failed candidates: "mnemotype, 
idea, idene, sociogene, concept, culturgen, and culture type" (Consilience 149). 
Whether or not a theory of aesthetics from evolutionary psychology would want 
to employ talk of memes is debatable. Although he is happy to use memes in talking 
about cultural evolution, Wilson does not explicitly invoke them to explain his 
archetypal theory, and although Dennett is prepared to list Homer's Odyssey as a meme, 
he maintains that memes are not to be mistaken for archetypes. Whereas the archetype 
(on Wilson's account) appears spontaneously in disparate cultures through the pressure 
of universal epigenetic rules, the meme is only ever culturally transmitted. Following 
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David Hull,^^ Dennett stresses that "we do not want to consider two identical cultural 
items as instances of the same meme unless they are related by descent" (Darwin's 
Dangerous Idea 356). This seems to confirm that the meme, useful as it may be as a 
means of demonstrating the universal power of Darwinian thinking, is far from being a 
scientific version of Jungian archetypes. So if the similarities in world narratives cannot 
be accounted for either by any direct, wholesale prescription hardwired into the mind 
(ie, a ready-made myth in natural language known from birth, such as that demanded by 
a collective unconscious), or as a product of cultural transmission, then they appear to 
be a result of convergent evolution. 
Convergent evolution anywhere is suggestive of function; a need is being 
answered by the repeated homing-in on the same solution over and over again. Here, the 
convergence is upon the same narratives. This provides a basis for a weak version of the 
collective unconscious. It does not demand that there are whole or even fragmentary 
myths floating around in the mind before birth, but does suggest that the same types of 
stories will always elicit the strongest responses. Which is to say, the mind is prepared 
to enjoy some stories more than others. Biologists talk of these preferences being 
steered by epigenetic rules, rather than being directly prescribed.^^ Whilst a collective 
unconscious as Jung (or Yeats, with his "spiritus mundi") might have imagined it is too 
information-rich, this weaker version is acceptable to the more empirically cautious 
pronouncements of science. As Wilson has it: 
Because of differences in strength among the underlying epigenetic rules, 
certain thoughts and behavior are more effective than others in the 
Hull, "Identity and Selection." Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics. 11 (1990): 311-32. 300. 
For example, Patrick Colm Hogan, not a biologist, but writing on evolutionary psychology, talks of 
"default tendencies" (229) in poetry - a phrase which captures well the sense in which an innate 
behaviour is not dictatorial, but can be unlearnt or overridden. Similarly, in The Language Instinct, Steven 
Pinker stresses the difference between constraint and determinism (473-475. This is discussed in more 
detail below). 
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emotional responses they cause and the frequency with which they intrude 
on reverie and creative thought. They bias cultural evolution toward the 
invention of archetypes. (Consilience 241) 
When these would-be-archetypal stories are chanced upon,^ '* a strong positive response 
will tend to ensure that they will be remembered and repeated. This also impacts on the 
types of stories that people would tell in the first place. The narrator is not a blind 
selector, but rather, generates and selects according to what he wants to hear himself. So 
even before it reaches an audience the story is converging towards one particular form, 
and that form will be the same wherever the story is told; because the minds which are 
generating, listening to, and responding to the tale will (if we accept the first principles 
of evolutionary psychology from which accounts like Wilson's take off) be everywhere 
the same. Successive adjustments made in later tellings bring the story closer to an 
ideal, an ideal which is presumably crystallised to myth over the years. But the need 
being answered by the myth needn't be (either currently or originally) functional at all. 
It is quite possible that narrative works by tricking the same responses out of people as 
participating in (or spectating) the events described might bring. So stories amuse, 
arouse, shock, frighten, please, anger, and so on, by fooling the mind into releasing the 
same (neurochemical) response reaction as "real" fear, shock, or anger, would 
produce. 
This is close to the function of "escapism" often assigned to the novel -
particularly the popular novel, whose plots we might expect to trade on these formulas 
most keenly. This also goes some way to explaining why "airport fiction" - novels read 
only once and only for plot - is formulaic: the books are designed to hit all the pleasure 
The stress on chance is important, given the intended analogy with Darwinian selection. 
"Real" is in scare-quotes here to stress that although the stimulus is faked, the response is real; in the 
sense that it is chemically identical to the response that would have been produced had the stimulus been 
real. 
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buttons as quickly and as unsubtly as possible. By this account, the lack of subtlety 
found in the popular novel is, at root, the same thing as its being formulaic. Airport 
fiction does not attempt to disguise the origin of its appeal, but advertises it with more 
garish covers illustrations: an explosion, couples embracing. When Susan Sontag talks 
of the "entire volume of sub-literary fiction produced for mass taste" ("The 
Pornographic Imagination" 206), it is in tacit comparison with pornography: a need is 
being answered, and answered as quickly and as unsubtly as possible. By contrast, 
canonical literature has typically struggled to escape formula (perhaps more so in recent 
years as formulas are explicitly codified and popularised). Many of today's art novels 
relish their absence of plot as a realisation of Flaubert's intention to write a novel about 
nothing at all; a novel entirely of style, and presumably one which had completely 
transcended its origins as a stimulus-simulator. But for the evolutionary psychologists, 
the appeal of minimalism and abstraction, and of the rejection of traditional subjects and 
forms in modernist and postmodernist art, is limited. As Denis Dutton points out, citing 
John Cage's musical silences and Duchamp's urinal: 
such modernist experiments ... will never for long capture the attention of 
the vast public for art, whose abiding concerns involve the same themes 
they always have from the archaic Greeks to this afternoon's soap operas; 
love, death, adventure, and triumph over adversity. ("Sociobiology and 
Art" 452) 
It is no coincidence that Georges Polti's dramatic situations fit more closely with 
blockbuster movies and best-selling popular novels than they do with contemporary 
literature and art-house films. Jung himself was (at least professionally) more interested 
in popular novels, where he believed that the archetypes he was interested in would 
feature unrestrained, claiming that "[l]iterary products of highly dubious merit are often 
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of the greatest interest to the psychologist" (87-88). In his essay "Creative Writers and 
Day-Dreaming," Sigmund Freud would similarly insist on "an initial distinction": 
We must separate writers who, like the ancient authors of epics and 
tragedies, take over their stories ready-made, from writers who seem to 
originate their own material. We will keep to the latter kind, and, for the 
purposes of our comparison, we will choose not the writers most highly 
esteemed by the critics, but the less pretentious authors of novels, 
romances and short stories, who nevertheless have the widest and most 
eager circle of readers of both sexes. (137) 
As with Jung, for Freud, it is the popular fiction, the mean reading habits of a given 
population, that are of most interest. In Freud's account, these popular works act as 
extensions of the type of "day-dreaming" that most adults engage in (albeit privately) as 
a furtive continuation of childhood play. Commonalities are drawn between popular 
fiction and the daydream. Characteristic of both is the heroic behaviour of the 
protagonist (in the daydream, the daydreamer), their invulnerability, and the simplistic 
morality of the imagined world: "the other characters in the story are sharply divided 
into good and bad, in defiance of the variety of human characters that are to be observed 
in real hfe" (138). Freud recognises that this sort of moral simplism - the defiance of 
reality - is by no means a feature of all fiction, and that the difference between popular 
fiction and great literature often lies in just such a variance in complexity. But, 
unwilling to sever the link between the playing child, the daydreaming adult, and the 
creative writer, he does not see canonical literature as a special case: 
We are perfectly aware that very many imaginative writings are far 
removed from the model of the naive day-dream; and yet I cannot suppress 
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the suspicion that even the most extreme deviations from that model could 
be linked with it through an uninterrupted series of transitional cases. (138) 
As with Boden and her creativity simulations, the emphasis here is upon establishing a 
continuum between the simple stories and the great works of literature; dissolving the 
grounds for an ontological distinction between literary and sub-literary fiction. With a 
continuum established, all that needs to be explained is the simplest case, and all other 
cases can be explained as complications thereof. 
In a professional capacity, the psychologist may well be expected to be more 
interested in popular fiction than specifically literary fiction. What makes some 
literature worthy of further study also makes it less typical of fiction generally, and so 
less interesting as data for the psychologist or scientist looking to formulate general 
patterns. To some extent this is because the psychologist looks to fiction not for the 
story it tells the reader, but for the story it tells about the reader: what, for example, do 
the choices that readers make reflect of their goals and interests? The literary critic is 
not the mean reader, and the psychologist (in any professional capacity - that is, qua 
psychologist) is not looking at art or literature for the same reasons as the critic. This 
problematises what we might expect evolutionary psychology to do with literature, in 
terms of interpretation and criticism. 
That there seem to be similarities across world narratives is a relatively 
uncontroversial (because empirically demonstrable) point. Recall that the existence of 
pan-human narratives was a relatively uncontroversial claim, with a history co-
extensive with the history of anthropological research in that area. What is disputed is 
more often the mechanics of how this came to be. With the possibility of direct cultural 
transmission disqualified by cases of prolonged geographical isolation, accounts seek 
instead to explain regularities in narrative fiction in terms of regularities in the minds 
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that collectively produce such nairatives. Given the apparent lack of an inheritance 
mechanism, the Jungian collective unconscious transpired to be a poor candidate for 
explaining how world narratives possess the similarities they do. A better (or rather, 
more scientifically credible) candidate seemed at first to be the memetic theory - but the 
hoped-for analogy with genes collapses when it emerges that memes demand cultural 
transmission, and are not innate in the necessary sense. It seems just as unlikely that an 
innate narrative instinct would manifest as precisely as Polti's formulations suggest; but 
his intuition here - that there are shaping principles behind the development of plot - is 
key. Evolutionary psychology, with its emphasis on the task-specific modularity of 
mind, presents itself by analogy with the success of Chomskyan linguistics as a means 
of explaining the narrative regularities through hardwiring; preserving Polti's insight, 
but now grounding it in what seems to be a scientifically credible theory. 
In linguistics, the ease and ability with which children are seen to acquire 
language "is hopelessly underdetermined by the fragmentary evidence available" to 
them (Chomsky 10). Likewise, we do not need to be told what types of things wil l make 
for an interesting story; the themes that f i l l fiction seem given, obvious, already there. 
As one sociobiologist puts it, there is never likely to be a play written about filling out 
tax forms (or rather, i f such a play was written, we would not expect it to enjoy the 
same level of success as a sex-and-deceit soap opera - see Dutton "Sociobiology and 
Art" 451). For linguists like Pinker looking for evidence of a language instinct, "[t]he 
crux of the argument is that complex language is universal because children actually 
reinvent i t" (The Language Instinct 21), as seen with the generational transition between 
pidgin and Creole. The geographically and culturally isolated recurrence of narratives, 
such as those recorded by Levi-Strauss and the Cambridge Ritualists, and the 
regularities of worship and magic recorded by Frazer, seem to constitute just such a 
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reinvention. The independent attempts by Jung, Campbell, Frye, and others, to organise 
an archetypal theory of literature show that there is a widespread and recurrent detection 
of pattern and theme, and the admiration for their ambition rather than their 
accomplishment that Ellis remarked upon (193) reflects a belief that their search for 
underlying order, although unsuccessful, is not necessarily misguided. The appeal of an 
evolutionary account is the same as for the collective unconscious, but unhke the 
collective unconscious, evolutionary psychology appears to offer a coherent scientific 
framework in which to insert a theory of narrative. 
Evolutionary psychology offers several accounts of art, and specifically literary 
fiction. These accounts vary in what they are willing to consider as art, in the 
importance they accord art in maintaining a healthy psychological state, and in the 
status and priority they accord to specific forms of art. In Homo Aestheticus, Ellen 
Dissanayake takes an ethological view: "It is time to recognise that art is normal, 
natural, and necessary as other things that people do, and to try to approach it 
ethologically, as a behavior" (33). She seeks to root art in the universal human impulse 
of "making special" our environment; decorating tools, walls, our bodies - but 
Dissanayake is not specifically interested in literary art. Nor is Wilson when he turns to 
"The Arts and their Interpretation" in Consilience (233-264). Wilson, interestingly, talks 
Of-
not only about general creativity but also interpretation: that is, Wilson is proposing 
the application of evolutionary theories as literary criticism. In keeping with his causal 
view (origins explain effects), Wilson sees an understanding of the creative process as a 
sufficient ground for an interpretative theory. Recall that for Wilson, complexity is 
always explicable with reference to a reductive hierarchy. Accordingly, what he has to 
Like Freud - but owing the idea more directly to Boden - he believes creativity to be a universal 
human ability, "common to everyone in varying degrees" (237) but possessed in incrementally different 
quantities: "Behind Shakespeare, Leonardo, Mozart, and others in the foremost rank are a vast legion 
whose realized powers form a descending continuum to those who are merely competent" (236). 
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say about literary criticism feeds out of this strong materialist thesis: "Interpretation has 
multiple dimensions, namely history, biography, linguistics, and aesthetic judgements. 
At the foundation of them all lie the material processes of the human mind" (237). But 
as Richard Rorty pointed out, it is not clear that a "better knowledge of how things 
work" ("Against Unity" 34) (in this sense of how the hardware works) will be of any 
great assistance to literary criticism. As mentioned above, Wilson also holds with an 
archetypal theory of literature, which relies on talk of epigenetic rules and convergent 
evolution to avoid any connection with a collective unconscious. 
One of the few evolutionary accounts of art to try to deal with specifically 
literary fiction has been put forward by Joseph Carroll, most comprehensively in his 
book Evolution and Literary Theory (1995). Carroll has two theses; one positive, one 
negative. The first of these is that literary criticism would benefit from employing 
Darwinian evolution as a conceptual base, and second, that we should reject the theories 
of deconstruction, relativism, and Rortyean style pragmatics - which Carroll covers 
with the blanket term of poststructuralism. 
For the positive thesis, Carroll is quite precise about what type of evolutionary 
account he wants. Although largely happy with Wilson's analysis, he criticises what he 
calls the "quasi-Jungian conception of 'archetypes'" ("Wilson's Consilience and 
Literary Study" 106), and in an essay derisively titled "Steven Tinker's Cheesecake for 
the Mind," Carroll is found arguing with Tinker's account of the place of art in 
evolutionary psychology, wanting to make different (and stronger) claims for fiction. 
This is largely because they have different ambitions here. Carroll is principally a 
literary critic, and this is evident from the works he uses to support his case. His 
examples are drawn almost exclusively from the nineteenth-century novel. This is not 
simply because Carroll's background is in the nineteenth-century novel (although it is 
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also this), but because here are realistic, character driven narratives in contemporary 
(and therefore, for their authors, familiar) settings, involving much social interaction 
and social commentary on the manners and mores of the day. This is the type of 
background that evolutionary psychology might be expected to better explain. However, 
Carroll's tight focus on literature may well be an impediment to his theory. Unlike 
Pinker, Wilson, and Dissanayake, who all operate with a very broad and inclusive sense 
of art, Carroll is trying to formulate a theory of literary appreciation that will serve the 
function of traditional criticism (that is, will enable canon formation, will discriminate 
between literary and popular fiction) but now integrate with the wider scientific 
worldview via evolutionary psychology. 
It might seem strange that Carroll should be hostile to the scientists he 
seemingly looks to for endorsement. Why attack Pinker? It seems that much of the 
disagreement between Carroll and Pinker turns on their different definitions of art. 
Pinker defines art very broadly. Art is a "pleasure technology" (How the Mind Works 
525) (hence a "cheesecake for the mind"), a means of shorting the brain's pleasure 
circuits "without the inconvenience of wringing bona fide fitness increments from the 
harsh world" (524). Art also instructs through simulations of potential situations, 
offering people a chance to mentally rehearse responses, "so they will be prepared i f 
they ever find themselves in similar straits" (542). "Fictional narratives," claims Pinker, 
"supply us with a mental catalogue of the fatal conundrums we might face someday and 
the outcomes of strategies we could deploy in them. ... The cliche that life imitates art 
is true because the function of some kinds of art is for life to imitate i t ' (543). As a 
The idea that language may have been selected for as a warning system is eminently sensible, and 
Pinker discusses this in The Language Instinct. He quotes evolutionary theorist George Williams: "Many 
of the accidental deaths of small children would probably have been avoided if the victims had 
understood and remembered verbal instructions and had been capable of effectively substituting verbal 
symbols for real experience. This might well have been true under primitive circumstances" (315). 
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definition of art this is a little vacuous, and more than a little circular: art is whatever 
serves the function Pinker ascribes to art. Also, his definition is perhaps too inclusive; 
there is no distinction made between art and entertainment, both are pleasure 
technologies. Shakespeare is on a level with pornography (both entertain, and in their 
own ways, instruct) - but Pinker is not concerned with developing a discriminating 
aesthetic theory. This is evident from the sources Pinker uses in How The Mind Works 
to support his case: Woody Allen (542), National Lampoon's movies (Animal House 
[548]), pop songs (Bob Dylan and Lou Reed [535]), and, sprinkled among them, some 
quotations from canonical literature (Shakespeare [528], Dryden [539], Joyce [541], and 
Kafka [541]). A clear distaste for the eclecticism of these references - which Carroll 
sees as vulgarity - leads him to conclude that 
there is little evidence that [Pinker's] familiarity with most of the works he 
quotes extends very far beyond the quotations. His literary taste and 
judgement seem those of an undergraduate who is extraordinarily bright 
but who is much more sensitive to computers than to poems, plays, or 
novels. ("Steven Pinker's Cheesecake for the Mind" 479) 
Carroll, on the other hand, considers himself appropriately sensitive, and is (as might be 
expected of a literary critic rather than, as in Pinker's case, a cognitive scientist) more 
concerned with literary merit, with distinguishing between "great literature" and what 
Susan Sontag called "sub-literary fiction" ('The Pornographic Imagination" 206). 
Carroll's interests are also more local, limited to the written word and, specifically, 
canonical literature. Accordingly, what Carroll is talking about when he is talking about 
art is art as distinct from entertainment. But given the avowedly counter-intuitive, anti-
mass-appeal intentions of literature and high art, can an account from evolutionary 
psychology ever hope to explain it? 
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The desire of high art not to be popular, and the fact that "popular" is pejorative 
and high art and the avant-garde are minority interests, suggests that the only relation 
high art and the avant-garde has to expected evolutionary trends is one of opposition. 
Perhaps, then, evolutionary psychology can only take us so far: it can predict large-scale 
trends with relative success, and can account for pornography, action movies, and 
romance novels. But for the type of analysis we might expect of literary criticism, it 
seems superfluous. I f Wordsworth, Shelley, Arnold, and Henry James were all able to 
write the type of criticism Carroll endorses without any explicit appeal to Darwin, there 
seems little reason why the critic of today need invoke him to explain their reasoning. 
Given that Carroll's account seems to float free of his many references to evolutionary 
theory, it might seem puzzling that he uses it at all. 
This is where the book's second thesis assumes prominence. As mentioned 
above, Carroll's negative account is an attempt to employ evolutionary theories to 
squeeze-out poststructuralist theories from the literary academy. Evolution and Literary 
Theory is as much an attack on poststructuralism as it is an endorsement of evolutionary 
psychology. This is because it is essential for Carroll to underline that there is no 
possibility of a hybrid theory here. He agrees with Wilson that (on a methodological 
level) a united two-cultures is desirable; but finds that to reconcile science with literary 
studies we must first extricate poststructuralist thinking from our critical toolbox. In 
part, this is because poststructuralism is often hostile to science and so its continued 
popularity is an impediment to the acceptance of an evolutionary psychological theory 
of literary interpretation. But more than this, he believes that poststructuralism adopts 
assumptions that Eire simply incommensurable with science. We should, Carroll urges, 
reject the relativism of the poststructuralists, and instead be materialists; the two being 
opposed positions that cannot both be sensibly held. Because Carroll holds that 
materialism is an essential ingredient of scientific thought, any attempt to preserve a 
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transcendental account of literature and creativity will contradict science, and so any 
accounts that attempt to employ ideas from both poststructuralism and science will not 
be simply unconventional, they will be incoherent. 
Poststructuralist accounts effectively neuter any scientific ideas they incorporate. 
Literary critics who have used Darwinian thought in the past have often done so under 
the condition that science be thought of as one way of thinking among many. George 
Levine is typical of this type of non-scientific science in the opening pages of his study 
of nineteenth-century fiction, Darwin Among the Novelists, when he writes: "For the 
purposes of this volume, I , like [Michel] Serres, consider science as an unprivileged 
form of cultural discourse, 'a cultural formation equivalent to any other,' but one that 
happens to have been privileged for much of modem history" (5). For Carroll, this type 
of formulation is not simply different to how the scientists think of science "from the 
inside," it is fundamentally incompatible with scientific thought. By maintaining that 
science is simply another form of cultural discourse, without any special relation to the 
truth, poststructuralism makes scientific fact into cultural comment. So the ideas of 
Darwin are carried over only as ideas, and in this fashion are inert. By isolating them 
from their scientific context (the background beliefs of biology) they have been stripped 
of all that made them science. Their validity as scientific ideas was intrinsically bound 
up with their place in the larger scientific ontology. So, maintains Carroll, when we find 
poststructuralist arguments that employ incorporations of scientific thought we can be 
fairly sure (even from a distance) that they are wrong. Science is powerful and 
"spectacularly useful," as even Rorty has it ("Against Unity" 38), but only in the hands 
of scientists, only when used within the limits of scientific thought. The principle here is 
Any account, that is, that resists the reduction of literature to scientifically digestible terms 
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the same as Barkow, Tooby and Cosmides laid out in the introduction to The Adapted 
Mind as a ground rule for conceptual integration: any theories from other disciplines 
must be checked against what are considered to be the more primary claims of biology 
and the natural sciences. 
Searching for ways to allow literary study to share in the prestige accorded to 
scientific discourse, Carroll is enthusiastic about evolutionary psychology: "The rapidly 
developing and increasingly integrated group of evolutionary disciplines has resulted in 
an ever-expanding network of reciprocally illuminating and confirming hypotheses 
about human nature and human society" (26-27), and he believes "this information 
should have a direct bearing on our view of literature" (27). However, he fears that in 
affiliating itself with poststructuralism, literary studies risks being excluded from what 
should be a real opportunity for meaningful interaction with the productions of the 
scientific community. Poststructuralism fails woefully to conceptually integrate, its 
"rhetoric altogether detached from empirical study" (27), and literary studies as a whole 
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displays none of the "intellectual constraints through which other disciplines establish 
their intellectual validity" (27). "For critical commentary to be susceptible to rational 
evaluation," he says, "critical propositions must be 'falsifiable,' that is, susceptible to 
being declared mistaken on grounds of logic and evidence that would be ratified by all 
reasonable, informed observers" (126). For Carroll, it doesn't matter whether or not we 
call the revised model a science, "only that we be clear about the conditions that 
distinguish such rational and empirical study from arbitrary rhetorical activity" (126). 
Having decided to reject poststructuralism, Carroll is pessimistic about what 
remains to be salvaged: 
We can assume that by "other disciplines" Carroll means mainly the scientific ones. 
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a very large proportion of the work in critical theory that has been done in 
the past twenty years will prove to be not merely obsolete but essentially 
void. ... It is essentially a wrong turn, a dead end, a misconceived 
enterprise, a repository of delusions and wasted efforts. (468) 
Because poststructuralism problematises the relation between author and text, and most 
radically, the relative causal primacy of texts and the material world, it cannot serve 
Carroll's Darwinian account, which insists on the importance of the relation between 
the author and his environment. Natural selection works on an organism's suitability to 
its environment. By Carroll's account, literature is equally inseparable from its 
environment, demanding a return to critical approaches that contextualise literature. To 
separate the text from the world, he argues, is both counter-intuitive and deleteriously 
restrictive. Like Tooby and Cosmides, Carroll stresses the importance of recognising a 
universal human nature: 
Despite all differences of metaphysics, scientific conceptions, and cultural 
heritage, traditional literary theorists largely concur in the idea that 
literature represents or articulates human experience, and most theorists 
would go on to say that that experience is rooted in "human nature." (170) 
Carroll finds "human nature" in the writings of most "traditional critics": "in 
Wordsworth, Shelley, Arnold, James, and Tolstoy" (170) and in sociobiology (Wilson's 
On Human Nature^"), but nowhere in poststructuralist critiques - "except to be 
repudiated" (170). By similarly holding to a belief in human nature, Carroll aligns 
himself with modem science and most of the literary giants, and masses these forces 
against poststructuralism. He maintains that this 
^ Wilson, E . O. On Human Nature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1978. 
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convergence of usage suggests, first, that in fundamental ways biological 
theory is compatible with traditional literary conceptions, and, second, that 
cultural constructivism is incompatible both with biological theory and 
with these traditional conceptions. (170) 
This is the pivot of Carroll's case: you are either with science and literary history, or 
you reject both of these things and hold with poststructuralism instead. It is unclear, 
however, that this particular "convergence" between science and nineteenth-century 
literature is a strong enough alignment to justify the sidings he suggests. Certainly, 
Wordsworth and Shelley might be expected to reject the materialist claims of a 
creativity algorithm that Boden investigated. There are important differences between 
the ways modem science talks of human nature and how Carroll's selection of 
nineteenth-century literary figures do. 
That Carroll chooses to frame his argument in terms of a conflict between 
realists and relativists reflects a deeper rift between the sciences and the humanities that 
has largely grown up in the fallout from the two-cultures debate. The root of the 
incompatibility he locates between evolutionary theory and those ideas he lumps under 
poststructuralism is a deeper scepticism about the epistemological status of scientific 
claims - not those doubts that scientists like Gould or Lewontin harboured about the 
validity of the adaptationist program within evolutionary theory, but rather a movement 
interrogating the fundamental claims of science to have access to privileged knowledge 
about the world in the first place. 
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Relativism and the Unity of Culture 
Wilson's conception of a productive unification being one which brings the 
humanities into the sciences (rather than the other way around) reflects not only his own 
interests as a scientist, but a belief that science is working well - working better in fact, 
than the other disciplines, and i f unification demands eliminations, then better they 
occur elsewhere where nothing useful is being done. It reflects a desire to preserve the 
achievements of science as they stand, and keep open the possibilities for future 
discoveries. In science, humanity has found a brilliantly successful method of exposing 
the mechanics of natural phenomena, and consequently, there is a special authority 
attached to scientific validation (something employed by advertisers, who use men in 
white coats to endorse their products, and seen in legal disputes, where the rhetoric of 
barristers is perceived as manipulative, in contrast to the forensic scientist, who is 
passively channelling facts). The consequence of all this praise and importance is the 
corresponding loss of status in anything not scientific. In academia, thinkers such as 
Freud, James Lovelock (Gaia theory), or Rupert Sheldrake (morphic resonance), are 
written off as unscientific and ignored for this reason. Reflecting the esteem in which 
science is held, the response to their work is all the more hostile for the pretence of 
scientific vahdity. 
Much of the prestige of scientific knowledge comes from its impartiality: 
scientific knowledge, unlike other forms of knowledge, is epistemologically "pure" 
(and, as seen with Wilson, there are those who question the validity of non-scientific 
discourses' claims to produce "knowledge" at all). What is meant by this is that 
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scientific knowledge is not the type of knowledge that can be corrupted by the cultural 
situation or the personal interests of the researchers involved: scientific knowledge is 
"just how things are." When talking about the epistemological security of scientific 
knowledge, the register is very often that of biohazard containment, and the hygiene 
metaphor is supposed to make us think of cleanliness without contamination, of purity, 
of something trustworthy. Scientific knowledge is sterile, clinical. The process of 
scientific data collection and the means by which it is subsequently handled is such as to 
ensure that few or no external concerns are allowed near. For this to be effective, the 
scientists themselves must appear impartial. In cultivating an image of themselves as 
distant from societal concerns and disinterested with respect to political or evaluative 
issues, the scientists often appear blunt and insensitive; there is no room for pillowed 
subtleties and sensitivities, which, to the scientists, look like euphemisms. Science is 
defiantly against euphemism, which is the act of redescription in the interests of 
primness and social order. Recalling DeLillo's observation that it is a "source of new 
names" (interview with LeClair 84), science redescribes in essentialist terms, providing 
the real words for things, with no regard to the niceties and repressions of politicised 
culture. 
Words like "sterile" and "clinical" are sometimes used pejoratively, too, when it 
is felt that the introduction of some personal or emotional concern might be appropriate. 
It can seem that science has no room for human concerns. So although this talk of 
"cold" and "hard" is comforting epistemologically, it is also somewhat alienating. This 
produces a conflict between scientific and previous modes of understanding the 
universe, and this is reflected in a return in recent years to traditional, and non-scientific 
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solutions, exacerbating that conflict. What is often called the New Age^' movement is 
wilfully anti-scientific - a reaction to the impartiality of a scientific universe which has 
apparently little or no space for human concerns. The growth in the popularity of 
homeopathy, for example, shows people investing more faith in the accumulated 
wisdom of traditional remedies than the recent discoveries of the (scientifically 
respectable) pharmaceutical industry. This resistance is tied up with a nexus of beliefs 
about the pharmaceutical companies and their relation to capitalist big business, but 
often roots itself ideologically in a defiant rejection of the superiority of scientific 
knowledge. This is a more fundamental motive, and appears to be a response to that 
same cold disinterest that the scientist cultivates in the name of impartiality. In a (non-
incidental) contrast to the New Age movement, science has little respect for tradition 
and history: it erases its own past without compunction and does not care if a belief has 
been held for millennia: i f it doesn't square with empirical results, then it will be 
rejected.^^ 
Science becomes a civilising force, the only thing between us and another Dark Ages. 
Do reactions against the dominant form of scientific rationalism (such as the New Age 
movement) threaten science? Andrew Ross senses an anxiety among scientists: "That a 
large number of North Americans today sustain a belief in creationism while living in a 
technologically advanced society ... is considered a clear and present danger to 
civilisation" (Science Wars 9). Physicist and historian Gerald Holton is keen to show 
how this danger can materialise, and scathing towards what he terms anti-science. 
Dubious about how benign the "mass appeal of alternative forms of rationality" (Ross 
" "New Age" itself is an astrological concept, this being the Age of Aquarius. 
Which is to say, the pharmaceutical companies appear to be motivated by profit rather than a beneficent 
desire to heal - something followers of Adam Smith would expect. 
Thomas Kuhn held this to be the key difference between art and science, arguing that, for all their 
similarities, they display "sharply divergent responses to their discipline's past. ... Unlike art, science 
destroys its past" (The Essential Tension 345). 
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9) may be, Holton cautions that "alternative sciences or parasciences by themselves may 
be harmless enough except as one of the opiates of the masses, but that when they are 
incorporated into political movements they can become a time bomb waiting to 
explode" (Science and Anti-science 181). Holton's position is not just that non-science 
is nonsense; but that the existence of non-science or anti-science (because any non-
science is inimical to the principles of science), and its legitimisation through the type 
of cultural relativism that the likes of Ross advocate, will only increase the likelihood 
that another Lysenko will be allowed the eminence to eventually pair up with another 
Stalin. The threat of alternative and para-science lies in the power of science proper. 
Holton's fears here are not just a case of scientific self-importance, which Ross derides 
as "the myth of scientists ... standing firm against a tide of superstitions" (9), but a 
reflection of the esteem in which scientific knowledge is held and the extent to which 
modem civilisation tmsts scientific pi-onouncements implicitly. As individuals are 
increasingly unable to check the veracity of a scientist's claim themselves, the truth of 
scientific theories is accepted on authority. The worry is that these are fertile conditions 
for parascientific theories to flourish. Whilst most of these theories - such as 
Sheldrake's notion of morphic resonance - do indeed seem harmless, Holton believes 
we ought to be wary of what we are willing to countenance as scientific knowledge, and 
is worried that parascience will erode the authority of real science. Given that 
parascience exhibits a willingness to exploit the authority of science (as Stalin and 
Lysenko did), Holton maintains that "it is pmdent to regard the committed and 
politically ambitious parts of the anti-science phenomenon as a reminder of the Beast 
that slumbers below" (184). 
Holton's Beast is not a metaphor for anti-science (or at least not all of it), so 
much as for the uglier sides of human nature. What is not clear is why the Beast should 
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be paired only with an anti-scientific movement. I f the Beast is distinct from anti-
science, and is instead an evil that evil men impose upon an otherwise inert (though 
factually wrong) thought system, then it is also and equally distinct from science proper, 
and surely also and equally able to attach itself to either. It seems to be Holton's tacit 
assumption that real science would never muddy its hands with something so 
ideologically noxious as Lysenko's neo-Lamarckism, and yet it is not clear from where 
the corrective would come. His complacency on this point - science could never be 
immoral - is perhaps an offshoot of science's self-imposed objectivity: the image that 
scientists deal in just the facts, and morality has nothing to do with it. But the possibility 
remains that scientific fact will contradict morality, and what then? Those scientists who 
follow the experimental physicists' line and "trust the equation" find morahty comes 
second to science. When Robert Lange, a member of the Sociobiology Study Group, 
was asked what he would do if "incontrovertible facts about sex roles or, even worse, 
racial differences, really were to emerge?" he replied: "'Then I would evidently have to 
become a racist, because I would have to believe in the facts'" (qtd. in Segerstrale 223). 
Grounding morality in science can seem intuitively jarring. A study like Richard 
J. Hermstein and Charles Murray's The Bell Curve (1994), which examined and 
purported to find evidence for the heritability of intelligence across different races might 
seem, as George Steiner has suggested,^ '* irreconcilable with the principles of social 
justice. But for defenders of "free-research," this amounts to confusing the political with 
the strictly factual. Bernard Davis, an advocate of behavioural genetics and 
sociobiology, calls this confusion the "moralistic fallacy" (after G. E. Moore's 
naturalistic fallacy, of which it is an inversion), and defines it as "an illogical attempt to 
Steiner is referenced in an anonymous editorial regarding the scope of scientific research and the moral 
responsibility of scientists, "Truth At Any Price?", from Nature (271 [2 Feb 1978]: 391): "Some of the 
truths that turn up or might be capable of turning up could be in conflict with the ideals of social justice or 
even survival." 
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derive an 'is' from an 'ought'" ("The Moralistic Fallacy" 390). For Davis, placing limits 
on scientific inquiry to preserve moral norms is misguided: 
Apart from the implication of a fixed rather than an adaptive concept of 
justice ... this proposition seems to be blaming the messenger for the 
message. For science does not create the realities of nature: it only 
discovers them. And i f it is not allowed to discover them they will still be 
there, determining whether or not our assumptions and our predictions turn 
out to be correct. (390) 
Davis asks instead that we "trust posterity to adapt its notions of morality to further new 
knowledge" (390). The implication is clearly that morality follows science, and not the 
other way around. Seen here as just an impartial report of how things really are, science 
seemingly offers a route to moral immunity. The apparent naivete of Hermstein and 
Murray and other researchers like them stems from a tendency of scientists to believe 
their own claims for impersonality and objectivity: science produces facts, and what 
society chooses to do with those facts is no business of science. In assuming the stance 
of an apolitical, distanced researcher, the scientist is apparently able to bypass social 
responsibility, to retreat inside impersonality. It is these claims that many sociologists 
and philosophers of science choose to dispute. 
Far from being an exercise in objectivity, many thinkers have argued that 
science is as much affected by personal opinion as any other discipline, and that 
scientists have no warrant to claim to possess what Thomas Nagel called a "view from 
nowhere." Central to these claims is the belief that scientific thought and language 
consistently fails to escape the influence of politics, gender, and personal prejudice. In a 
case like The Bell Curve, we are left wondering quite why Hermstein and Murray chose 
to investigate IQ in different racial groups. It seems highly improbable that the data was 
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collated randomly. Rather, it is assumed that the researchers made a series of conscious 
choices: they chose to study intelligence, they chose to quantify that intelligence within 
certain parameters, and they chose to sort their data by race (as opposed to, say, 
nationality, hair colour, marital status, and so on). We imagine they held expectations 
for the results, too. Perhaps they were outraged at talk of stratification of intelligence 
across racial groups, and hoped to prove once and for all that no such stratafication 
existed, and that it was only with great reservation and a strong fidelity to the principles 
of scientific integrity that they regretfully published their findings to the contrary 
(although neither Hermstein nor Murray's previous publications would suggest this). 
Even i f they did begin the study with no hopes for any particular outcome, there is still a 
trail of decisions leading up to the conclusion, asking some questions rather than others, 
precluding certain results. As N. Katherine Hayles puts it, "it matters what questions 
one asks and how one asks them" ("Consolidating the Canon" 228). 
It is worth examining in some detail the type of evidence usually offered by 
those sceptical about the security of scientific knowledge to support their claims that it 
is as culturally contaminated as any other form of discourse. The following case is 
presented by N. Katherine Hayles in Andrew Ross's Science Wars, a collection of 
essays exploring the hostilities that have grown up between the humanities and the 
sciences. Most of the contributors to Science Wars subscribe to the theory of the 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), or a variant of this, which holds that 
scientific beliefs are socially constructed and valid only within the limits of the social 
conditions and disciplinary conventions from which they emerge. Constructivists are 
relativists who hold that scientific knowledge is never universally applicable, and that 
the very idea of universally applicable knowledge is a nonsense. 
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Given that she is writing for an audience already largely convinced of the 
validity of her conclusions, it is instructive to follow Hayles's inferences here. She takes 
as her starting point the work of Donna Haraway. In Primate Visions (1989), Haraway 
had written about the work of primatologist Clarence Ray Carpenter, pointing out ways 
in which data collection could be affected by what were perhaps unconscious prejudices 
that were being carried over from human society and mapped out onto his interpretation 
of the monkey societies he was studying. Carpenter's work, conducted in the 1970s, 
was on group stmcture in Rhesus macaques, and his hypothesis was that the dominant 
"alpha males" assured group cohesion. To test this theory, he removed and isolated the 
dominant males from the groups he was studying, and his hypothesis was subsequently 
proved correct when the structure of the group collapsed. 
Haraway's objection was that Carpenter began the experiment with certain 
presumptions - that alpha males assured group cohesion - and as a result of this, only 
asked certain questions (namely, those relating to males). He never thought to ask about 
removing females from the group - a decision which, Haraway contends, reflected the 
dominant ideology in human society that says males hold power and females 
submissively follow. The design of the experiment and the foundation of Carpenter's 
hypothesis then consisted in transference of this ideology onto monkey society. The 
intention of such a criticism is not to discredit Carpenter's findings entirely, but rather 
to highlight the limitations of such a study (only the males were removed), and to 
undercut science's general claims for objectivity by pointing to the influence of extra-
scientific concems in the collection of data. It is this second move that Hayles sees as 
having been safely established by Haraway's analysis. 
How far does a criticism like Haraway's go? As mentioned, the findings as they 
stand are no less true for the accusations of ideological contamination: the results do 
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clearly demonstrate the importance of alpha males to Rhesus macaque social groups. 
But the findings are also limited - i f it is truth being uncovered here, then it is being 
uncovered selectively.^^ Furthermore, the criticisms are of limited scope. Whilst gender 
prejudice might be at work in Carpenter's study, it is by no means obvious that such 
prejudices might contaminate other areas of scientific research. The (genetic, and 
accordingly, phenotypic or physiological) similarities between monkeys and humans 
open all primatology to the temptations of anthropomorphism, and it is easy to see how 
presumptions about human behaviour and social organisation might be carried over to 
the study of Rhesus monkeys (a study which perhaps has more in conmion with 
anthropology than entomology).^^ 
The basic assumption behind the criticisms of Haraway and Hayles here is that 
anthropomorphism is an attitude entirely inappropriate to scientific investigations, but 
that this is the case is far from clear, and some theorists have argued that a veto on 
anthropomorphism is itself a sort of prejudice.Even allowing limited 
Carpenter could, of course, reply that realistic budgetary constraints only permit the exploration of a 
finite number of experimental approaches, and it seems unlikely that he would protest if other researchers 
were to carry out similar experiments, now removing only females, now only infants, and so forth. 
Rather, we might expect Carpenter to welcome such research as only building upon his findings - an 
augmentation, not a contradiction. Indeed, he appears to do just this, admitting that whilst "In almost all 
natural groupings which have been carefully studied, the male or males play the most prominent role in 
controlling the group .... This does not preclude the fact that, among the females, as among males, there 
is also a dominance gradient" and that "some of the most dominant females are more dominant than some 
of the least dominant males" (361). He concludes by arguing that the dominance gradients of both sexes 
"affect social controls in the group" (361). 
And it seems Carpenter wants to link the behaviour of the Rhesus Macaques to humans explicitly: 'The 
kinship of non-human primates to man makes it reasonable to assume that the study of these types may 
yield data which can be readily employed in understanding basic kinds of human motivations" (358).This 
is why Rhesus monkeys are used so extensively in medical research. It also presents a complicated ethical 
dilemma, as James Rachels points out: "If the animal subjects are not sufficiently like us to provide a 
model, the experiments may be pointless. ... But if the animals are enough like us to provide a model, it 
may be impossible to justify treating them in ways we would not treat humans. The researchers are caught 
in a logical trap: in order to defend the usefulness of their research, they have to emphasize the 
similarities between the animals and the humans; but in order to defend it ethically, they must emphasize 
the difference" (220). 
For example, Vidal, Vancassel and Quris claim the block "follows from the [adoption of] overly 
limited Popperian scientific standards" which are unrealistically severe, imposing "a restriction that most 
scientists transgress at some time or other in their research" (307). The approach may in fact be 
beneficial: "The effort required to repress our anthropomorphic thoughts is probably futile. It is 
anthropomorphic assumptions into data-collection, it is not so easy to see how 
presumptions or prejudices concerning class or race or gender could have such 
influential effects upon science as a whole, as Hayles at least seems to feel Haraway's 
work implies. Anthropomorphism is obviously a realistic worry for primatology, but it 
is unclear that anthropomorphism would have any effect upon the findings of particle 
physicists or the direction of research in solar neutrino emission levels. Haraway's 
criticisms are interesting as far as they go, but they do little to undermine the assumed 
objectivity of the larger scientific project and almost nothing in terms of questioning the 
truth-value of scientific theories. Anthony O'Hear agrees: 
science does not simply read the book of nature. What it discovers, it 
discovers as a result of our probing into nature, and in the terms in which 
we probe. Science, as much as everyday perception, is the upshot of 
human interaction with nature. (Beyond Evolution 90) 
But he is quick to hmit the conclusions we can sensibly draw from such a state of 
affairs: 
The fact that much of what we discover in science we also create does not 
impugn the reality or objectivity of what is thus revealed. What it does is 
to cast doubt on a naive view of science simply as reading off essences 
from what is there without us. (91) 
To use Haraway's study, as Hayles does, to insinuate that a possible transference of 
prejudice in a single experiment implies that such transferences occur regularly and 
undoubtedly more interesting to exploit their heuristic value by elaborating tools to sort between 
alternative hypotheses" (307). The position here is the same as that described by Daniel Dennett when he 
talks of taking the "intentional stance" toward subject matter whose behaviour can be fruitfully 
understood in terms of intentions, beliefs, and desires. The adoption of the intentional stance does not 
demand that we believe that the subject matter actually has conscious intentions, but simply involves a 
recognition that the subject matter is best understood and its behaviour best predicted by acting as if it 
did. 
across the scientific disciplines is simply invalid. Hayles wants us to see the flaws 
Haraway finds in Carpenter's research as falsifying science's claims for objectivity, and 
whilst readers already sympathetic to the thesis of the SSK will doubtless find Hayles's 
argument satisfying, the evidence is much too scant to warrant this broad inference. 
With no one to persuade, Hayles argues complacently. 
Even given as much force as Hayles would like to grant it, Haraway's case study 
can only tell us about how the direction of research can be affected by the personal 
interests of the researchers. It does not (in itself) imply data fabrication. For Hayles, 
however, the significance of such a case is that the "assumptions implicit in the 
questions also helped determine what counted as an observation" ("Consolidating the 
Canon" 288). That is to say, plenty of phenomena will have been manifest to Carpenter, 
but only some - the select few things the experimental questions were designed to ask 
about - wil l have been observed. So studying male dominance to an extent excludes 
studying female nurturing, just as it excludes observations of climatic conditions, or 
non-Rhesus monkey species, or monkey behaviour in relation to cloud formations. The 
researcher sees the types of things he or she is looking for, and what that is is 
determined by the questions asked. What is not asked about in the question is not 
relevant. 
This would seem fairly self-evident to most scientists: observation must always 
be a focused activity, and be carried out by a trained observer. Theory precedes 
observation insofar as you have to know what you are looking for. Although this is 
presented as a means by which scientific knowledge surrenders its objectivity, the claim 
that "it matters what questions you ask" is not something that scientists will try to deny. 
Heisenberg recalls Einstein's comment that "it is the theory that decides what we can 
observe" (Physics and Beyond 63). Similarly, neurobiologist Patricia Churchland 
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recognises that the limited scope of any single experiment is a necessary condition for 
research: 
it is an illusion to suppose that experimental research can be completely 
innocent of theoretical assumptions. So long as there is a reason for doing 
one experiment rather than another, there must be some goveming 
hypothesis or other in virtue of which the experimental question is thought 
to be a good question, and some conception of why the experiment is 
worth the very considerable trouble. (405) 
To be effective, the observer must have some prior familiarity and expectations.^^ 
Behind allegations of theoretical "interference" in data collection, Hayles wants to argue 
a larger point, and one more damaging to the security of scientific knowledge. 
When Hayles says that the results of an experiment are shot through with the 
presumptions of the researcher, she is setting up an argument that the traditional 
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification is 
untenable. This distinction implies that regardless of how the information was acquired, 
be it through a carefully constructed and informed hypothesis or simply by chance (the 
It would be pointless asking a non-scientist (and even a non-specialist) to look down a microscope and 
either affirm or deny that any mitochondria present are abnormal. Not only would the untrained eye fail to 
identify in the mess which patches of darkness were the mitochondria, but recognition of abnormality 
requires a familiarity with normality which could only be acquired through considerable experience. By 
analogy with Greek pottery, Paul Feyerabend makes a similar point: "Being able to 'read' a certain style 
[of primitive/archaic art] also includes knowledge of what features are irrelevant. Not every feature of an 
archaic list has representational value just as not every feature of a written sentence plays a role in 
articulating its content" (Against Method 235). Everything is not relevant, and you normally have to 
know what you are looking for. This ability to sort through data, to decode and classify the enormous 
deluge of information our senses present to us is largely taken for granted. We recognise objects as 
distinct form one another, and as tokens of a set of such objects - cars or tables or pens - and we attribute 
certain sounds, smells or textures to these objects without thinking about it. To drivers, individual makes 
of motor car are usually distinguishable, individual makes of aeroplane usually are not. Ornithologists see 
not just birds, but crows, sparrows, dippers, curlews. There is no magic or secrecy to scientific 
observation beyond this type of familiarity. Inside the cell, the microscopist sees individual structures as 
we might recognise and distinguish hawthorn, primrose, cow and oak tree in a photograph of the 
countryside. This point is laboured to stress that the type of specific observations made by scientists that 
Hayles professes to find so suspect and elitist are really not so different to the observations she makes in 
her own life and work. 
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discovery), what counts is how that information is then fitted-in to the larger scientific 
project, the proofs offered and the evidence presented (the justification). So, to use a 
common example, the story is told of August Kekule's dream of the snake swallowing 
its own tail and his subsequent (and correct) thesis about the structure of the benzene 
ring. Of course, the dream is just anecdotal; that part isn't science, any more than 
Shakespeare's diet might be a good indication of his competency as a writer. His work 
vindicated, Kekule would later speak of the dream to argue the necessity of irrationality 
for original thought, claiming that "the waking mind does not think in leaps" (in Otis 
431) and (with some theatricaUty) urging an audience of the German Chemical Society 
in 1890 to "learn to dream, gentlemen, for then, perhaps, we may find the truth" (433). 
But although he goes on to insist that scientists should "publish [their] dreams, before 
they are put the test by waking reason" (433), it is clear that even Kekule holds with the 
two-contexts model; recording that upon awaking from the dream, he "spent the rest of 
the night working out the consequences of this hypothesis" (432). Kekule's reputation 
did not rest upon publishing dreams, but upon having the requisite training to work out 
the consequences. What counts in his reputation as the founding father of organic 
chemistry is not the (possibly untrue) story about dreaming of a snake, but his 
knowledge of chemistry that enabled him to then justify that discovery through collation 
of experimental data. 
The context of justification is like conceptual laundering, and ideology and 
teleology come out in the wash. In this way, the theory escapes cultural contamination. 
But for critics like Hayles, because the questions asked determine the type of answers 
given, what goes through that laundry or airlock to the justification stage is always 
already decided and tainted by its culturally contaminated genesis in the context of 
discovery. As Hayles has it: "Prophylactic barriers between [the context of discovery 
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and the context of justification] cannot assure safe epistemology" ("Consolidating the 
Canon" 229). This was what the analysis of Carpenter's work was supposed to show, 
and this is why it matters what questions you ask. 
As a result of the necessity of directed questions and background knowledge to 
the act of observing, the observations are never universally valid, but are instead limited 
to the extent that only "someone who is properly enculturated and instantiated into a 
certain perspective can confirm scientific knowledge claims over a wide range of sites" 
(Hayles, "Consolidating the Canon" 231). This creates a double-edged exclusivity for 
scientific knowledge. We have no way of really assessing the truth value of a scientific 
statement unless we are already "enculturated and instantiated" into the scientific 
project, which means that whilst this knowledge is as good as incontestable outside 
science, it is also only true inside science. But i f this exclusivity is true for scientific 
knowledge, then it is surely also true for Hayles's work, and the work of writers and 
thinkers working within the conventions and vocabulary specific to their discipline. 
What Hayles (or any SSK-style constructivist) is writing is not transparent, nor is it 
couched in simple language. So it is not immediately clear why the exclusivity of 
scientific knowledge and discourse is a special case, distinct from the exclusivity of 
literary critical or philosophical discourse, except in who is excluded (that is, literary 
critics and philosophers). Presumably, science is to be considered separately because it 
considers itself separately, claiming universal validity and denying that the type of 
knowledge it produces is shaped by culture in these ways. The consequence of this line 
of attack is that Hayles can no longer claim a universal validity for her own argument. 
To succeed, the strategy has to be self-defeating, at least insofar as her criticisms can 
only really be applicable to those similarly enculturated as herself (which would seem to 
leave scientists untouched). Opening up a typical conundrum for relativists, Hayles is 
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forced to bite the bullet and lose universal knowledge altogether, denying that it is 
something we should be searching for or could ever actually possess: 
I want to argue, on the contrary, that culturally contingent knowledge is the 
only knowledge available to us as finite, embodied, culturally situated 
human beings. It is a fallacy, bom of the objectivist tradition, to think that 
culturally contingent knowledge is not reliable. If we grant that knowledge 
is not universal, does the sky fall as a result? ("Consolidating the Canon" 
233) 
Here is the thrust of the criticism directed at science by the humanities (or science 
studies, at least): science is no more universally true or valid than any other form or 
mode of discourse, and just as subject to cultural influence. Hence, Hayles can happily 
concede her own work lacks "universal tmth" (although this is, in part, because it is 
cultural criticism) providing science is willing to do the same. 
A science that lacked universal vahdity would not be easily recognisable, and it 
is unclear how far the relativist would be willing to take it. Hayles seems to see this 
relativising move as an opportunity to place science and the humanities on a level plane, 
and thus encourage the free flow of ideas and connections between the two cultures. No 
longer wil l scientific knowledge have special claims that can transcend the claims of the 
admittedly culturally contingent knowledge of humanities scholars. But such a 
conception is potentially absurd: would we then be free to contest such basic claims as 
"Al l things are made of atoms," or even "Water boils at 100°C"?^^ 
"All things are made of atoms" was the one piece of information Richard Feynman said he would 
preserve if the rest of scientific knowledge was to be cataclysmically lost. He believed it was possible to 
extrapolate an enormous amount of science from this insight (Gleick 358). "Water boils at IOO°C" is 
probably a bad example, because the centigrade scale is calibrated by the boiling point of water, thus 
making the statement "Water boils at IOOC°" necessarily true. Further, it is not easy to see how these 
statements might be differentiated from more complex science, apart from in their familiarity. The 
differences, then, are only incremental, of complexity but not of type, and as science slides away from 
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In the closing chapter of his 1975 work, Against Method, "anarchist" 
philosopher Paul Feyerabend suggests that we would, and that a "democratic science" 
would be better for all parties: "It is the vote of everyone concerned that decides 
fundamental issues such as ... the truth of basic beliefs such as the theory of evolution, 
or the quantum theory, and not the authority of big-shots hiding behind a non-existing 
methodology" (309). As Feyerabend sees it, science is forced upon us: 
Modem society is "Copemican" not because Copemicanism has been put 
on a ballot, subjected to a democratic debate and then voted in with a 
simple majority; it is "Copemican" because the scientists are Copemicans 
and because one accepts their cosmology as uncritically a one once 
accepted the cosmology of bishops and cardinals. (301-02) 
Rather than seeing science as the civilising force between today's world and that of the 
Dark Ages, Feyerabend sees the current pairing of science and state as a continuation of, 
or retum to, the Dark Ages. This seems a little silly, and the implied analogy is not 
entirely fair inasmuch as modem society will tolerate dissenters from Copemicanism -
a luxury notably not enjoyed by dissenters from the church state (as seen with Galileo's 
trial). Today's citizen is free to disagree with science (as relativists like Feyerabend 
prove) providing they are willing to be called wrong. Even i f Copemicanism was put to 
a ballot, how would "everyone concemed" know which way to vote? Central to the 
democratic ideal is the informed decision, and would the evidence presented not be 
scientific evidence, the same evidence (and more) as that which convinced the scientists 
themselves in the sixteenth century? It is not clear how one might go about arguing 
common sense, scepticism sets in. But if you accept first principles here, it is not altogether 
cogent/consistent to claim to choose whether you believe more complex science further from the obvious, 
where proofs are more obscure and facts more alien. 
That "everyone concerned" would probably vote Copemicanism back in, so to speak, isn't really a 
threat for Feyerabend. He once quipped "argument is not confession" and is no doubt Copemican himself. 
' " 16 r 
with the scientists without first becoming one, and as Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont 
point out, there is an apparent inconsistency as regards the scepticism toward scientific 
practice but faith in the vote: "How, after all, does one find out exactly what 'some 
people believe', i f not by using methods analogous to the sciences (observation, polls, 
etc.)?" (78). 
Isolated, this perhaps misrepresents Feyerabend, whose arguments are not 
against scientific knowledge but against scientific method, or at least the claims made 
for a single scientific method. Through case studies from Galileo onward, Feyerabend 
tries to demonstrate that that in presuming itself to have "found a method that turns 
ideologically contaminated ideas into true and useful theories" (302) science is deluded: 
There is no special method that guarantees success or makes it probable. 
Scientists do not solve problems because they possess a magic wand -
methodology, or a theory of rationality - but because they have studied the 
problem for a long time, because they know the situation fairly well, 
because they are not too dumb. (302) 
The consequence of what Feyerabend scornfully calls the "fairy-tale" (300) of method is 
the elevation and privileging of scientific knowledge. Science receives special 
treatment because it can claim to be "not mere ideology, but an objective measure of all 
ideologies" (302). In opposition to methodological monism Feyerabend proposes what 
he calls "an anarchistic theory of knowledge" whose credo is "anything goes" (28). This 
turned out to be an unfortunate phrase, easily (and sometimes wilfully) misread and 
and the point of the ballot is not so much to usurp scientific norms, but to give a broader range of people 
decision making powers, to let them feel that the truth is their own, and to take the secrecy out of science. 
That said, the "secrecy" is really not a result of deliberate obscurantism, but one of science's incidental 
complexity - a complexity which would doubtless have to mastered in order for the vote to be legitimate. 
So perhaps the ballot is a backhanded way of spreading the scientific gospel after all. 
Feyerabend writes "Scientists have ideas. And they have special methods for improving ideas. The 
theories of science have passed the test of method. They give a better account of the world than the ideas 
which have not passed the test. The fairy-tale explains why modern society treats science in a special 
way, and why it grants it privileges not enjoyed by other institutions" (300) 
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taken to mean that any method suits any situation - a reading apparent in criticisms such 
as Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont's: "There are several ways to swim, and all of them 
have their limitations, but it is not true that all bodily movements are equally as good" 
(75). It seems unlikely that Feyerabend would dispute this, as it is quite consistent with 
his thinking inasmuch as Sokal and Bricmont are conceding that different methods 
(here, for swimming) work in different situations. The criticism fails to touch 
Feyerabend because "anything goes" does not demand that no methods work, only that 
methodological monism is a fallacy'°^ and an impediment to progress: "Al l 
methodologies have their limitations and the only 'rule' that survives is 'anything 
goes'" (296). The aim of Against Method is more to collapse what has come to be seen 
as a hierarchy of methods, with science at the top. By showing that scientific discovery 
takes any number of different (and often distinctly unempirical) approaches (again, 
Kekule's famous dream of the benzene ring, or Fleming's apparently chance 
discovery of penicillin) Feyerabend wants to prove that what assures the success of a 
theory is not method but fi t . (Added to which, it is important to recognise that Against 
Method was never intended to stand alone. Originally, the book was conceived as a 
joint-authored project on rationalism [presumably For and Against Methodi with Imre 
Lakatos providing what would have been a useful counterbalance to some of 
Feyerabend's polemical excesses. Feyerabend describes Against Method as a "long and 
rather personal letter" [Against Method 7] to Lakatos, who died before the exchanges 
were completed, hence the separate publication of Feyerabend's sections.) 
'"^  If he is correct in his belief that there is a fallacy of method, then the proposal of "anything goes" is 
really not that radical because this would be the non-method already in use. That is, he argues only for an 
acceptance of "anything goes" and not its implementation. Anything already goes, and always has. 
'"^  These examples throw up further issues; although the discovery itself was perhaps just "lucky," the 
presence of the background knowledge to recognise or develop that discovery was not. As a disgruntled 
Louis Pasteur remarked, "Dans les champs de I'observation le hasard ne favorise que les esprits prepares" 
- Where observation is concerned, chance favours only the prepared mind. (qtd. In R.Vallery-Radot La 
Vie de Pasteur (1900) ch.4) 
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It seems at times as i f there are two theses at work in Against Method. The first 
is the reasonable sounding notion that scientific method is a fallacy, a myth or fairy-tale, 
constructed to lend authority to scientific pronouncements, but one which rarely informs 
their discovery. The second and stronger version emerges when Feyerabend is engaged 
in trying to show that science need not be the only way of knowing, and implies that 
because scientific method is a fallacy so too is scientific knowledge a fallacy. The 
difference between these two theses turns on the dissolution of the boundary between 
the private and public life of science, or in other words, the two contexts of discovery 
and justification. If the boundary holds, then the fallacy of method is an issue only so 
far as the context of discovery is concerned. If the boundary is dissolved, then any 
problems with method carry over. 
Although Feyerabend apparently rejects the distinction in Against Method (147-
49; 166-68), it is not clear how committed he is to this position. He does move against 
it, but in a different way to Hayles. She says that the context of justification is shot 
through with assumptions carried over from the context of discovery, and so the 
justification is prejudiced from the start (hence her belief that prophylactic boundaries 
cannot assure safe epistemology). But as discussed above, all the carry-over implies is 
incompleteness; selectivity, but not falsity as such. (Selectivity, to be fair, may or may 
not result in a bias in the volume of data supporting one hypothesis over another, but 
would not also invalidate that data.) In keeping with his insistence on methodological 
pluralism, Feyerabend says that a context of discovery and a context of justification are 
both very important to progress, and neither can or should be given epistemological or 
methodological preference, and so "we are dealing with a single uniform domain of 
procedures all of which are equally important for the growth of science. This disposes 
of the distinction" (Against Method 167). Note that the stress is on the progress and 
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growth of science - Feyerabend doesn't think that science doesn't work or isn't true, he 
just doesn't think it works as neatly as the scientists claim it does. What is being 
disposed of is the idea that all the important work is done rationally. Rather than 
eliminate the boundary, he just gives each context equal priority. This is not the same 
thing as saying "one is culturally contaminated, therefore so is the other" - which is to 
say, this conception doesn't demand a causal relation between the two contexts. Rather, 
he just says that there is also a good deal of important work done in the context of 
discovery that should (if we embrace his anarchistic theory of knowledge) demand that 
it be elevated to the same status that the context of justification currently has. 
What is being removed here isn't the distinction, but the privilege. Feyerabend 
simply thinks that the types of things that inform scientific discovery are also 
interesting, and he wants us to recognise that scientific ideas come from diverse sources, 
and not just through cold, rational thought. So Feyerabend is not tied to saying that the 
context of justification cannot validate scientific beliefs, just that it validates them in 
lots of different ways. To reiterate, Against Method doesn't claim that the justification 
of scientific beliefs is impossible, it just says that there is no single special method by 
which information is transformed into scientific knowledge. 
Unfortunately, this still leaves the problem that Hayles met: i f scientific 
knowledge has no special privileges, is it then equal to all other forms of knowing, or 
just some? Where now to begin to discriminate - must we accept/ reject everything? 
One suspects that less committed relativists would be tempted to respond a little like 
Sokal and Bricmont: there are many ways to swim but some are better than others. 
Without method it seems hard to preserve scientific knowledge at all - Hayles, having 
collapsed the prophylactic boundaries between discovery and justification, was willing 
to level the land to a uniformly low epistemological status, dissolving any human claims 
— 165 
for universally valid knowledge. What Feyerabend wants us to think is less clear when 
he calls science a "particular superstition" (Against Method 308).'°'* Unlike Hayles, he 
is not explicit about whether universally valid knowledge does or could exist. The 
rejection of methodological monism was in order to aid, not halt, scientific progress, 
and to widen the range of possibility: "Everywhere science is enriched by unscientific 
methods and unscientific results" (305). He seems optimistic about science, and is 
strongly opposed not to the content of scientific knowledge but to its didactic 
presentation as incontrovertible: "Almost all scientific subjects are compulsory in our 
schools. ... Physics, astronomy, history must be learned. They cannot be replaced by 
magic, astronomy, or by a study of legends" (301) and "We shall not permit them to 
teach the fancies of science as i f they were the only factual statements in existence" 
(300). Feyerabend has no objection to students choosing science (he studied physics 
himself); but believes it must be a choice, and not thmst upon them as the only rational 
choice (since, for Feyerabend, any science that insists upon methodological monism is 
already inherently irrational, because the rational method is a fairy-tale). So it is 
unlikely that Feyerabend wants to follow Hayles in rejecting universal knowledge 
altogether, and unlikely that he himself really believes the myths over the science. But 
once again, questioning science mns into an apparently unavoidable either/or of total 
acceptance or rejection: i f you [disjagree with one principle you would be logically 
inconsistent in not [dis]agreeing with the rest. This contributes to the drift toward the 
idea that outside science there is no knowledge (what Feyerabend tags as extra 
scientiam nulla salus [306]), inasmuch as we would rather have all science than no 
science (and therefore no technology). But it is also unduly demanding. Like 
Although he doesn't perhaps hold a belief in myths, nor does he hold such beliefs against those who 
do - and his comment about the particular superstition of science is no insult because he likes 
superstitions. He is very tolerant of everything but dogma. 
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Feyerabend, what we resist when we resist extra scientiam nulla salus is the exclusion 
of other forms of knowing. We do not necessarily want to be anti-science, just not 
exclusively scientific. There is too much to be lost either way, but where is the balance? 
As George Levine asks. 
How then to reconcile our respect for science with our resistance to it, to 
recognize the need for knowledge and to sustain our sense that science is 
in culture, that it is never any more unpolluted by the society out of which 
it emerges than any other cultural product, that the power of its knowledge 
production requires of us more, not less, attention? (136) 
Our respect for science is usually a function of our admiration for a type of knowledge 
that has been so successful at achieving its own ends, and has managed to command 
almost universal assent among its adherents when in so many subjects there is such 
disarray. Often, a practice is said to be "scientific" in character when it possesses this 
level of consensus.'^ ^ Our resistance to science is largely a resistance to losing our 
identity under a revised vocabulary that fails to capture those aspects of our discipline 
that had most interested us. The worry is that under the new description, there will be no 
way to talk about these things. Pessimistic about the possibility of productive 
interdisciplinary exchanges, Stanley Fish puts the point succinctly: "whenever there is 
an apparent rapprochement or relationship of co-operation between projects, it wil l be 
One of the features that characterises science is the high degree of consensus between practitioners, 
and the purported objectivity of science is not incidental to this. Objectivity is tied-up with consensus in 
something like a causal role, usually understood as being something like "the higher the degree of 
objectivity, the more likely consensus will be achieved." Pragmatism (in the tradition of John Dewey and 
William James), however, inverts this relation, and makes the claim that what we call objectivity only 
ever consists in a recognition of a higher level of consensus. As is discussed below, where we had 
considered consensus to be a result of science's "getting it right" in its attempts to describe an external 
world against which facts can be checked, and producing sufficiently "objective" results to effectively 
neutralise any prior "extra-scientific" concerns, Richard Rorty sees objectivity as not the cause of this 
consensus, but an accolade we tag onto any disciplines where this sort of consensus is achieved. The 
obvious objection here is that if it isn't objective and checkable correspondence with something like how 
the world really is, then what else impels consensus in the sciences? 
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the case either that one is anxiously trading on the prestige and vocabulary of the other 
or that one has swallowed the other" (Professional Correctness 83). The relativistic 
approach seemingly offers a means of resolving argument about epistemological 
superiority, but, as with Hayles and Feyerabend, this is often to the exclusion of what 
we have come to think of as a powerful tool for understanding the world and we are left 
wondering how it is that science appears to be so effective at achieving its ends. Richard 
Rorty seems to offer an account that allows us to retain our respect for the achievements 
and power of scientific thinking, whilst simultaneously recognising and allowing that it 
is legitimate and interesting to think about subjects not covered by the scientific 
account. As seen with his response to Wilson's Consilience, Rorty's account insists that 
there is no foundation for the hierarchy of disciplines. 
Unlike many relativists,Rorty is impressed with, and careful not to deny or to 
understate the effectiveness of scientific knowledge. Science, he claims, has been 
"spectacularly useful and astonishingly beautiful" ("Against Unity" 38), and elsewhere, 
" I am happy to agree with C. P. Snow that modem physics is one of the most beautiful 
Rorty is often described as either a "relativist" or a "postmodernist," or both terms in combination. But 
(like most relativists and postmodernists) Rorty denies that he is either: "I think that 'relativism' and 
'postmodernism' are words which never had any clear sense, and that both should be dropped from our 
philosophical vocabulary" (Philosophy and Social Hope xiv). He is, he insists, a pragmatist, in the 
tradition of William James and John Dewey, who was also called a relativist, but "of course, we 
pragmatists," he claims, "never call ourselves relativists" (xvii). Rorty says he would rather define 
himself negatively, in opposition to the things he doesn't agree with, so he is an "anti-Platonist," an "anti-
foundationalist," an "anti-metaphysician" (and elsewhere, "anti-representational"). To allow himself to be 
called a relativist is, he says, to accede to a vocabulary that already implicitly acknowledges the existence 
of the type of found-made or absolute-relative distinctions he is trying to remove, and to accept this to 
have no place to argue from. "We cannot allow ourselves to be called 'relativists', since that description 
begs the central question. That central question is about the utility of the vocabulary which we inherited 
from Plato and Aristotle" (xviii). And again, "We pragmatists shrug off charges that we are "relativists" 
or "irrationalists" by saying that these charges presuppose precisely the distinctions we reject" (xix). If he 
accepts he is a relativist, then there is no room left to argue that the apparently objective discoveries of 
science are not found but made, because then the way is open for his opponents to ask what he calls the 
"awkward question, viz.. Have we discovered the surprising fact that what was thought to be objective is 
actually subjective, or have we invented it?" (PSH xviii). So for Rorty's project to even get off the 
ground, it is imperative that he denies from the start the validity of such labels and the distinctions they 
imply. However, for the purposes of explaining his views, and those of his critics, the "relativist" label is 
here retained, because it describes clearly what he is to those who are not. 
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achievements of the human mind" (Philosophy and Social Hope'°^ 188). The emphasis 
here is on the utility and what he calls "the moral and aesthetic grandeur" of science, as 
distinct from its "purportedly exalted epistemico-ontological status" (PSH 188). This 
stress is important, because for Rorty, the success of science is no reason to prioritise its 
field of knowledge; the job that it does it does well, but it is not the only job to be done, 
nor is it any more important than other jobs. He insists that "the current scientific 
vocabulary is one vocabulary among others, and that there is no need to give it primacy, 
nor to reduce other vocabularies to i t" (Consequences of Pragmatism'"^ 142). Rorty 
wants to dispense with arguments about the relative status of various disciplines, and 
replace them with questions about the utility of those disciplines for their different 
purposes (PSH 186). Stanley Fish, a literary critic whom Rorty holds in high esteem, 
makes very similar noises: 
The job ... wil l of course always be a particular one, a job of history, or of 
law, or of literary criticism or whatever; and these different jobs will 
always be just that, different, and not in themselves capable of being 
ranked.... Ranking is, of course, something that happens; in our culture 
science is usually thought to have the job of describing reality as it really 
is; but its possession of the franchise, which it wrested away from religion, 
is a historical achievement not a natural right. (Professional Correctness 
72) 
Rorty claims that the success of the natural sciences, and physics in particular, has 
created a feeUng of insecurity in those subjects (including the largely non-mathematical. 
Hereafter cited parenthetically as PSH. 
Hereafter cited parenthetically as CP. 
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or "higher-level," sciences such as zoology'°^) where mathematical models are 
inappropriate or inapplicable, a feeling that the positivists encouraged, and that 
manifests in physics envy. With "knowledge" understood as being co-extensive with 
"scientific knowledge," the positivists' unity of science becomes a more global claim, a 
way to split propositions into knowledge and nonsense. As with Wilson's scheme, what 
this usually means is just that all knowledge is translated into physics, into what is 
explicable in terms of atoms, and any proposition that will not translate is eliminated. 
But this simple formula, which worked so well for the Newtonian universe of the early 
positivists, works less well for quantum mechanics. The picture that emerged after the 
1920s of the wave-particle duality, of particles that travel back in time, of properties 
called "spin" and "flavour," is less comprehensible and less easily substantiated to an 
inexpert public than a simple account of so many atoms in a stack or lattice."° Bas Van 
Fraassen sees this as a conflict between the scientific image and the manifest image, 
which is exacerbated by "just how unimaginably different is the world we may faintly 
discem in the models science gives us from the world that we experientially live in ... . 
once atoms had no colour; now they also have no shape, place or volume" ("Empiricism 
in the Philosophy of Science" 258). The consequence of this new information was not 
just scepticism towards the claims of physicists (although it was this, too), but rather, a 
Obviously, zoology is reducible to physics if you trace backwards through biology to biochemistry to 
chemistry to physics, and is in this respect mathematically formalisable. However, talk of zoology in 
terms of biochemistry or physics obscures the salient features that zoology studies; in other words, talking 
about zoology in terms of biochemistry is not talking about zoology qua zoology, because, at the 
biochemical level, the animals don't exist anymore than colours exist at the atomic level. 
Physicist Steven Weinberg is keen to point out that although "quantum mechanics can seem rather 
eerie if described in ordinary language," this is no reason to draw the invalid conclusion (as Andrew Ross 
does) that science "can no longer account for matter at the quantum level" (qtd. in Weinberg "Sokal's 
Hoax" 12; from Ross, Strange Weather: Culture. Science, and Technology in the Age of Limits. New 
York: Verso, 1991. 42). Physicists can, Weinberg assures us, "obtain a complete quantitative description 
of atoms using what is called the 'wave function' of the atom" ("Sokal's Hoax" 12). That said, Rorty's 
point holds here inasmuch as what is at issue is not whether the physicists can understand quantum 
mechanics, but whether there is any simple way to explain it to a non-professional audience. Apparently 
there is not. 
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shift in ideas as to who could question or criticise the findings of science, "so that an 
ontological respect for insensate matter" was "replaced by a sociological respect for 
professors of physics" (Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature"' 217). More than 
ever, the physicists held the epistemological high ground. Rorty, like Fish, wants to 
break this ranking down, but is careful about explaining his reasoning: 
I hope it is clear that I do not want to assign science a lower position on 
this pecking order. What I want to urge is that we stop using terms like 
"real" and "objective" to construct such an order. It seems to me about as 
silly to try to establish a hierarchy among disciplines, or cultural activities, 
as to establish one among the tools in a toolbox, or among the flowers in a 
garden. (PSH 186). 
This is typical of Rorty's position, and of his manner of speaking about the sciences. 
The central objection here is to using "real" and "objective" as criteria for establishing 
the worth of a discipline. Rorty wants to replace these terms with ways of thinking that 
do not insist on a background distinction of found (objective) versus made (subjective), 
when in his view, all truths are made. He is also concerned with revising our definition 
of "objectivity" to separate it from the connotations it has picked up as a synonym for 
"scientific" via "rational." So, instead of taking "objectivity" as a criterion, Rorty offers 
"unforced agreement," which, as he recognises, is not without its ambiguities; 
"Unforced agreement between whom? Us? The Nazis? Any arbitrary culture or 
Group?": 
The answer, of course, is "us". This necessarily ethnocentric answer 
simply says that we must work by our own lights. Beliefs suggested by 
another culture must be tested by trying to weave them together with the 
Hereafter cited parenthetically as PMN. 
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beliefs we already have. On the other hand, we can always enlarge the 
scope of "us" by regarding other people, or cultures, as members of the 
same community of inquiry as ourselves - by treating them as part of the 
group among whom unforced agreement is to be sought. What we cannot 
do is rise above all human communities, actual and possible. We cannot 
find a skyhook which lifts us out of mere coherence - mere agreement - to 
something like "correspondence with reality as it is in itself." (Objectivity, 
Relativism, and Truth"^38) 
So "objectivity" is taken as a synonym for "agreement" ("unforced" simply to remove 
the possibility of coercion), and, on this account, consists in the extent to which there is 
consensus within a discipline. Under this redescription, "we might, in an imaginary age 
in which consensus in these areas was almost complete, view morality, physics, and 
psychology as equally 'objective'" (PMN 335). For Rorty, what we have always meant 
when we have spoken of "objectivity" has been a recognition of this sort of consensus. 
"Objective" (considered properly) has never meant anything more than consensus."^ 
Rorty is able to make this redefinition because he doesn't believe that truth consists in 
descriptions that are closer to a correspondence with "how things really are." He sees 
this, the correspondence theory, as untenable because he believes that truth only ever 
exists as a property of statements. 
In trying to explain what he means when he claims to deny the correspondence 
theory of truth, Rorty gives the giraffe as an example (PSH xxvi). We all know what he 
Hereafter cited parenthetically as ORT. 
His thinking here is informed by William James, who said "ideas (which are themselves but parts of 
our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts 
of our experience" (Pragmatism 58) and John Dewey, who said "[r]ationality ... is the attainment of 
working harmony among diverse desires" (Human Nature and Conduct 196). Both quotes appear in Rorty 
(CP 205). Although Rorty describes himself as a pragmatist to align himself with both James and Dewey, 
his position is informed as much by the post-Wittgenstein "linguistic turn" in philosophy, and in order to 
stress this difference, he is often referred to as a "neopragmatist." 
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means when he says "giraffe," otherwise his example wouldn't work. But he wants us 
to realise that what we pick out when we say "giraffe" is not decided by the world; is 
not simply given, but made - decided by conventions that emerge from our relationship 
with the world.""* He says that the difference between the giraffe and the surrounding 
air is clear enough if you are a human hunting for meat, but not so clear i f you are an 
amoeba or a space traveller observing earth from above.There are lots of ways to 
describe how that particular piece of space-time occupied by a giraffe is configured, and 
they're all interest-relative, inasmuch as they are all valid from a different perspective 
(PSH xxvi). This was the point Putnam was making about square pegs and round holes: 
you can talk in terms of atomic or geometric structures,"^ neither is more true, but one 
is considerably more useful."^ Rorty takes this to mean that the only "truth" we'll ever 
have is determined by how useful the description is for our purposes. He calls this "the 
relativity of descriptions to purposes" (PSH xxvi). As Putnam said for the square peg: It 
When we say "given" in this sense, what we mean is that "this is how a phenonmena will appear 
before we have begun layering theory onto it," as opposed to "made," which is usually used to describe 
constructed interpretations (such as, "parking in that zone was wrong" or "the Germany-France border"). 
This is, of course, what Rorty says, too, but he wants to stress that the given is as much a human 
perspective as the made. In the sense that we don't choose the given but do choose the made (or, at least, 
our culture chooses the made), there does seem to be a difference: they are both necessarily human 
perspectives, but one is a universal human perspective, true for all humans (perhaps "the sky is blue"), 
and one is culturally limited. 
Rorty sensibly adds that you'd need to be a language-using amoeba for his point to hold. 
What Eddington called 'Table No. 1" and 'Table No. 2" in his introduction to The Nature of the 
Physical World (xi-xix). When Eddington says "... there are duplicates of every object about me - two 
tables, two chairs, two pens" (xi) it should be clear that he doesn't mean there are actually two tables, just 
that there are two ways of describing the one table; geometrically and atomically, a macro- and a 
microstructure. Eddington also goes on to add: 'The external world of physics has thus become a world 
of shadows. In removing our illusions we have removed the substance, for indeed we have seen that 
substance is one of the greatest of our illusions. ... Perhaps, indeed, reality is a child which cannot survive 
without its nurse illusion. But if so, that is of little concern to the scientist, who has good and sufficient 
reasons for pursuing his investigations in the world of shadows and is content to leave to the philosopher 
the determination of its exact status in regard to reality" (xvi). Rorty is only too happy to play the 
philosopher, but it seems probable that Eddington would not have approved of his conclusions about 
where this all leaves "reality." 
Putnam himself is not so clear on this. The upshot of his famous 'Twin Earth" thought experiment 
supports an essentialist position that argues for the denotation of a word being guaranteed by causally 
basic (usually atomic) structures. Twater (Twin-Earth's water analogue) is not water because twater is 
X Y Z and not H2O. These functional analogues are nonetheless different things; when a Twin Earthian 
says "water is wet" it does not mean the same thing as this same utterance on Earth by virtue of a non-
identity at the chemical (and so, causal) level. (See "Meaning and Reference" in Martinich 284-291, and 
"The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in Putnam. Mind. Language and Reality 215-271, esp. 223-227.) 
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might be true that there are these atoms here, now, in this organisation, but they're 
always changing, they are drifting off and moving amongst each other. They are in this 
exact position only for a moment. The type of coherence and organisation that we 
understand is a higher-level affair, and as Jerry Fodor has it, "[cjausal powers supervene 
on local microstructure" (Psychosemantics 44)."^ Certain descriptions make sense at 
some levels on the scale and not others. On our level of scale, they might mean 
"giraffe." Or else they might mean "square peg / round hole." But as Putnam says, how 
you choose to look at this either conceals the interesting relationships or else it reveals 
them. It makes sense for us to reveal them, so we effectively ignore the atomic structure. 
The atomic microstructure"^ is perhaps a more fundamental level, but Rorty's point is 
to ask: how is that more true? And his answer is that if we are talking about giraffes, or 
square pegs in round holes, it isn't. So truth becomes always interest relative. This is 
what was meant by "[rjeality is one, but descriptions of it are many. They ought to be 
many, for human beings have, and ought to have, many different purposes" (Rorty, 
"Against Unity" 31). 
There may at first blush seem to be an inconsistency in Rorty's refusing to grant 
science the privileged epistemological status it demands and yet still accepting those 
scientific findings (like atoms and quarks) that we cannot affirm by our own senses, but 
Rorty never denies the effectiveness of science for its particular ends. By accepting that 
science has discovered and accurately described things like atoms and electrons, he is 
This is not to imply that Fodor would wholly agree with Rorty. Fodor maintains a link between these 
layers of scale. The way Rorty tells it, as far as we can ever know, the different vocabularies do describe 
different worlds. The way Fodor tells it, these are different ways of describing the same world, and we 
use a different language to talk about micro- and macrostructure because the relationships at the macro 
level simply do not obtain at a micro level, but supervene upon the micro level. 
This point, if it isn't clear, applies at every level, right down to atoms themselves. The lessons of 
quantum physics and sub-atomic physics seem to be teaching us that even atoms are not quite as basic 
(which is to say, not quite as atomic) as Democritus had hoped, but also subject to change, and that on 
some level, it is all just matter and energy in flux. Physicist Richard Feynman mimics the haiku to claim 
that you cannot reduce one to the other, "You can't say A is made of B / or vice versa. / All mass is 
interaction" (Gleick 5). 
not tacitly agreeing that science is describing "how things really are," just accepting that 
we are creating for ourselves more and more descriptions to choose amongst. Rorty 
doesn't dispute the existence of atoms, or giraffes, for that matter, saying only that these 
are simply there. What we choose to call them and how we choose to describe their 
relations and actions is where we start to decide which are relevant and which 
irrelevant. A gradual increase in the effectiveness of science is not evidence of science 
getting "closer to the tmth" or "closer to how things really are," but is instead just a case 
of science gradually finding better descriptions of the world, understood as more 
effective descriptions that enable us to do things better than the previous descriptions. 
The difference is not supposed to be epistemological, but there will surely always be 
certain descriptions which will be more effective than others, certain ways of describing 
their "relevance" that are more useful (for example, it is more useful for us to use a 
geometric description to solve the square peg / round hole problem). The problem here 
is that Rorty seems to have reintroduced something like the correspondence theory of 
truth. A. J. Ayer sums up the objection in a letter to the London Review of Books: 
Professor Rorty endorses the view that "great scientists invent descriptions 
of the world which are useful for purposes of prediction and controlling 
what happens," and asserts that "there is no sense in which any of these 
descriptions is an accurate representation of the way the world is in itself." 
If the second of these sentences is tme, how can one description serve the 
purpose of prediction more usefully than another? In what, indeed, does 
Professor Rorty take prediction to consist? (4)'^° 
'^ ^ Ayer's letter comes in response to an article Rorty had published in the London Review of Books 
entitled 'The Contingency of Language" (17 Apr. 1986: 3-6), revised and reprinted in Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity (3-22). 
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What Ayer and critics like him want is for Rorty to admit that you cannot have a 
successfully predictive theory without your theory being in some way closer to how the 
world is, since this is what grounds prediction. Rorty's reply is that "a belief's purported 
' f i t ' with the intrinsic nature of reality adds nothing which makes any practical 
difference to the fact that it is widely held to lead to successful action" (PSH 151).'^' 
This is a version of WiUiam James's question of "do our purported theoretical 
differences make any difference in practice?" So by the pragmatist account, "how the 
world is in itself is superfluous to our use of the theories; either they work or they 
don't, and either they cohere with other working beliefs, or they don't, and it is utility 
and coherence that should decide whether or not we will be persuaded to believe in 
these theories rather than those. There will surely always be certain descriptions which 
will be more effective than others, certain ways of describing their "relevance" that are 
more useful. The question behind this is: how do we choose between descriptions?'^^ 
Or, given that the pragmatists hold that behef acquisition is not an issue of conscious 
choice but rather one of persuasion: why should one theory or account be more 
This is, of course, really quite evasive. All that's really being said is "it works doesn't it? What more 
do you want?" when what we want to know (as scientists) is "what are the mechanisms under the surface 
that make this theory able to successfully predict phenomena?", the assumption being, that these 
mechanisms will be universally applicable. 
'^ ^ Atomic or geometric, these are both valid descriptions, none more true than the other, but, are all 
descriptions valid? Presumably not, insofar as some will be useless and misleading. The intuition here is 
to mentally add "some accounts will be closer to how it really is." When we ask, "do all descriptions (that 
is, any descriptions) work?" what we are thinking is something like: "do all these accounts describe how 
it really is?" Because, to go back to the square peg / round hole, you can say "it's these atoms, here, now" 
(atomic) or you can say "it's that the area of the aperture in the board is smaller than the area of the face 
of the peg" (geometric), and both are true but only one is useful. What if, however, you tried to say: "it's 
because the peg is blue and the board is red" or "it's because squares and circles are enemies." Would 
these descriptions be valid? How would you tell? What if you said something like "that's typical of 
triangles and hexagons," would this be an inaccurate description? How, indeed, can objects (any objects) 
be picked out? Once again, we seem to be close to saying, "well, one would be true to (something like) 
how it really was and one wouldn't." Because it seems for each purpose, there is only one description that 
works properly. If the purpose is explaining to me why the peg won't go through the hole, the geometric 
argument, and maybe something about the solidity of the materials involved, is going to work best. The 
other explanations - colour, speculation about antagonism between different shapes, false descriptions of 
the shapes (assuming we can talk of false descriptions when we can't talk of true ones) and so on - are 
irrelevant and even misleading. I think that Rorty would probably agree that only one description really 
works, but he would stress that it worked only in light of the certain purpose I had in mind (explaining 
"why doesn't the peg pass through the hole?"). 
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convincing or have more explanatory power than the other? It behoves Rorty not to 
answer with "one was closer to how it really was," but it is difficult to see how else we 
could even begin to give an answer without some reference to one description (or even 
some descriptions) being closer to the truth than the others. The closest Rorty comes to 
answering this is probably in confronting how it is that we nearly all agree that science 
is a good way (and even the best way) to explain how the world works. As Rorty seems 
to be saying that there is no important difference between science and other types of 
human activity, how does he account for this success - why do we choose science? It is, 
he claims, nothing to do with "truth": 
Our reply has to be, I think, that the benefits of modem astronomy and 
space travel outweigh the advantages of Christian fundamentalism. The 
argument between us and our medieval ancestors should not be about 
which of us has got the universe right. It should be about the point of 
holding views about the motion of heavenly bodies, the ends to be 
achieved by the use of certain tools. Confirming the truth of Scripture is 
once such aim, space travel is another. (PSH xxv) 
Rorty never denies the existence or the solidity of the world. He agrees with common-
sense materialists that the world is pushing up against us, but believes that this gives us 
no reason to subscribe to an essentialist account that claims we have "cut nature at the 
joints." This is why naming and vocabularies are so important to him. He distances 
himself from much of Feyerabend, whose talk of teaching witchcraft in schools 
(Against Method 100; 298-309) and placing "the views of idiosyncratic nature mystics 
... 'on a par with' the views of professors of chemistry" Rorty calls "silly relativism" 
(ORT 89). Nor is he an idealist: "there is such a thing as brute resistance - the pressure 
of light waves on Galileo's eyeball, or of the stone on Dr. Johnson's boot" (81). But, 
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crucially, the Rortean pragmatist insists that there is "no way of transferring this non-
linguistic brutality to facts" (81). Facts, on this view, "are hybrid entities; that is, the 
causes of the assertibility of sentences include both physical stimuli and our antecedent 
choice of response to such stimuli" (81). Once again, the world is real and stable, but 
our interpretations of it are open to debate: "causation is not under a description, but 
explanation is" (81). 
It is useful to note here how Rorty uses this example to indirectly reinforce his 
claim that there is no qualitative difference between space travel and scripture, 
inasmuch as both can make people happy, and no epistemological difference because 
neither can be said to have any more access to how the world really is (although both 
will claim that they do). He also enjoys making implicit comparisons between the 
sciences (where participation usually requires a high level of academic education) and 
manual work (where participation usually requires familiarity with the tools of the job, 
but no academic education).This is not intended to be demeaning to scientists, rather, 
it underlines how Rorty wants us to think of them: as people skilled in using the tools 
(and the jargon) of their job. From the pragmatist's view, we "can see chemistry and 
literary criticism and paleontology and politics and philosophy all striding along 
together - equal comrades with diverse interests, distinguished only by these interests, 
not by cognitive status" ("Texts and Lumps" ORT 83). This all accords with the 
pragmatist view of objectivity as simply a greater amount of unforced agreement, and 
effecting this redefinition is how pragmatists are able to collapse the hierarchy of 
'^ ^ See, for example, "tools in a toolbox" (PSH 186); see "the plumber-carpenter or the carpenter-
electrician distinction" ("Against Unity" 30); see "Is the carpenter's or the particle physicist's account of 
tables the true one?" (PSH 153). This is doubtless also a vestige of the original rhetoric of pragmatism, 
where thinkers like John Dewey used similar juxtapositions to stress the importance of practical 
familiarity for all sorts of knowing: 'The scientific man and the philosopher like the carpenter, the 
physician and politician know with their habits not with their 'consciousness.' The latter is eventual, not a 
source" (Human Nature 182-183). 
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disciplines. One of the reasons for (or results oO collapsing the hierarchy of disciplines 
is an insistence that we prioritise happiness over truth. That this isn't an approach the 
rational realists would favour is well illustrated in a comparison with how Richard 
Dawkins feels about faith healers and their lack of empirical footing: 
Television is an even more powerful medium than the newspapers, and we 
are in the grip of a near epidemic of paranormal propaganda on television. 
In one of the more notorious examples of recent years in Britain, a faith 
healer claimed to be the receptacle for the soul of a 2,000-year dead doctor 
called Paul of Judea. ... Afterwards, I clashed with the commissioning 
editor of this programme . . . . The editor's main defence was that the man 
was doing a good job healing his patients. He seemed genuinely to feel that 
this is all that mattered. Who cares whether reincarnation really happens, 
as long as the healer can bring some comfort to his patients? (Unweaving 
the Rainbow 125-26) 
This last sentence is meant as an ironic appeal to our sense of robust rationality, but 
many people might be tempted to take it at face value, and ask: well, who does care 
what really happens? Compare this with Rorty: 
Nobody knows or cares about whether a given piece of computer software 
represents reality accurately. What we care about is whether it is the 
software which wil l most efficiently accomplish a certain task. 
Analogously, pragmatists think that the question to ask about our beliefs is 
not whether they are about reality or merely about appearance, but simply 
whether they are the best habits of action for gratifying our desires. (PSH 
xxiv) 
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For Rorty, all that really matters is whether or not the theory enables us to better cope 
with a situation. If the TV faith healer was not really a reincarnation, or i f a particular 
drug was really just a sugar placebo, what would it matter so long as the desired results 
were achieved? Rorty holds with "the pragmatist claim that our desire for truth cannot 
take precedence over our desire for happiness" (PSH 268). He keeps making this 
distinction between utility and correctness, saying the former is the best we can hope 
for, and the latter may be either unobtainable or else useless. He calls it "the invidious 
distinction between getting it right and making it useful" (PSH 146). As regards faith 
healers, or whether or not we should follow a Kantian programme for philosophy, this 
dictum seems harmless enough. But there are more controversial and difficult issues 
than these, where it is less than obvious that the conclusions should be dictated by the 
increase of happiness they would bring. Dawkins's frustration stems from the same 
thinking that led Bernard Davis to complain of the "moralistic fallacy," the worry that 
the truth will be suppressed in the interests of avoiding conflict with an existing moral 
scheme. Davis's point, something Dawkins would surely agree with, was that we should 
"trust posterity to adapt its notions of morality to further new knowledge" ("The 
Moralistic Fallacy" 390). Whilst Rorty would probably accept that much, he would 
surely reject the reasoning Davis offers: in criticising the findings of scientists, we are 
"blaming the messenger for the message. For science does not create the realities of 
nature: it only discovers them" ("The Moralistic Fallacy" 390). In other words, science 
is innocent as far as you believe scientists are simply reading off the book of nature. 
Their innocence is lost entirely when you claim, as Rorty does, that there is no "found" 
or "given" knowledge, and that all knowledge is made. Does all this leave Rorty unable 
to discriminate between theories? Apparently not. The pragmatist who holds with a 
coherence theory of truth can still call creationism "bad science," but only insofar as it 
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fails to cohere with other beliefs (PSH 149). The belief has to fi t with other behefs not 
with "how reality really is" simply because this is not something we can ever get to. 
It is important to recognise the importance of vocabularies to the pragmatist 
worldview. The basic argument from pragmatism says that (1) because there is a 
relativity of descriptions to purposes, there is no best way to describe a situation, and (2) 
because there are many different vocabularies there is no central vocabulary, so (3) 
therefore you cannot rank the vocabularies any more than you can rank the purposes. 
And, crucially, because each discipline is only a particular vocabulary looking at things 
from a certain angle for a certain purpose, (4) you cannot rank the disciplines. The 
conclusion is that all disciplines share an equal status. Consonant with Rortean 
pragmatism, Stanley Fish goes as far as to say that a discipline is exhausted by its 
particular vocabulary: "The vocabularies of disciplines are not external to their objects, 
but constitutive of them. Discard them in favour of the vocabulary of another discipline, 
and you will lose the object that only they call into being" (Professional Correctness 
85). So a contest of disciplines is always and only ever a contest of vocabularies, and as 
vocabularies are always purpose specific, any contest of disciplines is just a contest of 
purposes, and purpose doesn't seem to be the type of thing you could rank (without a 
circular appeal to desires and values). 
What Rorty says about what type of disciplines he likes or doesn't like is 
accordingly not informed by any belief in epistemological superiority, but by the extent 
to which he thinks their vocabularies might help us achieve our aims. He doesn't like 
the turn philosophy took after Descartes toward the analytic, regretting "the triumph of 
the quest for certainty over the quest for wisdom" which meant a concern with being 
rigorous or explaining the appearance of rigour in the sciences, rather than "help[ing] 
people achieve peace of mind. Science, rather than living, became philosophy's subject. 
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and epistemology its centre" (PMN 61). Rorty would replace the analytic philosophers 
with what he calls "edifiers." The edifier "aims at continuing a conversation rather than 
at discovering truth" (PMN 373). This can be contrasted with the scientists, who would 
(one suspects) gladly exchange their vocation for the complete world picture they are 
aiming at. The scientist wants to complete and be done, whereas "the point of edifying 
philosophy is to keep the conversation going rather than to find objective truth" (PMN 
377). Rorty doesn't want to see the conversation end, and he thinks edifying philosophy 
might keep this conversation "from degenerating into inquiry, into an exchange of 
views" (PMN 372). From here, it is possible to see why Rorty believes that one of the 
best ways of keeping the conversation going is literary criticism. 
For Rorty, Derrida is a shining example of what he thinks literary criticism is 
best for. He doesn't take Derrida seriously at all, claiming "his term 'grammatology' 
was evanescent whimsy, rather than a serious attempt to proclaim the discovery of a 
new philosophical method or strategy" (PSH xx-xxi). Elsewhere, he talks of how 
Derrida "is trying to get a game going which cuts right across the rational-irrational 
distinction" (Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity'^''^ 133). And again, "Derrida does not 
want to comprehend Hegel's books; he wants to play with Hegel" (CP 96).'^^ None of 
this sounds like he thinks Derrida is doing anything serious, which is because he 
doesn't. He thinks that Derrida is a good joker, someone playing around, "trying to get a 
Hereafter cited parenthetically as CIS. 
Rorty does think that Derrida also has a "very serious" side: "He is serious about the need to change 
ourselves, serious about what he calls 'deconstruction.'" (CP 98), and Rorty likes this "shadowy, 
deconstructive, good side," which he opposes to the "luminous, constructive, bad side" (99). It is also 
worth noting that what Rorty means when he talks about Derrida's lack of seriousness is "simply this 
refusal to take the standard rules seriously, conjoined with the refusal to give a clear answer to the 
question, 'Is it the old game played differently, or rather a new game?"' (98). When Rorty speaks of 
games, it is usually in the Wittgensteinian sense of language games, of participating in social procedures 
with certain rules, or even John Von Neumann's sense of "game theory," the logic of competition, but 
there is also a sense in which he is capitalising on the ambiguity here, and probably intends to also 
suggest the levity of a game: if he believes his own claims, then Rorty is intent on rejecting the terms and 
conditions of the rationale of his opponents, so it follows that he probably does not take their criticisms 
very seriously. 
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game going." Of course, not everyone feels that people in Derrida's position (sold as 
somewhere between a philosopher and a literary critic, but crucially, not primarily a 
creative artist) should be so casual about what they say. Rorty feels that there is an 
imbalance between how Derrida's work is treated and how someone like Yeats is 
treated: " I f you advertise yourself as a novelist or a poet you are let off a lot of bad 
questions, because of the numinous haze that surrounds the 'creative artist.' But 
philosophy professors are supposed to be made of sterner s tuff (CIS 133). The obvious 
rejoinder here is that, surely, this inequality is just the pay-off for being taken seriously: 
people listen to philosophers in a way that that they don't listen to Yeats. There may be 
an aesthetic aspect to philosophy, just as there may be a philosophical aspect to poetry, 
but you don't have to agree with Yeats's views on spiritualism (which Rorty calls "all 
that g u f f [CIS 133]) to enjoy his poetry any more than you have to like Kant's writing 
style to agree with his philosophy. But these distinctions between the aesthetic and the 
philosophical (or perhaps form and content; medium and message) are precisely the 
type of distinctions that Rorty would hke to see collapsed. Rorty likes Derrida, in part, 
because he doesn't have to take him seriously. In Derrida's "game," as Rorty sees it, the 
aesthetic dimension is as important as the philosophical content; and this is something 
Rorty himself often cashes in on. 
One of the most frequent criticisms of Rorty is that he is only a rhetorician; that 
he is playing with the language rather than the ideas. Bernard Williams takes issue with 
just such playfulness. Rorty's comment that philosophy happens "when language goes 
on holiday" is for Williams "a remark which, one might say, is, like some others of his, 
deeply shallow" (32). This is something literary critics, too, are sometimes accused of 
doing - playing with language, finding puns and slippage in the texts they study, but 
also, and more controversially, making their own puns, their own ambiguities (examples 
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of this are not hard to come by, but here is Irving Malin, one of the more enthusiastic 
practitioners, looking here at the word "occupants": "'Occupants' seems easy - except 
for the fanciful idea that 'oc' sounds like Ach as in Achtung or that 'u' sounds like 
'you' or that 'pants' makes me re(member) 'paints'" [in Kellman and Malin 132]'^^). 
Rorty sees this not as a weakness of literary criticism, but as its great strength. Because 
Derrida is not playing by "any antecedently known rules" Rorty urges we see "his 
purpose as the same autonomy at which Proust and Yeats aimed" (CIS 133), that is, a 
freedom from disciplinary constraints. Rather than "dissecting his writing along lines 
laid down by somebody else," we should instead "sit back and enjoy it" (CIS 133). 
Here, as before, we see Rorty happily acknowledging that no one takes literary critics 
seriously, and seeing this as a benefit. The problem is that some of them do want to be 
taken seriously. 
Rorty conflates literature with criticism, treating them as one type of discourse. 
He does this, in part, because he doesn't see the point in (or the possibility of) 
separating the object from talk about it, the analyst and the analysed. This is reflected in 
his attitude towards science, and how scientists do not simply "find," but make. But 
also, it has come from how Frye talked about the critic as someone who is just as 
creative as the author. In part it is from Harold Bloom, and the Yale School of critics, 
whom Rorty calls "textualists;" people who want to say that the creativity of the critic is 
just as important as the creativity of the poet. Here is Rorty on Bloom in relation to 
more traditional critics: 
The kind of textualist who claims to have gotten the secret of the text, to 
have broken its code, prides himself on not being distracted by anything 
It's unclear how seriously Malin wants to be taken. It is tempting to interpret his style as parodic, but if 
so, the joke is on the language, Malin's point presumably being that there is a greater layer of linguistic 
slippage and depth than we commonly realise. 
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which the text might previously have been thought to be about or anything 
its author says about it. The strong misreader, like Foucault or Bloom, 
prides himself on the same thing, on being able to get more out of the text 
than its author or its intended audience could possibly have found there. 
(CP 151-152)'^^ 
Of course. Bloom is saying just that when he talks about how every strong reading is a 
misreading. In The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom claims: 
The issue is reduction and how best to avoid it. Rhetorical, Aristotelian, 
phenomenological, and structuralist criticisms all reduce, whether to 
images, ideas, given things, or phonemes. Moral and other blatant 
philosophical or psychological criticisms all reduce to rival 
conceptualisations. We reduce - i f at all - to another poem. ... There are 
no interpretations but only misinterpretations, and so all criticism is prose 
poetry. (94 - 95) 
Rorty makes a distinction between the traditional humanistic critic and the textualist. An 
all-out "strong textualist" like Bloom (as Rorty reads him), does not merely treat the 
text as autonomous, ignoring the intentions of the author (as Frye insisted we do), but 
goes one step further, and ignores the intentions of the text, as well: "The critic asks 
neither the author nor the text about their intentions but simply beats the text into a 
shape which will serve his own purpose. He makes the text refer to whatever is relevant 
to that purpose" (CP 151). The weaker textualist critic Rorty dismisses as simply a 
"decoder," someone who thinks there is a meaning to be found, a stable sense to the text 
that the right type of analysis will yield up. Such a critic is, Rorty believes, "just doing 
'^ ^ It follows, of course, that if the author could not have "found" these meanings in his or her text, he or 
she certainly could not have consciously intended them to be read in this way. 
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his best to imitate science - he wants a method of criticism, and he wants everybody to 
agree that he has cracked the code. He wants all the comforts of consensus .... The 
strong textualist is trying to live without comfort" (CP 152). The central point here, and 
the reason why the approach so impresses Rorty, is that (like the pragmatist) the 
textualist critic is concerned with making rather than finding. The textualist is aware 
that he is constructing the readings he produces, but believes that this is all anyone ever 
does, and so will "treat the scientist as naive in thinking that he is doing something more 
than putting ideas together, or constructing new texts" (CP 140). Because the textualist 
is awake to the real possibilities of engagement and not, like the scientist, deluded by a 
false realism, Rorty is able to re-cast the hierarchy, and make what he calls "the 
plausible claim that literature has now displaced religion, science, and philosophy as the 
presiding discipline of our culture" (CP 155). This is a rather audacious and seemingly 
baseless compliment to pay. It jars with Rorty's later comments that he doesn't want "to 
assign science a lower position on [the] pecking order" (PSH 186), and seems inimical 
to the more central pragmatist belief in the relativity of descriptions to purposes. To 
make sense of this (and assuming it is any more than provocative rhetoric - which is not 
an unrealistic suggestion), we must first agree with Rorty that scientists really are 
mistaken in believing that they are accurately describing the physical universe; and, 
secondly, must share his preference for the strong misreaders (Harold Bloom, Paul De 
Man, Geoffrey Hartman) over the "weak decoders" (Murray H. Abrams, Frye, Leavis). 
Given Rorty's conviction on these two points, it becomes easier to see why he thinks 
literary studies is so impressive, but the qualities he looks for in criticism are not so 
highly valued by all critics, nor (in light of the concerns displayed in books like 
Keman's The Death of Literature, John EUis's Literature Lost, or even Harold Bloom's 
own doubts for the future of Uterary studies outlined in The Western Canon [esp. 517-
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28]'^^) is there much evidence that critics themselves would share his optimism. In an 
essay in which he takes issue with Rorty's "defence" of literary criticism, Michael 
Fischer sums up the disjunction: "Many professors of literature, disappointed by 
dwindling enrolments, shrinking job opportunifies and stagnant salaries, will be 
surprised to learn from Rorty that they are conquering heroes, that their depleted 
classrooms and budgets signal victory over the minds of 'bright youth'" (236). 
Fischer concedes that a rationale for literary studies is "sorely needed" (233), but 
believes that Rorty's account, far from offering such a rationale, "in fact, demeans the 
study of literature, or fails to remedy what many see as its present aimlessness" (233). 
Rorty stresses the chaotic nature of literary development: "one can achieve success by 
introducing a quite new genre of poem or novel or critical essay without argument. It 
succeeds simply by its success, not because there are good reasons why poems or novels 
or essays should be written in the new way rather than the old" (CP 142). There are a 
number of issues here. It is surely one thing for a poem to succeed without "argument," 
and quite another for a critical movement to do the same - but because Rorty conflates 
them, this difference is concealed. Fischer finds Rorty's account vacuous, remarking on 
the tautology of literature's "succeeding simply by its success." On a generous reading, 
we might excuse Rorty by arguing that "succeeding" is meant in the sense of 
"succession," and gloss the phrase as meaning: "One theory takes the place of another 
simply by being more popular with the community involved, rather than by being a 
more rigorous or more convincing argument." This would be consistent with his broad 
definition of literature as "the areas of culture which, quite self-consciously, forego 
agreement on an encompassing critical vocabulary, and thus forego argumentation" (CP 
Bloom writes: "I have very little confidence that literary education will survive its current malaise" 
(517). 
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142), and with his fondness for wordplay, but as a defence, this still rings hollow, 
inasmuch as it still fails to account for why the community was convinced in the first 
place by the new style of poetry or criticism. That is, without a persuasive reason 
(which means: an argument) it is not clear what it is that propels change. Added to 
which, very often there is an aesthetic manifesto behind the shifts between literary 
movements or styles (we need only think, for example, of Romanticism, Modernism, 
Surrealism, the New Journalism).'^^ This is, for Fischer, excessively casual. He 
complains that Rorty: 
exaggerates the shapelessness of the literary culture that interests him. Put 
more bluntly, though not scientists, literary critics speak a more stable 
vocabulary and heed firmer rules than Rorty supposes. Instead of 
resembling the shouting match described by Rorty, literary culture, in 
short, quaUfies as a conversation. (237) 
Fischer's "conversation" is carefully defined: "Contrasted to a certain kind of argument 
- a debate, for example, or a scientific paper - a conversation seems loose in structure. 
... While a conversation may be less confining than an argument, it is nevertheless 
highly restrained, bound by conventions" (238). Fischer is happy to assent to Rorty's 
conflation of literary works and literary criticism, but sees both activities not as 
"chatter" but as "free-flowing, yet controlled, discussion" (238). Simply because 
"literary intellectuals break the rules of argument laid down by some philosophers" is 
no reason to conclude, as Rorty does, that they do so "without argument" (238). Fischer 
agrees with Rorty that philosophy and literature have much in common, but "not. 
Rorty's thinking here is informed by a Kuhnian notion of theory change, whereby the revised 
vocabulary is incommensurable with the old one - the idea being, there is no intermediate vocabulary to 
argue for the change, although this sits uncomfortably with the response to artistic change. Modern art 
does not invalidate the art of the renaissance - as Kuhn himself points out, "Picasso's success has not 
relegated Rembrant's paintings to the storage vaults of art museums" ("Comment on the Relations of 
Science and Art," The Essential Tension 340-351. 345). 
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however, in dispensing with rules and a stable vocabulary, but in probing their limits, 
often in dialogues" (239). So, when Rorty claims that literature is "a usurping 
discipline" that has "put the other discipHnes in their places" (CP 155) he doesn't think 
it is because literature has shown itself to be "cognitive, serious, powerful and 
responsible" but because philosophy has shown itself to be "like literature: imprecise, 
capricious and methodologically dishevelled" (Fischer 241). Fischer emerges 
disappointed with the defence: "Instead of strengthening Hterature, Rorty leaves it 
impotent" (241). 
That Rorty's allegiance should be unwanted is not without precedent. Many of 
the philosophers Rorty calls in for support have expressed reservations about how he 
has used them. W. V. O. Quine says: 
One of the quiet pleasures that a philosophical writer is sometimes 
vouchsafed is that of reading a colleague's favourable and faithful account 
of one's views. When, on the other hand, the account is favourable but 
mistaken, it is with some regret that one undertakes to set the colleague 
straight; for the colleague might no longer favour one's views if he saw 
them aright. (117) 
Quine sounds like a man eager to distance himself from Rorty's views; his response to 
this praise for him is punctuated with denials. Answering Rorty's account of his 
philosophy, Quine goes on to say, "Not quite," "No, I favour no such invidious 
distinctions," "No, it is a naturalistic claim," " I disown...," " I deny that..." (118-19). 
There is also Thomas Kuhn, whom Rorty describes as "the most influential philosopher 
to write in English since the Second World War" (PSH 175), but Rorty (a self-professed 
"Kuhn-disciple" [PSH 182]) is forced to admit that "Kuhn would have been 
embarrassed by my defence of him" (PSH 187) and that "[i]n interviews Kuhn took 
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pains to distance himself from 'Rorty's relativism'" (PSH 188). Rorty also admits that 
Donald Davidson would have "slim sympathy" (CP 17) for the uses Rorty puts him to; 
claiming: "Davidson and [William] James are both pragmatists" ("Pragmatism, 
Davidson and Truth" 335), and also: "Davidson, however, has explicitly denied that his 
break with the empiricist tradition makes him a pragmatist" (333). That so many 
philosophers feel that Rorty has misread them is perhaps a consequence of Rorty's 
admiration for textualist critics like Harold Bloom, which is to say, the misreadings may 
not be entirely innocent and accidental. Rorty is a strong misreader of philosophy. He 
thinks that "literary critics seeking help from philosophy may take philosophy a bit too 
seriously" ("Texts and Lumps" ORT 78), and that rather than try to choose philosophers 
according to "antecedently plausible principles" (79), "[ i] t would be better for critics to 
simply have favorite philosophers (and philosophers to have favorite literary critics)" 
(78). Because Rorty is willing to treat "both science and philosophy as, at best, literary 
genres" (CP 141), they are, like literary works, open to being beaten "into a shape which 
will serve his own purpose" (CP 151). To reiterate Fischer's criticisms, Rorty's defence 
of literary study only works i f you are willing to see it and the other disciplines as 
ideally lacking in structure. Rorty has collapsed the hierarchy, but at a cost. It seems to 
be the case that literary studies can accept Rorty's compliment only if it is first willing 
to accept its own irrationality. 
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Relativism and the Commonsense Realists 
Whilst Rorty may think of literary studies as irrational and inefficacious, is this a 
model he wants other disciplines to follow; or is the ideal (like the practice) also 
discipline specific? As discussed above, Rorty is ambivalent on this point - he claims 
both that literature is the presiding discipline, and that there is not a pecking order. 
Although he does not share Feyerabend's explicitly (and perhaps not altogether serious) 
anarchistic agenda, Rorty's society of "edifiers" - more interested in reinventing 
themselves than inventing technologies - seems liable to yield similarly anarchistic 
results. Pragmatism in the Rortean mode (sometimes "neo-pragmatism" to distinguish) 
has the potential to be ironically impractical. Because Rorty's account puts all skills on 
a level, all "equal comrades with diverse interests," there is no guilt associated with 
pursuing work that does not contribute to the material welfare of society. Although it 
was the utility of (applied) science he admired, Rorty's belief that people "have, and 
ought to have, many different purposes" ("Against Unity" 31) means that he doesn't 
think these are compelling reasons to study science. ConsequenUy, by his own lights 
Rorty would be under no obligation to answer Snow's demand to acquire scientific 
knowledge.'^^ Scientific knowledge is strictly for the scientists, and Rorty sounds 
complacent about his inefficacy. Just because the sciences are more useful for 
In his autobiography, Killing Time, Feyerabend stresses that AM was only ever a collage, without an 
overall coherence, and expresses reservations about his commitment to philosophical argument: "Didn't I 
care about what I had written? Yes and no. I certainly didn't feel the religious fervor some writers apply 
to their products; as far as I was concerned, AM was just a book, not holy writ. Moreover, I could be 
easily convinced of the merits of almost any view. Written texts, my own text included, often seemed 
ambiguous to me" (145). 
That said, Rorty (who was trained in formal logic) almost certainly could acquit himself before Snow's 
questioning. In one aside, Rorty recalls being "forced to learn the proofs to some of Goedel's results in 
order to pass my Ph.D examinations" (PSH 178). 
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manipulating the material world is no reason to accord them a higher status, and nor 
should this (undisputed) material usefulness serve as a rationale to support the idea that 
it is in any sense our moral or intellectual duty to learn science. 
"We admire the people who possess the practical wisdom we want; but we don't 
quarrel with them. Then why should they quarrel with us? Live, and let live, we say to 
them. Live upon your practical wisdom, and let us live upon you!" This isn't Rorty, but 
Harold Skimpole, from Dickens's Bleak House (624-625; ch. 43). Like Skimpole, Rorty 
seems to be technologically and materially dependent upon a network of people whose 
work would apparently struggle to proceed without their belief in a tight 
correspondence between their theories and the world those theories purport to describe. 
This is the basis of the charge brought against relativism by those scientists and 
supporters of science who suspect that Rorty's position, and other forms of relativism, 
are either a purely academic posture or else a luxury afforded by the commonsense 
realism of the majority. Richard Dawkins uses a similar tack for what he calls his 
"knock-down argument" (River Out of Eden 32n.) against relativism: 
Show me a cultural relativist at thirty thousand feet and I ' l l show you a 
hypocrite. Airplanes built according to scientific principles work. They 
stay aloft and they get you to a chosen destination. Airplanes built to tribal 
or mythological specifications, such as the dummy planes of the cargo 
cults in jungle clearings or the beeswaxed wings of Icarus, don't. (River 
Out of Eden 31-32) 
SSK proponent Sarah Franklin takes up the challenge, and critiques Dawkins's 
argument along lines that would be familiar to Rorty: "what," she asks, "is so self 
evident about the fact that planes could fly? This feat could easily be described as 
sophisticated tool use instead of an indicator of epistemological certainty" (153). The 
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central objection is that the aeroplanes are not built according to theory, but rather, that 
theories are constructed after the fact to explain how aeroplanes work. The force of 
Dawkins's point is that it becomes harder to call science "merely a social construction" 
when that same science is holding your plane aloft, and Franklin is hoping that i f you 
can separate the scientific theory from the technological practice, this can be shown to 
trade on the same sort of circularity that theists employ to argue that, as part of His 
creation, it is ungrateful (and moreover, blasphemous) to deny God's existence. 
Dawkins wants you to admit that either the science (of aerodynamics) is true or else the 
aeroplane is not flying, or flying by luck alone.'^^ 
Although unsympathetic with much of the SSK's program, '^ ^ Stephen Jay Kline 
reminds us that, of course, "we can make innovations without any science at all" (210). 
The relationship between science and technology is considerably more tangled than 
Dawkins suggests with his aeroplane argument, and the type of after-the-fact theorising 
that Franklin wants us to recognise may well be the primary mode of theory production 
within the sciences. Many scientists treat technology as the direct application of their 
primary laboratory work. This enables them to claim as their own any success, prestige 
and utility attached to technological progress and innovation. But the success of 
'^ ^ Franklin doesn't make this explicit, but note that Dawkins here inverts the way scientific principles get 
to be useful. The way Dawkins tells it, Frank and Orville Wright might simply have used a recognised list 
of equations to design their aeroplane, knowing it would work because they had built it in obedience to 
those equations. But in fact, the relationship between the physics of aeroplanes and the actual engineering 
is more complex, and the science behind aeronautics emerged hand in hand with the messier and more 
confusing task of experimentally testing hundreds of different designs, and composing and editing the 
theories of aerodynamics according to the results of these attempts. Aviation authorities and 
manufacturers do not simply greenlight the launch of a new passenger plane because it is obedient to the 
equations used for designing aeroplanes, but instead insist that numerous tests are run. Which is to say, it 
is practical function rather than fidelity to theory that satisfies. Franklin's argument is that explicit 
knowledge about the principles of aeronautics is not essential for building aeroplanes, and will (and in 
fact did) emerge only after practical success. Rorty and company do not doubt that there may be laws that 
decide how aeroplanes fly, only that, to build and fly aeroplanes, the manufacturers do not need to know 
them explicitly (on the analogy that you needn't know the science of combustion to start a fire - it's 
enough to know through trial and error that wet materials are less likely to catch than dry ones). 
He stresses that "I have no wish to deny the power and the utility of the methods of science within 
their proper domain" (Kline 113, my emphasis) - although note the limit placed on applications within a 
specific and bounded domain. 
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technologies can, Kline believes, be only partially attributed to scientific progress. He 
argues that because many of the skills needed to bring technologies into being (he's 
thinking of the mechanical engineering skills) are not themselves scientific skills, it is 
thus too simplistic to think of the various technologies "as merely application of the 
related fields of science" (211). Added to which, Kline draws attention to what he calls 
"technology-induced science" (210), where problems in engineering lead directly to 
new directions in scientific research, so that "the flow of information is backwards from 
the picture of science setting off innovation; here innovation sets off science" (Kline 
210). Kline includes fluid dynamics as one such example of this technology-induced 
science, with Ludwig Prandtl (who is recognised as the founder of the subject in its 
modem form) prompted to think about how aeroplane wings create l i f t only after the 
Wright brothers' first successful flight (211). 
Perhaps recognising that the relations between technological progress and 
scientific change are less clear than is needed for arguments that base the utility of 
science upon the utility of technology, scientists notoriously choose to make this bond 
only selectively. This is doubtless because there is, of course, a flip-side to science 
being the same as technology, and here is Weinberg reiterating the familiar case for 
moral immunity of scientific knowledge: conceding that science has "made its own 
contribution to the world's sorrows," Weinberg wants to say that it has done so only by 
"giving us the means of killing one another, not the motive" (Dreams of a Final Theory 
259). Once again, we see this switch between science as a moral force (curing illness, 
increasing agricultural yield) to science as an amoral activity, more mathematics than 
ethics, and the switch occurs over the practical influence of scientific theories: science 
claiming any benefits as its own doing, and any losses as technology's. Hence, he calls 
the Nazi regime (which, although never a science, claimed scientific support to better 
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effect its atrocities) and "eugenics"'^ '* "perversions of science" (259). This is thin ice, 
particularly when only a page before Weinberg has been arguing that the same cannot 
be said for the application and misapplication of religion: "it is not safe to assume that 
religious persecution and holy wars are perversions of true rehgion," he claims, going 
on to add that: "It should not be surprising that some of the people who take these 
teachings seriously should sincerely regard these divine commands as incomparably 
more important than any merely secular virtues like tolerance or compassion or reason" 
(258). 
It is unclear where Weinberg thinks the difference between applications and 
misapplications emerges - that is, why Weinberg thinks that the evil in "evil scientist" 
floats free of the wider enterprise of science itself, but the evil in "evil religious zealot" 
attaches to religion as a whole (this is the same problem Holton had with his Beast).'''^ 
It might make more sense i f Weinberg wanted to argue that religion could constitute a 
world-view, including a philosophy, whereas science could not. But he does nothing of 
the sort. Instead, Weinberg classifies his own "working philosophy" as a "rough and 
ready realism, a belief in the objective reality of the ingredients of our scientific 
theories," which is, crucially, "learned through the experience of scientific research" 
(Dreams 167). Science, then, seems perfectly able to construct and to constitute a world-
view,'^^ and one which, i f Weinberg is representative (and he claims to be - maintaining 
The quote marks around eugenics are Weinberg's; presumably included so as to distance the 
pernicious science of eugenics from the beneficent science of nuclear physics he is himself a practitioner 
of. 
Tom Sorrell talks of the linkage here between the noun and the modifier as hinging upon hyphenation: 
the "evil-scientist" is evil because of something about the way scientists look at the world, but the "evil 
scientist" is simply a scientist who happens to be evil. The issue is whether the nature of the belief system 
impacts on the world-view and ethics of the individual, and Weinberg is answering a no for science and a 
yes for religion. 
Weinberg finds science's "moral core" in its "agnosticism" (in Thomas H. Huxley's sense of the 
word): "It is not the certainty of science that fits this role" - that is, to "preserve a sane world" - "but its 
uncertainty" (Dreams... 259). 
195 
that that this rough and ready reahsm is held by "most of us," meaning, most scientists 
[167]), leaves little room for (cultural) relativism in the scientific mind. 
Sharing Weinberg's commonsense realism, and his disdain for philosophical 
talk, Dawkins believes that relativism is an untenable notion for practical engagement 
with the world; that it is a purely academic position that nobody seriously believes. As 
Dawkins sees it: 
no philosopher has any trouble using the language of truth when falsely 
accused of a crime, or when suspecting his wife of adultery. "Is it true?" 
feels like a fair question, and few who ask it in their private lives would be 
satisfied with logic-chopping sophistry in response. (Unweaving the 
Rainbow 21) 
Perhaps surprisingly, Rorty agrees: 
"There is no truth." What could that mean? Why should anybody say it? 
Actually, almost nobody (except Wallace Stevens) does say it. But 
philosophers like me are often said to say i t . . . . [S]ince most people think 
that truth is correspondence to the way reality "really is," they think of us 
as denying the existence of truth. (Truth and Progress 1) 
To reiterate, Rorty's position is not that there isn't a real world, just that "[i]t is only the 
relative about which there is anything to say" (Truth and Progress 3). The world is 
there, but we can only talk about our perceptions of it. This is partly a rejection of 
nomenclature ("We pragmatists shrug off charges that we are 'relativists' or 
'irrationalists' by saying that these charges presuppose precisely the distinctions we 
reject" [Rorty, PSH xix]), but more substantially, it represents a misunderstanding on 
the part of critics like Dawkins of what the "relativist" position is supposed to be. 
Relativists rarely claim that science and technology doesn't work, only that it does not 
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necessarily work in the way the scientists think it does. The aeroplane argument 
assumes that if you don't think science is accurately describing the world then you don't 
think its technologies work (and accordingly insists upon the tight link between 
scientific theory and technological practice). Relativists think that technology works 
with or without a quasi-theistic account of Truth making things happen. Relativists are 
often found trying to assure their audience that dire consequences will not ensue if we 
all accept their relativism in place of universal Truth. In a passage quoted above, 
Katherine Hayles pleaded against sensationalism: " I f we grant that knowledge is not 
universal, does the sky fall as a result?" (in Ross 233). Feyerabend ended Against 
Method with the suggestion that we stop entrusting scientists with the job of deciding 
what is or is not real and true, and, in the interests of democracy, put their 
pronouncements to the vote instead, promising that "[t]here is no need to fear that such 
a way of arranging society will lead to undesirable results" (309). 
Hayles's implicit appeal to commonsense is interesting in light of Dawkins' 
assessment of relativistic interpretations of truth, because commonsense seems to 
support Dawkins's argument, too, as he goes on to say: "Yes, there are philosophical 
difficulties about truth, but we can get a long way before we have to worry about them" 
(Unweaving the Rainbow 21). He leaves it unclear quite how far we can get before we 
run into the epistemological difficulties he thinks are out there. The hkelihood is that he 
doesn't want to be too specific about where we will start to encounter stress-points in 
commonsense because he wants to have it both ways: on this occasion he wants to use 
commonsense to bolster his case against relativists, but at other times he will ask us to 
reject our commonsense assumptions by accepting his gene-centric view of life.'^^ This 
'^ ^ For this reason, Dawkins's appeal to simple robust conimonsense is surprising. Commonsense is 
something that scientists would do well to leave out of their reasoning, as appeals to commonsense can be 
made from either side here - something Dawkins's colleague Lewis Wolpert is well aware of. Rather than 
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is where the "rough and ready realism" starts to look more rough than ready. 
Christopher Norris draws attention to the invalidity of this style of appeal from within 
the sciences: 
so much of the current debate among physicists regarding various rival 
(e.g., "many-minds" and "many-worlds") interpretations of Q[uantum] 
M[echanical] phenomena takes place at a rarefied speculative level that is 
just as remote from any realist worldview and which leaves no room for 
pointed comparisons with the kinds of misunderstanding put about by 
people on the "cultural left." (Deconstruction and the "Unfinished Project 
of Modernity" 195) 
Working under Dawkins's rationale, a parallel case could be made for the rejection of 
quantum physics along the lines of: "Yes, there are difficulties with classical mechanics, 
but we can get a long way before we have to worry about them." The point in both cases 
is about specialism, and how unnecessary specialist vocabulary appears to be from the 
outside. 
In part, this is because the terms just aren't as simple as either Dawkins or 
Weinberg would like them to be.'^ ^ Rorty takes issue with Steven Weinberg for just 
being intuitively obvious, science is often highly counter-intuitive, and Wolpert's 1992 book The 
Unnatural Nature of Science makes just this point. Wolpert believes that science is reliable, but that more 
often than we realise, "both the ideas that science generates and the way in which it is carried out are 
entirely counterintuitive and against common sense.... Science does not fit with our natural expectations" 
(1). As the evolutionary psychologists would say, commonsense is not necessarily the best tool for sorting 
out truth, but evolved as a rough-and-ready strategy of "best-fit" in a world which to all approximations 
obeyed Newtonian mechanics. Commonsense, of a sort, says heavy objects fall faster, and commonsense 
alone would probably suggest dualism as a theory of mind. (Needless to say, commonsense rejects 
quantum mechanics.) On the other hand, commonsense favours the correspondence theory of truth, and 
rejects Rortean pragmatism and the social constructivism of the SSK. 
" Weinberg, for example, in wanting to be a realist about quantum physics, finds himself at an initially 
surprising variance with the positivists. In opposition to Wilson (who was sympathetic to the positivists), 
Weinberg is a realist as opposed to a positivist. Weinberg, surrounded by elementary particles that are 
categorically unobservable, cautions against "taking too seriously the doctrine of positivism, that science 
should concern itself only with things that can be observed. Other physicists including myself prefer 
another, realist, way of looking at quantum mechanics" (Dreams... 251). At the scale Weinberg is 
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such philosophical naivety: " i f you imagine that you can explicate 'real' by saying 'you 
know, like rocks' - you had better not think that you understand the epistemico-
ontological status of physical laws" (PSH 185-86). For Rorty, who works with them 
every day, the problems of philosophy are very real. He criticises Weinberg for 
"blowing smoke": 
He is throwing around terms ("objectively real", "one-to-one 
correspondence", etc.) that have been the subject of endless philosophical 
reflection and controversy as i f he and the common reader knew perfectly 
well what they meant, and could afford to ignore the pseudo-sophistication 
of the people who have spent their lives trying to figure out what sense, if 
any, might be given to them. (PSH 183) 
Much as the problems of quantum physics raiely intrude upon the lives of non-
physicists, so the problems of philosophy rarely appear as problems for non-
philosophers. This seems true of most disciplines. I f what counts as a description and 
what counts as a proof is discipline specific, so too is what counts as a problem. 
Problems are localised, and what the scientists see as rhetorical trickery is to the 
philosophers a substantial difficulty that cannot be dismissed by an appeal to robust 
commonsense. Due in part, perhaps, to shared historical origins and a continued interest 
in the same issues (both wil l claim to be using the most appropriate vocabulary for 
talking about and understanding reality), scientists, arguing confidently from a 
materialist-empiricist position, display a particular lack of interest in and even contempt 
for the problems of philosophy - an attitude seen already in Wilson's comment about 
philosophy being unfinished science (Consilience 10), and here again from Weinberg, 
concerned with, what will count as an observation is less clear than it is for Dawkins the zoologist, or for 
Wilson the synthesist. 
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who claims: "It is just that a knowledge of philosophy does not seem to be of use to 
physicists - always with the exception that the work of some philosophers helps us to 
avoid the errors of other philosophers" (Dreams... 168). 
Looming behind many of these criticisms from scientists like Dawkins, 
Weinberg, and Lewis Wolpert who have little patience for the "logic-chopping 
sophistry" (Dawkins Unweaving the Rainbow 21) of philosophers like Rorty, is the 
belief that a familiarity with scientific method and working practices would render the 
problems that occupy much of modem philosophy and the anti-science movement 
within the humanities irrelevant. The assumption here is that the various relativisms 
(like the social constructivism of the SSK, or Rorty's anti-realism) do not make sense if 
you are a scientist. It is, they argue, simply not possible to entertain intellectual doubts 
about the ontological status of the tools and objects of scientific enquiry when your 
everyday experience involves the manipulation of these very things. This was what 
Weinberg was saying when he spoke of how the rough and ready realism of working 
scientists was acquired "through the experience of scientific research and rarely from 
the teachings of philosophers" (Dreams... 167), and it is the force behind Dawkins's 
aeroplane argument: here is working technology that proves the science by practical 
engagement. Many of the errors of the humanities, claim the scientists, can be seen to 
arise from scientific ignorance (or at least this sort of unfamiliarity with the methods 
and practices of working scientists), and consequently could be remedied by learning 
about science. The problems that occupy anti-scientific movements like the SSK would 
evaporate (along with the pesky SSK, hope the scientists). Added to which, as discussed 
above, the humanities would benefit from the corrective science could provide - the 
type of commonsense-realist position held by Dawkins and Weinberg (and consistent 
with a scientific worldview) would act as a methodological constraint that would 
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prevent many of the deep and serious errors which are (they contend) at present 
incubated by the methodological sloppiness of the humanities. 
When the scientists present a case for the dangers of relativism (and the 
irrelevance of the humanities in general) to the business of modem life, they often trade 
on assuming: "What would happen if everyone did this?" (which translates to "it is 
dangerous") This is clearly too strong a condition to impose, as there is no single 
occupation or discipline that could survive such a test.'^ ^ It is only effective when 
inverted, so as to ask: "What would we lose if nobody did this?" (which translates to "it 
is irrelevant") and in this form it can be used to argue for elimination. As discussed 
above, eliminativism is the doctrine that seeks to remove from normal discourse those 
explanations and theories that can be more fully explained by a causally prior, more 
fundamental theory (normally understood as one which also accounts for a broader 
range of phenomena). The usual assumption for the eliminativist - as was seen in the 
case of the Churchlands - is that the theory to be eliminated is not only a false postulate, 
but also a misleading one. 
How is literary study related to this process? Most scientists who write about 
eliminative reductionism are quick to reassure non-physicists that they will retain their 
disciplinary autonomy. Physics is unlikely to make a hostile bid for chemistry, but they 
like to imply that it is well within their power to make such moves. For example, Steven 
Weinberg: 
I see no reason why chemists should stop speaking of such things [as 
valence, bond structure, acidity, colour, taste, smell] as long as they find it 
useful or interesting. But the fact that they continue to do so does not cast 
™ One need only think about how a world of skilled doctors would make the pharmaceuticals they 
require. 
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doubt on the fact that all the notions of chemistry work the way they do 
because of the underlying quantum mechanics (Dreams... 43-44) 
- a statement which can be paraphrased as: "Physicists don't want to envelope 
chemistry. Yet." John Gribbin goes as far as to claim: "With the new understanding of 
atoms and molecules that is provided by quantum physics, of course, the old joke of 
physicists that chemistry is simply a branch of physics has become much more than half 
true" (30). It is important to realise that these takeovers are not just threatened within 
the sciences (intra-scientific). As was seen above, with reference to the interests of 
evolutionary psychology in literature, the firewall between the subject matter of the 
humanities and that of the sciences (and the sciences' present lack of interest in literary 
study) need not be a permanent condition. The issue at the overlap is as much 
methodological as disciplinary autonomy, which may amount to the same thing. 
Literary study will almost certainly continue to exist, but in what form? In the ongoing 
process of explaining culture under a Darwinian description, evolutionary psychology 
has begun to offer accounts of literature and art. Whilst these are as yet nascent, a 
matured evolutionary psychology might eclipse the existing mode of literary study as 
the primary vocabulary for talking about fiction. From the perspective of current literary 
study, evolutionary psychology - or, for that matter, cognitive or formalist accounts -
seem to offer an impoverished and clipped account of the range of issues currently 
embraced by literary critics. Adopting evolutionary psychology or cognitive science as a 
research model or program would allow smooth inter-theoretic transitions between the 
sciences and the arts, but constrain the types of things that could legitimately be said. 
That is, what does and does not count as knowledge would be affected - with much of 
current literary criticism likely to be eliminated (on the basis that if it cannot be said 
scientifically, it cannot be said). So the elimination that is threatened by the sciences is a 
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replacement of one vocabulary for another. The hostile bid is for the way we talk about 
books. The threat is of methodological monism across the disciplinary spectrum. 
What motivates the sciences to make such demands? It could be argued here that 
in fact, no scientists do make such demands - not explicitly, at least. The radical 
reductionist is perhaps just a bogeyman for the humanities scholar, or else a straw man 
to catalyse debate. This is something Stephen Jay Kline rejects. He writes that "[i]n the 
late twentieth century, some (seemingly quite a few) people in the physical sciences 
hold this view, but I repeat, I have no reliable statistics on how many people do hold 
such a view" (112). He does, however, find at least one writer willing to make such 
claims for a Laplacean "omniscient superphysicist" (216) who could know the future 
and past, on the basis that "[a]ll the information needed to build the universe at any 
moment in its history has always existed and wil l always exist, however mixed up it 
becomes" (qtd. in Kline 216). Another would be Wilson. So although there are not 
people calling for the excision of literary studies from the academy, there are radical 
reductionists, and whilst the excision of literary study is surely not their aim in pursuing 
such a project, it remains a realistic consequence. 
It is hard to discern i f this is an extension of the desire to predict and control that 
characterises the scientific approach to the natural world, or else a sincere feeling that 
theirs is a method universally applicable and universally successful at organising a 
coherent account of the subject of study, whatever that subject might be. (These two 
options are not, of course, exclusive or exhaustive.) That the scientists should wish to 
treat culture as they have nature is to be expected. Behind the enfolding of the human 
world into the natural world is the realisation that i f you are a materialist, then nothing 
can be considered outside of the domain of the sciences (on the basis that a suitable and 
causally basic way to discuss matter is in terms of physics). This, of course, was one of 
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the consequences discussed by Oppenheim and Putnam in their theory of hierarchies: 
each level is causally dependant upon the level immediately below it, and each level 
contains all the levels above it. The idea, traceable through Laplace, the logical 
positivists, and recently revivified by Wilson, is that a completed physical theory would 
suffice for an exhaustive account of the world, from the bottom up. 
To argue against the bottom-up determinists, it seems necessary to either depart 
from the materialist worldview altogether and introduce something non-material into 
your account (usually a soul, or a deity) that remains untouched by the laws of physics, 
or else to try and argue that the causality that the physicists have assumed to be wholly 
bottom-up may in part be top-down. Bottom-up and top-down explanations are 
sometimes called reductionist and synoptic explanations. Consistent with the hierarchies 
discussed above, "top" is us humans thinking about things, and "bottom" is atoms and 
quarks, from which we are all made. Causal powers are usually assumed to be bottom-
up, and that is how the physicists want it. They need it to be this way, or else their 
fundamental theories will lose much of their power, and cease also to comprehensively 
explain such disciplines as chemistry, and on top of that, biology, and on top of that 
neurology, and so on, up to explaining the behaviour and motivations of individual 
persons. But there is also a strand of thinking, even within the sciences, that has room 
for top-down explanation. So, instead of saying, "These two chemicals behave in this 
way because their atoms behave in this way," the top-down explanation allows the 
macroscopic object - or at least a macroscopic organising principle - to dictate the 
behaviour of the microscopic components. So, we might instead say: "These atoms 
behave in this way because someone put this reagent in the solution." The thinking 
behind this inversion was well summarised in the comment by Jerry Fodor, seen earlier: 
"Causal powers supervene on local microstructure" (44). 
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How might this work? Theoretical biologist Brian Goodwin gives the example 
of vortices in fluids, such as water. Vortices are explained by reference to physical laws 
about how fluids behave, collectively known as hydrodynamics. On the atomic level, 
there's nothing interesting happening. There is no perceptible difference in organisation 
between water molecules in a vortex and those in a stream or a beaker. But the manifest 
behaviour of the water is quite different at the macroscopic scale, and it does seem that 
the vortex is dictating "from above," as it were, how the individual molecules should 
behave "down below."''^ '^  
Kline's case against the exclusivity of either scheme works on insufficiency. 
Whilst he agrees that the world is made of only atoms and the void, he doesn't think 
that radical reductionism (the strong version of bottom-up determinism seen in Laplace) 
can by itself provide a complete account of causality. Kline accepts the existence and 
even necessity of hierarchies,''^' but is cautious about how they should be employed. 
'""^  This looks complicated, because the discipline that studies vortices is hydrodynamics, which is part of 
physics, and the water molecules are the domain of chemistry; so to some extent, it's physics dictating 
chemistry all over again. The point here is that there is an organising principle that does not exist at the 
atomic level that seems to be controlling the behaviour of objects at the atomic level. See again Fodor's 
comment, which sums it up neatly. Goodwin's vortex example is intended to ease the passage of his more 
controversial thesis about structural biology, whose proponents want to argue that form (or 
"morphology") in biology is dictated by structural as much as functional rules. Rudolf Raff explains the 
position: "In many cases, we can recognize constraining factors in evolution. For instance, why there are 
no animals with wheels is easily explained. It is not possible to connect nerves and circulatory systems to 
the tissue of a free-turning wheel. ... Questions about missing body plans or unexplored adaptations are 
more difficult to answer" (295). So he asks (rather light-heartedly), "why are there no centaurs or six-
legged greyhounds?" (295). Goodwin explains that to understand vortices (and waves, ripples, etc), 
"[w]hat you need is a physical theory of fluids, which are a state of organisation of matter. It's the same 
type of problem with organisms. . ..There are certain principles of spatial order in organisms, in cells, in 
the ways cells interact with one another, and these can be written down as rules or equations, and then 
you can solve the equation on a computer and find out what shapes emerge, exactly the way you can with 
liquids" (in Brockman, The Third Culture 102). Goodwin calls his theory "morphogenesis," and the idea 
is that growth and form are constrained in ways that selectionist evolutionary theory (which argues that 
function and the necessity of useful adaptation dictate form) cannot account for. The idea at its most basic 
says that form comes first, and organisms grow to fit the available shapes, which is to say, not everything 
is allowed. Hence, no six-legged greyhounds, because that bodyplan is prohibited. Conventional 
selectionist theory says that form is dictated by the genetics, and genetics by the molecules. What the 
structural biologist wants to argue is that the genetic and molecular action is controlled by the necessities 
and dictates of morphology. 
He writes: "hierarchy is nearly ubiquitous as a structural form in our world. If we deny the existence of 
hierarchy in structure, we will end up confusing ourselves about how things are put together, how they 
work, and also about how we think, communicate, and use concepts" (Kline 105) 
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and keen to impose limits upon their use. He finds neither the reductionist nor the 
synoptic view'"*^ wholly adequate (111), and, further, thinks that both the radical 
reductionist (bottom-up determinism) and radical synoptic (top-down determinism) 
programs are impossible "even in principle" (128) - this last phrase being one which 
often appears as a prop in arguments about radical reductionism.''*^ He believes that 
bottom-up determinism moves from the true belief that "all material objects are made 
up of 'particles' of matter;" to the "totally false" belief that "one can therefore aggregate 
the [various representations of the system under study] for particles and thereby find (or 
derive) all the behaviours for all systems" (113). 
Kline thinks that only both views together can approach a sufficient account, and 
holds with what he calls an "interface of mutual constraint," whereby bottom dictates 
possibility and top dictates direction. He thinks this because he believes that: 
In systems with hierarchical structure and interfaces of mutual constraint, 
we cannot find adjacent levels merely by aggregation to a higher level or 
by disaggregation to a lower level, because the adjacent levels only 
mutually constrain, and do not determine each other. (121) 
That is, the constituent parts (atoms, molecules, bricks, cells, and so on) limit the 
possibilities of organisation but do not determine what to do within the range of that 
possibility. The organising principles exist only at a higher level of the hierarchy, and, 
crucially, the organisation is invisible to the constituent elements. This allows for top-
'•'^  He actually has more complex categories than this, five types in all: "synoptic; reductionist; a belief in 
the synoptic and reductionist views, held as an existential paradox; explicit attempts to reconcile the two 
conflicting views; and abandonment of these attempts to form an overview (and thus live without any 
coherent view of our world)" ( i l l ) . For these purposes, the split between the two is sufficient. 
'''^  For example, the pro-reductionist Rudolf Carnap: "no scientific reason is known for the assumption 
that such a derivation should be in principle and forever impossible" (qtd. in Hanfling 128, my emphasis), 
the ambivalent Oppenheim and Putnam: "If this is achieved, then psychological laws will have, in 
principle, been reduced to the laws of atomic physics" (7, my emphasis), and the anti-reductionist 
Eldredge and Tattersall: 'Theoretically, in principle, a reductionist could explain human evolution in 
terms of the laws of physics" (14, emphasis preserved). 
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down causation, which, as Kline points out, has the profound consequence that "[i]n 
hierarchically structured systems, the levels of control (usually upper levels) 'harness' 
the lower levels and cause them to carry out behaviours that the lower levels, left to 
themselves, would not do" (119). 
This notion of top-down causality is close to what in philosophy is often called 
supervenience. Supervenience has been enormously profitable as a defence against 
reductionism, as it offers a way of recognising the essential materiality of the world 
without insisting that reference to the material structure is the best or only way to talk 
about the world. This can be understood by recognising that another descriptive 
vocabulary becomes available at a certain level of complexity. The original descriptive 
vocabulary (perhaps that of physics or chemistry) is not invalidated by the availability 
of the new vocabulary, but it ceases to be the most efficient way of talking about the 
phenomenon or subject-matter. The higher-level vocabulary is thus said to supervene 
upon the lower-level vocabulary. 
Why this is interesting here is that it seemingly offers a means by which to 
release the higher-level disciplines from the tyranny of fundamentalist physics.''^ A 
top-down approach would allow for the causal properties of higher-level subject matter 
to control (that is, supervene upon) the behaviour of the physical matter of which they 
were composed. Said like this, it sounds easy and trivial, but the point is that it is the 
macroscopic organisation that does the work. It's how the painting isn't just the paint, 
and the book not just the words (and it is how Kripke's statue was the same even when 
cast in different materials). Nothing magical is introduced to accomplish this, just that 
there is physical matter - so many atoms - and then there are relations. Al l the 
'^^  Also, it seems like a way to reintroduce free will to an otherwise bleakly determinist universe. This is 
pleasant side effect: If higher levels command the behaviour of lower levels, then the picture suggests that 
will is supervening on the atomic laws, that is, will is (literally) moving matter. 
207 
interesting work goes on in the relations, in the organisation. The top-down approach 
from supervenience is a functionalist approach, insofar as it says that although the 
organisation is of matter (that is, matter is the thing being organised), it was always the 
organisation that the higher-level disciplines have been interested in, never the matter 
that grounded it. 
Setting aside the validity of the argument from top-down causality, why resist 
the threatened methodological monism? Rorty's answer was that we should value 
variety over truth. To support his case, he first argues that what the scientists feel they 
have captured with "truth" is never the whole picture, but only a fragment, a view from 
a particular perspective. This is also the logic used by opponents of science within the 
SSK, who argue for the cultural contamination of scientific belief by their strategic 
corrosion of the boundary between the contexts of discovery and justification within the 
sciences. Rorty's second move is that he doesn't want to hear everyone speaking in the 
same voice. There is something approaching a definable sub-genre of literature that 
speaks to this intuition: books like Zamyatin's We, Huxley's Brave New World, and 
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty Four, which propose a future of immaculate (and highly 
technologised) order, where the right to be wrong has been removed (a theme prefigured 
by Dostoevsky in books like Notes From Underground). In the world of practising 
scientists - or at least those who have become sufficiently well known to speak to 
audiences outside of their specialism - there are plenty of voices willing to justify the 
concern. Steven Weinberg, for example, says: "It would be foolish to expect that any 
discovery of science could in itself purge the human race of all its misconceptions, but 
the discovery of the final laws of nature will at least leave less room in the imagination 
for irrational beliefs" (Dreams... 240). We need only recognise the close proximity of 
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"irrational beliefs" to "individual beliefs" to see how near Weinberg's vision is to 
Orwell's. Because it is seen as a real threat, these cautions continue outside fiction from 
writers anxious about the influence of science on society - books like Anthony 
O'Hear's Beyond Evolution, and the Roses' Alas, Poor Darwin, and, making its debt to 
the fiction explicit, Brian Appleyard's Brave New Worlds. These works critique the 
claims of the biological sciences to provide a sufficient explanatory ground for the 
richness of human culture, and caution against uncritically embracing the newly 
available genetic technologies that in the days of Zamyatin, Huxley, and Orwell were 
still a distant prospect. 
Unfortunately, the drift of these works can make their adherents look like 
technophobes, or, in C. P. Snow's language, luddites. The counter-claim from the 
sciences is that those resistant to science are in fact resistant to progress and cultural 
amelioration, which for the scientists is the natural result of their work. Resistance to 
science is simply an expression of an ignorance of science. So here is another reason 
why the humanities would profit from a closer familiarity with scientific knowledge and 
practice: not only would it prevent those mistakes peculiar to thinkers removed from the 
sciences, but also it would help the resistant to overcome their fear of scientific progress 
(itself a concept neutered for many science sceptics by accounts of scientific change that 
do not necessarily rely upon progressive improvement, like Kuhn's incommensurability 
thesis). The scientists offer their knowledge as a panacea to the humanities. There are, 
however, problems. Most immediate is the question of quite how the scientifically 
ignorant are to be converted - how the science is to be learnt, and why. There seems to 
be a discrepancy between the reasons given for learning science and the remedial 
measures suggested by some of the critics. Popular science is presented as a means for 
non-scientists to understand science, but the accommodations it makes in the service of 
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comprehensibility necessarily impact on the type of understanding available.''*^ The 
effects of these accommodations are seemingly in conflict with the reasons given for the 
urgency of learning science in the first place. 
For the purposes of argumentative clarity, I have been using the term "scientists" 
to label all those who evangelise the benefits of scientific knowledge, which perhaps 
conceals the fact that there is a wide range of attitudes toward the humanities from 
science and mathematics. At the weak end, there is something like curiosity, even envy. 
Dawkins - displaying uncharacteristic humility - reports that Auden's comment about 
feeling like "a shabby curate who has strayed by mistake into a drawing room full of 
dukes,"''^'' "is pretty much how I and many other scientists feel when in the company of 
poets" (Unweaving the Rainbow 15). Some scientists, however, are happy to play the 
duke. For example, Raymond Tallis (a professor of geriatric medicine who has 
published several books attacking the anti-realism of French literary theory, along with 
collections of his own poetry and fiction) is hostile to the point of alienating even fellow 
scientists. One pro-science reviewer of his 1996 book, Newton's Sleep (who describes 
the first section as being "written in a kind of lucid rage" [Webster 30]), remarks that 
Tallis's "defence of science is so zealous that even his admirers (of whom I am one) 
may find some of his arguments extreme" (Webster 30). Here at the strong end is the 
incomprehension shading into hostility that Snow spoke of. The following is a sign 
hung outside the door of mathematician Ron Graham: "ANYONE WHO CANNOT 
COPE WITH MATHEMATICS IS NOT FULLY HUMAN. AT BEST HE IS A 
TOLERABLE SUBHUMAN WHO HAS LEARNED TO WEAR SHOES, BATHE, 
AND NOT MAKE MESSES IN THE HOUSE" (Hoffman 16). Clearly, Graham's 
'"'^  For a more detailed analysis of the changes made to scientific data between peer-review journals and 
popular re-packaging, see Jeanne Fahnestock, "Accommodating Science: The Rhetorical Life of 
Scientific Facts" in McRae, ed.. The Literature of Science 17-36. 
'"^  The quotation comes from Auden's essay 'The Poet and the City" in The Dyer's Hand. 72-89. 81. 
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intentions here are as much to amuse as convert, but the sign does draw attention to how 
the mathematically competent regard with a real sense of wonder those who find 
mathematics difficult. The sign also inverts a popular theme of the two-cultures debate: 
while there is doubtless mutual ignorance, there is an asymmetry in the shame. The 
shame of ignorance is assumed to be one-way, with many commentators recording a 
generalised willingness to admit mathematical or scientific ignorance coupled with an 
inverse reluctance to appear ignorant of the arts (see Snow, Tallis, and Pinker, below). 
Literary intellectuals have a reputation for exactly this type of shameless scientific 
ignorance. A character in one of Ian McEwan's novels complains that "you 'arts' 
people, you're not only ignorant of these magnificent things, you're rather proud of 
knowing nothing" (45). This may be a caricature, or may be a situation that no longer 
exists, but the perceived social acceptability of scientific ignorance in contrast to the 
perceived unacceptability of literary ignorance has been important as regards the 
motives behind and direction of the two-cultures debate. 
For C. P. Snow, it seems to have been the prompt for his Rede lecture. Snow 
was concerned that our notion of "culture" was too closely tied to literary knowledge, 
and that a person could be considered "cultured" without knowing any science - a 
situation exacerbated by the literary intellectuals who. Snow maintains, "still like to 
pretend that the traditional culture is the whole of 'culture', as though the natural order 
didn't exist" (14).'^^ It was this Eliotic conception''*^ of culture as "traditional culture" 
that Snow wanted to revise. Snow argued that, despite scientists and literary 
intellectuals being "comparable in intelligence" (2), the bias toward culture-as-
This is putting the case too strongly; for the literary people are not, of course, denying the existence of 
the natural order, they are simply saying that it seems an unsuitable candidate for what we might call 
"culture." 
'""^  A shadow cast from Eliot's 1919 essay 'Tradition and the Individual Talent," which maintained that it 
was exclusively literary culture that carried the weight of cultural identity. 
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traditional-culture meant that the possession of literary knowledge was both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for being cultured, whereas scientific knowledge was neither 
necessary nor sufficient. Those whose knowledge was limited to the sciences were 
accordingly excluded from discussions of culture (and cultured discussions; Snow 
records the social isolation of the Cambridge scientists: '"Oh, those are mathematicians! 
We never talk to them'" [3]). Consequently, there was a sense in which "intellectual" 
came to exclude the scientists. It had, complained Cambridge's own G. H. Hardy, 
acquired a "new definition which certainly doesn't include Rutherford or Eddington or 
Dirac"''*^ (qtd. in Snow 4). It seems unlikely that this is still the case, and it was only 
dubiously true for Snow. By 1959, Einstein was already four years dead and his 
reputation secure. Fellow physicists, such as Heisenberg, Schrodinger, and 
Oppenheimer, were recognisable names, who had long since achieved sufficient cultural 
and celebrity status to have their voices heard in books and in interviews on issues that 
went far beyond the narrow remit of scientific popularisation granted them by their 
achievements within physics.'^ '^  The scientific intellectual was never quite as 
marginalized as Snow required for his argument. Yet even today, the feeling clearly 
remains among scientists that whilst they are allowed some play in cultural debate, their 
scientific credentials alone will not award them status of "cultured." This is Steven 
Pinker, writing in 1995: 
In a gathering of today's elite, it is perfectly acceptable to laugh that you 
barely passed Physics for Poets ... and have remained ignorant of science 
'''^  That is, Ernest Rutherford, Arthur Eddington, and P[aul]. A. M. Dirac, all physicists. Rutherford and 
Dirac were both Nobel laureates (1908 and 1933 respectively). Famed for splitting the atom, Rutherford 
was awarded his Nobel for chemistry, a subject which, according to John Gribbin, he had little regard for, 
feeling it was inferior to physics (In Search of... 30). 
'^ ^ Non-specialist appearances included Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy (pub. 1959, from lectures 
given at St. Andrews University 1955-1956), Schrodinger's What Is Life?: The Physical Aspects of the 
Living Cell (1944), and a troubled Robert Oppenheimer, still reeling from the aftershock of Hiroshima, 
quoting the Bhagavad_Gita on American television. 
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ever since, despite the obvious importance of scientific literacy to 
informed choices about public health and public policy ... But saying that 
you have never heard of James Joyce ... is ... shocking..., despite the 
obvious unimportance of your tastes in leisure time activity to just about 
anything. (How the Mind Works 522-23) 
The roots of this asymmetry may lie in what is usually meant by "culture" (that is, the 
vernacular sense, which Snow was keen to revise, that restricts the term to the arts), or it 
may lie in a difference between how scientists and literary intellectuals treat those who 
do not share their interests. Scientists are apparendy less scathing of the scientifically 
ignorant. That, or else they have simply been less effective in their insults than literary 
critics, who have acquired a formidable reputation for belittling the unread.'^' Certainly, 
this was apparent in Leavis's reply to Snow - a response so abrasive that it has often 
overshadowed discussion of the central issues, and for some contributors (notably 
Raymond Tallis) come to define the terms of engagement. What is shocking about 
never having heard of James Joyce is the response; it raises a memory of Leavis saying 
"Snow is, of course, a - no, I can't say that; he isn't; Snow thinks of himself as a 
novelist. ... [F]or as a novelist he doesn't exist; he doesn't begin to exist. He can't be 
said to know what a novel is" (44-45). To some extent. Snow seemed to have 
anticipated this, commenting on how the literary intellectuals offer "a pitying chuckle at 
the scientists who have never read a major work of English literature. They dismiss 
them as ignorant specialists" (14). And Pinker, it seems, was not simply suffering a 
There is even a word for artistic ignorance, "philistinism." If there were a scientific equivalent, it 
would probably be "Luddite." Neither quite captures the deficiency being criticised, but can and often are 
used in these senses. For "philistine," The Shorter OED offers (rather unhelpfully given the concepts 
under discussion): "An uneducated or unenlightened person; a person indifferent to culture, or whose 
interests are commonplace and material." But does specify that the philistine is usually "aesthetically 
unsophisticated," which clearly chimes with Carroll's criticism of Pinker. For "Luddite" the dictionary 
suggests: "A person opposed to increased industrialization, or the introduction of new technology." 
Snow's use of the term is probably meant to appeal to the fact that the dictionary describes the original 
Mr Ludd as "insane." 
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persecution complex when he felt there was no room for literary ignorance - recall that 
Joseph Carroll was happy to confirm his fears, deriding Pinker's "literary tastes and 
judgement" as those of an "undergraduate" ("Steven Pinker's Cheesecake..." 479). 
Pinker's argument above is similar to that of John Allen Paulos, in Innumeracy: 
Mathematical IlUteracy and its Consequences (1989). Both stress how disabhng 
scientific ignorance and mathematical illiteracy are, and how broad and deep the use of 
scientific knowledge is, in contrast to literary knowledge, which is useful in a much 
more limited sphere. Scientific knowledge and mathematical literacy are transferable 
skills - Paulos gives examples of how those whom he calls innumerates find themselves 
repeatedly duped by statistics and percentages that they cannot comprehend. The 
consequences here are more damaging than the temporary social discomfort following 
an admission of literary ignorance, as innumerates find themselves missing bargains or 
losing their possessions in debts they have signed up for without understanding the 
conditions, and this on top of the world of wonder they miss out on because they cannot 
appreciate large numbers, logarithmic scales, squared and cubed numbers, and so on. 
Another voice is that of Raymond Tallis, who agrees with Lewis Wolpert that 
"[s]cience is arguably the defining feature of our age" (The Unnatural Nature of Science 
ix) and is disappointed that Western Civilisation can remain so ignorant of this. "It is," 
writes Tallis in Newton's Sleep, "deeply unsatisfactory that most people should be so 
distant from the major cultural force of our time, being engulfed in science but having 
no insight into its basis, its methods, its powers and its limitations" (3). This sense of 
exclusion has not gone unrecognised outside of the sciences; a character in Martin 
Amis's The Information is described as being "[uJngratefuUy dependent, like all of us, 
on technologies he did not understand" (232). What this confession and the criticisms 
above share is an insistence that learning more about science would be useful in a way 
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that learning more about literature would not. Al l trade on the utility of science, with 
Tallis going so far as to subdivide Newton's Sleep into "Part I : The Usefulness of 
Science" and "Part I I : The Uselessness of Art." Overwhelmingly, the reasoning for 
learning science is given in straightforward utilitarian terms,'^^ but how appropriate is 
this register? At first blush, the stance seems to be that "non-scientists should learn 
science because science accomplishes useful and worthy things," but on examination, it 
appears to be closer to "non-scientists should learn science because scientists do useful 
and worthy things" - and this is not the same thing at all. 
When Snow asked a group of literary intellectuals i f any of them knew the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics, he recalled receiving "cold and negative" looks (15) -
despite this being, by Snow's estimation, the scientific equivalent of asking if they had 
read a work of Shakespeare's. It is not clear, however, i f Snow would have been 
satisfied i f the literary intellectuals he had asked had been able to repeat the Second 
Law back to him. It seems that behind the complaint common to many advocates of 
science of: "You don't know any science," is another complaint, far less easy to 
remedy, charging: "You're not a scientist." This becomes more apparent upon 
examining some of the challenges issued to non-scientists in order to highlight their 
scientific ignorance. 
Snow's "scientific equivalent of: Have you read a work of Shakespeare's?" (15) 
is rephrased by Tallis, but emerges essentially the same, when he charges that "though 
most [literary intellectuals] will have caught up with Copernicus' daring heliocentric 
conjecture, it is a safe bet that few will be able to give any evidence for it" (Newton's 
Sleep 5). The reason, he goes on to suggest, has something to do with the fact that 
'^ ^ Note that this utility extends beyond proficiency in the sciences - the skills acquired in the study of 
science (basic numeracy, familiarity with statistics, techniques for accurate measurement, etc) are offered 
as useful for business affairs and home management. 
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"[e]ven an elementary equation, such as the one representing the universal law of 
gravitation ... is more opaque to non scientists than the most intractably obscure 
modem verse" (6). Wolpert makes much the same point: ".. .1 doubt that of those who 
do believe the earth moves round the sun, even one person in 100,000 could give sound 
reasons for their conviction" (Unnatural Nature... ix-x). (Although - characteristically 
more generous than Tallis - Wolpert concedes parenthetically that "the evidence and the 
arguments for supporting such a belief are in fact quite complex" [x].) And here is Alan 
Sokal, who frames his question in very similar terms in an appendix to Intellectual 
Impostures: "Ask an average undergraduate: Is matter composed of atoms? Yes. Why 
do you think so? The reader can f i l l in the response" (256). 
On the one hand, these observations are intended to draw attention to gaps in the 
non-scientist's world-view, and thereby to show it wanting. But equally, the second 
condition of each question - can you give any evidence? - demonstrates that rote-
learning alone will not satisfy. Claims for the importance of science run parallel to tales 
of its difficulty. TaUis picks up on this theme, contrasting the accessibility of the novel 
with the exclusivity of science, which, he claims, "is difficult for many people because 
they find it hard to concentrate on and this in turn because it is as remote as possible 
from gossip." He goes on to argue: 
The humanities are closer to this ordinary gossipy interest than science is. 
The kind of effort routinely demanded of professional scientists is rarely 
required of humanist intellectuals. Reading a novel appeals to something 
closer to our everyday curiosity than reading a scientific treatise. 
(Newton's Sleep 8) 
Snow was making much the same point when he said "[the scientific] culture contains a 
great deal of argument, usually much more rigorous and almost always at a higher 
- - ^ ' ~ ' ' 216 
conceptual level, than a literary person's arguments" (12). The thrust is that science is 
hard work, and moreover is harder work than literary studies. In his introduction to The 
Faber Book Of Science. John Carey makes this subtext explicit: "Though most 
academics are wary of saying it straight out, the general consensus seems to be that arts 
courses are popular because they are easier, and that most arts students would simply 
not be up to the intellectual demands of a science course" (xxvi). It is difficult to say if 
this was Snow's implication when he asked the literary people i f they knew the Second 
Law, but it certainly seems to be the thinking behind the challenges from Tallis, 
Wolpert, and Sokal. Of course, the obvious reply is that i f science really is so much 
harder, why are the literary intellectuals not excused from answering questions on it? 
This opens up problems for science advocates from the Snow/ Tallis school. They seem 
to be saying both that you should learn science (Tallis going so far as to charge that 
"those whose experience of disciplined thought has been confined to the humanities ... 
cannot be considered adequately educated" [Newton's Sleep 40]) and also that science 
is very difficult to learn. The scientists cannot have it both ways on this issue: either 
science is difficult, and it is therefore unfair to expect non-scientists to comprehend its 
machinations, or else it is simple, and the claims for conceptual superiority are 
unwarranted. The confusion seems to arise from there being two senses of scientific 
knowledge at play here. It isn't just the names of scientists and scientific principles that 
the literary intellectual is supposed to have remembered; they must also have 
understood those principles with their context and applications. Tallis and Sokal, in 
particular, are hard to please. Both demand a more thorough awareness of science from 
non-specialists, but differ significantly on how the requisite knowledge should best be 
acquired. 
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Tallis suggests that as "there is no shortage of reliable popularisations" scientific 
ignorance is inexcusable, "all that is required is some effort" (Newton's Sleep 7). But 
the type of knowledge Tallis apparently demands is simply not attainable through these 
means. Would any popularisation really explain the Schrodinger Wave equation (as 
Tallis suggests in Newton's Sleep [6])? Stephen Hawking's Brief History of Time 
doesn't, nor even does John Gribbin's In Search of Schrodinger's Cat - a text more or 
less devoted to this issue. Both go some way to explaining the issues that surround the 
equation, and offer some of its uses and implications, but an intimate knowledge of the 
algebra is simply unnecessary at this level. Unnecessary because readers of popular 
science are (usually) not scientists, are not expected to be inserting variables into 
equations and to be calculating values. Unnecessary and, it seems, unwanted: in the 
preface to Brief History, Hawking reports: "Someone told me that each equation I 
included in the book would halve the sales. I therefore resolved not to have any 
equations at all. In the end, however, I did put in one equation, Einstein's famous 
equation, E=mc^. I hope that this will not scare off half of my potential readers" (vi-vii). 
Contrary to what we might hope in reading them, what can be learnt from 
popularisations of science doesn't include the ability to practise it. I f such complex 
science was accessible through popularisations, then higher education in the sciences 
would swiftly become redundant. Familiarity with The Selfish Gene doesn't make you a 
geneticist, or Brief History a cosmologist, anymore than the Reader's Digest Medical 
Guide makes you a doctor. Aldous Huxley was aware of these limitations, of the 
compromise brokered between information and attention: 
However elegant and memorable, brevity can never ... do justice to all the 
facts of a complex situation ... But Ufe is short and information endless: 
nobody has time for everything. In practice we are generally forced to 
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choose between an unduly brief exposition and no exposition at all. 
Abbreviation is a necessary evil... (Brave New World Revisited foreword, 
n.p.) 
Popularisations inevitably offer restricted descriptions, and popular science is successful 
at the price of scientific explanation. Physicist Richard Feynman, fielding questions 
from journalists looking to condense copy, is said to have replied: "Listen, buddy, i f I 
could tell you in a minute what I did, it wouldn't be worth the Nobel Prize" (qtd. in 
Gleick 378). 
Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, both theoretical physicists, seem more aware 
than Tallis of the shortcomings of popular science. Anxious about what they consider to 
be the abuse of science at the hands of postmodern philosophers and critics,'^^ Sokal 
and Bricmont want to place limits on the spread of pseudo-scientific discourse. As they 
say, "It's a good idea to know what you're talking about": 
Obviously, it is legitimate to think philosophically about the content of the 
natural sciences. ... But, in order to address these subjects meaningfully, 
one has to understand the relevant scientific theories at a rather deep and 
inevitably technical level; a vague understanding, at the level of 
popularizations, won't suffice. (176) 
Arguably, Sokal and Bricmont are not so much addressing the problem of scientific 
ignorance so much as the quite different problem of scientific pretension. As such, it is 
difficult to gauge how useful they believe popularisations are. Whilst they admit that "it 
is usually possible to explain [difficult scientific concepts] in simple terms, at some 
'^ ^ Mainly French academics, including Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce Iriguay, Jean Baudrillard, 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. To underline the distinction between use and wonder, it is important to 
note that their criticisms do not extend to science in fiction. 
219 
rudimentary level" (176),'^'^ they are quick to illustrate the limitations of such 
knowledge. Concerning conflicting findings by different researchers working on solar 
neutrino emission levels (a study not quite inside Sokal or Bricmont's field), they claim: 
we could get a rough idea by examining the scientific literature on the 
subject; or failing that, we could get an even rougher idea by examining 
the sociological aspects of the problem, for example, the scientific 
respectability of the researchers involved in the controversy. ... But the 
degree of certainty provided by this kind of investigation is very weak. 
(87) 
This last issue of "scientific respectability" highlights another problem for the keen 
amateur, which Tallis fails to recognise. As Norris points out: 
one need only glance at a typical number of up-market popularizing 
journals like New Scientist or Scientific American to see how narrow is the 
line that separates "advanced" theoretical physics from the crankier 
versions of New Age thinking or sheer science-fiction fantasy. ... [0]ne 
just can't be sure ... which are (supposed to be) the purveyors of mere 
fashionable nonsense and which are reputable scientific sources. 
(Deconstruction and the "Unfinished Project of Modernity" 197) 
The reason why it is hard to tell the sense from the nonsense is in part due to the ever-
widening gulf (discussed above) between theoretical physics and commonsense beliefs 
about the world, and in part rooted in the type of understanding available to thinkers 
'''' They add: "For example, although neither of us has any training in biology, we are able to follow, at 
some basic level, developments in that field by reading good popular or semi-popular books" (176-77). 
Regarding the difficulty of comprehension outside of specialisation, see Erwin Chargaff, "Building the 
Tower of Babble" in Nature 248 (1974): 776-79. As mentioned above, Chargaff feared that acute 
scientific specialisation would eventually bring communication between scientists to a halt, and a 
situation would arise where nobody could ever "know more than an ever smaller portion of what they 
must know in order to function properly" (777). 
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whose lack of scientific training limits their reading matter / input to popularisations 
(rather than technical journals). Unlike, say, medical ethics or even evolutionary 
psychology, there are no intuitions here against which to measure the feasibility of ideas 
like "superstrings" and "wormholes."'^^ Be that as it may, many non-scientists exhibit 
an almost reUgious faith'^^ in the pronouncements of theoretical physics. In an 
interesting inversion of the two-part questions that Snow, Wolpert, Tallis, and Sokal 
were asking, Wayne C. Booth reports: " I have known science majors who would go to 
the stake ... for E=mc^... though I have never found one yet who professed to be able 
to reconstruct Einstein's reasoning in support of this interesting proposition" (Now 
Don't Trv To Reason With Me 85).'^^ The type of uncritical acceptance Booth is 
interested in is itself a special sort of scientific ignorance. It is interesting to note the 
similarities between the credulity being criticised by Booth and the type of scientific 
pretension being criticised by Sokal. Both Booth and Sokal are interested in people who 
employ a scientific vocabulary without necessarily understanding the science behind the 
terminology. For Sokal, this manifests in conspicuous misuses of the vocabulary by 
poseurs and manipulators - and these misuses occur as a result of (and their success 
depends upon) the same uncritical acceptance of science being critiqued by Booth. The 
same point is being made by both Sokal and Booth - that is, that scientific authority 
It is also surely no coincidence that these ideas - some of the most abstract and difficult to explain 
even to scientists - are those most appealing to popular readers. It seems reasonable to assume that it is 
this difficulty that licenses popular writers to not even attempt to explain the mechanisms. Ironically, it is 
perhaps here, at what is (apparently) the cutting edge of science, that the understanding possessed by 
(non-specialist) scientists and laymen is most similar; which to say, almost equally vague in each. This 
chasm between the specialist and the layman seems inevitable, and reminiscent of Erwin Chargaff s 
worries about incommunicability ("Building the Tower of Babble"). James Rachels, reflecting on the 
success of the Origin, writes: "Darwin was a wonderfully clear writer, and the book was easy for any 
educated person to read and understand. It may have been the last great work of science that will ever be 
so accessible to the layman" (34). 
"Religious" is not intended here in any pejorative sense - the scientific beliefs of non-scientists are 
religious insofar as they seem to ask believers to accept the word as true and do not demand proof beyond 
this authority. 
It's perhaps worth asking if the case was not that they could not provide an explanation at all, but that 
they could not offer anything that Booth, as a non-scientist, would have recognised as a proof or 
explanation. 
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does not consist in simply saying the words, and that saying the words and knowing 
what they mean is not the same thing. 
The type of knowledge available to the non-specialist may be able to answer 
Snow or Tallis's pop-quizzes, but it comes pre-assembled; a conclusion for which the 
premises - the evidence and the mechanisms - must be taken on trust. Wolpert is well 
aware that "many people accept the ideas of science because they have been told these 
ideas are true rather than because they understand them" (Unnatural Nature... x). Sokal 
makes a similar point: "The teaching of mathematics and science is often authoritarian; 
and this is antithetical not only to the principles of radical/pedagogic democracy but to 
the principles of science itself (256). Yet it seems undeniable that without access to the 
relevant equipment, and without the years of study necessary to make sense of that 
equipment (and the results it offers), the only scientific "facts" available to the non-
scientist (and, indeed, non-specialist) come as received wisdom; unchecked and for the 
main part uncheckable.'^^ There is a minimum amount of training and preparation 
necessary, and a certain worldview - as Ian Hacking notes, "[this is] surely inescapable. 
Science without background beliefs makes no sense" (in Pickering 45). In addition to 
scientific training and familiarisation with the tools and equipment, there is the idea that 
science proceeds from mathematics, and that an understanding of mathematics is the 
crucial attribute dividing the scientists from the laymen. Richard Feynman is 
unequivocal on this point: "it is impossible to explain honestly the beauties of the laws 
of nature in a way that people can feel, without their having some deep understanding of 
mathematics" (The Character of Physical Law 39-40). 
It is interesting that Sokal and Bricmont argue that the "main reason for believing scientific theories (at 
least the best verified ones) is that they explain the coherency of our experience" (55), as this goes 
strongly against Wolpert, who - as mentioned above - believes that science is reliable, but that more 
often than we realise, "does not fit with our natural expectations" (Unnatural Nature... 1). 
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Feynman draws attention to one of the apparently unavoidable blocks on non-
mathematical explanations: "Physicists cannot make a conversion to any other 
language. I f you want to learn about nature, to understand nature, it is necessary to 
understand the language that she speaks in" (The Character of Physical Law 58). The 
contention here is that there is only so much science that can be explained without 
recourse to mathematics, and there seems to be no place for such mathematics in 
popularisations. Richard Dawkins thinks there may be a way out: "it is possible to enjoy 
the Mozart concerto without being able to play the clarinet.... Couldn't we learn to 
think of science in the same way?" (Unweaving the Rainbow 36). Can we separate 
learning to "play" science from learning how to listen to it? Snow described the 
scientifically ignorant as "tone-deaf - "Except this tone-deafness doesn't come by 
nature, but by training, or rather the absence of training" (14). Feynman was more 
pessimistic. He thought that science without mathematics wasn't just a case of learning 
to listen rather than learning to play, it was like teaching music to the deaf (The 
Character of Physical Law 58).^ ^^ Perhaps Dawkins is implicitly conceding the 
redundancy of popularisations by utilitarian standards. The correlation Tallis finds 
between "useful" and "worthy" simply doesn't obtain in popular science. As former 
Times editor Simon Jenkins says: " I can think of very few science books I've read that 
I've called useful. What they have been is wonderful ... I think that science has a 
wonderful story to tell. But it isn't useful..." (qtd. in Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow 
37). 
How should this discrepancy between Jenkins and Tallis be understood? 
Dawkins considers the notion that science is wonderful but useless "so idiosyncratic 
that I shall pass over it ," adding: "Usually, even its sternest critics concede that science 
159 See also Carey's introduction to The Faber Book of Science (xvii). 
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is useful, perhaps all too useful" (Unweaving the Rainbow 37). But Jenkins's point is 
need not be a criticism. One way to explain the discrepancy is to recognise the ends to 
which that scientific knowledge can be put. For the non-speciahst such as Jenkins, 
science books can be interesting, informative and, as he says, wonderful - but the type 
of information they offer is not "useful" insofar as it cannot be put to any use. What 
Booth was questioning is not whether or not E=mc^ is either true or false, but rather, 
whether or not as non-scientists we are qualified to say. Booth holds that "as believed 
by most of us... it is nether true nor false but simply meaningless" (85). It is, of course, 
legitimate as a free citizen to have an opinion on whether or not E=mc^ is true (although 
this would only be "an opinion about an opinion" [85]), but he maintains that such an 
opinion is not the same thing as an idea. Booth is trying here to set up a sharp 
distinction between ideas and opinions. On this account, ideas are those opinions for 
which we can "reconstruct the reasons for believiilg them" (83). So, unless we know "in 
a nonhistorical sense, where they came from" (83), our beliefs are only opinions. Ideas 
must be "earned," they must be understood from the ground up. Consequently, opinions 
are "almost always proved to be false" (83) and ideas are "seldom shown to be false 
though they may prove to have been inadequate" (83).'^° Booth is advocating a more 
ready admission of ignorance during arguments where the subject matter under debate 
(say, E=mc^) is one that is poorly understood by the parties involved. One result of this 
is that two people could say the same sentence and it could have a different 
epistemological status in each utterance - coming from Booth, "E=mc^ is true" is an 
opinion about an opinion, whereas for Einstein (and presumably most physics 
professors), it is an idea. Booth's claim, then, is that whilst what we say might be true 
It should be clear that because the students Booth has met who would go to the stake for E=mc were 
unable to explain or reconstruct Einstein's reasoning, they would be going to the stake for a mere opinion. 
This is Booth's criticism: it may or may not be foolish to go to the stake for an idea, but it is certainly 
foolish to go there for an opinion. 
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for someone who understood the processes, it can never be anything but meaningless 
for someone who did not. (Its truth-value isn't false, but it certainly isn't true.) The 
upshot is that truth is (in this respect) domain relative, that is, the statements we make 
are applicable only within "the world of discourse we have chosen to operate in, and 
within that world, whatever it is, there are always rigorous standards which dictate 
decisions as to truth or falsehood" (90). So, by Booth's rationale, a non-scientist giving 
an answer to Snow's questions is simply making a meaningless utterance.'^' 
This use of "ideas" and "opinions" is a little idiosyncratic (and it is easy to 
predict the difficulties of preserving a word like "idea" as a specialised concept), but it 
is not important to agree with Booth's choice of terms to recognise the distinction he is 
making. Booth's point is that science is only science in the hands of scientists, which is 
to say, what makes science good is what makes it useful, and what makes it useful can't 
be (even partially) conveyed by rote learning, and certainly cannot be learnt from 
popularisations. An alternative terminology is found with Gilbert Ryle's demarcation 
between "knowing how" and "knowing that" (The Concept of Mind 25-61; esp. 27-32). 
"Know how" is the type of hands-on, functional knowledge that allows practical 
engagement, whereas to "know that" is to possess abstract knowledge; a list of names, 
or an index of equipment and parts. The type of knowledge Jenkins, as a non-specialist, 
can glean from reading science books (by which he presumably means popular science 
books as opposed to text books - given that he is in conversation with a popular 
scientist and is not himself scientifically trained) is only ever knowing that; which is to 
say, facts un-supplemented by the type of know-how Dawkins and Tallis (as trained 
scientists) can bring to their readings. In Booth's language, it is only ever opinions, and 
It isn't really meaningless, of course, because it will (hopefully) mean something to the interrogator. 
Nor is it meaningless if we recognise the role it plays socially, as an almost symbolic and ritualised 
exchange between the scientifically trained and those without such training. The point is that as science it 
doesn't work anymore, and so it is meaningless in this capacity. 
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never ideas. And because it is usually only popular science books and not science text-
books that are accessible to non-specialists, the only science the non-specialist can 
acquire is almost certain to be "useless." Which is to say, of no scientific function or 
value; isolated as the findings are from the evidence, and the non-specialist reader from 
the proofs. 
So there are two types of scientific knowledge here - that which functions as 
science (and may incidentally be astonishing), and that which cannot function as science 
but does retain much of its power to astonish (perhaps all the more so because the 
mechanisms are opaque and mysterious). A functionalist thinker might want to say that 
the second type of knowledge is not science at all, but something like "trivia," a 
separate domain, with its own vocabulary and unique applications (answering questions, 
for example). Given the limits placed on the non-scientist's comprehension of scientific 
information, it is normally only this inert type of scientific knowledge that we can 
expect to find in the possession of the non-specialist. That this distinction seems hard 
for a scientist such as Dawkins to appreciate is perhaps not surprising, given that, for the 
scientist, proofs exist and are recognised and understood at every level up to the 
"wonder" of a conclusion. But it is surprising (and disappointing) to find many 
scientific commentators consistently failing to recognise that i f science is ever going to 
feed into Hterature, the most likely way for it to do so is through popularisations; and 
not only that it may do so, but that it has. Saddened by what he sees as the neglect of 
science by serious writers, Dawkins writes: "It is my thesis that poets could better use 
the inspiration provided by science" (Unweaving the Rainbow 17).'^^ This echoes 
Snow's regret that "[t]here seems then to be no place where the two cultures meet" and 
'^ ^ It's interesting to compare this with Steven Weinberg, who writes that 'The problem seems to be that 
we are trying to be logical about a question that is not really susceptible to logical argument: the question 
of what should or should not engage our sense of wonder" (Dreams... 238). 
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that "the clashing point of two subjects ... ought to produce creative chances" (16). It 
seems that these "creative chances" can (and do) occur, but in terms of popularisations; 
in terms of knowing that rather than knowing how. Novelist Richard Powers appears 
acutely aware of this distinction. Reading through scientific literature, he writes, " I took 
the math on faith, having long ago sacrificed my math to the study of fiction," and 
going on to add, " I could follow the story of the math, if not the substance" (Galatea 2.2 
74). For Powers, this separation of "story" from "substance" is essential. The know-how 
has long ago been forsaken for specialisation elsewhere, but the story is still within 
reach. 
Science's use and practical function come only with the know-how, and whilst 
whole shelves of popularisations can explain the structure of DNA and its process of 
translation and transcription, not one will offer step-by-step instructions for gene 
therapy or cloning. Popular science can only ever teach the story - a fact that Sokal and 
Bricmont are uniquely placed to appreciate. The type of overreaching pseudo-science 
they are criticising is the story of science mistaking itself for the substance. For 
worthwhile, practical engagement, "a vague understanding, at the level of 
popularizations, won't suffice" (Intellectual Impostures 176). For a man credited with 
bringing about a renaissance of science, and employed to promote the public's 
understanding of science, Dawkins seems curiously unsure as to what the public's 
understanding is for. That it will not achieve practical engagement (as Sokal and 
Bricmont have shown) is not to say that it will not enable engagement at all. What 
popular science offers is the story without the substance; a mathematics taken on faith 
that for all its uselessness can still inspire wonder. Perhaps to argue in this fashion is to 
commit a simple category mistake - to have access to all the parts, and still fail to 
recognize the whole. Perhaps knowing enough about science is the same thing as 
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knowing science, and this seems true for what Oppenheim and Putnam called higher 
level sciences, such as zoology or botany. But at a more fundamental level it seems 
scientific awareness is just not the same as scientific knowledge - just as listening to 
music is not the same as playing it. What popular science offers is scientific awareness, 
it offers a route out of appearing scientifically ignorant, but it doesn't offer full-blooded 
scientific knowledge, and it is through popularisations that science seems most likely to 
feed into the minds of humanities scholars - i f only because specialisation elsewhere 
has rendered "real" science inaccessible. 
Across these accounts is a pessimism about the possibilities of 
interdisciplinarity. Booth and Sokal and, in their own ways, Dawkins, Tallis, and even 
Leavis, insist upon the importance of disciplinary boundaries. It is not a matter of 
etiquette and territorialism; it is a firm and frank belief that contributions to professional 
discourse at anything less than a professional level of specialisation will be useless. 
What's being blocked here is not the possibility of creative borrowings and inspirations, 
it is the hope that literary critics and scientists could sit at the same table and talk in 
non-trivial terms about each other's discipline. But this seems impossible, and the 
reason for this is that they are all using highly specialised vocabularies. They cannot 
make themselves understood. There are two responses to this. Stephen Jay Kline 
believes that we ought to try to create a "multidisciplinary" vocabulary in addition to 
and not in place of the existing specialist disciplines; a point of interface between the 
cultures, a place where specialists could exchange ideas. Stanley Fish is more 
pessimistic, and because he thinks that a discipline is constituted by its vocabulary, he 
cannot see a way for two disciplines to both make exchanges and retain autonomy.'^^ In 
Fish's view, as soon as you start trying to do historical literary criticism you have 
'^ ^ That is, both disciplinary and methodological autonomy - for Fish, the method is the discipline. 
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started doing history (and stopped doing literary criticism), and as soon as the scientist 
starts popularising, his science becomes redundant, stops being science and starts to be 
story. Fish's line is similar to that taken by Feynman, rather than Dawkins, regarding 
the importance of mathematics to understanding science. Both used musical analogies, 
but recall that where Dawkins felt there was a legitimate space to teach people to hsten 
to science rather than play it,'^'^ Feynman believed that trying to teach science without 
mathematics was like teaching music to the deaf. The Dawkins line here basically 
assumes that communication is possible (although given where his reputation rests, this 
is unsurprising"^^), whereas Feynman is more sceptical, or attaches more importance to 
what is lost in abbreviation. 
The issue for Feynman and Fish is the impossibility of exporting specialised 
concepts in anything like their useful sense (which is to say, embedded within their 
disciplinary context) outside of the boundaries of the specialism.'^^ The reason the 
concepts are no longer useful is discussed above in relation to the neutering of science 
at its own borders, but it is easy to see that if we follow Stanley Fish and assume that 
the vocabulary of a professional discourse exhausts the discipline, then it is clear that he 
can only argue in one direction here. There's nothing magical about this claim, all it is 
There is a case for Dawkins's point here, in that it is necessary to learn a good deal about music to 
genuinely appreciate the depth of a Bach fugue, for example. This type of knowledge - musicology -
doesn't include the ability to play the instruments, but it does require a good deal of specialist language 
and careful attention to the music. The difference is sometimes explained in terms of the difference 
between hearing and actually listening. Poetry appreciation is another example; simply reading the words 
or hearing them said is insufficient, and we talk of "trained ears" to distinguish the type of sensitivity 
skilled readers or listeners have acquired. But what is learnt in order to appreciate poetry or music in this 
deeper sense is probably as hard to teach as the mathematics itself It's another professional and specialist 
skill, and equally prone to any criticisms about the impossibility of exporting specialist terms outside the 
specialism. 
Dawkins is the first holder of the Charles Simonyi Chair for the Public Understanding of Science at 
Oxford University. In The Selfish Gene's 1989 preface, Dawkins says: ".. .1 prefer not to make a clear 
separation between science and its 'popularization'" (xi). 
Put like this - that specialist language only works within a specialist context - it seems impossible to 
achieve meaningful interdisciplinary exchanges, and that is Fish's point. Once you have accepted his 
thesis that the vocabulary exhausts the discipline, you are logically bound to accept the consequential 
impossibility of transporting it outside the boundaries and retaining disciplinary identity. 
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saying is that within a specialism, words and concepts are used as part of a larger set of 
interrelations, and it is from these other interrelated words and concepts that the words 
and concepts acquire their meaning and their importance, and the specialism its identity. 
Take them out of that web, and they no longer have their connotations, and may, in fact, 
acquire new connotations. 
In stressing the untranslatability of discipline-specific concepts, Feynman and 
Fish take an almost Whorfian position, and the idea that scientific theories in particular 
have profound effects upon our observations has been much discussed within the 
philosophy of science. In the prefatory material to The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn acknowledges a debt to Benjamin Lee Whorf (vi). The most 
controversial sections of that book have always been and continue to be the parts where 
he claims that there is a non-trivial sense in which "after a revolution scientists work in 
a different world" (135). This is the strong-end of the Kuhnian thesis, and it continues to 
be a contentious issue. Whorf's is an explicit version of the idea that our language 
makes our world, and this is close to what Kuhn is claiming when he talks of theory 
limiting perception. A good deal of the confusion arises from Kuhn's inclusion of 
sentences like this: "though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the 
scientist afterwards works in a different world" (121), where world is being used in two 
quite distinct senses: in the first instance to refer to something like "the material 
universe as physical matter, independent of observers"; and in the second, to refer to the 
mental image of a situated and language-using observer exposed to that material 
universe. To sharpen this contrast, we might call these differences "physical universe" 
and "worldview." I f you substitute these senses, the sentence loses its gleam: "though 
the universe does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterwards works 
[withjin a different worldview." So language makes our world but not the world - an 
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interpretation Rorty might be expected to be in sympathy with (albeit on the condition 
that the world was something we could never get to - so as far as we are concerned, our 
world is the world). 
Benjamin Lee Whorf is often criticised for the Hopi translations that serve as 
evidence in his argument for linguistic relativism, which claims that "the structure of a 
human being's language influences the manner in which he understands reality and 
behaves with respect to it" (John B. Carroll, intro. to Whorf 23). The strong version of 
the Whorfian thesis is linguistic determinism, which claims that the language a person 
speaks determines which phenomena he or she is able to observe. That is, two observers 
who speak different languages may find that one can see or understand something that 
the other categorically cannot, because it is excluded by his or her language. It implies 
that language can generate perceptual and conceptual blindspots. The weaker version is 
linguistic relativity, which makes the far less troubling claim that the language an 
observer speaks may affect which phenomena he or she is prepared to count as 
significant. This doesn't claim that the phenomena not labelled by the language won't 
be seen, only that they might be more easily overiooked. There is a section in Language, 
Thought and Reality where he talks of Hopi containing "abstractions for which our 
language lacks adequate terms" (58). Whorf writes: "In order to describe the structure of 
the universe according to the Hopi, it is necessary to attempt - insofar as it is possible -
to make explicit this metaphysics, properly describable only in the Hopi language" (58). 
Whorf then includes a translation in English - a point which he has been picked up on 
by Donald Davidson (in his often cited 1974 essay "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme," Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 183-198. 184), among others. As 
Norris explains: 
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Whorf is here attempting to have it both ways, on the one hand declaring 
that Hopi cannot be "calibrated" with Enghsh, while on the other 
presuming to describe in English those various lexical and grammatical 
features of Hopi that supposedly render such description impossible. (New 
Idols of the Cave 145) 
But being generous, the issue isn't so much that the basic idea is untranslatable, it's that 
the bit that does the work is untranslatable, and Whorf continues the passage above by 
explaining that this translation wil l work "by means of an approximation expressed in 
our own language, somewhat inadequately it is true, yet by availing ourselves of such 
concepts as we have worked up into relative consonance with the system underlying the 
Hopi view of the universe" (58). The salient part here is the hope of achieving "relative 
consonance." You can convey the ideas of Einstein to an audience of non-scientists, but 
the audience can't do science with them, they come over as inert. Rorty (who favours 
the stronger interpretation of Kuhn's claim that scientists working within different 
paradigms work in different worlds) makes a similar point about "the intuition behind 
the false romantic claim that great poems are untranslatable. They are, of course, 
translatable; the problem is that the translations are not themselves great poems" (PMN 
355). That is closer to what is at stake: the bit you are actually interested in (the nuance, 
the special significance of how something is said) gets lost in the move, and the most 
that can be achieved is relative consonance. 
Added to which, the claim by Feynman that there are concepts within 
mathematics that cannot be translated into English is a quite different type of claim than 
Whorf's belief about the impossibility of calibrating certain natural languages (such as 
Hopi and English). There is a plausible case for the content of mathematical theories 
being untranslatable into natural language, but this is not support for Whorf's argument. 
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rather a matter of numbers and words being different types of things. Mathematics is 
hermetic, internally consistent and world-independent, and not a language in the usual 
sense at all. It is only syntactic, a system of rules specifying relations between numbers. 
As mentioned earlier (with reference to Frye's desire to see literary criticism achieve a 
similar hermeticism), the philosophical difficulty for mathematicians is not internal 
consistency, but external application; explaining quite why their models appear to fi t the 
world at all. So it is coherent for Feynman to make the claim that nature cannot be 
understood by non-scientists only insofar as the mathematical concepts that prohibit 
non-scientists' comprehension accurately describe nature. If nature does work on 
mathematical rules, then it may be the case that only those suitably trained in 
mathematics could ever really appreciate those relations, with the corollary that they 
could never talk or even think about them in non-mathematical terms. 
Fish's case is different inasmuch as he wants to make the claim that concepts are 
sensible only within the disciplines which generated them (and of which they are 
constitutive), that is to say, only within their interrelations. But all this amounts to is the 
claim that without knowledge of the context, a term loses its sense. That sense isn't 
untranslatable, it just requires a good deal of background knowledge in order to be 
properly understood. Of course, untranslatability is only one part of the Whorf-Kuhn 
thesis, the corollary being the claim that the untranslatable vocabulary or theory either 
produces or is the product of a distinct and incommensurable conceptual scheme. It is 
unclear i f either Fish or Feynman would want to say that possession of specialised 
vocabulary affects our perception of the world in this more profound sense, although 
given Feynman's commonsense realism, it seems very unlikely that he would want to 
say that he lived in a different world to non-scientists, or to previous scientists. 
Feynman did not think only scientists could experience the wonder of nature, but rather. 
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that this was felt by everyone already, and that the purpose of teaching scientific 
knowledge "is to appreciate wonders even more. And that the knowledge is just to put 
into [the] correct framework the wonder that nature is" (The Pleasure of Finding Things 
Out 102). 
Given that these arguments about the importance of professionalism trade on a 
version of linguistic relativism, it is unfortunate that Whorf is often dismissed within 
linguistics for not being a professional (he was a fire inspector for an insurance 
company, who never held an academic position, although he was apparently offered 
them). But the argument here is not about being a nominal professional; it is about 
knowing the professional vocabulary, and being able to work with it. Here's Kline on 
multidisciplinarity: "It is not much of an exaggeration to say that in our late-twentieth-
century universities we have acted as though there were a 'First Commandment of 
Academe' which reads, 'Thou shalt not transgress thy disciplinary boundary'" (5). 
Kline makes it sound as i f the problem were simply territorial, but the issue is as much 
about possibility: it's not that people object to others working within their specialism 
(although with competition for jobs and funding being tight, this is obviously a factor), 
just that when people who haven't devoted years of study to it start to pronounce upon a 
given specialism, they are likely to say silly things. This is what we saw between Rorty 
and Weinberg: Weinberg does sound naive to philosophically-trained ears when he 
starts to talk about "epistemico-ontological" issues that have taxed philosophers for 
centuries as if they really could be dismissed as easily as saying "You know, real; like 
rocks." One of the problems here is that Rorty seems to be in a situation where he wants 
to use his own specialism to close down the types of things that the scientists can talk 
about, but is unwilling to have the scientists close down the types of things he can say. 
The question in this case is: who knows most about reality? And it is unclear who 
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should take priority. The physicists say, "We work all day with the very ground of 
matter, with the particles from which everything else is composed, I think we're in a 
good position to say what is and isn't real." And the philosophers reply, "You physicists 
don't even know what questions to ask - you start with assumptions about objectivity 
and reality that are tailored to the types of things you are willing to call real, and so 
unsurprisingly, you find what you expect." 
We see this same conflict replayed between Sokal and the literary theorists, and 
in criticisms by biologist H. Allen Orr of Dennett's foray into evolutionary theory. Orr 
is quite scathing at times, particularly of Dennett's failure to consider the "neutral 
theory" of Kimura: "What can account for this astonishing omission?" he writes. "One 
possibility is that Dennett may not know about the neutral theory. Kimura is, after all, a 
tad harder to read than the pop biology Dennett appears to devour" (468). Orr is 
repeating Sokal's complaint that popularisations offer insufficient detail to permit 
meaningful contributions. The substance of the complaints is the same: and it isn't 
territorial, it is that the outsider says silly things because he or she simply doesn't speak 
the same (professional) language. Like the two interlocutors trading misunderstood 
concepts in Booth's example, non-specialists or specialists from separate domains 
simply argue past each other. Their exchanges will be meaningless. The possibilities of 
assent are constrained by this condition. 
In summary, this chapter attempts to braid three related arguments. The first is 
an argument for the separation of science and technology. This says that the putative 
usefulness of science is actually the usefulness of technology. Here is another way to 
understand Jenkins's comment about the science he has read being of no use, and that is 
to recognise a difference between science (which is an academic discipline and source 
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of theories about natural phenomena) and technology (which is equipment that solves a 
problem in the material world). Whilst technology may be informed by many of the 
findings of science, it is possible to see science's relation to technology as similar to the 
relation between mathematics and science. Even though a particular technology has 
been made possible by scientific knowledge, insofar as the final product continues to 
work whether or not we understand the theory, we can say that science is only a 
handmaiden to technology, just as mathematics is a handmaiden to science. 
Mathematics by itself (that is, independent of science) makes nothing happen. Science 
by itself (that is, independent of technology) is similarly inefficacious. In material 
terms, only technology is useful. 
Scientists are well aware of this division, and use it strategically. The link 
between science and technology is embraced by scientists when they want to make 
claims about their practical worth and virtue (in contrast to the inefficacy of literary 
study), but denied when the products of technology threaten to question the moral 
responsibility of science, at which point scientists usually retreat to a claim that insists 
upon the separation of science (as something like the love of knowledge and discovery 
for its own sake), and technology (as the use of certain scientific principles by non-
scientists - engineers, craftsmen, farmers - for purposes beyond the scope of scientific 
control). What happens here is that the scientists claim to dictate technological limits, 
but not technological direction: they supply the tools but have nothing to say about how 
to employ them. (A stronger version of this argument would claim that science does not 
even dictate technological limits: that very often, working technology awaits an 
explanation from the sciences [for example, analgesics like paracetemol are manifestly 
effective, but lack a comprehensive explanation from neurochemistry], so the job of 
science is very often to reverse-engineer a technology to explain how it works.) 
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This feeds into the second argument, which is about top-down control, or at 
least, the non-exclusivity of bottom-up determinism as a causal power. This is an 
argument about what level of scale is doing the work. The scientists' arguments for the 
primacy of their vocabulary comes from an assumption that causal forces move only 
upwards from fundamental particles to macrostructures, but there is a good case for the 
relationship being more complex than this. Kline offered a system of "mutual 
constraints" whereby the macrostructure is limited in its possibilities by the 
microstructure, but that the microstructure is controlled or directed by the 
macrostructure. So the macroscopic supervenes upon the microscopic. Scientists from 
higher-level sciences (for example, evolutionary biology) often use this same line of 
reasoning to argue against the threat of genetic determinism (see, for example, Steven 
Pinker, The Language Instinct 473-478). They will say genes offer limits on possibility, 
a cap on potential, but they do not tell you what to do with the potential you do have. It 
is easy to see how the same thinking maps over determinism in physics. Top-down 
causality is also the most efficient explanation for many phenomena. It makes more 
sense to say that it is the emergent properties of the higher-level objects that dictate and 
co-ordinate the behaviour of the lower-level objects, and that a degree of causal 
autonomy exists with respect to these emergent boundaries. 
The third part argues for the usefulness of science only within the sciences, that 
is, the uselessness of science to non-scientists. This is an argument about the 
unavailability of a suitable vocabulary for the translation of much scientific knowledge 
into non-scientific terms, and aims to show that the type of questions Snow, Tallis, 
Wolpert, Sokal and Dawkins are asking humanities scholars to know the answers to are 
not questions about scientific knowledge, but are in fact trivia questions whose subject 
happens to be science. Because the questions are about scientific theories ("What is the 
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Second Law of Thermodynamics?" "Who proposed the Universal Law of 
Gravitation?") they seem to be testing scientific knowledge. However, being able to 
answer questions such as these does not demand a knowledge of how the concepts 
involved are important for the scientific fields from which they emerge. Such facts are 
meaningful only when part of a wider understanding of how they fit together with other 
scientific beliefs. Isolated in this fashion, they are inert. Consequently, scientific 
ignorance is more difficult to remedy than thinkers like Snow imply. 
To a large extent, the argument for the superiority of science trades upon an 
argument for the utility of science, and this in turn upon maintaining a tight connection 
between science and technology, but pure science (when considered apart from 
technology) starts to looks as inefficacious as literature and literary criticism. Literature 
being chastised for its uselessness by Tallis and company seems a far less threatening 
criticism i f we separate science from technology. Al l too often the wonder of science is 
conflated with its use. I f science is useful, it is only whilst it is being done by scientists; 
and if its use is its virtue, then it is virtuous only in the hands of scientists. The facts and 
figures non-specialists possess will never function as the scientific know-how of Tallis 
or Dawkins can function, they can never be of use. But a synthesis of literature and 
science surely never could. In the realisation of Snow's "creative chances," science's 
use and function is lost, and only the awe and the wonder survives. 
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Centralities of Language and Matter 
Much of the conflict between the relativists and the commonsense realists is 
centred upon an understandable reluctance to relinquish a characteristic way of speaking 
about the world. Neither vocabulary suffices to describe successfully the things the 
other is interested in. The problem with replacing one vocabulary with another is that 
we may find that there are things that we used to be able to say using the old vocabulary 
that we cannot say with the new vocabulary. To some extent, this became apparent 
when Wilson was trying to argue for an account of the world ultimately reducible to the 
language of physics, but to do so, he found himself employing a series of different 
levels of explanation. This is what Oppenheim and Putnam suggested in their theory of 
the hierarchy, and what Putnam went on to explore with his notion of appropriate levels 
of description. It is tied to what Rorty called the relativity of descriptions to purposes. 
From here, it is then a comparatively short step to the stronger case for 
disciplinary autonomy that claims that the particular vocabulary a discipline employs to 
do its work is constitutive of that discipline. This is Fish's position, and is expounded at 
length in his 1995 book. Professional Correctness. Fish holds that a discipline is not a 
natural kind - he is keen to stress that he does not take an essentialist line on 
disciplinary identity - but instead describes literary studies as a "conventional activity, 
one shaped by the vocabulary, distinctions, and questions it employs," and because of 
this, "it behoves us to be wary of discarding its machinery" (70). In Fish's account, to 
discard the machinery, to adopt a new vocabulary, is to lose the discipline. This is 
because he holds that any conventional activity "lives and dies by the zeal with which 
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we ask its questions and care about the answers" (70). The language of Hterary study is 
thus "a specialized and artificial vocabulary which is generative of the phenomena it 
picks out" (70). Consequently, " I f that vocabulary falls into disuse, the facts it calls into 
being will no longer be produced or experienced": 
If no one any longer asks "What is the structure of this poem?" or "What is 
the intention of the author and has it been realized?" or "In what tradition 
does the poet enrol himself and with what consequences for that 
tradition?", something wil l have passed from the earth and we shall read 
the words of what was once literary criticism as i f they were the remnants 
of a lost language spoken by alien beings. (70) 
The intuition that Fish is appealing to here is the idea that literary studies was not 
always a part of the university and may cease to be so in the future. He is not calling for 
a lock-down on interdisciplinary work (actually, he says the very idea is a nonsense -
that apparent interdisciplinarity is really only ever one of the supposedly cooperating 
subjects, and never both), but the implication is clear: you can alter the way we do this 
only so much, and then it becomes something else. At a sufficient distance from the 
original type, speciation occurs. The discipline vanishes with the way of talking, 
because the way of talking was all the discipline was. The flip side to the impossibility 
of meaningful exchanges is the necessity of professional discourses, and the 
professionals to speak them. Fish becomes a Scheherazade-figure; as soon as he stops 
talking like a literary critic, the discipline vanishes behind him. If serious about his 
claims, then he's talking to save his job, to keep it in existence. 
There are some parallels here between Fish's (entirely serious?) claim about the 
unintelligibility of literary studies in a future where its remaining productions were now 
long-unread journals and books, lost in the storerooms of libraries, and Rorty's 
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concession to the physicists that it might just be possible to predict the future, but not to 
know what it m e a n s . I t is not clear if the productions of literary critics really would 
be "alien," although this would presumably be a question for archaeologists to sort out. 
The productions of literary study would surely be no more alien than they currently are 
to non-specialists: in a future where literary study had ceased to exist, people would 
view the orphaned books and journals in much the same way as scientists and 
mathematicians view them today. (Perhaps this is alien enough.) 
He calls for a recognition of the necessity of professionalisation. His closing 
comment is: "when there's a job to be done, and you want it done correctly, call in a 
professional" (126). Professionals have expert knowledge in a limited field. That's why 
Fish uses the word: it puts specialism in a good light. This works by reminding us of 
professionals like plumbers and doctors; individuals trained in particular specialist 
skills. Analogously, we think that a plumber is to a leaking pipe as a doctor is to an 
illness (and then) as a literary critic is to a text in need of interpretation. But this is 
where the argument falls down: leaking pipes and illnesses are things we want sorting 
out; they are problems for which an expedient solution allows us to get on with the 
things we want to do. But an un-interpreted text is not an obstacle in this sense. The 
question of why anyone should bother examining and interpreting literary texts is less 
clear, and at the end of Fish's defence, remains unanswered. It has been suavely avoided 
in all the talk of generative vocabularies and disciplinary professionalisation, but it is 
the question that criticisms of literary study inevitably want to address. Complaints 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (206), Rorty discusses the claims of Laplacean physics 
determinists that an adequate knowledge of the current position and velocity of atomic particles would be 
sufficient to exactly predict future events - including the behaviour of future humans. Even if this were 
possible (and there are many reasons why it is not, even in principle), Rorty maintains that the 
knowledge-productions of future humans would be meaningless to us without our understanding of their 
context within the future society from whence they came - an understanding that could only be achieved 
by immersion within the culture. This is a strongly historicist view. Meaning is assumed to be almost 
emergent - a property of interaction. 
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about the lack of rigour within literai-y studies or the dissolution of the canon are usually 
only technical ways of getting to the thing that puzzles those unsympathetic to literary 
study: what's the point of studying books in this manner? In the first place, what does it 
do (apart from keep people like Fish in employment)? An answer to "why study literary 
texts?" is the hollow at the middle of Fish's argument. (Rorty had an answer with his 
notion of edification: it makes us aware of new ways of thinking about ourselves, and 
perhaps Fish would agree.) This is nothing new. Frye had encountered a similar 
problem regarding the "use or value" of studying literary texts. Doubtful about the 
possibilities of persuading those external to the discipline of its worth, he saw a 
circularity involved with the familiar appeals to aesthetic experience as an end-in-itself: 
"most 'defences of poetry' are intelligible only to those well within the defences" 
(Anatomy 10). Anxious about answering directly questions about the use of studying 
literature, Frye diverts the issue to the question of "What follows from the fact that it is 
possible?" (10). 
What is being asked for when literary study is being criticised is usually a 
definition of the subject so that its merits might be evaluated. Fish, however, claims that 
a definition in this sense cannot be given; that such discursive definitions do not exist 
outside of performative demonstrations. To this end, he devotes nine pages to a reading 
of the opening words of Milton's Lycidas (4-13). The reading he offers is designed to 
both satisfy those expectant of a definition, and also to underline his belief that a 
discipline is no more than its unique approach, what he calls its "distinctiveness." 
Consequently, i f we significantly alter this approach, then the distinctiveness of the 
discipline vanishes, and because a discipline is no more than its distinctive approach, 
the discipline vanishes, too. 
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This account of "distinctiveness" means that hterary study is defined as 
whatever literary studies departments do. That this all sounds a little circular is half the 
point - the act of approaching a text as a poem is generative of the discipline of literary 
study and generative of the poem itself. Fish believes that the act of interpretation 
"makes" the poem - that our willingness to treat a text as a poem is (something like) the 
special quality that formalists like the early Jakobson had searched for in terms of 
locating and defining the property of "literariness." If there is something different about 
literary and non-literary texts, it does not exist - or is at least only latent - until a reader 
has decided to look for it: "Linguistic and semantic density is not something poems 
announce, but something that readers actualize by paying to texts labelled poetic a kind 
of attention they would not pay to texts not so labelled" (13). 
Preserving the distinctive approach of a discipline is therefore the same project 
as preserving the discipline itself. For this reason. Fish wants us to share his concerns 
about the possibility of literary critics making waves in the world outside of the narrow 
field of fellow scholars. His condition of professionalisation means that the opinions of 
literary critics on subjects outside of literary criticism - such as racism or terrorism or 
feminism - will have a limited impact: 
It is not so much that literary critics have nothing to say about these issues, 
but that so long as they say it as literary critics no one but a few of their 
close friends will be listening, and, conversely, if they say it in ways 
unrelated to the practices of literary criticism, and thereby manage to give 
it a political effectiveness, they wil l no longer be literary critics. (1) 
Of course, this apparent block on the field of legitimate contributions for literary critics 
ultimately cuts in favour of literary criticism: the corollary is that the wall that keeps the 
literary critics in keeps the scientists out. It is not unrealistic to see Fish's whole 
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argument here as serving a primarily defensive role. For all the talk of the limited scope 
of professional contributions, there was never any real danger that literary critics were 
going to drift en masse out of literature and into politics. What Fish has done, however, 
is to outline an account of disciplinary identity that seems to offer a means of 
legitimising an overlap of subject matter between disciplines, without demanding either 
relinquish the way it usually deals with its subjects of study. (Like travelling abroad 
without learning the language.) 
Under this account, it is possible to review the interest of evolutionary 
psychology in fiction, and the interest of literary criticism in evolutionary psychology, 
and to recognise that the interaction is both less promising than some had hoped and 
less threatening than some had feared. It seems that the hope and fear arises from a 
misapprehension of what evolutionary psychology is trying to do with literature. It does 
not and cannot provide empirical support for value-judgements, nor can it serve as a 
heuristic device for unveiling new meanings; rather, evolutionary psychology wants to 
explain the urge for and object of criticism, and is not itself a type of criticism. 
Whilst Carroll's position as laid out in Evolution and Literary Theory was bound 
to meet with resistance from those involved with or sympathetic to the poststructuralist 
positions he attacks, there has been a wider rejection of the use of evolutionary 
psychology as a critical tool from critics whose objections tend to centre on two claims: 
first, that as an heuristic tool, evolutionary psychology seems to offer no original 
insights; and secondly, that evolutionary psychology offers a crude account of literary 
fiction. These claims are related, and have a common explanation. 
In an article called "Questioning Interdisciphnarity" (Poetics Today 21.2 
[2000]), literary critic Tony Jackson surveys attempts to employ evolutionary 
psychology and cognitive science in the service of literary study. He levels the familiar 
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charge that these scientific approaches have nothing to add that literary critics didn't 
already know. Reading Carroll's Evolution and Literary Theory, he complains that 
"[h]is interpretations are worth reading in a general sense, but as with his claims about 
literature per se, he does not really offer us anything new. And it is not clear that 
Darwin or biology have made any interesting difference in getting at the interpretations 
he does provide" (328). And again with Robert Storey's Mimesis and The Human 
Animal: "Though he has good, useful things to say, he does not really offer much that 
sounds revolutionary" (334). And again, of Steven Tinker's account from How the 
Mind Works: "Pinker is very smart and a very good writer, and everything he says is 
true, but he tells us nothing that is not already widely known" (336)."'^ 
These criticisms stem from a mistaken idea about what it is that evolutionary 
psychology is meant to be doing with literature. Evolutionary psychology is looking for 
confirmation that its assertions and expectations are correct, and literature - broadly 
conceived as traditional narrative fiction - is the type of place where any panhuman 
cognitive traits might emerge as recognisable continuities. I f such continuities can be 
found then the evolutionary psychologist is in a stronger position to repeat his claim that 
man has a human nature and it is always and everywhere the same. Proving this claim is 
the extent of evolutionary psychology's interest in literature. It does not aim (and may 
be unable) to function as a heuristic device for producing new meanings. It is still the 
job of literary criticism to produce new readings, and not the job of evolutionary 
psychology. I f evolutionary psychology did start to turn up readings radically divergent 
"^^ Similar criticisms come from Frederick Adams, writing in the Stanford Humanities Review 4.1 (and 
online: http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/4-l/text/adams.conimentarv.html) dedicated to responses to 
psychologist Herbert Simon's take on cognitive science's promise for literary study: "some of his 
offerings do not seem to add things that are new or more precise than any literary critic would have 
known" (qtd. in Tony Jackson 336). The "precision" claim is important in this case because Simon had 
explicitly advertised precision as a virtue of his approach. 
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from the standard positions of literary criticism, then there would be questions asked 
about how correct it all was. 
The reason that Jackson finds so much to criticise is that he assumes that " i f the 
interweaving of evolutionary psychology and literary interpretation are to matter, 
presumably we will have to hear new interpretations" (335). But this is not the case. It is 
not necessary that Carroll introduce new interpretations, just that he offers a rationale 
for the set of interpretations he does provide. For although Carroll and critics like him 
do indeed seem to be using evolutionary psychology as a framework for saying things 
that have been said without this framework, this need not be a failure, even though it is 
possible that removing all references to evolutionary psychology would yield the same 
(literary critical, i f not scientific) account. To say that all the talk of evolutionary 
psychology is not essential to preserve the content of Carroll's account, but is instead 
wholly and cleanly detachable, is not to say that evolutionary psychology has no 
relevance to Carroll's account. On the contrary, it is the decision procedure for what 
types of comments are permissible, that is, which types of things are (by Carroll's 
rationale) sensible things to say and which are not. The issue here is filtering. 
Using an analogy with physics, Frye wrote of how the perspectives of 
"externally derived critical attitudes" (of which evolutionary psychology is one)'^^ acted 
as "color-filters" (Anatomy 7). It is instructive to pursue this analogy so far as colour 
filters do not add anything to the light they filter. A red filter will not "turn" all the 
white light red; there is transformation only insofar as there is blockage. Al l a red filter 
does is block those sections of the spectrum that are not red light (this was the novel 
Of course, the critical approach will only be considered "externally derived" by those unsympathetic to 
or sceptical of its effectiveness. An avowed Marxist would presumably maintain that the literature is a 
product of the socio-economic environment from which it emerged. Likewise, an adherent of 
evolutionary psychology can be expected to believe that their approach is not external to literature, but 
constitutive of it: that in evolutionary psychology they have identified the source of literature's character 
and condition of its possibility. 
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part of Newton's theory of optics). So in an important sense, the filter is taking nothing 
away but variety: filters homogenise. 
Carroll's filter allows anything consonant with evolutionary psychology to pass 
through, and nothing that isn't. This means that the reading that emerges is not a more 
but a less various one - which may or may not be more illuminating. The reading from 
evolutionary psychology fits this. This is the reason why an account such as Carroll's 
seems like it could have been produced without all the talk about Pleistocene man and 
the hunter-gatherers of the African savannah. Existing literary criticism could have 
constructed such an account, and for the main part, already had. All the evolutionary 
talk did was decide which elements of the existing literary criticism were admissible. 
This all becomes much clearer when Jackson writes: "For Carroll, evolutionary 
theory is going to save literature and criticism from poststructuralism" (327). Jackson is 
perhaps being hyperboHc here, but this is nonetheless exactly what Carroll wants. In 
fact, it is hard to tell whether Carroll's motives for adopting and endorsing the 
evolutionary psychology view are motivated by a genuine belief in the program, or, 
more shrewdly, because he doesn't value poststructuralism, and believes that by 
encouraging the adoption of evolutionary psychology he might veto the poststructuralist 
by proxy: render their vocabulary invalid and moot everything they say before it's said. 
So, Carroll demands of and expects from evolutionary psychology the type of 
account he can already get from literary criticism, but now blessed by science. He wants 
this because he is taking sides, and, as explained above, the way he cuts the pack is 
poststructuralism on one side, and science on the other. Anything allied to 
poststructuralism must go, and anything that can be allied with science should be 
preserved and examined more closely, as the new focus allows. He likes books and 
literary criticism, but seems to feel ashamed and disheartened that he cannot talk about 
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these books with the authority with which practitioners of other disciplines - particle 
physicists, molecular biologists - are able to talk about their interests in atoms and 
molecules. He seems to feel that this authority was once possessed by literary critics 
(presumably - judging by the weight given to Pater and Arnold - around the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century), but has since been lost in the subsequent 
ascendancy of both science and poststructurahsm (subjects he construes as inherently 
antagonistic). By producing an account of literary study that will not offend at least this 
one branch of science, Carroll perhaps hopes to receive wider acclaim from the 
scientific community as a w h o l e . S o it is not invahd for Carroll to invoke 
evolutionary theory in his account, although it may be that he is doing so 
disingenuously - that is, because he thinks it is useful only instrumentally, only insofar 
as it blocks poststructuralist readings. 
Another common response to evolutionary psychology is the accusation that it is 
a too crude and clumsy method of interpretation that fails to account for much of what 
'™ Of course, the problem with this is that evolutionary psychology has not received the universal acclaim 
of the scientific community that Carroll needs. One of the better essays denouncing the scope of 
evolutionary psychology comes from Stephen Jay Gould ("More Things in Heaven and Earth" in Rose 
and Rose, Alas. Poor Darwin 85-105). Gould doesn't attack the more conservative claims of the 
evolutionary psychologists: he agrees that the mind is an evolved organ, but is hesitant about assenting to 
the ability of evolutionary psychology to explain every feature of human behaviour by natural selection 
alone. He seizes on the Lamarckian nature of cultural evolution, and argues that this effectively eclipses 
any Mendelian effect that Dawkins and Dennett want to re-introduce through talk of memetics. The 
meme is intended to facilitate and encourage an analogy between Mendelian genetic evolution and the 
"evolution" of thoughts and ideas. Gould and others (including Mary Midgely ["Why Memes?" in Rose 
and Rose 67-84], and biologist H. Allen Orr [from whom Gould borrows the bulk of his argument] in 
"Dennett's Dangerous Idea"), however, hold that the analogy is fundamentally skewed because cultural 
evolution is Lamarckian (not Mendelian) in character, and they argue that the desire of the ultra-
Darwinists to account for every aspect of humanity - physiological and psychological - in terms of 
evolved adaptations has forced them to invent the meme. In an irony probably designed to rankle Dennett 
(who had written "an excoriating caricature of [Gould's] ideas" where it was hard to find an argument 
"amid the slurs and sneers" [Gould in Rose and Rose 94]), Gould effectively dismisses the meme as a 
skyhook. Cutting against the memetic theory, Mary Midgely makes the further claim that belief is not 
granular (like the genes in DNA), in the sense that Dawkins and Dennett need for the memetic theory to 
hold. The correct register for talking about memes, these critics argue, is not that of genetics, but of 
epidemiology. (Oddly, Dawkins himself seems to recognise this, writing a typically hostile account of 
religious belief entitled "Viruses of the Mind" [in Bo Dahlbom's Dennett and His Critics 13-27].) It is 
unclear whether or not memes are essential to evolutionary psychology: some proponents talk about them 
but most do not. Carroll himself never draws on the memetic theory explicitly, so a criticism of memes 
perhaps misses him. 
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literary studies is interested in. This usually takes the form of a falsification argument. 
One of the universals E. O. Wilson talks about is a preference for a 20% level of detail 
redundancy in visual art - something found in Chinese ideograms and genuine 
Mondrians (see Consihence 245-46). Here is architecture critic Charles Jencks having 
fun with the idea that it might be possible to write an algorithm for artistic productions: 
What about the Modem Masters? Did they have the right degree of 
redundancy? Of Simplicity divided by Complexity? [...] There must be 
some limit on the degree of labyrinthine complication; Wilson must be 
right. Too bad James Joyce, too bad T. S. Eliot, your Wasteland is just too 
... complex, not enough redundancy, (in Rose and Rose 39. Ellipsis 
Jencks's unless in []). 
Jencks's sarcasm here is misplaced, attacking a claim that Wilson does not make. 
Wilson, and the researchers from whom he takes his data, are not claiming 20% 
redundancy is a necessary condition for artistic productioiis, and certainly not that it is 
sufficient, only that there is a marked tendency towards this level of redundancy in 
many instances of visual design from different geographical and historical periods. 
Added to which, the claim is made only for visual art, so invoking either Joyce or The 
Wasteland as counter-examples seems puzzling or just plain obtuse.'^' What Jencks's 
Jencks does also list Jackson Pollock as an anomaly, but this is met by Dutton's point that Pollock's 
art, like that of Duchamp, was controversial: that is, it shocked and offended, and is still largely an avant 
garde concern. Any wider popularity Pollock now enjoys is not based upon the immediate appeal of his 
work, but rather, its critical success and consequent dissemination in the form of book-covers and poster 
prints. Unlike a pastoral Constable or the work of the Hudson River School, Jackson Pollock is not 
universally popular with audiences. The same is true of The Wasteland or Ulysses - a view Frye 
explicitly endorsed when he made the claim that "Whatever popularity Shakespeare and Keats have now 
is ... the result of the publicity of criticism" (Anatomy 4). Jencks writes complacently for an audience 
already persuaded that the biological approach is wrong. This leads to carelessness, and easy, often facile 
sniping. The volume's editors, Hilary and Steven Rose, describe Jencks's essay as "stylishly ironic" 
(Rose and Rose 9). Jencks apes Danny Kaye's Court Jester patter ('The pellet with the poison's in the 
flagon with the dragon; the vessel with the pestle has the brew that is true" [Court Jester dir. Melvin 
Frank and Norman Panama, 1956]): "the issue of the tissue is the sound which is found in the nose, I 
suppose. What?" (31-32). 
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criticisms underline, however, is the common and persistent misunderstanding of the 
aims and extent of explanations from evolutionary psychology. 
Evolutionary psychology is interested in explaining the existence and origins of 
art and literature, and in sketching out the types of things art and literature will generally 
tend to concern themselves with describing. It is interested in broad trends, not specific 
works. Those who object to the use of evolutionary psychology in the service of 
explaining the existence of art and literature tend to do so by appeal to an anomalous 
counter-example, as if taking evolutionary psychological theories to be falsifiable by a 
single anomaly. That is not the case. Evolutionary psychology proposes statistical 
results - trends, not axioms, and an anomalous datum does not refute a trend. To object 
then, as some critics do, that such accounts fail to touch the literary greats is to have 
mistaken what it was that evolutionary psychology was trying to do with literature in 
the first place. 
It is unfortunate, given the many things wrong with Wilson's programme, that 
the types of objections heard are more commonly these. What this should not do is 
make us reject evolutionary psychology on the grounds that it is dull and 
overdetermines criticism. What it should make us realise is the superfluous character of 
extra-literary interpretations. (For example, Carroll's bizarre defence of Wuthering 
Heights on the grounds that it doesn't violate the Westermarck effect works on an 
implicit assumption that Wuthering Heights would be somehow less compelling if it 
did.) In other words, we should not expect evolutionary psychology to do what literary 
criticism does. 
This goes some way to answering the criticism that evolutionary psychology 
offers only crude and simplistic readings, and offers no separate account of literary 
fiction. If these types of criticisms recall some of the complaints heard before regarding 
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linguistic analyses (such as Jakobson's), it is because they have the same explanation. 
Linguistic readings of literary texts were interested only in the linguistic features of the 
text, and lacked an apparatus for providing an account beyond this of the text's 
excellence or literary merit. Likewise, evolutionary psychology is interested in culture 
generally, and narrative fictions only incidentally (as instances of this broader field). 
And as with linguistics, evolutionary psychology is not interested in qualitative 
judgements, and interested only in popular trends. Seeking to explain the anomalous 
popularity of works like The Waste Land or Ulysses, which may not fi t their 
expectations, evolutionary psychologists would likely be more interested in the social 
status and authority of literary critics in shaping public opinion than they would in 
analysing the texts themselves for appealing content. 
Looking again at the argument between Carroll and Pinker,'^^ it becomes 
possible to better understand where they diverge. Carroll is first a literary critic and 
secondly an adherent of evolutionary psychology. Pinker, on the other hand, approaches 
literature from inside evolutionary psychology, as one of its foremost public advocates. 
These separate agendas mean there are differences in how each utilise their materials. I f 
Carroll was using evolutionary psychology only instrumentally, then Pinker is using 
literature only instrumentally. Pinker is saying the same things as Aristotle deliberately; 
or at least, it does not touch him to complain that his account is consistent with 
traditional accounts because his argument only works i f the mind has always been this 
way. The project here is not about novelty but consistency, and Pinker's job is to reach 
the same conclusions using novel methods - that is, according to the expectations of 
'^ ^ See Carroll's essay "Steven Pinker's Cheesecake for the Mind" Philosophy and Literature 22 (1998): 
478-85. 
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evolutionary psychology.He is not a literary critic, and it is wrong to treat him as 
one. For the same reason, he's not interested in giving an account that recognises 
literature outwith fiction. Pinker's is a theory of aesthetics only in the non-evaluative 
sense. Like linguistics, evolutionary psychology isn't interested in giving a value 
account, and would have no grounds upon which to construct such an account outside 
its own account of the types of things it would expect people to find valuable. 
As regards evolutionary psychology's obligation to explain the existence of 
literary texts outwith fiction generally, there is the option of leaning on an argument 
from sexual selection - something Geoffrey IVIiller might want to take up (see The 
Mating Mind, esp. 258-291). Miller claims that a preference for "costly and wasteful 
display" distinguishes the "elite" individual from "the common run of humanity" (284). 
This works well for exclusive items such as expensive jewellery and clothes, but less 
well for reading habits, except insofar as they display education. The sexual worth of 
literary fiction might then he in showing off intelligence. Reading difficult books is one 
way of vicariously being clever, or signalling intelligence. Of course, this reasoning 
alone hardly serves as an explanation for why Joyce is held in such esteem: those 
features which separate Joyce from popular fiction are better explained with reference to 
values intrinsic to literature, and their connection to sexual attractiveness (and biological 
fitness) is almost uselessly distant. The most such an account can offer (and the most 
evolutionary psychologists could be expected to provide) is an explanation for why 
there is a division at all between high and low art, and it appears Miller is aware of this 
A Kuhnian would call this an example of normal science. See The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 
the translation of "mere facts" (35) into science comes with their absorption into the paradigm: in a 
discussion about the reception of Coulomb's experimental data, Kuhn explains that this "is why that 
result surprised no one and why several of Coulomb's contemporaries had been able to predict it in 
advance. Even the project whose goal is paradigm articulation does not aim at the unexpected novelty" 
(35). What is being sought by experimenters working within a paradigm is corroboration: "the aim of 
normal science is not major substantive novelties" (35). 
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limitation: "The human tendency to regard works of art as a fitness indicators is being 
used here as a clue to art's evolutionary origins - not as a prescription for how art 
should be made or viewed" (285). 
Centrally, evolutionary psychology is or is at least trying to be a science, looking 
to explain the origins of culture and the reasons for the popularity of some forms of 
cultural production over others. I f we stop interpreting the interests of evolutionary 
psychology (or cognitive science) in literature as replacements for the current 
vocabulary, and begin instead to interpret them not as instances of criticism but as 
instances of science, then many of the problems evaporate. The sciences are interested 
in what it is that makes people interested in literature. Insofar as evolutionary 
psychology is a scientist's look at literature, it is also a disinterested look - with neither 
the intention nor the capacity to make evaluative judgements. It is not trying to answer 
the types of questions literary study tries to answer, and nor will it provide a foundation 
for what Northrop Frye called the "donkey's carrot of literary criticism" (Anatomy 20), 
the demonstrable value-judgement.'^ "* To use the terms Fish employed, whatever 
personal interest an evolutionary psychologist (or linguist, or cognitive scientist) has 
invested in literature, their professional interest (and accordingly what they can say in a 
professional capacity) wil l be limited to the types of things their profession is concerned 
with. 
Armed with this account of the divergence of professional purposes, literary 
critics needn't fear that an account of literature from evolutionary psychology will 
invalidate the way they currently talk about books. Both literary criticism and now 
evolutionary psychology find themselves trying to describe creativity. The role of 
'^ ^ 'The demonstrable value-judgement is the donkey's carrot of literary criticism, and every new critical 
fashion, such as the current fashion for elaborate rhetorical analysis, has been accompanied by a belief 
that criticism has finally devised a definitive technique for separating the excellent from the less 
excellent. But this always turns out to be an illusion of the history of taste" (Frye, Anatomy 20). 
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literary study is to make those descriptions in the intentional language appropriate for 
answeiing questions about intentional projects.'^^ The role of evolutionary psychology 
is to make those descriptions in terms of trying to answer their quite separate questions 
about the origins of creativity, and to try and understand the enduring popularity of 
certain narratives and visual images. So an overlap of subject matter does not imply a 
conflict of purposes, and it is purposes that assure disciplinary autonomy, and not 
subject matter. 
This is not intended as an argument either for or against evolutionary 
psychology's interest in literature, anymore than one might sensibly argue against the 
interests of biochemists in zoology. Al l that is being said is that their interest is neither 
threatening nor misplaced - it is disinterested scientific enquiry, running on separate 
tracks and with separate goals from those of literary criticism. The scientists see the 
enormous and enduring cultural significance of literature and wonder how they can best 
fit that into their worldview (which aims to comprehensively explain phenomena) and 
evolutionary psychology is one of the best tools they have for attempting to do that. It is 
science's way of explaining what's going on - that is, science's way into literature and 
not (as Carroll had hoped) literature's way into science. 
Does this then imply that literary study gains none of science's prestige from the 
type of empirically grounded organisation that evolutionary psychology seems to offer? 
Whilst evolutionary psychology cannot provide any support for evaluative claims about 
literary and sub-literary fiction, it might still function as a hub upon which to centre an 
account of literature, such as Frye's, that seeks to organise literature in conceptual 
'^ ^ Of course, this all becomes problematised by the tendency of many critics to use a behaviourist 
approach to literary production - see section on Frye below. 
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(rather than historical) space. In short, Frye needs an account hke that offered by 
evolutionary psychology to anchor his conceptual schema to. Without it, his taxa (like 
Polti's thirty-six dramatic situations) risk appearing arbitrary. 
As covered before (Chapter 2), Frye described his intention to organise literature 
thematically. Rather than see literature as involved in a linear, historical progression, he 
wanted to see if it would be possible to see it as a complication in conceptual space. It is 
a fundamental assumption of any such scheme that there are forces at work greater than 
the efforts of individual writers. This needn't sound so mysterious. Another way to say 
it is that such schemes must assume there are levels of organisation above the 
individual, and that these higher-level organisations supervene upon individual efforts, 
to grant the type of coherence that Frye and so many others have seen in literature as a 
whole. The alternatives are to say either that any large patterns are coincidental 
(something rejected by evolutionary psychology or cognitive science, which takes 
regularity to be evidence for the existence of a universal human nature), or to say that 
large patterns are forced impositions. This is the case i f the patterns are made by the 
critics and are not themselves an emergent property of the data. Scientific interpretation 
proceeds from the belief that the scientist is working with a ready-made world that is in 
need of explanation. The claim from Frye is that the taxa (whether that is the same 
scheme he suggests or some other doesn't matter) are real; that they are found and not 
made. He is claiming they are the product of an "inductive survey" of literature. Frye's 
is not the first such attempt, and he expects that his taxa will be revised and/ or 
augmented, stressing that his is a preliminary effort. When Frye wonders if it would be 
possible to organise a "science of criticism," he is asking whether hard rules exist for 
literary organisation. 
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When scientists find patterns, they are usually working with unconscious subject 
matter. Nature fits a coherent scheme because (this is the reductionist's justification) it 
is constructed according to very simple, iterative rules. As a result, patterns and trends 
can be explained in terms of the complication of simple rules. Literature, too, could fit 
patterns - if there were similar rules governing the behaviour of mankind. This is, of 
course, the thesis of evolutionary psychology and it is hard to see how Frye could 
support his scheme without some similar sort of account of a commonality in humans. 
Where it meets problems is in the difference between finding patterns in the behaviour 
of ant colonies and sand dunes (or whatever) and that of sentient humans. Could such 
simple rules be at work behind the artist, shaping their work into fitting a pattern? 
A scheme like Frye's needs top-down causality in something like the sense 
suggested by Kline's claim that "[i]n hierarchically structured systems, the levels of 
control (usually upper levels) 'harness' the lower levels and cause them to carry out 
behaviours that the lower levels, left to themselves, would not do" (Conceptual... 119), 
or Fodor's claim that "[cjausal powers supervene on local microstructure" (44). 
The higher levels of control here would be commonalities of human minds (on 
the assumption that physically similar human minds would share functional similarity) 
such that all human minds would tend to be internally similar and consequently exhibit 
similar responses to similar stimuli. These similarities would engender what Patrick 
Colm Hogan called "default tendencies" (229), meaning that all human minds (or at 
least, the mean average human mind) would tend to find similar stimuli similarly 
interesting or dull. Consequently, they would tend to tell the same types of stories. 
(Although it has been stressed above, it is worth repeating that this does not imply that 
there is a limit on the number of possible stories, only that there may be a limit on the 
number of entertaining stories. The set of possible stories could still be infinite, of 
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which the set of entertaining stories is a finite subset. Again, "entertaining" is a non-
evaluative label understood in terms of what is popular.) 
It doesn't make sense to talk of a pattern in the whole without the parts being 
organised and shaped by the pattern. It doesn't make sense to think there are themes in 
literature that are not also themes for individual writers. Unless they have similar minds, 
it doesn't make sense that they collectively produce similar works. Frye's account is 
bound up with a view of creativity that is entirely consistent with the account offered by 
evolutionary psychology. To talk about there being a possibility of conceptual 
organisation is to shave a little autonomy from the individual writer. The threat from 
evolutionary psychology is determinism: the author cedes a little creativity when he 
admits that his works is part of a panhuman expression, and the same is true for any 
account that seeks to impose a conceptual net wider than the actions of one individual 
acting autonomously. 
This also goes some way to explaining why it is a commonplace within literary 
criticism that the poet'^ ^ is not necessarily an authority on his own work. Recall that 
Frye believed actually being Dante does not in itself make you a good critic of Dante: 
"what he says has special interest but not special authority" (Anatomy 5). As discussed 
above, he points out that people accept that a poet may not be able to fairly judge the 
value of his own work (for obvious reasons), but think that the poet should be consulted 
for learning about the meaning of the work, and that the author's account of the text's 
meaning would be definitive (4-6). For Frye, the assessment of both the value and the 
meaning of a text were to be tasks for the critic, not the poet. He dismissed as "the 
absurd quantum formula" (17) the idea that it is the critic's task to get out of the text the 
For argumentative clarity (and consistent with Frye's usage), the term "poet" is used here to denote the 
creative writer or artist as distinct from the critic or interpreter. 
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meaning that the author put in. But i f these meanings are to be any more than critical 
imposition, we must assume that there is unconscious behaviour by the creative writer; 
that the writer was including meanings of which he was not aware. This effects an 
abduction of authorial control from the poet into the hands of the critic. It is a strategic 
move, enabling the critic to wriggle free of accusations of parasitism, and to 
consequently assure a level of interpretative autonomy unachievable i f the decisive 
reading and final say on interpretation stays with the poet. 
This does not in itself open the way for wild misreadings and free-interpretation 
of texts, but it does importantly allow the critic to better claim that the poets are acting 
in obedience to larger patterns - something we might expect individual writers to deny: 
being told that we are behaving in a typical fashion is an insult to our sense of personal 
autonomy. It is a sort of weak determinism, and it is the same thing that grates against 
us when evolutionary psychologists claim we are behaving in species-typical ways. It 
implies that our behaviour, if not quite tropistic, is at least close to it. But i f a taxonomic 
scheme in anything like the sense envisaged by Frye exists, then either artists are 
consciously designing their work to slot into one of its categories (perhaps true of some 
commercially motivated genre works),'^^ in which case some conscious awareness of 
the scheme must exist, or else, there is no conscious awareness of the scheme and the 
scheme therefore precedes the authorial decision-making process. This second take is 
the one that shaves authority off the author. This suggests that artists are acting to some 
extent in blind obedience to a system of which they are a part. For Frye's scheme to 
work, he has to treat the poet as a herd animal. Only then does it make sense to think 
that literature could ever be organised around anything larger or more coherent than 
thousands of individual conceptual schema. 
This is something Amis toys with in The Information, see section below. 
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Once you have the artist in a position of bovine obedience to unconscious 
forces, it becomes possible to talk of their productions with a similar authority with 
which scientists talk of the natural world. This is because it enables interpretations 
unfettered by worries about the creator's intentions and designs. It doesn't matter what 
the artist wanted; this is what we have. What is being imitated here, consciously or 
otherwise, is a version of what in science is known as the two contexts of discovery and 
justification. 
Literary criticism employs the distinction whenever there is talk of the 
irrelevance of a writer's biography to a writer's art (following the New Critics, or 
following the Proust of Contra Saint-Beuve). What goes into the life is supposed to have 
no bearing upon our opinions about what comes out in the art. Although counter-
intuitive, this allows critics to avoid charges of parasitism. If the art is immune to the 
opinion of its creator, then the critic could be as creative and as important as the artist. 
This is a clever trick, but one that physicists have been doing much longer. Take 
out the Creator, and all you have is an object and your interpretation - there is no need 
to worry about design and intention. The difference, however, is that physicists seek a 
stability of interpretation, whereas critics seek idiosyncrasies of interpretation. Frye 
builds this into his account of what a science of criticism might look like, and it is 
crucial, because it keeps criticism from ever completing its work. Unlike science, which 
seeks to exhaust nature in its description, and would welcome this event as a triumph, 
criticism takes its subject to be inexhaustible, and seeks to proliferate readings. As Frye 
famously has it, the inexhaustibility of literature holds even i f new works cease to be 
produced (Anatomy 17, 133). 
In the same way scientists talk of "raw data" in the context of discovery, the text 
before interpretation is "bare." There is here a context of discovery, the text itself, and a 
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context of justification, the reading a critic makes of that text, and in modem hterary 
criticism it does not seem too strong to claim that this reading really does float free of 
the text as much as the scientist's proofs and conclusions float free of the conditions of 
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their discovery. 
From here, it is not overreaching to see the efforts of the critics to strip the 
author of post-publication authority (as regards interpretation of meaning) as a 
conscious or subconscious imitation of the relationship that scientists hold between the 
world and their work. That is, one of found subjects (the devising of a series of 
taxonomic systems for the interpretation of nature), rather than created subjects (the 
author whose finite capacity to create will limit the interpretative act). With intention 
out of the way, it becomes possible to talk about "art" outwith "artists." So finding 
patterns in the whole implies there is less control in at least this one respect. 
We needn't, of course, immediately collapse into a fatalistic determinism, but it 
is worth interrogating the claim that for every way in which we are like other people we 
are that much less free. This cuts both ways: it could be used to support the liberal-
egalitarian idea that all men are created equal, but it could also support the idea that our 
flaws are ineradicable. On the strong view of this sort of determinism there are the 
tropisms. A tropism is a reflex which affects the movement of the whole organism - so 
blinking is a reflex, but not a tropism. A flower's turning to the sun is called a 
phototropistic response. There are also animal tropisms, and the account is familiar 
enough, as James Rachels explains: "We may mistakenly believe that an animal is 
The two contexts mark the same division that is used to argue within pohtical circles that a man's 
personal life has no impact upon his ability to make professional decisions. In fact, the two contexts idea 
is something that runs throughout intellectual thought. The idea that a contribution should be judged by 
its merit within the debate rather than on the identity of the speaker is something that is central to 
standards of academic integrity. If Hitler says: "Genocide is wrong," the statement is not rendered untrue. 
It becomes perhaps a little senseless in Hitler's mouth, but the moral worth of such a prohibition survives 
because it rests not upon the identity of the speaker but upon the validity of the contribution. 
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behaving rationally, but in reality the animal's movement is only a machinelike, 
unreasoning response to a stimulus" (144). To give the flavour of how these might 
work, he offers some examples of tropistic behaviour in animals: 
when the male nocturnal moth mates with the female, we may be tempted 
to see in his evident zest something analogous to the lusty desire of a man 
- yet it turns out that the male moth's behaviour is triggered entirely by the 
odour produced by two scent organs near the female's abdomen. When 
these are removed the male will attempt to mate with the organs, ignoring 
the nearby female. Again, upon analysis, we seem to find nothing but a 
fixed, unreasoning response to a stimulus. (144)'^^ 
Rachels goes on to ask "One key question is whether all animal behaviour is to be 
regarded as tropistic, or only some of it" (145). He asks this partly because he is 
concerned with animal welfare, but to this end, he is also interested in establishing a 
continuum between man and animal, which he sees as a logical consequence of 
accepting Darwin's ideas about evolution and speciation. It is quite uncontroversial to 
claim that the behaviour of moths or the sphex wasp (Darwin's example, and now a 
stock case) is tropistic in this sense, but quite a different thing to consider the behaviour 
of rats, dogs, chimps, and ultimately humans in the same way. Exploring the 
possibilities, Rachels asks: "But what i f all behaviour is tropistic, including the most 
impressive performances of the higher animals?" (145). The tropistic behaviour of 
higher animals would have to be more complex, but it is conceivable that any tropistic 
behaviour could be made more sophisticated by the addition of a subroutine and still be 
Daft as the moth's behaviour might seem, that a similar principle applies to human males is apparent 
from the popularity of pornography, where the olfactory stimulus is replaced by a visual stimulus. 
261 
a tropism. In theory, there is no limit to the number of subroutines the tropism may have 
and still be a tropism. 
As should be clear from the talk of subroutines, the argument for tropisms in 
higher animals works from an analogy with computer programs. Consistent with his 
project of describing the human mind in computational terms, Daniel Dennett wonders 
what number of subroutines you'd have to add to make the sphex wasp look intelligent: 
There will always be room for yet one more set of conditions in which the 
rigidly mechanical working out of response will be unmasked, however 
long we spend improving the system. Long after the wasp's behaviour has 
become so perspicacious that we would not think of calling it tropistic, the 
fundamental nature of the systems controlling it will not have changed; it 
will just be more complex. In this sense any behaviour controlled by a 
finite system must be tropistic. (Brainstorms 245) 
Rachels concludes that 
[sjince all animal behaviour is controlled by finite systems, we might by 
this reasoning come to regard even the most 'intelligent' behaviour of the 
higher animals as in principle similar to the behaviour of the bee, the moth, 
and the wasp. ... Human behaviour, too, is under the control of a finite 
system - the human brain - and this means that the human repertory, no 
matter how vast, also has some limits. (146) 
Being told that our behaviour is analogous (however distantly) with the behaviour of 
moths and flowers is a blow to our sense of personal control, but consistent with the 
decentring science effects. 
The Kuhnian view of scientific change rejects the idea of cumulative knowledge, 
alleging that what the scientists often call progress is better understood as a series of 
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new beginnings. Be that as it may, the history of paradigm shifts does have a core theme 
constituting a progression of sorts, and this becomes apparent when listing the major 
revolutionaries: Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, Einstein. As well as being attached to 
scientific revolutions, these names are among the most famous science has produced. 
What unites them and explains their cultural value is that each pushed mankind a little 
further from the traditional, theistic view, that had humanity at the centre of the physical 
universe and the closest to God. Each successive and culturally significant scientific 
development has involved a reconception that has moved man further and further from 
the central figure he was. The trend in the history of science has been the decentring of 
the human subject. 
The cultural significance of scientists is usually related to the extent to which 
their work contributes to this decentring. What is scientifically significant about Newton 
is that he proposed a universal law of gravitation, invented the calculus, or that he 
pioneered the almost autistic attitude to data collection standardised as the modem 
scientific method. What is culturally significant is that he offered us an account of the 
universe that didn't need intentionality. You can do a lot of work in science and not 
change our position in the universe. Darwin and Copernicus force re-thinkings in a way 
that Mendeleyev's elegant periodic table or even Watson and Crick's double helix do 
not. The scientific community already believed in an atomic universe, Mendeleyev 
simply organised that system. Similarly, so far as the work of Darwin and Mendel had 
already persuaded the scientific community that some or other mechanism existed for 
the transmission of genetic material, all Watson and Crick's discovery did was provide 
a model for how this could be realised. (The profound point at the centre of Darwin's 
work was that mankind is just another animal.) This is not to try to undermine the 
importance for the scientific community of what Mendeleyev or Watson and Crick 
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achieved, but their work does not shift humanity any further from the centre of the 
universe than where the atomists and evolutionists had already put us, it only secures 
that position. 
It is part of the materialist credo that our lives are insignificant to a mechanistic 
universe whose continued operation does not need us, or our native obsessions about 
purpose and meaning and intention. Explanations from science are almost defiantly 
anti-intentional. (What makes science rational is the absence of what Dennett called 
"skyhooks" - an appeal to anything outside of a mechanistic causal explanation.) Given 
this prohibition, it comes as no surprise to hear that Steven Weinberg finds "a chilling 
impersonality in the laws of nature" (Dreams... 245), or that Richard Dawkins believes 
in "an orderly universe, one indifferent to human preoccupations" (Unweaving the 
Rainbow xiii), where "nature is not cruel, only pitilessly indifferent. ... neither good nor 
evil, neither cruel nor kind, but simply callous - indifferent to all suffering, lacking all 
purpose" (River Out of Eden 96).'^ *^ Or Stephen Jay Gould, saying: "Nature does not 
exist for us, had no idea we were coming, and doesn't give a damn about us" ("The 
Golden Rule" 168). 
To say that decentring has been a constant theme in the history of science is not 
to say that decentring is a deliberate aim of science. The removal from centre stage of 
the human is surely a secondary effect of trying to account for phenomena without 
recourse to teleological or intentional explanations. When scientists talk of aiming for 
objectivity, what they are trying to capture is the idea of a third person account; to see 
things as they are, rather than as we see them. (That this is something that thinkers like 
He makes similar comments later in the book: "In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic 
replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any 
rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should 
expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but bland, pitiless 
indifference" (133). 
264 
Rorty have rejected as a nonsense helps locate much of the argument between the 
commonsense realists and the relativists, as discussed above.) Recognising that our own 
senses are fallible (that they can be misled by illusions, for example), the scientist 
becomes sceptical of appearance and of intuitive accounts, and may attempt to construct 
apparatus to measure the world for him (relocating the problem of measurement to the 
movement of dials). The effect, as Anthony O'Hear puts it, is "to present the human 
being and his modes of perceiving the world as incidental parts of the picture," and, 
consequently, "of no more significance than any other incident in the development of 
the cosmos" (The Element of Fire 14-15). 
On account of its apparent independence of human perceptions, the scientific 
view is also credited with being an epistemologically more secure, and therefore 
satisfying, view. Recall that Steven Pinker described science as a "uniquely satisfying 
kind of understanding" (The Language Instinct ix). The rationale for this is easy to 
follow: the truth is how things are, and not necessarily how they appear to be, so a view 
unclouded by human perception is a more truthful one, and the truthful view is 
ultimately more satisfying than a fabricated view. Accordingly, the extent to which a 
view is independent of human perceptions is proportional to its accuracy and 
truthfulness. This is why Dawkins believes that the universe "indifferent to human 
preoccupations" he speaks about, "is a more beautiful, more wonderful place than a 
universe tricked out with capricious, ad hoc magic" (Unweaving the Rainbow xiii). It is 
no accident that Dawkins splits the options this way: anything that seems remotely 
interested in the merely human must be nonsense. 
The consistency with which anthropocentric accounts have been shown to be 
erroneous has led to a situation where the presence of anthropocentrism in a theory 
becomes sufficient grounds for its outright rejection. In much the same way as the 
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patent office will not consider applications for perpetual motion machines because they 
entail a violation of the inviolable second law of thermodynamics, the presence of 
anthropocentrism flags an account as ultimately unsound, as wrong from the start. 
Accordingly, it is the mark of a respectable account of the cosmos that it does not 
require human beings. Most long-range sciences - such as cosmology, geology or 
evolutionary theory - work from the principle and accept as a truism that there was a 
world long before there were people living in it, and that there will still be a world if 
people disappeared.'^' They accordingly hold that the world was neither created for 
humans nor that humans are an endpoint for evolutionary change (the very idea of an 
endpoint - barring extinction - being inimical to and a nonsense in terms of 
evolution).'^^ 
Al l this flies in the face of the traditional teleological and theistic conception of 
the universe, and (on the smaller scale of life on earth) of the relative importance of 
different forms of life. Accordingly, appeals to the prima facie special sanctity of human 
life are invalidated, and the value of non-human life reassessed. In Created From 
Animals, Rachels embraces this position to argue for the development of a "better ethic 
concerning the treatment of both human and non-human animals" (5): 
Human life will no longer be regarded with the kind of superstitious awe 
which it is accorded in traditional thought, and the lives of non-humans 
This is what is meant by the independence of scientific ideas from humans, as opposed to the 
humanities, which are so called because they are entirely dependent on the existence of humans. It may be 
possible to push this further and to claim that they must be biological homo sapiens, too, and not just 
intelligent persons. It might be that the humanities would make no sense to intelligent aliens, but the 
scientists are fairly sure that their work would. 
'^ ^ James Rachels stresses that this has been a tenet of Darwinian thinking right from the start: "For 
Darwin there was nothing in the constitution of any organism that propels its development in any 
particular direction. Nor were there any 'higher' or 'lower' forms of life; nor any 'progress': there were 
only organisms adapted in different ways to different environments, by a process ignorant of design or 
intention" (116). There is a pleasant symmetry between Rachels's paraphrasing of Darwin and the way 
that that Rorty talks about the relativity of descriptions to purposes and the corresponding absurdity of 
ranking disciplines in the academy. See also Stephen Jay Gould's Wonderful Life and Life's Grandeur for 
a lengthy account of how evolutionary theory is non-teleological. 
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will no longer be a matter of indifference. This means that human life will , 
in a sense, be devalued, while the value granted to non-human life will be 
increased. A revised view of such matters as suicide and euthanasia, as 
well as a revised view of how we should treat animals, will result. (5) 
Rachels wants to use Darwinian thinking as a supplementary argument in support of 
vegetarianism and environmental protection. He is an ethicist, and his is an ethical 
argument, interested in the question of how ought we to act, given this revised account 
of the importance of human b e i n g s . A s when ethicists ask questions like "what is 
wrong with killing?" or "what is wrong with rape?",'^ '* Rachels is not looking to 
overturn our sense of right and wrong, but to interrogate our assumptions so as to better 
ground our beliefs: "Abandoning the idea that human life has special importance does 
not leave us morally adrift; it only suggests the need for a different and better anchor" 
(4). 
What Rachels wants is for the implications of the decentring to have some 
positive impact outside of science - here, upon our behaviour toward animals. His 
argument is in line with Peter Singer's account of animal welfare. Both claim that a 
proper consideration of the relative importance of humans and other animals should 
make us recognise that an appeal to the special concerns of humans constitutes a 
prejudice, analogous to sexism and racism, which Richard Ryder called "speciesism." 
Rachels uses Darwin to support his behef that speciesism is to be resisted as another 
type of anthropocentrism. 
In making such a case, Rachels is well aware that he is skirting a violation of the naturalistic fallacy, 
and so is careful to stress the relations between the naturalistic reasons found in the acceptance of a 
Darwinian account of life, and the normative conclusions about how we should behave with regard to the 
environment: "in providing reasons, one need not be claiming that the facts logically entail the moral 
judgement. One need only claim that they provide good reasons for accepting the judgement" (96-97). 
See, for example, R. M. Hare's essay "What is Wrong with Slavery?" in Singer 165-183. 
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Because of the shared concern with avoiding anthropocentrism, we might expect 
scientists to be sympathetic to an account like Rachels's. Here is Richard Dawkins 
apparently doing just that: 
The attitude that living things are placed here for our benefit still 
dominates our culture, even where its underpinnings have disappeared. We 
now need, for purposes of scientific understanding, to find a less human-
centred view of the natural world. ... We must learn to see the world 
through non-human eyes. (Climbing Mount Improbable 238) 
It should, however, be stressed here that when Dawkins talks about looking at the world 
through non-human eyes, he is not trying to talk about the moral benefits of a more 
objective worldview. "Non-human" is not meant as "free-floating" or "disembodied" or 
in any such Nagelian view-from-nowhere sense. When Dawkins says "non-human" he 
means only that - he is thinking that we should do the other Nagelian thing: that is, to 
imagine what it would be like to be a bat, or a bee, or any other creature with 
significantly different perceptual apparatus to ourselves. That is why he places the 
emphasis on the available gains for scientific understanding. Although it is dressed up 
as an ethical point, analogous to Rachels's, Dawkins's is an argument for environmental 
protection only insofar as there can be gains for human life and human understanding. 
In a sense, his is another version of the idea that the world exists for our pleasure, but 
here the pleasure is calibrated by scientific discovery: the better we are to the 
environment, the more Dawkins (as a zoologist) has to investigate. (It is a bit like 
thinking of a wealthy literary critic patronising creative writers so that he might have 
more books and poems to interpret.) Dawkins sees anthropocentrism as an 
epistemological problem; Rachels saw it as an ethical one. 
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That Rachels seems to accept that human behaviour may be tropistic, and that 
Dawkins looks forward to an age where the human viewpoint is marginalised is not to 
say that all scientists are happy with the decentrings and accordingly fatalistic about 
agency. Although obviously an advocate of the sciences, Tallis finds fault with the trend 
toward decentring insofar as it creates "a climate of intellectual opinion in which 
individual human consciousness and the part it might play in bringing about change for 
the better is marginalised" (Enemies of Hope 221). Tallis thinks that the success of 
mechanical explanations within the sciences has led to a generalised eagerness to 
employ mechanistic explanations where once intentional explanations had been 
employed, with the result that the sphere of human agency is reduced. He points out that 
since "[i] t is the mark of a science that it does not consult its object in order to find out 
the truth about it" (226), there is a tendency for thinkers wishing to scientise their 
subject to insist upon "the autonomy of the object of study (language, society, etc.)" 
(225). Accordingly, various determinisms - physical, biological, psychological -
replace what had been thought to be free choice and rational action. As indicated by the 
title of his book - Enemies of Hope - Tallis fears that a desire among the humanities (he 
says "human sciences") to become more scientific has led some thinkers into too readily 
ceding control to forces outside of human influence, and hence becoming unduly 
pessimistic about the possibihty of escaping biological (or psychological, or social, and 
so on) constraint. Among these thinkers, Tallis targets Marx's historical determinism 
and Freud's emphasis on the subconscious, as examples of what he calls "marginalising 
consciousness" (220). 
Rather happily, Freud explicitly claims to do just this: situating his own work as 
another stage in the successive decentrings of science. He claims that 
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In the course of two centuries the naive self-love of men has had to submit 
to two major blows at the hands of science. The first was when they learnt 
that our earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of 
a cosmic system of scarcely imaginable vastness. ... The second blow fell 
when biological research destroyed man's supposedly privileged place in 
creation and proved his descent from the animal kingdom and his 
ineradicable animal nature. ("Fixation to Traumas - the Unconscious," 
Complete Works 16.284-285)'^^ 
Then, in what Stephen Jay Gould has called "possibly the least modest statement of 
intellectual history" (Urchin in a Storm 214), Freud claims that it is from his own work 
that "human megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow" (285). 
First Copernicus removes humans from the centre of the universe (the cosmological 
blow), then Darwin removes them from the centre of the animal kingdom (the 
biological blow), and now Freud "seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in 
its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on 
unconsciously in its mind" (16.285). This last, Freud's psychological blow, is a 
wresting away of control from the patient into the hands of the psychoanalyst - it carries 
the subtext that although access to the unconscious mind is denied to the individual, it 
may yet be accessible to the Freudian analyst. 
This is the same model Frye and the New Critics had employed to think about 
the poet's reading of his or her own work, seen again in the output-based Skinnerean 
Behaviourism, and seen again today in how neuropsychologists will favour brain scans 
over direct reports of mental experience. It opens the way for claiming that an 
See how Freud equates anthropocentrism with narcissism. In a slightly later lecture, he is more 
forgiving, and allows that unaided sense perception is consistent with geocentrism. (See "A Difficulty In 
The Path of Psychoanalysis," Complete Works 17.137-144.) 
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individual may be deluded about his or her motivations. Whilst not amounting to a 
claim that behaviour is tropistic, it is an important first step toward doing so. In this 
respect, it is also a different type of blow to the decentrings effected by the Copemican 
and Darwinian revolutions. Writing on the same subject in a later lecture, Freud would 
stress this difference: "Although thus humbled in his external relations, man feels 
himself to be supreme within his own mind" ("A Difficulty in the Path of 
Psychoanalysis" 17.141). Freud becomes quite emphatic: 
You feel sure that you are informed of all that goes on in your mind if it is 
of any importance at all, because in that case, you believe, your 
consciousness gives you news of it. ... Indeed, you go so far as to regard 
what is "mental" as identical with what is "conscious"... . Come, let 
yourself be taught something on this point! What is in your mind does not 
coincide with what you are conscious of.... (17.142-43) 
This intuition - that the conscious is not coextensive with the mental - has endured; and 
found support from modem psychology in spite of the widespread rejection of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. The claim being made is that the conscious mind is less efficacious than 
we are led (by the conscious mind) to believe. Because the conscious is - by definition 
- that part of the mind (and the only part of the mind) to which the individual has 
access, this becomes an essentially irrefutable argument in support of the existence of 
the unconscious. Recognising this strength, Freud uses our resistance to any reduction 
in the influence of consciousness as evidence of his being correct on this point: "No 
wonder, then, that the ego does not look favourably upon psychoanalysis and 
obstinately refuses to believe in i t" (17.143). 
It is an argumentative technique that would later be employed again through the 
efforts of evolutionary theorists to convince us that our conscious reasons for action are. 
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if not supplementary to, then at least not independent of the dictates of our genes. Matt 
Ridley (following an argument made by Robert Trivers) uses a similar failsafe to 
counter our gut-resistance to genetic determinism: 
If man has evolved the ability to override his evolutionary imperatives, 
then there must have been an advantage to his genes in doing so. 
Therefore, even the emancipation from evolution that we so fondly 
imagine we have achieved must have evolved because it suited the 
replication of genes. (The Red Oueen 9) 
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The tightness of this sort of appeal has meant that some evolutionary psychologists 
are accordingly fond of talking about the "real" reason for liking literature, or falling in 
love, as being the biological reason, and calling any other account delusional. 
Richard Dawkins is often cited as being one such thinker, and although he 
explicitly denies this toward the start of The Selfish Gene ("I am not going to argue 
about whether people who behave altruistically are 'really' doing it for secret or 
subconscious selfish motives. Maybe they are and maybe they aren't, and maybe we can 
never know..." [4]), it is something implicit in his work in that it is the basis of his 
metaphorical inversion (it is the gene that is selfish, not the person), and the reason his 
books have attracted so much attention; and it is this aspect of the evolutionary 
perspective - the threat of determinism - that meets with the fiercest resistance from 
critics of the project. Whether or not this is something evolutionary psychologists are 
actually saying, it is something that they are thought to say, and something consistent 
with their accounts. 
There is a contradiction here, too. The first premise allows that man can override his evolutionary 
imperatives, but then Ridley seems to switch back to claim that this emancipation is only fondly 
imagined. But it is either emancipation or it isn't. To use Ridley's intentional language, if the genes "let 
us free," then their motives for doing so are rendered irrelevant, because they don't have the power 
anymore. 
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As Freud recognised,'^^ advocates of the delusion thesis find an ally in 
Schopenhauer, who relegated romantic love to the role of a trick used to dupe the 
species into reproducing. In Schopenhauer's view, "all love, however ethereally it may 
bear itself, is rooted in the sexual impulse alone" (3.339'*^). And, consonant with 
modem biology, this impulse - reproduction - is no less than "the ultimate goal of 
almost all human effort" (3.339). Schopenhauer's account has some striking parallels 
with the biologistic theories of behaviour offered by evolutionary theorists, but with 
none of Dawkins's reservations about whether the biologistic are the "real" reasons for 
our actions. So love is a way to "deceive our consciousness; for nature requires this 
stratagem to achieve its ends" (3.341). Deception is necessary because the job of 
reproducing the species is (like respiration or the regulation of the heartbeat) simply too 
important to be trusted to absent-minded consciousness and so nature, like capitalist 
marketing, makes an appeal to our reliable self-interest: 
nature can only achieve its ends by implanting a certain illusion in the 
individual, on account of which that which is only a good for the species 
appears to him as a good for himself, so that when he serves the species he 
imagines he is serving himself. (3.345-46) 
Although he calls love an "illusion," it is not clear that this is justified. It is important to 
recognise that Schopenhauer's identification of romantic love with a pragmatic end 
doesn't demand the elimination of love, any more than the identification of the cause of 
a pain (the doctor says it is a sprained ankle) would have any effect upon the felt 
intensity of that pain. Equally, learning that a pain is a certain type of neural activity in 
'^ ^ Freud was aware that he was not the first to suggest that we might not be the best reporters of our own 
mental lives, and credited Schopenhauer with being a significant forerunner, claiming that his 
"unconscious 'Will' is equivalent to the mental instincts of psycho-analysis" (Complete Works 17.143-
144). 
See 'The Metaphysics of the Love of the Sexes," The World As Will And Idea 3.336-375. 
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the brain doesn't, unfortunately, make that pain illusory.'^^ The explanation from a 
different level isn't "actually," but rather "also" the reason, and the apparent 
interference doesn't seem to occur. 
Lacking both Freud's unconscious and the Modem Synthesis vocabulary, 
Schopenhauer spoke not of "genes," but of "the genius of the species" - a hazily defined 
subconscious force that pushed human behaviour in directions that would benefit the 
species rather than the individual. Although the emphasis on species-level selection has 
since been rejected by orthodox evolutionary theory, Schopenhauer's delusion argument 
sits surprisingly easy alongside the rhetoric of the neo-Darwinists. Here is Ridley again, 
laying out the bones of his thesis in the opening pages of The Red Queen: "reproduction 
is the sole goal for which human beings are designed; everything else is a means to that 
end" (4). It is possible, of course, that Ridley (as a populariser) is only trying to attract 
browsers with such a line, and it is unlikely that many evolutionary theorists would 
assent to this statement without careful qualification (the kind of qualification which 
Ridley wil l devote the rest of his book to'^"). But the current here is toward 
downplaying the potency of conscious intention. I f we are not conscious of being 
controlled by our genes or by our unconscious mind, it must be because it is in the 
"interests o f the genes or the unconscious mind to conceal their influence from our 
conscious experience. Repeatedly, one reads references to being "worked through" and 
"manipulated by" and "tricked into." It is as if we are no longer in control. 
Yet there is something almost seductive about this sort of fatalistic determinism, 
too. Rather than see it as a loss of control, it can be switched around and seen as a 
release from responsibility. Martin Amis seems to be doing just this when, in his 
There is a chance that the situation is analogous with the identification of micro-organisms as the 
cause of disease: it is not in itself a cure, but may point the way for a cure. 
He immediately admits this to be "an astonishingly hubristic claim" but then says "[y]et I know of no 
other way that human nature can have developed" (4). 
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autobiography, he claims: "My respect for the unconscious continues to grow. ... 
Really, the conscious mind can afford to give itself a rest. The big jobs are done by the 
unconscious. The unconscious does it all" (Experience 80). This sort of resignation is 
precisely what Tallis was worried about: determinism becomes an excuse, another way 
in which things are not our fault, a dereliction of social and ethical duties. 
Equating a reduction in agency with a release from the existential pressure to 
choose and decide our own fate is an only dubiously praiseworthy consequence of 
decentring, and whilst Amis is probably quite serious when making claims for the 
power of the unconscious, it seems unlikely that in so doing he is advocating a collapse 
into the type of impotent fatalism experienced by the homuncular narrator of his Time's 
Arrow; condemned to simply watch events unfold and absolutely powerless over the 
body in which he finds himself. Freud, too, overstates his case when he claims that 
consciousness is no longer "master in its own house" (Complete Works 16.285). The 
conscious mind is not as enfeebled as Freud would have us believe (at the very most, 
following Freud's metaphor, the staff are occasionally disobedient). There are, however 
ways in which the reduction in the potency of consciousness and a more humble 
conception of our place in the universe can be seen as positive moves. The way Freud 
tells it, the decentring revolutions constitute attacks; wounding what he calls our "naive 
self-love," and effectively driving wedges between humanity and God. But it is equally 
possible to see them as historian Bruce Mazlish (following Jerome Bruner^^') suggests: 
namely, as continuities between man and nature. The further from God's favour we 
slide, the closer we come to a natural harmony: 
Mazlish, The Fourth Discontinuity. 3-4. Jerome Bruner, "Freud and the Image of Man." Partisan 
Review 23.3 (Summer 1956): 340-47. 
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In this version of the three historic smashings of the ego, humans are 
placed on a continuous spectrum in relation to the universe, to the rest of 
the animal kingdom, and to themselves. They are no longer discontinuous 
with the world around them. In an important sense, once humans are able 
to accept this situation, they are in harmony with the rest of existence. 
Indeed, the longings for a sense of "connection" seen in the early 
nineteenth-century romantics and all "alienated" beings are, unexpectedly, 
partially fulfilled. (4) 
Note that Mazlish sees this sort of materialism as sympathetic to Romanticism - a sharp 
contrast with Dennett, who sees scientific materialism as destructive of Romanticism; 
opening Consciousness Explained with a denial of the possibility of "'true love' - as i f 
this were some sort of distinct substance (emotional gold as opposed to emotional brass 
or copper)" (23). Mazlish's agenda is to remove what he calls "the fourth discontinuity" 
- the break between man and machine.'^^ Mazlish (like Boden) believes that silicon 
technology is soon to provide a demonstration that our mental powers are not unique: 
that the materialist claim that the mind is just another machine will receive the same 
near-universal assent as the Copemican claim that the earth is just another planet, and 
the Darwinian claim that man is just another animal. Reviewing Robert Jastrow's The 
Enchanted Loom (see 'The Perils of Hope" in An Urchin in the Storm, 208-215), 
Stephen Jay Gould embraces Mazlish's idea to add his voice to those calling for a 
recognition of our more humble place in nature: 
When you think on it, Mazlish's fourth discontinuity is much more in the spirit of Darwin and 
Copernicus than Freud - Mazlish's is really just a special case of materialism: recognising a continuum 
between the organic and the inorganic and between the mind and the brain. Freud's is an epistemological 
concern about the security of our self-knowledge, whereas Darwin and Copernicus's claims were more 
ontological; where are we? what are we like? 
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By forging a true discontinuity in the physical history of intelligence on 
earth, we may force ourselves to appreciate our own deep embeddedness in 
nature. Of course, any paleontologist knows that too deep an embedding 
can lead to oblivion. This, indeed, is the paradox we may soon face. (An 
Urchin in the Storm 215) 
The "oblivion" in question is a conceptual alteration: a gestalt shift in how we think of 
ourselves in relation to the universe - from figure to ground. This, Gould believes, is the 
consequence of accepting the decentrings. (It is passivity in the face of this oblivion that 
some commentators - like Tallis, above - have found pernicious inasmuch as it seems 
to encourage fatalism about our potential for change.) It is an idea that Gould would 
return to in an essay from 1990, "The Golden Rule: A Proper Scale for Our 
Environmental Crisis" (in Pojman 164-168). Once again, Gould draws upon his 
experience as a palaeontologist to resituate humanity in a more minor role. 
Here, Gould is analysing the claims made by environmental ethicists to the 
effect that the eco-system is fragile and at dire risk from humanity's unchecked and 
destructive spread, and that consequently, it falls to humanity to protect the 
environment, and (as the slogan says) "save the planet." Perhaps surprisingly for 
someone professionally concerned with the environment (but consistent with the drive 
to reduce the importance of humans), Gould attacks the claim that we are in a position 
to "save the planet," on the grounds that we could not destroy the world in the first 
place, dismissing the rationale behind these arguments as a monstrous arrogance: "Such 
views, however well intentioned, are rooted in the old sin of pride and exaggerated self-
importance. We are one among millions of species, stewards of nothing" ('The Golden 
Rule" 167). Gould's take on the problem of environmental damage is based upon his 
understanding of geological "deep time," which talks in terms of millions of years 
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rather than hours and seconds. Consequently, the existence of human beings becomes a 
far smaller fraction of the whole, and the importance of an individual life is sHvered to 
insignificance.'^^ 
Gould is well aware that deep time is not a useful way to think about 
environmental preservation, and this is why he talks instead of choosing the "proper 
scale": that we couldn't destroy all the bacterial life is not to say that we couldn't make 
the planet inhospitable to mammalian life. It is not supposed to be an argument for 
abandoning green policies and indulging again in reckless pollution.'^"* What it is 
supposed to be is a demonstration of how our interpretation of the scale and nature of a 
situation is dependant upon the scale we choose to view it from. 
Another trick with time - this one fictional, but no more comforting - is the 
perspective offered by the Tralfamadorians in Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five. 
Billy Pilgrim is a chaplain's assistant in the Second World War who, as Vonnegut has 
it, "came unstuck in time" (30). The Tralfamadorians see time omnisciently, making no 
distinction between tenses: 
Al l moments, past, present, and future, always have existed, always will 
exist. The Tralfamadorians can look at all the different moments just the 
way we can look at a stretch of the Rocky Mountains, for instance. They 
can see how permanent all the moments are, and they can look at any 
moment that interests them. It is just an illusion we have here on Earth that 
"We are virtually powerless over the earth at our planet's own geological time scale. All the 
megatonage of our nuclear arsenals yield but one ten-thousandth the power of the asteroid that might have 
triggered the Cretaceous mass extinction. Yet the earth survived that larger shock and, in wiping out the 
dinosaurs, paved the road for the evolution of large mammals, including humans" ('The Golden Rule" 
168). 
Gould is trying to puncture the overblown rhetoric of the environmentalist movement in the name of 
intellectual honesty, but it's not at all clear that this is a particularly responsible move. It seems a little 
perverse to talk down our impact upon the environment, when so many corporations and governments are 
looking for convenient excuses to bypass and ignore the environmentalists cutting into their profits. 
Selective quotations from Gould's article could provide just such excuses. 
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one moment follows another one, like beads on a string, and that once a 
moment has gone it is gone forever. (27) 
So time here is non-sequential, composed instead of a (presumably infinite) number of 
discrete moments. There are plus sides to this: dead bodies, for example, are only in a 
poor condition at this particular time, but at other moments, are healthy and happy (27). 
What the Tralfamadorian perspective inadvertently dissolves, however, is the possibility 
of change. For the Tralfamadorians, events are fixed like events in a novel. Readers 
avoid turning to the last pages to preserve the suspense, to discover how events unfold. 
In narrative fiction, sequence is a convention we willingly play-along with. For the 
Tralfamadorians, sequential time is just such a construct. So the relationship the 
Tralfamadorians have with time is much like the relationship we have with past events: 
everything has already happened, is known, and cannot be altered. As far as the 
Tralfamadorians are concerned, our future is always already someone else's past. Of 
course, the problem at the foot of this is determinism. (This has always been a vexing 
problem for theologians seeking to reconcile moral agency with God's omniscience -
either God knows what actions we are going to perform next, and therefore we have no 
choice but to perform them, and consequently, no responsibility for them, or else he 
doesn't know what is going to happen next, and is therefore not truly omniscient.) In 
conversation with one of the Tralfamadorians, Billy notices this apparent 
incompatibility: "You sound to me as i f you don't believe in free wi l l" : 
" I f I hadn't spent so much time studying Earthlings," said the 
Tralfamadorian, " I wouldn't have any idea what was meant by 'free wil l . ' 
I've visited thirty-one inhabited planets in the universe, and I have studied 
reports on one hundred more. Only on Earth is there any talk of free wi l l . " 
(86) 
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Vonnegut presents free will as something humans choose to believe in, as something at 
odds with how the physical universe actually is. The behaviour of characters in Billy's 
world is fixed in the same way that the behaviour of people in the past and characters in 
novels is fixed: everything is already on the page. 
As Vonnegut tells it, free will is a condition of there being a present tense, 
towards which events approach, and behind which they recede. This sounds as i f free 
will might be just a linguistic construct. In After Babel, George Steiner wonders i f this 
could be the case: 
The past-present-future axis is a feature of grammar which runs through 
our experience of self and being like a palpable backbone. The 
modulations of inference, of provisionality of conjecture, of hope through 
which consciousness "maps ahead" of itself, are facts of grammar. Does 
the past have any existence outside of grammar? ... No raw data from the 
past have absolute intrinsic authority. Their meaning is relational to the 
present, and that meaning is realized linguistically. Memory is articulated 
as a function of the past tense of the verb. (137-38) 
He goes on to point out that a phrase violating tense structure, like "it happened 
tomorrow" causes a discomforting "'nausea of the illogical' which is not the same as 
the imitation caused by a syntactic impossibility such as 'one men'" (138). Steiner 
seems to be implying here (a little too grandly, perhaps) that it is as if we intuitively 
recognise the plausibility of the Tralfamadorian account of time, but are prevented from 
experiencing it by the structure of our language, which, in turn, is a manifestation of 
some cognitive limit peculiar to human minds. 
Vonnegut's Billy came "unstuck" partly as a coping mechanism, as a way of 
understanding or coming to terms with the horrors of war. In a fully determined 
universe, all is as it should be, or rather, since, in the absence of alternatives, the 
normative force of "should" falls redundant, all is as it always has been. At one point, 
Billy asks how the universe will end, and the Tralfamamdorians calmly inform him that 
they blow it up, accidentally: 
" I f you know this," said Billy, "isn't there some way you can prevent it? 
Can't you keep the pilot from pressing the button?" 
"He has always pressed it, and he always wil l . We always let him, and 
always will let him. The moment is structured that way." (117) 
In Slaughterhouse-Five's autobiographical prelude, Vonnegut recalls telling a 
filmmaker of his intention to write an anti-war novel, to which the filmmaker had 
replied that he might as well write an anti-glacier novel (3). The point being that wars 
are inevitable, and the Tralfamadorian perspective is a way of flatly accepting the 
Dresden fire bombing (which so shocked Vonnegut in reality and Billy in the novel) as 
something that was always going to happen, or rather, had always happened. Once 
more, there is a collapse into fatalistic determinism, and it is this same collapse, this 
abdication of responsibility, that Martin Amis - partly inspired by Vonnegut - explores 
in Time's Arrow. 
The novel tells a life story backwards, opening with a man's death and closing 
with his birth. The central conceit is that Amis writes this in first person. The narrator 
has never known time to run anything but backwards, and so accepts this as the normal 
course of things. Much of the narrative is then given over to the confusions this reversal 
creates. By interfering with the tense structure in this manner, by making the known 
past someone's future. Amis effectively strips his narrator of control. The narrator is 
entirely powerless - he becomes a spectator of his own life, a sort of homunculus, 
passively riding around inside the head of his host; an American doctor called Tod 
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Friendly.'^^ The past to which the narrator is inexorably led finds him leaving America 
(as Tod arrives) and eventually arriving in Auschwitz, where he is (or rather. Tod has 
been) a Nazi doctor. As with Vonnegut's Tralfamadorian time, Amis's backwards world 
is perhaps a coping mechanism: a way of understanding what the subtitle of the book 
describes as 'The Nature of The Offence" - as if the scale of the atrocity violates known 
convention such that it cannot be approached or comprehended directly. 
The subtitle is also a reference to 'The Memory of the Offence," a chapter of 
Primo Levi's The Drowned and The Saved (11-21). (Levi is credited in Amis's author's 
note.) Tod Friendly's memory of the offence, like the memories Levi examines, is 
distorted, buried, and inaccessible to the narrator except in guilt dreams, which seem to 
him prophecies. The emergence of the narrator's consciousness at Tod's death can be 
seen as a forced re-examination: as i f Tod's conscience was so shocked that it travelled 
the path back again, struggling to understand how everything happened. 
Time's Arrow is an exercise in the narrative potential of determinism, in as 
much as it is all about not having any choice. Expanding upon the fatalism embedded in 
the cliche that all roads lead to Rome, for the narrator, working backwards against a 
causal web of choices, every route leads to the same conclusion. The phrase works on 
the rationale that the Romans built all the roads, and the logical corollary of that is 
simply that following any one road back to its origin will find you in Rome. The 
holocaust becomes an analogue of that; both for the narrator, and in the wider sense in 
which Amis is setting up the holocaust as an attractor towards which memory is drawn. 
It is possible to think of historical events as having a metaphorical gravity, and the 
gravity of the holocaust is such that all history sufficiently close behind and everything 
As the book moves back through time, 'Tod Friendly" emerges to be a pseudonym, one of several, 
culminating in his being called Odilo Unverdorben. Although there may be a sense in which Amis wants 
us to think of these as discrete selves, and question the identity of self over time, for clarity, I will refer to 
the host as Tod at all stages. 
282 
sufficiently far ahead gets drawn in. Just as Levi finds complicity in the deliberate 
silence of those living near the camps, it is as i f the surrounding time becomes 
complicit, too, implicated in the offence. It is a massive body, a black hole in memory, 
distorting our interpretation of the past, informing our view of the present. The narrator 
is drawn back into it, compacted into a child, eventually reduced to a singularity. 
Amis isn't the first to tell a life backwards. There have been short stories by 
science fiction writers, such as Phillip K. Dick and J. G. Ballard, where time is run 
backwards. It threatens to be a silly thing to do, and Salman Rushdie cautions his fellow 
writers against it in Shame: 
no, ends must not be permitted to precede beginnings and middles, even if 
recent scientific experiments have shown us that within certain types of 
closed system, under intense pressure, time can be persuaded to run 
backwards, so that effects precede their causes. This is precisely the sort of 
unhelpful advance of which storytellers must take absolutely no notice 
whatsoever; that way madness lies! (22) 
But of course, for the narrator, effects don't precede causes in Time's Arrow: there is 
still suspense, and the only certainty is the narrator's eventual death (albeit in birth), but 
that's a given for characters in conventional narrative, too. What Amis does is offer us a 
grand piece of dramatic irony with the joke on the narrator, who is the only one who 
doesn't realise what's happening. In terms of sense perception, of course, everything 
has a certain internal logic: unsupported bodies fall upwards, food is delivered in 
dustbins. Most things can be made to fi t , but the glitch is control; the causal power to 
influence events, to alter the environment, and of that, the narrator has and can have 
none. The determinisms here are manifold: there is the determinism of physics, the 
inversion of what Arthur Eddington had called "time's arrow," and the set term of our 
natural lives; that archaic sentence meted out to the condemned - but even here the term 
of a natural life has the peculiar property of being fixed: because, as the narrator 
realises, in a life whose end is birth there is no possibility of suicide. 
The germ of Time's Arrow seems to have been a short story from Amis's 1987 
collection Einstein's Monsters, "Bujak and the Strong Force: Or God's Dice" (27-48). 
Polish Bujak is an ex-strongman, now East End suburbanite with an interest in physics: 
Einsteinian to the end, Bujak was an Oscillationlist, claiming that the Big 
Bang will forever alternate with the Big Crunch, that the universe would 
expand only until unanimous gravity called it back to start again. At that 
moment, with the cosmos turning on its hinges, light would begin to travel 
backward, received by the stars and pouring from our human eyes. If, and I 
can't believe it, time would also be reversed, as Bujak maintained (will we 
move backward too? will we have any say in things?), then this moment as 
I shake hands wil l be the start of my story, his story, our story, and we will 
slip downtime of each other's lives, to meet four years from now.... 
(Einstein's Monsters 47) 
Four years later. Amis publishes Time's Arrow. Some of the important features of the 
later work are being asked about already. The parenthetic asides there: "(will we move 
backwards too? will we have any say in things?)" are questions Time's Arrow answers 
at length. It is as i f Amis, at the end of this story, is warming to his theme - we can 
almost sense him running with it, catching on to the import of this idea. 
There are also early signs here of Amis experimenting with the wordplay he will refine 
in Time's Arrow; with the ways in which some phrases can be turned over to make 
sense in both directions: a sort of logical palindrome, as when he realises "we will have 
our conversations, too, backing away from the same conclusion" (47). We can see here 
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the emergence of a construction that will become familiar in Time's Arrow - Amis here 
playing with the available figurative sense to be made of "backing away" - as in 
retreating from the conclusion because it is horrifying (in "Bujak," nuclear war; in 
Time's Arrow, the holocaust) and also logically; backing away from the conclusion 
through the premises, reverse engineering the initial axiom or postulate from the 
solution. 
To switch the register into chemistry, the idea of the elements of a solution 
spontaneously separating back into their component parts is a violation of the second 
law of thermodynamics - a classic demonstration, in fact, and one which the Victorian 
physicist James Clerk Maxwell used as a thought experiment: in a letter of 1870, 
Maxwell had said that the second law of thermodynamics "[h]as the same degree of 
truth as the statement that if you throw a tumblerful of water into the sea you cannot get 
the same tumblerful out again" (Laidler and Meiser 693-694). Which is to say, it is a 
statistical law. There is a chance that random motion would reassemble the tumbler of 
water, but the odds are infinitesimally small. It is not possible to unmix things - like the 
Tralfamadorian's resignation at the world's end, things done cannot be undone. 
Locked into his host, the narrator of Time's Arrow says: "It just seems to me 
that the fi lm is running backwards" (16). The second law of thermodynamics is the law 
that prohibits the f i lm from running backwards. Interestingly, it's also the law that Snow 
in his "Two Cultures" lecture suggested was so fundamental to the sciences as to be the 
equivalent of having read a work of Shakespeare's. There's a sense in which Amis can 
be seen to be demonstrating his scientific literacy on this point. But the second law is an 
appealing law for fiction writers, too, inasmuch as it is all about entropy, about the shift 
from order to chaos, and about how you can't put things back together again. Time's 
Arrow can be seen as meditation on the irreversibility of actions, what Richard Menke 
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calls "the thermodynamics of history" (Menke 959). In this respect. Amis's trapped and 
impotent homuncular narrator is also a metaphor for a sort of historical determinism, or 
at least, the feeling that we can do nothing to alter the course of events, that we are too 
insignificant to make a difference. The narrator resigns himself early: "Still, I 'm 
powerless, and can do nothing about anything. I can't make myself an exception" 
(Time's Arrow 16). It sounds like the guilty excuses people tell themselves for having 
not resisted. It sounds like a prompt for the title of another one of Levi's books: If Not 
Now, When?. The narrator's fatalism on this point is indicative of a greater determinism 
- that our own fates might be fixed. 
It is important not to miss the point behind the central conceit of Time's Arrow: 
time runs backwards here, but away from what? Frye spoke of how literary study is 
sometimes criticised for being a backward looking discipline, but that this is a hollow 
complaint, because of course we never do face the future, we face the past, moving 
backwards into the f u t u r e . A m i s takes this line in Time's Arrow: "When we drive, we 
don't look where we're going. We look where we came from" (30). If the narrator is 
facing the past, then (on his inverted timeline) it is important to think about what it is in 
the future that he is backing away from. There is a clue to this in the early stages of the 
book. The narrator, riding around inside Tod in New York is suddenly struck by the 
intricacy and the might of the city and what he calls the "notched pillars of the 
skyscrapers" (26): 
Jesus, how do cities get here? One can just about imagine the monstrous 
labours of the eventual demolition (centuries away, long after my time), 
and the eventual creation of the pleasant land - the green, the promised. 
"The preoccupation of the humanities with the past is sometimes made a reproach against them by 
those who forget that we face the past: it may be shadowy, but it is all that is there" (Anatomy 345). 
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But I 'm awfully glad I wasn't around for the city's arrival. It must have 
just lurched into life. It must have just lurched into life out of a great 
trodden stillness of dust and damp. (31) 
This passage assumes a new prominence in light of "Bujak" and Amis's dominant 
preoccupations at this time. Here is a description of what Amis sees as the inevitable 
apocalypse for our world (where time moves forwards): nuclear annihilation, the other 
holocaust of the book, just out of sight of the narrator. As terrible as the slow and 
careful holocaust which Amis is bom just after in 1949, is the sudden and catastrophic 
holocaust that his narrator arrives just before, and recedes away from. How sudden 
destmction seems, or as the narrator in his backwards world sees it: "Destmction - is 
difficult. Destmction is slow. Creation, as I said, is no trouble at all" (26); "Creation... 
is easy, is quick" (23 - ellipsis preserved). Flipping the narrative back: the holocaust is 
where we have come from, where we're going to is apocalypse. Amis, oscillationist, 
shuttles between holocausts. What Time's Arrow offers is a way of seeing the history of 
the second half of the twentieth century as bracketed by holocausts, one actual, 
documented, and one just out of sight, but (for Amis) as inevitable as the holocaust 
Time's Arrow moves toward. 
Just as Time's Arrow ends with Odilo's birth, at the close of "Bujak and the 
Strong Force," Amis briefly imagines the hulking Bujak tumed back into a child, weak 
again, and without his family, as he is at his life's end: "We cry at both ends of life 
while the doctor watches" (Time's Arrow 129) and, "then big Bujak shrinks, becoming 
the weakest thing there is, helpless, indefensible, naked, weeping" (48) - the symmetry 
of this infirmity prompting Amis to ask: "wil l that be easier to bear than the other way 
around?" (Einstein's Monsters 48). Amis seems to see our place in history - like the 
narrator's place in Time's Arrow - as trapped and determined. The fate that awaits us is 
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nuclear holocaust, but i f we back away from this conclusion (as he puts it), we end up in 
the other holocaust. It's Big Bang or Big Crunch. Either way, we are at the mercy of 
events outside of our control, and it is this sense of powerlessness in the face of history 
that Amis is so despairing about in the introduction to Einstein's Monsters, when he 
says that nuclear weapons "distort all life and subvert all freedoms. Somehow, they give 
us no choice" (Einstein's Monsters 2), and it is this same sense of powerlessness that he 
dramatises so effectively through the inversion of time's arrow. 
What Eddington was trying to convey when he talked of time's arrow was that, 
as regards the operations of the laws of physics, the orientation of time's arrow was 
irrelevant. That is, the equations of physics are reversible in principle, and the second 
law is why they are not reversible in practice. Both "Bujak" and Time's Arrow ask the 
same question: i f time went the other way, what difference would it make? Because for 
all the confusion our narrator's inversion engenders, there is a disturbing moral 
equivalency to the reversal of time's arrow. Tod is first bad, then good,'^^ which ever 
way you play the tape, things even out, and that's another sort of determinism. 
In this light, Time's Arrow can be seen as an almost cynical interpretation of the 
radical Laplacean claim that all physical events - including the behaviour of persons -
are subject to deterministic physical laws, that the future was set at the moment of the 
universe's conception. "God's Dice" - the subtitle of the Bujak story - refers to the 
absence of chance in the account of the universe promised from a matured science. 
Against such a universe, free-will looks like another anthropocentrism, as it did to 
Vonnegut's Tralfamadorians. As a complication of the principle that "ought implies 
To clarify this: the narrator feels that the work Tod does in his old age as a charitable doctor is bad 
(because charity = stealing from the needy, and doctoring = unpicking stitches and inflicting wounds), 
and that the work he does in the concentration camps is good: making a race of people out of ashes and 
populating Europe with them. In forwards-time: the work Tod does in his youth is bad and the work he 
does in his old age is good. If you reverse the arrow, morality is also reversed, so the effect is the same. 
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can," there is blamelessness in inevitability: the manipulation of time by both Vonnegut 
and Amis translates this inevitability to effect a voiding of moral responsibility (this 
being the collapse that Tallis was worried about). If things were always going to 
happen, then (in the important sense in which there was ever a difference between 
tenses) they have happened already. Guilt and morality are surplus to a deterministic 
universe. That this doesn't square with experience is precisely the tension that Vonnegut 
and Amis are exploiting; a tension between the mechanical, physical universe described 
by science, and the existential, lived-world of guilt and blame. 
The scientific perspective - or rather, those different perspectives inspired by or 
realised by or made possible by science - have the uncanny property of taking the 
individual perspective (and as importantly, intentionality) out of the picture. By seeing 
the threat humanity poses to the environment in geological time scales, Gould was able 
to minimise it. By seeing the Dresden fire bombings as events which had already 
happened and would always have happened, Vonnegut (or, at least, Billy Pilgrim) was 
able to void himself of dread and regret, and by reversing time's arrow. Amis was able 
to better explore what he described as "the nature of the offence." All three views -
Gould's deep time, Vonnegut's flat time, and Amis's backwards time - accept a 
diminished capacity for action. The question is: Does science offer these perspectives to 
choose from, or force them upon us? Does it become more "proper" to think in these 
scales and contexts rather than the scale of individuals and the context of our own lives? 
The problem here is choosing the appropriate scale. This is very similar to the 
central problem of Thomas Nagel's The View From Nowhere: "how to combine the 
perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective view of that same 
world, the person and his viewpoint included" (3). Nagel is concerned with reconciling 
the internal and the external, the subjective and the objective, acknowledging the 
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validity of both and without eliminating or giving epistemological priority to either. To 
this end, he sets the dilemma against terms similar to those used by the scientists when 
they talk of the indifference of nature: "From far enough outside my birth seems 
accidental, my life pointless, and my death insignificant, but from inside my never 
having been bom seems nearly unimaginable, my life monstrously important, and my 
death catastrophic" (Nagel 209). It's a relatively straightforward point being made, but 
one surprisingly easy to miss. There is a disjunction between what the scientists claim in 
their professional capacity (to maintain Fish's terminology) and how they behave in 
their everyday lives. It's a safe bet that Dawkins and Weinberg do not think themselves 
so insignificant that they would not attach considerable value to their own lives, or 
(hopefully) to the lives of fellow humans. This is not meant facetiously, but just to 
underline how often the point is overlooked that the universal scale is not necessarily 
the correct scale for thinking about all situations. 
When scientists say things like this, they are likely just talking tough, displaying 
through this sort of bravado their commitment to the mechanistic-end of the materialist 
worldview. (It's what Richard Rorty pointedly calls "all this masochistic talk about 
hardness and directness" ["Texts and Lumps" ORT 81]). But it is important not to make 
the mistake of assuming that because they are correct when they say that the universe is 
indifferent to us that our interest in the "merely human" is somehow less worthy. 
More sensitive to this than some of the brasher voices, Richard Feynman 
confronted the same issue when talking about hierarchies. Given the variety of 
vocabularies available, and aware that each stratum captures a different kind of subject 
matter, Feynman climbs gradually from the physical up to the metaphysical: 
And going on, we come to things like evil, and beauty, and hope... 
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Which end is nearer to God; if I may use a reUgious metaphor. Beauty and 
hope, or the fundamental laws? I think that the right way, of course, is to 
say that what we have to look at is the whole structural interconnection of 
the thing; and that all the sciences, and not just the sciences but all the 
efforts of intellectual kinds, are an endeavour to see the connections of the 
hierarchies, to connect beauty to history, to connect history to man's 
psychology, man's psychology to the working of the brain, the brain to the 
neural impulse, the neural impulse to the chemistry, and so forth, up and 
down, both ways. And today we cannot, and it is no use making beheve 
that we can, draw carefully a line all the way from one end of this thing to 
the other, because we have only just begun to see that there is this relative 
hierarchy. 
And I do not think either end is nearer to God. (The Character of Physical 
Law 125, ellipsis preserved) 
So Feynman shares Wilson's desire to see consilience, but without Wilson's 
eliminativism. Feynman is adamant on this, maintaining that "to stand with evil and 
beauty and hope, or to stand with the fundamental laws, hoping that way to get a deep 
understanding of the whole world, with that aspect alone, is a mistake" (125-26). The 
view from one level doesn't invalidate other levels so long as it continues to capture 
something unique; that is, something invisible to the other levels - as atoms are 
invisible to humans, and aesthetics are invisible to (or rather, simply do not exist for) 
chemicals. Feynman's ambivalence on which end is closer to God reflects a more 
sophisticated conception of the problem of scale, one closer to Nagel's worries. The 
question being asked is where our (intellectual) commitments should really lie - with 
the personal (the internal, the subjective, the anthropocentric, the indulgent), or with the 
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universal (the external, the objective, the humble), and how best to think of ourselves in 
light of the information science offers about our place in the universe. 
In The Information (1995), Amis takes on the same problem, but as it intersects 
with and impacts upon the place of the novel against science's ever-widening backdrop. 
The question of how important we really are assumes a new relevance in these terms. 
The novel, i f you take Ian Watt's line, is primarily concerned with an almost absolute 
anthropocentrism, that is, the indulgent immersion in the consciousness of not just 
mankind, but one man. Scientifically literate. Amis exploits the available scales to 
recast apparently important events as inconsequential, and apparently trivial events as 
having massive consequences: 
And just by dropping his head like that Richard was changing his temporal 
relationship with the quasars by thousands and thousands of years. He really did. 
Because the quasars are so far away and getting further away so fast. This is to 
put Richard's difficulties in context. The context of the universe. (163-64) 
Whilst an available scale, this is obviously not the appropriate scale: it is a clumsy 
language for trying to understand human action. Amis is well aware of this, and it 
becomes a way of mocking his protagonist, Richard Tull. 
Tull is an eminently dislikeable character. A writer of serious and difficult 
fiction, he is intensely bitter about the commercial and critical success of fellow writer 
and old friend, Gywn Barry, whose Utopian fable Amelior enjoys a level of praise 
inexplicable to Tull. Much of the novel follows Tull's jealousy; through various revenge 
plots and attempts to come to terms with Gwyn's success by undercutting the critical 
standards of the establishment. These latter segments involve minimising Gwyn's 
success by recasting it in progressively wider contexts. Tull's jealously centres on what 
he sees as the parochialism of Gwyn's writing. By seeing Gwyn in the context of his 
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importance to the universe, Tull finds he is able to make him and his novel appear petty 
and useless. 
Recast in the context of the universe, the joke is on Tull: his criticism is too 
strong, the universal scale is simply too big - it makes everything seem unimportant. 
This was what Gould was trying to poke at when he talked about our inability to wipe 
out life on earth: deep time is the wrong perspective for assessing our impact upon the 
environment. At the other end of the scale, it is the same point Putnam was making 
when he argued that the atomic account was a an unworkable and effectively useless 
way of explaining why square pegs won't pass through round holes. Tull's work, as 
much as Barry's, ends up appearing parochial and irrelevant. It becomes clear that 
against the universal scale, it is difficult to find anything that isn't parochial. Amis 
wonders throughout the book about what all "the information" is leading up to, what 
conclusions we should draw from recognising our diminished potency in an indifferent 
universe, finally deciding: 
The information is nothing. Nothing: the answer to so many of our 
questions. What wil l happen to me when I die? What is death anyway? Is 
there anything I can do about that? Of what does the universe primarily 
consist? What is the measure of our influence within it? What is our span, 
in cosmic time? What will our world eventually become? What mark will 
we leave - to remember us by? (452) 
But then we are forced to recognise that nothing - not love, not tragedy, not war -
matters at the cosmological scale. In what has been a recurrent theme throughout this 
study, we find Amis confronting the problem of how best to situate ourselves. Clearly 
the universal is the wrong language for trying to capture human behaviour. It's too 
massive, too imprecise. 
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Imprecision is not always accidental. Dawkins recalls how a fellow zoologist 
would make the claims that "to a first approximation all species are insects" (Climbing 
Mount Improbable 97). A little more counter-intuitively, Gould recalls a colleague who 
would open lectures with the line: "To a first approximation, all species are extinct" 
("The Golden Rule" 166). Steven Pinker makes a similar claim for language, citing 
Chomsky's argument that "aside from their mutually unintelligible vocabularies," a 
visiting Martian would to a first approximation conclude that "Earthlings speak a single 
language" (The Language Instinct 248). First approximation is sufficient to demonstrate 
group similarity, but it is often too broad a category to offer useful information - the 
generalisation clips too much detail; as i f we were to claim: "To a first approximation, 
everything is brown," or, "To a first approximation, I never go to sleep." Similarly, the 
universal offers a hopeless binary, becomes either the universe or the everyman (against 
a solipsistic "me"). As Gould warned, the perspective of the universal results in an 
oblivion. Man has become ground, and the figure is the whole universe upon which he 
was previously set and against which he is now indistinguishable; or rather, to adopt 
Mazlish's continuity thesis, figure and ground are no longer instructive (or valid) ways 
to separate man from environment. 
With the parochial being something unavoidable, it falls to Amis to select from 
the available scales one able to offer some sort of comfort from the strange and modem 
isolation that comes from being absorbed and camouflaged in this manner. The horrible 
realisation for Tull is that this type of comfort is precisely what the homely 
parochialism of Gwyn Barry's novels offer: "So that's what you'd have to do. That's 
what you have to do, to make it all new again. You'd have to make the universe feel 
smaller" (437). And this Gwyn achieves by an inversion of Tull's decentring 
perspective: 
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Of course, in Gywn's novels, there wasn't much talk of astronomy. There 
was talk of astrology. And what was astrology? Astrology was the 
consecration of the homocentric universe. Astrology went further than 
saying that the stars were all about us. Astrology said the stars were all 
about me. (437) 
The return to astrology (and by extension all things New Age) constitutes a flight from 
the indifference of scientific rationalism. In addition, it allows people to reconcile the 
universal with the individual: astrology accepts the cosmologist's account of an 
inconceivably vast universe, but perverts the data to its own ends, these being the 
elevation of the human. It lifts the individual out of the background, repairing and 
reinflating the ego after the successive woundings Freud spoke of. It also promises a 
means of reintroducing the hero to literature (a hero being something quite absent from 
The Information), and Amis/TuU makes reference to Frye's theory that the history of 
Western literature sees an ever-decreasing heroism in its protagonists. 
Frye's theory of modes - one of the conceptual organising principles he saw 
behind the history of literature, and the first essay of the Anatomy - says that fictions 
"may be classified, not morally, but by the hero's power of action, which may be greater 
than ours, less, or roughly the same" (33). He explains that using this standard, we can 
sort fictions into a matrix comprising: 
1. myth, where the protagonist is "superior in kind both to other men and to the 
environment of other men" (33) - divine beings, gods, etc. 
2. romance, where the protagonist is "superior in degree to other men and his 
environment" (33) - human but heroic; folk heroes, etc. 
3. high mimetic, where the protagonist is "superior in degree to other men but not 
to his natural environment" (33-34) - human leaders, kings, etc. 
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4. low mimetic, where the protagonist is "superior neither to other men nor to his 
environment" (34) - one of us. 
5. ironic, where the protagonist is "inferior in power or intelligence to ourselves" 
(34) - a villain or peasant. 
Frye notes that it is possible to "see that European fiction, during the last fifteen 
centuries, has steadily moved its centre of gravity down the list" (34). 
What Amis does is to map Frye's theory of modes over the history of scientific 
decentrings described above, pairing writers with their contemporaries in the sciences, 
seeing the shift Frye recorded in the history of the decreasing power of protagonists as 
running parallel to the history of the decreasing power of man in the face of an 
(epistemologically and, as Hubble would show, literally) expanding universe. Amis's 
Richard Tull explains his plan for "a big bold book he never wrote called The History of 
Increasing Humilation" (435):'^^ 
literature, Richard said, describes a descent. First, gods. Then demigods. 
Then epic became tragedy: failed kings, failed heroes. Then the gentry. 
Then the middle class and its mercantile dreams. Then it was about you ... 
: social realism. Then it was about them: lowlife. Villians. The ironic age. 
And he was saying, Richard was saying: now what? Literature, for a while. 
''^ It seems safe to assume that Amis has not come to the same conclusion independently: there is 
evidence that Amis is familiar with Frye - in the introduction to his selected essays and reviews, The War 
Against Cliche, Amis recalls having discussions about literary criticism in the early 1970s, citing Frye's 
work as one of the topics (xi). There is even a chance that Amis heard these ideas firsthand - in a letter to 
Kingsley reprinted in his autobiography. Experience (231-32, dated, vaguely, as "July? 1971?"), Martin 
mentions that he is attending a series of seminars given by Frye at Oxford. Although the "History of 
Increasing Humiliation" is presented as Richard Tull's (and the debt to Frye unacknowledged), it seems 
probable that Amis also subscribes. In an essay from 1994 (a year before The Information is published), 
Amis can be found offering the theory in his own name. Responding to a writer who has recorded a 
downward trajectory of heroism in cinema over the second half of the twentieth century, Amis points out 
that the trend is much wider than just cinema: "literature ... has been following exactly the same graph 
line for two thousand years" (note that Amis has five hundred on Frye). He goes on to say: "If art has an 
arrow, then that is the way it points: straight downward, from demigod to demirep" (The War Against 
Cliche 15). 
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can be about us ... : about writers. But that won't last long. How do we 
burst clear of all this? And he asked them: whither the novel? (435-36) 
Tull's fear - and, it seems fair to infer, Amis's - is that the importance of the novel 
seems to find itself bound up with and contingent upon the importance of the individual. 
After Ian Watt's The Rise of the Novel, Amis seems to be speculatively charting 
its decline. Watt saw that ascent as bound up with a shift in the early eighteenth century 
toward individualist thinking: 
The novel's serious concern with the daily lives of ordinary people seems 
to depend upon two important general conditions: the society must value 
every individual highly enough to consider him the proper subject of its 
serious literature; and there must be enough variety of belief and action 
among ordinary people for a detailed account of them to be of interest to 
other ordinary people, the readers of novels. (60) 
But i f the novel is a form tied to documenting the lives of the ordinary people, then it 
starts already low on the Hst of modes, and can only slide down. This is something 
Amis accepts as inevitable, writing elsewhere (and a year before the publication of The 
Information): " I f art has an arrow, then that is the way it points: straight downward, 
from demigod to demirep" (The War Against Cliche 15). As the universe and what we 
know of it gets bigger, the importance of the individual (and more generally, mankind's 
role) diminishes. Amis/Tull even speculates that scientific understanding is not riding 
benignly behind the ever-decreasing potency of literary protagonists, but actively 
displacing them: "supposing that the progress of literature (downwards) was forced in 
that direction by the progress of cosmology (upwards - up, up). For human beings, the 
As a typical example. Watt says: "the novel is surely distinguished from other genres and from 
previous forms of fiction by the amount of attention it habitually accords both to the individualisation of 
its characters and to the detailed presentation of their environment" (17-18). 
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history of cosmology is the history of increasing humiliation" (The Information 436). 
Those same blows to humanity's importance that Freud saw himself capping off are 
seen now as causal in the simultaneous demotion of the importance of the humanities. It 
is as if Amis is suggesting that modem science, far from endorsing Frye's tentative 
system for a science of criticism, has invalidated it. It is as i f science has so changed our 
world as to make redundant the patterns traditionally used to organise literature. In this 
scientific age, it is as if Frye's "conceptual centre" cannot hold. 
Early in the book. Amis interrupts his narrative to directly address us in one of 
the many short lectures on literary theory (often voiced through Tull, but there are 
lectures on other subjects, too) offered throughout the novel: "Consider. The four 
seasons are meant to correspond to the four principal literary genres. [...] Close this 
book for a minute and see if you can work it out: which season corresponds to which 
genre. It's obvious really. Once you've got comedy and tragedy right, the others follow" 
(52). Amis again follows Frye's Anatomy^"" here, in according summer to romance, 
autumn to tragedy, winter to satire, and spring to comedy. But then Amis returns these 
correlations back to the real seasons, as opposed to how the seasons are meant to be, 
and finds that the mapping doesn't work: "Something had gone wrong with summer" 
(52) he writes, and this becomes a way of saying: something had gone wrong with 
romance. 
From here, he maps back again, as i f these relations were concrete - fixed and 
interdependent: "We keep waiting for something to go wrong with seasons. But 
something has already gone wrong with the genres. They have all bled into one another. 
'^^  In Frye's "theory of mythos," comprising the third essay of his Anatomy, genres are allotted to 
seasons. Amis uses the pattern of the Anatomy rather than simply Frye's pattern, because, as discussed 
earlier, Frye is inconsistent with his allocation, in 1951 Frye linked the genre of romance with Spring, and 
comedy with Summer. By the publication of the Anatomy six years later, these had been inverted. So it 
isn't that obvious, even to Frye. 
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Decorum is no longer observed" (53). In the gradual dissolution of clear seasonal 
breaks. Amis sees a corresponding dissolution of the literary genres. It is unclear 
whether he thinks that the breakdown of literary genres is affecting the seasons, or if the 
absence of clear seasonal boundaries is affecting our ability to keep separate the genres. 
It may be that Amis feels that the system Frye saw as a means of organising 
Westem literature simply no longer holds, and that the seasonal tropes have lost much 
of their relevance in an increasingly technologised society insulated from the natural 
rhythms upon which it was previously dependent. The industrial revolution, the ease of 
intemational trade, the efficiency of agriculture and climate-controlled interior 
environments have all contributed to a diminution in our awareness of seasonal change. 
It might be snowing outside, but the food we eat is the same, and the temperature inside 
(where we spend most of our time) remains a constant 20°C. It is as if our scientific and 
technological age demands a new model for organising our genres; it is as i f the 
seasonal tropes are too geocentric, and, like Gywn Barry's novels, too parochial. 
Towards the end of the book. Amis reintroduces the seasonal analogy ("It was 
spring, season of comedy." [479]), then self-consciously wonders i f this novel will 
manage to f i t the scheme: "But we haven't had much luck with our seasons. Not yet, 
anyway. We did satire in summer, and comedy in autumn, and romance in winter" 
(479). It is as i f Amis is questioning his own ability as a narrator to remain obedient to 
the conventions. In doing so, he is alerting us to how artificial those conventions have 
become.^ *" I f he thinks the seasonal analogy doesn't work, he can refute it by 
deliberately not using it, or by revising it. To this end, he can be found tentatively 
One of the conditions for Frye's schema was that they were being acted upon unconsciously: the 
anatomy was never intended to be prescriptive - it was diagnosis, not direction. In the hands of authors 
familiar with the theory, there is a risk of manipulation, although the risk is all to the validity of the 
theory. Perhaps this is just another way in which criticism cannot be a predictive science. Frye might want 
to treat the author like an object, by the author will always react like a subject. 
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suggesting a new model: one drawn not from direct experience, but from the findings of 
cosmology. 
As part of his effort to shift our perspective from the parochial to the universal, 
or rather, to recognise the implications of effecting such a shift. Amis says it might help 
i f we knew 1) where we are 2) where we are going 3) what we are made of. He then 
answers these questions in astronomical terms: so "where we are" becomes an address 
of increasing generality ("This or that street, .. .This or that country. The Earth, The 
Superior Planets," and so on up to "The Universe" [64]), "where we are going" is given 
in terms of orbits and galactic movements ("Astronomically, everything is always 
getting further away from everything else." [65]), and "what we are made o f is stars 
"that explode when they die" (65). Maintaining this dislocation from more familiar 
ways of thinking of our situation, he goes on to talk of how "we are warmed and 
hatched and raised by a steady-state H-bomb, our yellow dwarf: a second-generation 
star on the main sequence" (65). The main sequence is a diagonal cluster on the 
Hertzsprung-Russell (HR)-diagram, which is a scatter-graph used by astronomers as a 
method of indexing stars by luminosity and surface temperature. By talking of our sun 
as if it were just another star (as astronomers do), Amis is again inviting us to 
acknowledge our normality and the typicality of our part of space. He returns to the 
subject of yellow dwarves later in the novel, punning fairly crudely on the double-
referent: "Where I live there's a yellow dwarf I keep seeing... . She is young and yellow 
and less than four feet tall" (124). His description here is literal, but (bluntly) alerts us to 
where the lateral move into metaphor will be coming from.^"^ So we have the "half-
Asian, half-Carribean, pale-eyebrowed, white lashed" (124) dwarf, but Amis wants us 
There is, of course, a yellow dwarf visible from where he lives, and all the talk of astronomy leads the 
reader into assuming he is talking technically of the sun. The passage resolves itself only when he gives 
her physical description, and he then switches between registers. 
300 
to encourage his readers to think of her not as an individual, but as a type. To this end, 
he shifts from the specific to the general: 'The yellow dwarf is not exotic. Yellow 
dwarves are not exotic" (125). Of course, "yellow dwarves" understood as four-foot-tall 
Asian-Caribbean people are surely hard to come by, and by this standard, exotic; so it's 
clear that referent has shifted now. Amis proceeds to shuttle back and forth between star 
and human, threading analogies between them.^ *^ ^ 
The main point of this seems to be in pursuing the possibilities for grading types 
of people into types of stars. It is as i f Amis is suggesting the HR-diagram of the 
(Copemican) universe as a substitute for the worn-out (largely Ptolemaic) tropes that 
Frye had chosen to work with. But such a revision here was perhaps anticipated by 
Frye, who was well aware that those patterns in literature that mapped so well onto the 
idealised seasons and heavens of the medieval age fit the real world less closely. Frye's 
fondness for the neatness of that correspondence is such that he is unwilling to abandon 
the old system altogether, and thinks he may have a means of preserving it. Recognising 
that cosmology probably has more in common with poetry than it does with descriptive 
science, "the thought suggests itself that symmetrical cosmology may be a branch of 
myth" (Anatomy 161). He explains that "[i]t has long been noticed that the Ptolemaic 
universe provides a better framework of symbolism, with all the identities, associations, 
and correspondences that symbolism demands, than the Copemican one does" (161). He 
even suggests that the ancient version of cosmology was never more than a literary 
device: "Perhaps it not only provides a better framework of poetic symbols but is one, 
or at any rate becomes one after it loses its validity as science, just as Classical 
mythology became purely poetic after its oracles had ceased" (161). Inapplicable within 
For example, the prohibitions on staring at the sun or staring at the congenitally deformed: "I will 
never be able to meet the eye of the yellow dwarf. Its stare will never soften; its defiance will be always 
be absolute" (125). 
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the sciences, Frye sees no reason why the Ptolemaic system shouldn't still function as 
an organising principle for literature: it is, after all, the intuitively correct account of 
heavenly motion. He seems almost nostalgic for a time when the Ptolemaic universe 
held: and why shouldn't he? After all, i f he is right, its existence is testament to a 
society which values the literary over the scientific. That's not the world he finds 
himself in now (and here we see one of the reasons behind his desire to scientise 
literature). 
Amis's position seems to be that we perhaps can update it, that there may yet be 
a way to reconcile the anthropocentrism necessary to sustain the humanities with the 
apparent indifference of a scientific universe. So is Amis trying to rope the Copemican 
universe into the service of the poets? With the old systems of organisation used by 
Frye rendered invalid, Amis's reworking suggests that it may still be possible to employ 
the new cosmology as model and metaphor. Exploring these, he contrasts the banality of 
yellow dwarves with the possibilities: '^^ '^  
She is ordinary, in the big picture. Who will ever tell her? She is ordinary. 
Not like the other stars of the street. Not like the red giant flailing and 
falling under the overpass, not like the black hole behind the basement 
window, not like the pulsar on the roundabout in the deserted playground. 
(125) 
In thinking of people as stars. Amis is surely also referring back to the literal truth of 
this, based upon his previously having informed us that all matter was produced in 
stellar explosions, in "stars that explode when they die" (65). So some of the yellow 
^* Of course, it's worth realising that if you push the analogy, it collapses: stars do not remain stationary 
on the HR-diagram, but travel along the main sequence over time: yellow dwarves can become red giants. 
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dwarf (person) used to be a yellow dwarf (star): he is drawing attention to the 
continuities that Mazlish spoke of, of the inseparability of mankind from the universe. 
What we have arrived at is the central premise of scientific materialism: all 
things - animals, planets, stars, brains and their minds - are made of the same building 
blocks, the same elementary particles, and can ultimately, in principle, be understood 
through an understanding of those elementary particles. In tracing a path from the 
secure anthropocentrism of the ancient world to the vertiginous sense of irrelevance we 
first feel in the face of Einstein's universe. Amis finds not a dislocation, but an almost 
complete continuity: materialism unifies all matter. 
If Frye wanted to stop with the anthropocentric myth-science of Ptolemaic 
cosmology, then Amis wants to push all the way forwards to Einstein's relativity, 
because in the Einsteinian universe, the individual again assumes a curious centrality. 
Einstein's relativity theory says there is no absolute frame of reference, and in this 
sense, it is the ultimate decentring, but the flip-side of there being no centre is that 
everywhere is the centre: Einstein's contribution to the decentrings is to dissolve the 
sense behind the very idea of a centre. Relativity puts us back in the middle of the 
universe, but on the condition that being in the centre means nothing, is particular to 
each observer. So the shift Amis is registering in his calibrating the collapse of the hero 
with the ascent of science ultimately returns to a centrality of the individual, albeit on 
the egalitarian condition that everyone shares it equally, and the centrality that science 
returns to us is a curiously washed-out version: we can be just as important as the stars, 
but only because we are as irrelevant. 
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Conclusion 
Tessellation Patterns 
That Amis's attempt to understand the information should arrive at this 
continuity between man and the material world is in some ways expected. The lesson 
from science - because the information is always scientific information - is that i f we 
are going to take seriously the materialist thesis then we must be prepared to accept that 
if it explains stars and atoms (and what they do) then it also explains humanity (and 
what humans do). Given this, and working with an account that sees the identity of a 
discipline decided by the subject matter it studies, then at first sight it doesn't make 
sense to maintain a distinction between what is covered by the humanities and what is 
covered by the sciences: the former was always a subset of the latter, and any apparent 
separation was an illusion caused by science's previously lacking a vocabulary for 
talking about the subject matter of the humanities. Properly considered, everything 
could be covered by the sciences, and the humanities would be superfluous, vestigial 
disciplines. 
That, of course, was the rationale behind Wilson's drive for unity. It comes as 
something of a surprise that Consilience ends not with a design for how the academy 
might be restructured so as to facilitate his plan for unified study, but with a polemic on 
the importance of environmental protection, making dire predictions for the future of 
humanity i f we fail to recognise the fragility of the ecosystem. Reviewing the book, 
Tzvetan Todorov complained that this final section was tacked on, and had nothing to 
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do with the rest of the project?"^ But in one sense, i f Wilson is even halfway right in all 
that has come before, then it has everything to do with the project. Consilience is 
Wilson's account of what he thinks would happen i f everyone adopted scientific 
materialism. That is, the unification of the disciplines is not so much Wilson's aim but 
what he sees as an inevitable consequence of recognising the situation (or perhaps, 
"situatedness") of humans in the natural world. From Sociobiology onward, Wilson's 
argument has always been that man is within nature, not external to it, and certainly not 
above it. Behind the physics imperialism, his call, finally, is for humility. 
This is much the same conclusion that Levi-Strauss drew from his work with the 
indigenous civilisations of the South American forests, and what he perceived as their 
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symbiotic relationship to nature, in contrast to Western civilisation's destructive 
parasitism. Levi-Strauss's particular take on the continuity between man and nature 
picks up on how the etiquette of table manners in Western civilisation reveals a 
conception of humanity as clean and the natural world as dirty, in marked contrast to the 
South American Indians, who, as Jose Merquior explains, "behave on the assumption 
that man smears the world: whilst we use cutlery and canned food to protect our meals 
from infection, they think it is the world that needs protection against our activity" 
(106). Levi-Strauss explicitly links this to an increased ecological awareness, 
concluding that "correct behaviour, is to be found ... in deference towards the world -
good manners consisting precisely in respecting its obligations" (The Origin of Table 
Manners 507). The "Moral of Myths" (496-508) offers us "a lesson in humility which, it 
is to be hoped, we may still be capable of understanding": 
205 "Wilson's last chapter is a convincing cry of alarm about the dangers of genetic technology, over-
population, and the destruction of the ecosystem, but it bears no visible relation to the rest of the work" 
(Todorov, "The Surrender to Nature" 29). 
By symbiosis, I mean the vernacular sense of mutually beneficial cooperation, what is sometimes 
called "social mutualism" or "parabiosis"; to distinguish from parasitism, which is also a form of 
symbiosis, but not the sense intended. 
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In the present century, when man is actively destroying countless living 
forms, ... it has probably never been more necessary to proclaim, as do the 
myths, that sound humanism does not begin with oneself, but puts the 
world before self interest: and that no species, not even our own, can take 
the fact of having been on this earth for one or two million years ... as an 
excuse for appropriating the world as if it were a thing and behaving on it 
with neither decency nor discretion. (508 - closing words) 
But although Merquior is clearly sympathetic to the general direction of such an 
argument - describing Levi-Strauss's as "a wise and useful warning against mindless, 
ruthless forms of economic and technological drives, well in tune with the growing 
consciousness of our duties toward mother nature" (105) - he suspects that this 
endorsement of the Indians has as much to do with tacitly condemning the attitudes of 
the West. Susan Sontag describes Levi-Strauss's position in Tristes Tropiques as a 
"heroic, diligent, and complex modem pessimism" (Against Interpretation 81, and qtd 
in Merquior, From Prague To Paris 104). Merquior says that Levi-Strauss's position is 
pessimistic, but not heroic: 
I fail to see where lies the heroism of such an outlook. By that I do not 
mean, of course, that Professor Claude Levi-Strauss ... is defective in any 
moral dimension. Al l I am saying is that his worldview speaks of 
detachment and despondency, not of resistance and defiance. Like 
Schopenhauer, he is not a heroic thinker, but a subtle master of 
renunciation. (104) 
The pessimism in question is Levi-Strauss's attitude toward man's place in nature; the 
renunciation is of control (hence the comparison with Schopenhauer). The heroism that 
Sontag detects here is just that willingness to relinquish privilege, and insofar as this 
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secession sees mankind reduced to the level of animals, then it is also pessimistic, 
because - in line with Schopenhauer, Freud, and the evolutionary psychologists - it 
leaves our sphere of agency (and so our capacity for right action) reduced. What 
Merquior sees as "the spectacle of a first-rate writer indulging in one of the favourite 
games of contemporary intellectuals: kick the West, bash modernity, down with 
progress" (106), we ought instead to see as an attack on our acceptance of the biological 
imperative to indefinitely better our conditions, at any price. This is an attack on 
progress only insofar as progress entails environmental destruction. 
Wilson and Levi-Strauss both argue from a recognition of material continuity 
between man and nature to a position that advocates a more humble relationship 
between man and nature. James Rachels made exactly the same move when he 
demanded a revision of our view of the natural world as a proper response to 
Darwinism. For Rachels (picking up Richard Ryder's concept of "speciesism"), 
anthropocentrism is not simply awkward ideological baggage; it is another type of 
prejudice, analogous to (and as insidious as) sexism and racism. The prohibition on 
anthropomorphism from the sciences collapses the figure and ground relationship of 
man superimposed upon and qualitatively superior to his environment into a new model 
which has man inside and part of his environment: a product of natural processes and 
subject to natural constraints. 
What apparently happens, if this line of thought is pursued long enough, is that 
humans start to seem increasingly awkward: humans become an aberration, they don't 
fi t in anywhere; both within and above nature, we are outsiders. The broader sphere of 
the Darwinian world reintegrates with our person-centred world in such a way as to 
demand a shake-up of our value system. Out of this come two strands of environmental 
concern, sometimes called the Shallow and the Deep Ecological movements. The 
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Shallow movement advocates the preservation of environment and the conservation of 
natural resources with a view to the well being of present and future generations. In 
other words, it is a way of saying that the earth and its contents are here for our 
consumption, but now recognising that those resources are finite, and so, in the interests 
of human welfare, ought to be used considerately. The concern here is not for the 
environment, but for the persons for whom the environment is important. To the extent 
that environmental preservation is an instrumental rather than intrinsic good, it is an 
anthropocentric view.^ *'^  
The Deep Ecology movement, initiated by Norwegian philosopher Ame Naess 
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in the 1970s, seeks to replace the image of "man-in-environment" with a relational 
image. Naess calls this "biospherical egalitarianism" - a dissolution of the master-slave 
relationship implied by the shallow view ("The Shallow and the Deep..." 103). 
Typically, the Deep Ecology movement sees natural diversity as an intrinsic good, 
rather than an instrumental good for humanity. The Deep movement rejects the idea that 
"'Resource' means resource for humans" in favour of the idea that "'Resource' means 
resource for living beings" (106). The value of the environment is accordingly 
"independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes" (Bill 
Devall and George Sessions, in Pojman 115). 
What is crucial is that these distinctions turn on how important humans are. 
What this reflects is the decentring project of science being turned upon environmental 
ethics. The disdain displayed by the scientists for anthropocentric accounts (as a move 
consistent with the historical trajectory of science) is embraced by the environmentalists 
It is also the view usually endorsed by those mainstream pohticians who take an interest in the 
environment. Al Gore, for example, rejects Deep Ecology precisely on the grounds that it is "anti-
humanistic." See Gore's The Earth In Balance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992) and the essay 
"Dysfunctional Civihsation" in Pojman 473-482. 
Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecological Movement" in Pojman 102-104. 
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who find themselves with a convenient rationale to support their long-held intuition that 
the environment must not be wilfully destroyed. They speak of "biocentrism" to draw 
attention to precisely this contrast. So the block on anthropocentrism is no longer just an 
efficient means of displaying affinity with the sciences, it is also - as Wilson, Levi-
Strauss, Rachels, and the Deep Ecologists have it - an ethical statement of humility. 
After scientific materialism, there seems to be a general convergence upon this 
conclusion. 
Yet beside the ecologists' talk of being at one with nature comes an awareness 
of the artificiality of such claims: our self-knowledge makes "blending in" a forced 
condition. That same, unique level of consciousness, which fed in the first place what 
Freud called the megalomania of self-love, also made us rational enough to accept the 
decentrings. Similarly, there is something disingenuous about pretending to be entirely 
subject to unconscious forces or genetic constraints - it is the same sort of specious 
argument that sees defendants claiming their crimes were committed because of their 
genes; which is to say, consciousness of any such underlying determinism also cancels 
out much of its power to control us. 
There is doubtless an opportunity here to see literature as a site for exploring this 
disjunction between the twin legacies of culture and biology, of rationalism and 
genetics. I f science's progressive decentrings seem to be invalidating the traditional 
appeal to the centrality and importance of human life, this is only as a more general 
consequence of accepting the materialist view. That such a perspective increases our 
awareness of the importance of environmental conservation whilst simultaneously 
decreasing the importance of literary study points to a new and deeper tension between 
the two cultures. It is what Amis meant when he wrote of how the progress of 
cosmology entailed the decline of literature. The importance of human individuality has 
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been seen as a condition of possibility for the novel. By undermining human 
individuality, the sciences threaten to unbalance the conceptual foundations of literature. 
From this view, i f literary study risks becoming irrelevant in the face of an increasingly 
omniscient scientific community, it is not directly because of any uncivil, territorial 
hostility of the type recorded by Snow, but only as an indirect corollary of the 
decentrings science effects; that is, i f literature becomes irrelevant, it is because human 
life itself doesn't seem so important from the scientific perspective (or rather, the 
sciences have no rationale to support a claim for the special importance of human life). 
The humanities are - by definition - anthropocentric, at a time when this is shorthand 
for wrong, epistemologically and ethically.^^^ Against the spread of physics 
imperialism, there seems little hope for such defiantly anthropocentric disciplines as 
literary study; and i f acceptance into the academy of the future depends upon successful 
tessellation with the sciences, then it seems an obvious candidate for ejection. 
Dividing the disciplines in this way, by their respective adherence to forms of 
anthropocentrism, it is clear that here is that sharp break between the humanities and the 
sciences. The substance of the two-cultures arguments can be understood in this 
manner: at the most basic and fundamental level, the arts and sciences divide over the 
importance of human beings to the validity of their conclusions. The sciences do not 
require the existence of humans for their conclusions to hold, whereas without 
humanity, the humanities are prima facie inconceivable. This apparent independence 
from humanity is what the scientists mean by objective, and it is precisely what 
relativists like Rorty want to undercut when they redefine objective to mean consensus-
It is clear that this is precisely the association those disciplines currently fashioning themselves as the 
"Social Sciences" are trying to escape; a Social Science can produce claims potentially true for all social 
groups, humans being only an incidence of this field, and not its extension. 
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based (what the scientists would probably call inter-subjective).Seen like this, the 
conflict between science and literary study is a branch of this much wider conflict 
between those disciplines that revere (conscious) human achievement and those that 
revere (unconscious) natural processes (or, those disciplines which make a distinction 
between willed human action and spontaneous or natural processes: so there is room for 
the sciences to revere human achievement, but as a type of natural process, rather than 
as the autonomous achievement of a person to whom admiration could be sensibly 
directed).^'' This broader understanding perhaps explains why the subject of Snow's 
"Two Cultures" lecture has ballooned to involve so many disciplines in the debate. 
Thinking about the two-cultures arguments in terms of anthropocentrism does 
not, of course, answer all the questions at once, but it does suggest that the rift between 
the humanities and the sciences is deeper than a simple shift of methodology could 
repair, and it also helps us to understand what it was that was so unsatisfying about the 
accounts of fiction that the evolutionary psychologists and cognitive scientists had to 
offer. In contrast to these universally anti-intentional, mechanistic accounts, literary 
study offers us the type of explanation that acknowledges the individual author's 
intention and purpose - and it is in this ability that literary study can hope to maintain 
its place within the academy. 
It is also the central claim of most relativist positions that the sciences are equally dependant upon 
human perspectives, and any apparent independence from such perspectives is an illusion of there being 
no alternative viewpoint. Obviously, this objection appears to flounder upon the mathematical sciences, 
where internally consistent logic holds regardless of the symbols used or the language spoken. This 
difference between a mathematical axiom (which is true in virtue of the meaning of the terms used, or 
"analytic") and a scientific theory (which is true in virtue of an agreement with empirical data, or 
"synthetic") was probably the reason why Orwell chose "2 - H 2 = 5" (and not, say, "the speed of light is a 
constant") as the unthinkable proposition forced upon Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four (270; 290; 
303) 
^" That is, they admire the mechanism behind the action. So, whilst the art lover might make a comment 
such as: "What a wonderful artist Michelangelo was," the scientist may reply: "You are right, the human 
mind is indeed an amazing thing." It looks like consensus, but they are actually talking about quite 
different things. The scientist is interested in the mechanism and subsumes intention into that as a mere 
epiphenomenon of the mechanism, which is for him the really interesting thing, and was all along. 
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Literary study without a certain reverence for the conscious achievements of 
human minds doesn't make sense - something that became problematic for Jakobson's 
linguistic readings, and any similar account that seeks to relegate apparent acts of 
conscious will to unconscious, mechanical processes. This is also the substance of many 
of the grievances held against evolutionary psychology: if the behaviour can be 
explained in mechanistic, biological terms, then the intentional account of creativity 
becomes an adjunct and can be eliminated. Scientific understanding threatens to 
demystify and mechanise creativity. The objection to the interest of the sciences in 
artistic production is founded upon a fear that creativity will cede to just such a 
destructive mechanistic understanding. At the very least, assigning a function to art 
risks making art appear purely functional (a stimulus simulator, or whatever, tricking 
responses from our nervous system). 
Marginalising the conscious will of the author in favour of a behaviourist-style 
insistence on the autonomy of the text, and (which is really the same thing) emphasizing 
the importance of the unconscious mind to the creation of literature, was a critical 
strategy aimed at escaping charges of parasitism and the most effective way of making 
the study of literature look more like a scientific business. Emulation here trades on the 
idea that science is characterised by not asking questions of its object of study directly. 
This is the difference seen in how a psychiatrist might talk to someone who is thought 
to be insane and how he might talk to his colleagues: the doctor does not engage with 
the patient, disinterest means treating the subject as an object (or rather, it means 
treating everything as an object). Accordingly, the critic who wishes to be more 
scientific wil l seek to interpret the text (as object), and ignore the author (as subject). As 
was seen above, a criticism that doesn't care for what the author is trying to say ends up 
by missing out on many of the answers. Jakobson's meticulous poetry analyses never 
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did decide if the texts were also good poems, and deliberately never sought to ascertain 
what they meant. By retaining an approach that recognises intentionality, literary critics 
retain a niche in the academy. The problem for tessellation is that the same 
anthropocentrism that is anathema to the dominant sciences is both desirable and useful 
to criticism. 
This also goes some way to explaining the appeal of relativism to besieged 
scholars within literary study. Relativism (in the sense that is opposed to objective 
scientific knowledge) is deeply anthropocentric: everything is centred on the observer, 
everything filtered through his or her concerns, his or her ideology and observations. In 
this sense, relativism is a way to get back into the middle of things: it puts the observer, 
the individual, back in the middle of the universe, and legitimises again the focus on the 
individual. 
Frye's nostalgia for the geocentric universe of medieval times arises precisely 
because the Ptolemaic universe is so anthropocentric: it provides a cosmology that 
supports the importance of man, something literary study demands in order to escape 
from seeming irrelevant. What has replaced that universe is a place where free will is a 
plurality of determinisms, where man is another animal, a universe indifferent for the 
main part and positively hostile beyond earth's atmosphere. The "new" Copemican 
model invalidates not just those archaic structures Frye had hoped might organise 
literature, but also the very importance of writing stories in the first place. It seems 
difficult for a writer like Amis to square his belief in a universe obedient to scientific 
principles with the elevation of man necessary to sustain or justify the writing of a 
novel. (One wonders if this revised perspective has any bearing on Amis's most recent 
work, Koba the Dread [2002], a factual and sobering account of the horrors of the 
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Stalinist government.) Amis's concerns about the possibility of literary study after the 
decentrings are echoed here by Alan Sinfield: 
The collapse of Man has made the traditional project of EngUt absurd; it 
has become an edifice built over a void. So the students drift away, for if 
professional attainment is the only reason for studying literature, why not 
choose a more useful major - law, for instance? [Today's critics] are 
sustaining many of the old routines while knowing, really, that their 
validity has evaporated. That is why, very often, work is admired, not 
because it is right or useful (it may well be barely comprehensible), but 
because it is smart. (287) 
Of course, this is exactly what Rorty thinks literary study should be: his admiration for 
the "textualists" and his enthusiasm for reading philosophy as i f it were fiction is one 
way to deal with the displacement. Rorty's willingness to elide the boundary between 
substance and style is a tempting prospect; the linguistic turn is an about face from 
scientific materialism and the requirement to do materially useful things. 
If science does pose a threat to literary study, it is unlikely to be a 
methodological threat - nothing so direct as the hostile takeover that the radical 
reductionist wants to achieve - and it won't be a gradual takeover of the subject matter 
by disciplines such as evolutionary psychology and cognitive science, but it might 
conceivably occur as a secondary consequence of the growing acceptance of scientific 
materialism. It seems possible that the gradual absorption of the consequences of the 
decentrings might lead to scholars and writers questioning the ethical value of pursuing 
work in the humanities - but this is not a new worry, and concerns about the disutility 
of literary study have been active since its inception in the late nineteenth century (see, 
for example, the first chapter of Alvin Keman's The Death of Literature). Simply put. 
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literary study can retain disciplinary autonomy so long as it does work that the sciences 
cannot. 
The advantages of such an account are clear. It shows interdisciplinary 
hostilities to be misguided, and it removes the need to either scientise literature or to 
construct or borrow arguments that attempt to deny the effectiveness of scientific 
knowledge. The threat of excision from the academy is made more real when literary 
critics respond by siding with the constructivists and relativists. The denial of scientific 
knowledge is neither necessary nor is it sensible. As stressed repeatedly, the threat to 
literary studies from science's interest in literature - be that by evolutionary 
psychology, cognitive science, or even linguistics - can be neutralised by recognising 
that the shared subject matter does not entail a destructive interference so long as the 
purposes for which that subject matter is employed remain distinct. The threat posed by 
science is contingent on disciplinary identity being decided by subject matter. It has 
been a recurrent claim of this study that disciplinary autonomy is assured not by 
exclusive access to a unique subject matter, but by the particular approach that 
discipline takes toward its subject of study. 
There is a second level of threat here, first encountered with reference to 
Wilson's ConsiHence, and implicit in the claim from the radical reductionists that as 
physics is the discipline which studies the fundamental particles it is therefore the 
fundamental discipline, and that (ultimately) physics is sufficient to do the work 
currently done by the various other disciplines, both scientific and non-scientific. It is 
useful to make an analogy with the limits of linguistics here. To reiterate what was said 
with reference to the global claims of the Hnguists: whilst it is true that linguistics is that 
subject which studies written material, it is an invalid inference to conclude from this 
that linguistics is the only tool necessary for the interpretation of all written material (or 
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else linguistic readings of scientific texts would be sufficient). Likewise, it is invalid for 
the physicists to conclude that theirs is a comprehensive and satisfying account of the 
behaviour of all physical things. Physicists do physics when they look at atoms 
anywhere, but they do not by extension also do all those disciplines whose business also 
happens to rely upon the existence of atoms. 
It is not necessary to undermine science in order to champion literary study. The 
two cultures need not interfere destructively. Thinkers within the humanities can accept 
what science has to say, and still maintain disciplinary autonomy. On some level, that 
has been the central claim of this project. It is about the impossibility of challenging 
science without first being a scientist, and it is about the paucity of trying to do this, and 
it is about how literary study needn't either become a science or revert to relativism. It 
is possible to hold with scientific materialism and still believe in the validity of literary 
study, so long as literary study continues to offer answers to questions that the sciences 
have no access to. It is a peculiar injustice that attempts to scientise criticism by treating 
the texts objectively in the interests of emulating scientific practice actually make 
literary study seem not more relevant, but less. 
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